## Contents

Preface .......................................................... XIII

**KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS**

**WORKS**

February 1855-April 1856

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F. Engels</td>
<td>The Struggle in the Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels</td>
<td>Palmerston.—The Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>From Parliament.—Gladstone at the Dispatch-Box</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Lord Palmerston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Herbert's Re-election.—The First Measures of the New Ministry.—News from India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>The Coalition between Tories and Radicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>F. Engels</td>
<td>The War That Looms on Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels</td>
<td>Parliamentary and Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>On the New Ministerial Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Joseph Hume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Palmerston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>The British Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>Layard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>The Crisis in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>The Buying of Commissions.—News from Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>K. Marx</td>
<td>The English Press on the Late Tsar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title and Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>On the History of the French Alliance 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>The Committee of Inquiry 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>The Brussels Mémoire 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Ireland's Revenge 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The Results in the Crimea 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>Fate of the Great Adventurer 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels.</td>
<td>Criticism of the French Conduct of the War 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Agitation against Prussia.—A day of Fasting 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Reports from the English Press 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>From Parliament 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>Napoleon's Last Dodge 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>A Battle at Sevastopol 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Napoleon and Barbès.—The Newspaper Stamp 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>The Committee of Inquiry 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>The British Army 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>Progress of the War 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The Situation in the Crimea 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>A Scandal in the French Legislature.—Drouyn de Lhuys' Influence.—The State of the Militia 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Prospect in France and England 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>Napoleon's Apology 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The Siege of Sevastopol 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>Germany and Pan-Slavism 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The European Struggle 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>On the History of Political Agitation 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>From Sevastopol 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Pianori.—Dissatisfaction with Austria 177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The New Move in the Crimea 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td><em>The Morning Post</em> versus Prussia.—The Character of the Whigs and Tories 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>A Sitting of the House of Lords 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>The Agitation Outside Parliament 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>Questions of Finance 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>F. Engels.</td>
<td>The Crimean War 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>K. Marx.</td>
<td>On the Reform Movement 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>K. Marx. A Critique of the Crimean Affair.—From Parliament</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>F. Engels. The New French Commander</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels. Prologue at Lord Palmerston’s.—Course of the</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latest Events in the Crimea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>K. Marx. Parliamentary Reform.—The Break-off and Continuation of the</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna Conference.—The So-Called War of Annihilation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>K. Marx. Disraeli’s Motion</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>K. Marx. From Parliament</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>K. Marx. The Association for Administrative Reform.—People’s Charter</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>K. Marx. Parliamentary</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>F. Engels. From the Crimea</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>F. Engels. A Critique of the Events in the Crimea</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>K. Marx. The Great Parliamentary Debate</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>F. Engels. Sevastopol</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>F. Engels. Napoleon’s War Plans</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>K. Marx. Napier’s Letters.—Roebuck’s Committee</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels. The Debate on Layard’s Motion.—The War in the</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>K. Marx. Prince Albert’s Toast.—The Stamp Duty on Newspapers</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>K. Marx. Eccentricities of Politics</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels. The Local War.—Debate on Administrative</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform.—Report of the Roebuck Committee, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>K. Marx. Announcement Concerning the Taking of Sevastopol.—From the</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paris Bourse.—On the Massacre at Hangö in the House of Lords</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>K. Marx. The Mishap of June 18.—Reinforcements</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>K. Marx. Anti-Church Movement.—Demonstration in Hyde Park</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>K. Marx. Miscellaneous Reports</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>F. Engels. From Sevastopol</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>K. Marx. Miscellaneous Reports</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>K. Marx. Agitation over the Tightening-up of Sunday Observance</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>F. Engels. The Late Repulse of the Allies</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>K. Marx and F. Engels. Clashes between the Police and the People.—</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Events in the Crimea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
81. K. Marx. From Parliament.—Roebuck’s and Bulwer’s Motions .......................................................... 337
82. K. Marx. From the Houses of Parliament.—Bulwer’s Motion.—The Irish Question .......................... 340
83. F. Engels. The Great Crimean Blunder .......................................................... 344
84. K. Marx and F. Engels. Russell’s Resignation.—The Events in the Crimea ........................................... 348
85. K. Marx. Russell’s Dismissal .......................................................... 352
86. K. Marx. From Parliament .......................................................... 355
87. F. Engels. War Prospects .......................................................... 358
88. K. Marx and F. Engels. From Parliament.—From the Theatre of War .................................................. 363
89. K. Marx. Palmerston.—The Physiology of the Ruling Class of Great Britain .................................... 367
90. K. Marx. Lord John Russell .......................................................... 371
91. K. Marx. The Late Birmingham Conference .......................................................... 394
92. F. Engels. The Armies of Europe .......................................................... 401
93. K. Marx. General Simpson’s Resignation.—From Parliament .......................................................... 470
94. K. Marx. Commentary on the Parliamentary Proceedings .......................................................... 472
95. K. Marx. The Military Forces against Russia .......................................................... 476
96. K. Marx. The Poland Meeting .......................................................... 477
97. K. Marx. On the Critique of Austrian Policy in the Crimean Campaign ............................................ 481
98. K. Marx and F. Engels. The Anglo-French War against Russia .......................................................... 484
99. K. Marx. Events at the Theatres of War .......................................................... 490
100. K. Marx. Napier’s Letter .......................................................... 493
101. K. Marx. Austria and the War .......................................................... 495
102. K. Marx and F. Engels. The Punishment of the Ranks .......................................................... 501
103. F. Engels. The Battle of the Chernaya .......................................................... 504
104. K. Marx. Another British Revelation .......................................................... 513
105. F. Engels. The Fall of Sevastopol .......................................................... 519
106. K. Marx. O’Connor’s Funeral .......................................................... 524
107. F. Engels. Crimean Prospects .......................................................... 525
108. K. Marx and F. Engels. Events in the Crimea .......................................................... 531
109. K. Marx. The Commercial and Financial Situation .......................................................... 534
110. F. Engels. The State of the War .......................................................... 537
111. K. Marx and F. Engels. The Reports of Generals Simpson, Pélissier and Niel ................................ 542
112. F. Engels. The Great Event of the War .......................................................... 546
113.  K. Marx. A Diplomatic Impropriety ........................................ 553
115.  K. Marx. The Bank of France.—Reinforcements to the
        Crimea.—The New Field Marshals ..................................... 557
116.  K. Marx. The Committee at Newcastle-upon-Tyne ...................... 560
117.  F. Engels. Progress of the War ............................................. 563
118.  F. Engels. Aspects of the War .............................................. 569
119.  F. Engels. The Russian Army ................................................ 575
120.  K. Marx. Big Meeting in Support of Political Refugees .............. 581
121.  K. Marx. Traditional English Policy ....................................... 584
122.  F. Engels. The War in Asia .................................................. 588
123.  F. Engels. The European War ............................................... 595
124.  K. Marx. The American Difficulty.—Affairs of France ............. 599
125.  K. Marx. The Fall of Kars ................................................... 605
126.  K. Marx. The France of Bonaparte the Little ......................... 615
127.  K. Marx. The Fall of Kars ................................................... 621
        Delivered in London, April 14, 1856 .................................. 655
129.  K. Marx. Prussia ............................................................... 657
130.  K. Marx. The House of Lords and the Duke of York’s
        Monument ........................................................................ 662
131.  K. Marx. To the Editor of The Free Press ............................... 672
132.  K. Marx. Kars Papers Curiosities .......................................... 673

FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS

133.  F. Engels. Crimean War .......................................................... 685

APPENDICES

134. Austria’s Weakness ................................................................. 689
135. Progress of the War ................................................................. 694

NOTES AND INDEXES

Notes ............................................................................................ 705
Name Index .................................................................................... 764
Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature .................................. 795
Index of Periodicals ...................................................................... 816
Subject Index ............................................................................... 820
Glossary of Geographical Names ................................................ 832
ILLUSTRATIONS

Crimean War 1853-56. The Crimean Theatre .............................................. 204-05
Crimean War 1853-56. The siege of Sevastopol ........................................... 330-31
Chart of the Battle of the Chernaya (August 16, 1855) made by Engels ................................................................. 505
Crimean War 1853-56. The general course of war ....................................... 598-99
Fragment of the first page of Marx's notes for his articles on the fall of Kars ........................................................................ 607
Engels' summary "Crimean War" ..................................................................... 683
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Preface

Volume 14 of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels contains articles and newspaper reports written between February 9, 1855 and April 25, 1856. Most of these items were published in the American newspaper the *New-York Daily Tribune* (and often reprinted in its special issues—the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*), and also in the German democratic newspaper, the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*. As in previous years some items were published in the Chartist weekly *The People's Paper*. In the spring of 1856 Marx began to write occasionally for periodicals published by David Urquhart and his supporters—*The Free Press* (London) and *The Sheffield Free Press*.

Writing for the comparatively progressive bourgeois press was the only effective means available to Marx and Engels at that time to communicate with a mass readership, and to influence public opinion in favour of proletarian communist ideas. Since a properly working-class and revolutionary democratic press was still so weak, they attached great importance to this channel of communication. The possibility of addressing the German reader through the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, the most radical of all the newspapers that remained in Germany in the mid-1850s, was particularly important. Marx wrote for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* from December 1854 (the relevant section of his articles for this newspaper is published in Volume 13 of the present edition) until November 1855, when due to serious financial difficulties and pressure from the censorship the editorial board was compelled to reduce the number of foreign correspondents and later to cease publication of the newspaper entirely. He also sent to the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* military reviews written at his request by Engels for the *New-York Daily Tribune*, translating them
into German and often shortening them and adapting them to the requirements of the German reader. In a number of cases Marx included the texts of the military reviews in his own contributions, supplementing them with other material (reviews of international and domestic events, parliamentary debates, etc.).

The editorial board of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* printed the material Marx sent them in its authentic form. On the other hand, the interference of the *New-York Tribune* editors with the text of articles by Marx and Engels, including arbitrary cuts and insertion of passages which contradicted the original content, became particularly frequent during this period. Thus, Marx’s pamphlet *Lord John Russell* was published in the *Tribune* in an abridged form, one of Engels’ articles on Pan-Slavism was arbitrarily revised, and many articles were supplemented with introductory, and sometimes also concluding, paragraphs to give them the appearance of having been written in the United States of Northern America (all these cases of editorial interference are indicated in the notes). Eventually the editorial board of the *Tribune* ceased almost entirely publishing articles by Marx under his name, printing them instead in the form of its own editorials. Although angered by such cavalier treatment, Marx and Engels nevertheless continued to write for the *Tribune*. They could not renounce the opportunity of contributing to this widely circulated newspaper, read not only in America but also in Europe.

The present volume is largely a continuation of Volumes 12 and 13 of the present edition. Among the numerous events which attracted the attention of Marx and Engels in 1855 and early 1856, the central place was still held by the Crimean War, which had entered its final stage and was accompanied, as in the preceding stages, by a bitter diplomatic struggle. They continued to analyse in their articles the economic condition of the European countries—England in particular—the domestic and foreign policy of the ruling classes, the state of the working-class and democratic movements, and the prospects for their development.

Marx’s and Engels’ journalistic activity in this period was also closely intertwined with their theoretical researches, in particular, with Marx’s studies in both political economy and foreign policy and diplomacy, and Engels’ in military science, the history of the Slavonic peoples, and linguistics. At the same time, through their journalistic activities they accumulated new facts and observations which were then generalised in their scientific writings. Thus, the material Engels used in his regular reports on the Crimean War
was summarised by him in important works on military theory, like his series of articles, *The Armies of Europe* written for the American journal *Putnam's Monthly* and published in the present volume. Reports by factory inspectors and information on agrarian relations in Ireland, quoted in Marx's articles for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, were later incorporated by him in *Capital*.

Marx's and Engels' journalistic work played an important part in crystallising their sociological views. By analysing current events in their articles, they acquired an increasingly profound understanding of the interconnection between historical processes, the laws of social development and class struggle. This is well illustrated by the contents of the present volume. Its articles and reports present a broad panorama of European social and political life during the mid-1850s against the background of continuing political reaction. They give a clear idea of the class structure of society at that time, the domestic and international conflicts of the day, the characteristic features of the state and its various forms, the position of the political parties, of various organs of the press as their ideological mouthpieces, and the customs and morals of the ruling classes. Serious attention is devoted in these articles to the working-class and national liberation movements.

The main aim of Marx's and Engels' journalistic writings during this period, as in previous years, was to provide the theoretical basis for the strategy and tactics of proletarian revolutionaries on cardinal questions of domestic and international policy, taking into account that in a large part of Europe the transition from the feudal system to capitalism had by no means been completed. The over-riding task was to effect the abolition of the vestiges of feudalism, the unification of politically divided countries, the liberation of oppressed nationalities. And this meant the revolutionary overthrow of the counter-revolutionary regimes which stood in the way of these transformations, and principally the Austrian, Prussian and Russian monarchies, the Bonapartist Second Empire, and the British bourgeois-aristocratic oligarchy. This was the way, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, to prepare for the working class winning political power in the capitalist countries.

The revolutionary approach to current events is seen clearly in those articles by Marx and Engels in which they continued to analyse the causes of the outbreak and the true character of the Crimean War. The final stage of the war confirmed the conclusions of their previous articles and reports, during the period when the conflict between the European powers was
coming to a head, and in the early stages of the military operations against Russia by the Anglo-Franco-Turkish coalition, which was later joined by Piedmont. Marx and Engels became even more firmly convinced of the falseness of the official attitude of the West European governments and press, which was that the war of England and France against Russia was being waged in the “national interest” to defend “freedom” and “civilisation” against the encroachments of “despotism”. They showed convincingly in their articles that the war was the result of a clash of economic and military interests of the ruling classes of the states engaged in it—the struggle for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and for dominion in the Balkans and the Black Sea straits. Marx and Engels came to the conclusion that the counter-revolutionary standpoint and class self-interest of the West European bourgeoisie made it increasingly incapable of expressing and defending any national interests. “As soon as the effects of the war should become taxable upon their pockets,” Marx wrote in the article “Prospect in France and England”, “mercantile sense was sure to overcome national pride, and the loss of immediate individual profits was sure to outweigh the certainty of losing, gradually, great national advantages” (see this volume, p. 143).

Marx and Engels concluded that bourgeois-aristocratic England and Bonapartist France, while striving to weaken Tsarist Russia as a rival in the Near East and the Balkans, to capture Sevastopol, to take the Crimea and the Caucasus away from Russia, and to destroy the Russian navy, had no interest whatever in the collapse of Tsarism. The conservative forces in Europe, headed by the governments of the West European states, needed the Tsarist autocracy as an instrument for repressing popular movements and so as one of the bulwarks of the system of capitalist exploitation. Above all, Western politicians feared the revolutionary consequences of the collapse of the Russian autocracy, which would lead to the destruction of the foundation of the political system in Europe laid down by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Crimean War, Marx stressed in the article “Eccentricities of Politics”, “is undertaken with a view not to supersede but rather to consolidate the Treaty of Vienna by the introduction, in a supplementary way, of Turkey into the protocols of 1815. Then it is expected the conservative millennium will dawn and the aggregate force of the Governments be allowed to direct itself exclusively to the ‘tranquillization’ of the European mind” (see this volume, p. 284).
In the articles “From Parliament”, “Napoleon’s War Plans”, “The Debate on Layard’s Motion.—The War in the Crimea”, “The Local War.—Debate on Administrative Reform.—Report of the Roebuck Committee” and others Marx and Engels showed that these counter-revolutionary aspirations of the ruling circles in Britain and France had left a profound imprint on their diplomacy, military plans and methods of warfare. Seeking to avoid any revolutionary consequences, the Allied states had launched military operations in one of Russia’s outlying areas, away from the possible centres of the revolutionary and national liberation struggle. Marx and Engels revealed the hided purpose behind the plan of “local war for local objects” put forward by the French Government and supported by the British Government (see this volume, p. 272). They showed that this strategy was by no means prompted by the desire to reduce the number of casualties and scale of destruction. The “local” Crimean War had inflicted enormous losses and bitter tribulations on the armies and peoples of the belligerents. The Anglo-French strategic plan was aimed at preventing the Crimean War from turning into a war of the peoples against Tsarism, a war which would have threatened the very existence of the anti-democratic system of government in Western Europe.

To change the character of the war, and turn it into a war for the democratic reconstruction of Europe and the liberation of the oppressed nationalities, including the peoples of the Balkans who were under Turkish rule, depended on the level of activity of the proletarian and revolutionary-democratic masses. In place of anti-popular governments, Marx wrote, “other powers must step on to the stage” (see this volume, p. 289). In the articles “The Crisis in England”, “Prospect in France and England” and others, Marx and Engels continued to show the working class and the revolutionary democrats how advantage could be taken of the military conflict to develop the movement against the existing counter-revolutionary regimes. Marx hoped that a revolutionary turn of events would “enable the proletarian class to resume that position which they lost, in France, by the battle of June, 1848, and that not only as far as France is concerned, but for all Central Europe, England included” (see this volume, p. 145).

Marx and Engels placed special hopes on the initiative of the French working class. In the article “Fate of the Great Adventurer” Engels wrote openly about the possibility of “the fourth and greatest French revolution” capable of producing an outbreak of powerful revolutionary and national liberation movements all
over the continent of Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Italians, Croats are loosened from the forced bond which ties them together, and instead of the undetermined and haphazard alliances and antagonisms of today, Europe will again be divided into two great camps with distinct banners and new issues. Then the struggle will be only between the Democratic Revolution on one side and the Monarchical Counter-Revolution on the other" (see this volume, p. 89).

The idea that the way out of the war lay in a popular revolution was the theme running through many articles by Marx and Engels. They sought to show the real instability not only of the domestic, but also of the foreign-policy positions of the counter-revolutionary ruling circles, the contradictions between them in the international arena, and the vulnerability of their diplomacy.

In particular, Marx and Engels revealed deep splits in the coalition of the European powers opposing Tsarist Russia. They noted the constant friction between its main participants, Britain and France, both in the conduct of military operations and in diplomatic talks (see the articles "Some Observations on the History of the French Alliance", "A Critique of the Crimean Affair.—From Parliament", "From the Crimea", "Another British Revelation", "The Reports of Generals Simpson, Pélissier and Niel", "The American Difficulty.—Affairs of France" and others). The collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance predicted by them soon took place, during the Congress of Paris in 1856, at which Russian diplomacy skilfully exploited the differences between the Western powers.

Marx's article "Palmerston.—The Physiology of the Ruling Class of Great Britain", his pamphlet The Fall of Kars and Engels’ military review “The War in Asia” revealed the colonialisit aims underlying the policies of the Western powers, and their treachery in relation to their junior coalition partner—Turkey. Taking advantage of Turkey's backwardness, Marx noted, the governments of Britain and France, under the guise of defending the unity of the collapsing Ottoman Empire, had taken a new step towards its colonial subjection. They had set up effective control over its foreign policy, intervened in its internal affairs, and were laying a hand on Turkish finances (see this volume, p. 368). In The Fall of Kars, which has survived in several versions, Marx showed on the basis of facts and diplomatic material how frequently the Western statesmen—the British, in particular—took decisions concerning Turkey behind the back of the Turkish Government, using the weak Turkish army at
their discretion and exposing it to attack. The moves of Western diplomacy in relation to the Ottoman Empire, Marx noted, constituted a web of intrigue and provocation aimed at using Turkey as small change in the diplomatic game of the great powers and increasing even more its dependence on the West.

A number of articles in the present volume ("The European War" and others) were written by Marx and Engels when the outcome of the Crimean War was already predetermined. They could already sum it up to a certain extent: "The Anglo-French war against Russia will undoubtedly always figure in military history as 'the incomprehensible war'. Big talk combined with minimal action, vast preparations and insignificant results, caution bordering on timidity, followed by the foolhardiness that is born of ignorance, generals who are more than mediocre coupled with troops who are more than brave, almost deliberate reverses on the heels of victories won through mistakes, armies ruined by negligence, then saved by the strangest of accidents—a grand ensemble of contradictions and inconsistencies. And this is nearly as much the distinguishing mark of the Russians as of their enemies" (see this volume, p. 484).

Marx's and Engels' hopes that the Crimean War would be turned into a war for revolutionary change in Europe were not realised. Apart from its influence on the internal development of Russia, it brought about no significant changes in the social and political structure of the European states. The question of the national independence of the peoples subject to the Ottoman Empire also remained unsolved. Nor did the war resolve the contradictions which existed between the European powers on the Eastern and other questions. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 not only failed to settle the points of dispute, but engendered new, even more bitter conflicts. Marx called it a "sham peace" (see this volume, p. 623).

Many of the journalistic works of Marx and Engels dealt with the effect of the war on the economic and social life in the main European countries. Participation in this large-scale military conflict, they noted, had put the existing anti-popular regimes to a serious test, which revealed their defects and inability to meet the new social requirements. War "puts a nation to the test", wrote Marx in the article "Another British Revelation". "As exposure to the atmosphere reduces all mummies to instant dissolution, so war passes
supreme judgment upon social organisations that have outlived their vitality” (see this volume, p. 516).

Marx’s main attention was devoted to capitalist Britain, where the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were more developed than in any other country at the time. In the articles “Questions of Finance”, “The Commercial and Financial Situation”, “The Crisis in England” and others, Marx analysed the state of the British economy. It provided, he stressed, a striking example of the operation of the general economic laws of capitalist society, in particular, the cyclical nature of capitalist production, the inevitable alternation of phases of prosperity and crisis. Marx showed that even within the limits of a given cycle the capitalist economy develops unevenly, in fits and starts, and is subject to the emergence of crisis phenomena. Thus, the period of economic prosperity which began at the end of the 1840s was repeatedly interrupted by stagnation in certain branches of industry and commerce in England, particularly in the textile industry. Marx noted an economic decline in late 1853 and early 1854 and another one in 1855. Analysing the tendencies which he had discovered in the economic life of Britain, and also on the world market, Marx predicted that in the near future Britain would undergo a more serious economic crisis than it had ever experienced before. This prediction was fully borne out in 1857, when the first world economic crisis broke out.

Marx’s articles “Palmerston”, “The British Constitution”, “The Morning Post versus Prussia.—The Character of the Whigs and Tories”, “The House of Lords and the Duke of York’s Monument” and a number of others contain an accurate description of Britain’s traditional two-party system under which power was held in turn by the Whigs and Tories. “The British Constitution,” Marx wrote, “is indeed nothing but an antiquated, obsolete, out-of-date compromise between the bourgeoisie, which rules not officially but in fact in all decisive spheres of civil society, and the landed aristocracy, which governs officially” (see this volume, p. 53).

One of the main supports of the regime of the bourgeois-aristocratic oligarchy, Marx pointed out, was the aristocracy’s monopoly of the key state offices. In many of his articles Marx showed that the oligarchical political system was an obstacle to the country’s progressive development. The debates held in both houses of Parliament on various questions, which Marx closely analysed, showed clearly enough what was the class essence of the British Parliament. He revealed the hypocrisy and cupidity of the representatives of both the main political groupings, the obstacles
they raised to the exposure of the scandalous abuses in the various
departments of the state machine and to progressive reforms.

An important contribution to his vivid description of the ruling
oligarchy was the pamphlet **Lord John Russell** (see this volume,
pp. 371-93). It provided an addition to Marx's gallery of portraits of
leading nineteenth-century British politicians. In this pamphlet
Marx showed that Russell's false, ostentatious liberalism, his political
wiliness and time-serving, were fully in keeping with the whole
character of the Whigs, that party of careerists who, like the Tories,
were striving to strengthen the oligarchical regime, but in doing so
showed greater flexibility and a readiness to make certain
concessions to the industrial bourgeoisie. The struggle between the
Whigs and Tories, Marx pointed out, was merely a quarrel between
the two ruling factions of the aristocratic upper crust of the
exploiting classes; the differences in their policies were becoming less
and less marked. Bitter attacks on the government by one or other
party when it was in opposition were a means of removing the rival
party from power. Once in power, however, each party continued to
follow the political course of its predecessor.

Marx discovered more and more signs of the political disintegration
of both the Whig and Tory parties, which he had noted when he
first began to write for the **Neue Oder-Zeitung** (see present edition,
Vol. 13). It was manifest in the bankruptcy of the political doctrines
of these old aristocratic parties, their division into separate
groupings, the increasing need to resort to manoeuvres and
parliamentary alliances. Political instability was giving rise to the
tendency to strengthen the personal power of the head of the
government, which Marx noted, in particular, in the policy of
Palmerston during the formation of his ministry in 1855 and in
following years. In the article “Palmerston” Marx drew attention to
the way in which this leader of the Right wing of the Whigs had
assured by skilful manoeuvring such a composition of his Cabinet as
left all the most important threads of government in his own hands.
“This time we have not a Cabinet at all, but Lord Palmerston in lieu
of a Cabinet” (see this volume, p. 50).

The phenomena detected by Marx reflected a process that had
begun under the influence of the drawing together of the interests of
industrial capital and of the landed aristocracy and the commercial
and financial magnates—the transformation of the Tories into the
party of the big bourgeoisie, the Conservatives, and of the Whigs,
around whom the middle and petty bourgeoisie were grouped, into
the Liberal party. The latter were soon joined by representatives of
the bourgeois opposition—the Free Traders.
In his articles of this period Marx continued his trenchant criticism of the ideology and political positions of the Free Traders, using them to expose the class limitations of bourgeois liberalism as a whole. He again showed the illusions of the Free Traders’ argument that capitalism could develop without crises, and exposed their hypocritical protestations about love of peace which concealed the striving of the British bourgeoisie to dominate the world market. The Manchester School, Marx stressed, was striving for peace “in order to wage industrial war at home and abroad” (see this volume, p. 258). Cobden, Bright and the other leaders of the Free Traders, he pointed out, while proclaiming themselves “champions of liberty” and “defenders” of the interests of the masses, in fact supported the cruel exploitation of the working class. Evidence of this was their encroachments on the institution of factory inspectors, who to a certain extent restrained the arbitrariness of employers, and their attempts to repeal the laws which limited the working day for women and children.

In contrast to the false statements of the Free Traders about the “prosperity” of the English workers, Marx made use of reports by factory inspectors to show the terrible working conditions at capitalist factories and the constant growth in the number of industrial accidents, particularly among women and children. “The industrial bulletin of the factory inspectors,” he wrote, “is more terrible and more appalling than any of the war bulletins from the Crimea. Women and children provide a regular and sizeable contingent in the list of the wounded and killed” (see this volume, p. 370).

Bourgeois-aristocratic Britain was confronted by the working masses, first and foremost, the English industrial proletariat. Marx followed carefully every manifestation of discontent and revolutionary ferment among the masses both in Britain itself and in its colonies. Thus, in the article “The Buying of Commissions.—News from Australia” he noted that in the Australian state of Victoria resistance had been “initiated by the workers against the monopolists linked with the colonial bureaucracy” (see this volume, p. 65).

Marx, who never ceased to take an interest in the fate of the oppressed Irish people, regarded Ireland, which was the arena of bitter social antagonism, as one of the permanent centres of popular discontent (see the article “Ireland’s Revenge”).

Opposition tendencies among the various social strata in Britain, including the working class, were also being promoted by David Urquhart and his supporters, who, despite their conservative world outlook, criticised the foreign policy of the ruling oligarchy. Marx
continued to attack Urquhart’s views in the press. But nevertheless he thought it expedient to devote attention in his articles to the comparatively progressive activity of the committees on foreign affairs set up by Urquhart and his followers, which also included representatives of the workers (“The Late Birmingham Conference”, “The Committee at Newcastle-upon-Tyne”).

Marx’s main attention was directed to the English working-class movement—first and foremost, to the continuing attempts, despite the general decline of Chartism, of the leaders of its revolutionary wing to revive mass political agitation under the banner of the People’s Charter. In the articles “Anti-Church Movement.—Demonstration in Hyde Park”, “Clashes between the Police and the People.—The Events in the Crimea” Marx noted that the Chartists had succeeded in reviving to a certain extent the political activity of the working class, which found expression in mass popular demonstrations in London in the summer of 1855 against the parliamentary ban on Sunday trading. Marx praised the refusal of Ernest Jones and other Chartists to follow the lead of the bourgeois radicals, instead of which they continued to defend the independent positions of the working class and retain its political programme in full, in spite of the radicals’ intentions to replace the latter with “moderate” demands for administrative and other reforms.

In the article “The Association for Administrative Reform.—People’s Charter” Marx explained the historical significance of the Chartist programme, the central point of which was the demand for universal suffrage. Adopting a historical approach to political slogans, he showed that whereas in France and on the Continent in general the demand for universal suffrage did not extend beyond the framework of bourgeois democracy, it had a different significance in England. “There it is regarded as a political question and here, as a social one,” Marx noted. In England, where the working class constituted the majority of the population, he pointed out that the implementation of this and other points of the People’s Charter could lead to a radical democratic transformation of the whole parliamentary system and the country’s political structure by the proletarian masses, which would mean “the assumption of political power as a means of satisfying their social needs” (see this volume, pp. 242, 243). From these arguments it is clear that Marx at that time admitted the possibility of the English proletariat coming to power by peaceful means, unlike the countries on the Continent where, in his opinion, the working class could triumph only as a result of the forcible destruction of a military-bureaucratic state machine.
The Chartists' attempts to instil revolutionary energy in the English proletarian masses could not, however, arrest the decline of the Chartist movement, which was increasingly on the wane. This was due to the peculiarities of the development of British capitalism. The British bourgeoisie had succeeded by means of colonial conquests and profits and monopolies on the world market in chaining a significant section of the higher-paid skilled workers to the capitalist system, thereby splitting the working class and strengthening reformist tendencies in the British working-class movement. Nevertheless right up to the end Marx never tired of encouraging his Chartist friends and urging them not to give way to difficulties and to keep faith in the coming proletarian revolution.

On April 14, 1856 at a banquet in honour of the fourth anniversary of the publication of *The People’s Paper* Marx delivered a speech full of revolutionary optimism. He spoke of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and the world historic mission of the working class as the social force called upon to overthrow the exploiting system. “History is the judge—its executioner, the proletarian” (see this volume, p. 656).

Continuing to regard the struggle against Bonapartism as one of the most important tasks of the working class and revolutionary democracy, Marx and Engels sought to expose in their articles the close connection between the Bonapartist state’s foreign and domestic policy. “It would be easy to demonstrate,” we read in the article “Criticism of the French Conduct of the War” by Marx and Engels, “that the pretentious mediocrity with which the Second Empire is conducting this war is reflected in its internal administration, that here, too, semblance has taken the place of essence, and that the ‘economic’ campaigns were in no way any more successful than the military ones” (see this volume, p. 93). In this article, and also in the articles “Fate of the Great Adventurer”, “Napoleon’s Last Dodge”, “The Local War.—Debate on Administrative Reform.—Report of the Roebuck Committee”, “The American Difficulty.—Affairs of France” and others, Marx and Engels stressed that military adventurism was an intrinsic feature of Bonapartist policy, that conquest and aggression were one of the principles on which the political rule of the Bonapartist circles in France itself rested.

Marx’s article “The France of Bonaparte the Little” revealed the glaring contrast between official France, which was recklessly squandering the nation’s wealth, and the France of the people, to whom the Bonapartist regime had brought poverty and police
repression. In the heart of this France of the people, Marx emphasised, revolutionary ferment was maturing against the Bonapartist dictatorship, which betokened "the downfall of the Empire of Agio" (see this volume, p. 620). In the articles "The Reports of Generals Simpson, Péllisier and Niel" and "The Bank of France.—Reinforcements to the Crimea.—The New Field-Marshals", Marx and Engels noted the deterioration of the political situation in France, drawing attention to the signs of growth in the revolutionary mood of the working class, the students and other strata of the population, and to the discontent displayed by a certain section of the bourgeoisie and even of the army, which had up till then served as a bulwark of the Second Empire.

Marx and Engels continued to analyse in the press the events in Prussia, Austria and Tsarist Russia. The Crimean War had exposed the profound contradictions between these states and at the same time confirmed the common counter-revolutionary aims of their ruling circles, united by the attempt to preserve intact the reactionary systems within each of these countries and the corresponding pattern of international relations. Thus, as Marx repeatedly pointed out, the neutrality in the war proclaimed by the Prussian Government was dictated by fear of the revolutionary consequences of transferring the theatre of military operations to Central Europe. In the article "Prussia", Marx dealt with the political system of the Prussian monarchy, in which the formally proclaimed constitution served merely as a cover for the continuation of absolutism and its product— an all-powerful bureaucracy. He notes the lack of rights of the majority of the population, the oppression of the peasantry which remained, as before, "under the direct yoke of the nobility", both administratively and judicially (see this volume, p. 661). At the same time Marx pointed to the rapid growth of industry and commerce, and the unprecedented wealth of the Prussian propertied classes—the Junkers and the bourgeoisie. But the latter remained, as always, politically passive and servile, which confirmed the opinion expressed by Marx and Engels as early as 1848-49 that the German bourgeoisie was incapable of playing a leading role in the struggle for radical bourgeois-democratic demands.

As to the ruling circles in the Austrian Empire, they were striving to obtain Turkish possessions in Europe, and so adopted a hostile attitude towards Russia as their main rival in the Balkans. In his reports "On the Critique of Austrian Policy in the Crimean Campaign" and "Austria and the War" Marx quoted documents that revealed the duplicity of the Austrian government's foreign
policy. Marx and Engels saw the cause of this in the internal weakness of the reactionary Habsburg Empire, which stemmed not only from the backwardness of its social system, but also from profound national antagonisms. Reaping the fruits of the centuries-old oppression of the peoples who made up the Empire and fanning national enmity between them, the rulers of the Austrian Empire were in constant fear of an upsurge of the national liberation movements. It was these fears that held them back from open intervention in the military conflict.

Quoting information in their articles about the situation in Russia, Marx and Engels drew attention to the difficulties experienced by the Tsarist autocracy in the course of the war, the exhaustion of its material resources, which were in any case limited by the serf system and the economic backwardness it engendered (see Engels’ article “The State of the War” and other items). As Marx and Engels soon realised, the consequences of the Crimean War had a serious effect on the internal development of the Russian Empire. The defeat sustained by Tsarism, which showed, in the words of Lenin “the rottenness and impotence of feudal Russia” (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 17, p. 121), created the prerequisites for the maturing of a revolutionary situation in the country, which compelled the ruling classes to introduce reforms. “The Russian war of 1854-55,” Marx remarked in a letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, “...has ... obviously hastened the present turn of events in Russia” (see present edition, Vol. 40). Later, in 1871, in a draft of The Civil War in France Marx again emphasised the connection between the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861 and other transformations. The Crimean War revealed the profound crisis of the whole social and political system of Tsarist Russia, even though it had “saved its honour by the defence of Sevastopol and dazzled foreign states by its diplomatic triumphs in Paris”.

Marx and Engels continued throughout the final period of the war to point out that, despite numerous military defeats, Tsarist despotism still represented a serious threat to the European working-class and democratic movement. As one might have expected, they remarked, the changes on the Tsarist throne did not lead to any substantial changes in the foreign policy of the Russian autocracy. Nicholas I’s successor Alexander II and his government did not renounce aggressive intentions—in particular, the attempts to exploit Pan-Slavist propaganda as an instrument of aggrandizement.

Engels’ article “Germany and Pan-Slavism”, together with its English versions, “The European Struggle” and “Austria’s Weak-
ness", showed how reactionary were current Pan-Slavist ideas, and Alexander II's Pan-Slavist sentiments. The dissemination of these ideas by the monarchical elements of certain Slavonic national movements, Engels noted, played into the hands of the Habsburg monarchy and Russian Tsarism in their struggle against the revolution in Germany and Hungary in 1848-49.

Marx and Engels resolutely attacked all nationalistic ideology, whatever form it took, whether Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, or any other form. They stressed that this ideology fanned national differences, that it was deeply alien to the interests of democratic development and the national and social liberation of all peoples, including the Slav peoples.

In his polemic with Pan-Slavism, however, Engels repeated certain theses which have not been borne out by history, about the alleged loss by a number of Slav peoples who formed part of the Austrian Empire (Czechs, Slovaks, and others) of the ability to lead an independent national existence—theses which were expressed by him earlier in the works "Democratic Pan-Slavism" and Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany (on this see the prefaces to Volumes 8 and 11 of the present edition). The process of social development, which up to the 1860s was dominated by tendencies towards centralisation, the creation of large states, had not yet provided sufficient objective evidence for revising this mistaken view. It was only subsequently that another historical tendency manifested itself fully, namely, the striving of oppressed small peoples, including the Slav peoples of the Austrian Empire, for national independence, and their ability not only to create their own states but also to march in the van of social progress.

The present volume contains a large number of military articles by Engels, who regularly analysed the whole course of the Crimean War, and also his military survey The Armies of Europe. These works constitute an important part of his studies on military theory.

Although based on contemporary reports primarily in the English and French press, which contained many omissions and inaccuracies, Engels' military reviews show great insight and a profound understanding of the nature of the military operations in the various theatres of the war—the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Baltic—and of the decisive role of the siege and defence of Sevastopol in the overall course of the military operations, which by then had reached culmination point. Engels found increasing confirmation in the development of the military events of his basic propositions on the theory of warfare, the dependence of warfare on the social and
political system, the interconnection between military strategy and
the policy of the ruling classes, and the influence of the general state
of the organisation of the armed forces on the mode of waging war.
He held that the organisation of the army was an integral part of the
system of state administration and reflected its characteristic class
features.

Thus in the articles “The Struggle in the Crimea”, “The War
that Looms on Europe”, “The Punishment of the Ranks” and
others Engels shows the connection between the crude blunders of
the British military command, the wretched state of the British
expeditionary forces and the conservatism of the British military
system as such. He noted the routine nature of the organisation of
the British army, the caste spirit and favouritism that prevailed in
the War Office, the quartermaster service and the officer corps,
the practice of selling commissions and other defects engendered
by the oligarchical political regime. The article “The Reports of
Generals Simpson, Pelissier and Niel” by Marx and Engels states
openly that “the miserable leadership of the British Army is the
inevitable result of rule by the antiquated oligarchy” (this volume,
p. 542).

In many articles Engels points to the pernicious consequences for
the French and Allied armed forces of interference by the ruling
clique of the Second Empire and Emperor Napoleon III himself in
the conduct of military operations, and also of the effect of the
counter-revolutionary aims for which the Bonapartist circles sought
to use the army. Under pressure from Paris the operations by the
Allied troops were often determined not by military, but by totally
unrelated political and dynastic considerations (see the article “From
Sevastopol” and others).

Describing the armed forces of Tsarist Russia, in the article “The
Russian Army”, the relevant section of The Armies of Europe and in
other works, Engels noted the weakness of the economic base and
the archaic nature of the social base of the Tsarist military system.
The technological backwardness of the Tsarist army, he emphasised,
the almost total absence of modern means of transport, the
old-fashioned methods of recruiting and training troops, the
substitution of parade-ground drilling for proper military training,
the length of military service, the corruption and embezzlement of
public funds in the military and civilian administration—all this
was the product of the social and political order of the Russia of
autocracy and serfdom.

At the same time Engels constantly emphasised the military
qualities of the rank and file participants in the armed struggle. He
paid tribute to the initiative and élan of the French officers and men, and the stamina and resolve of the English in battle. He invariably spoke with respect of the traditional courage of the Russian soldier. “The Russian soldier is one of the bravest men in Europe”, he wrote in *The Armies of Europe* (see this volume, p. 444).

However, the description of the Russian army which Engels gave in these and other works, for all the aptness of his assessment of the state of the army in the Russia of serfdom, was influenced by his sources of information at that time, the anti-Russian bias of the West European press and the tendentious works of Western historians. This, and to a certain extent also the political slant of his articles against Russian Tsarism, explains the presence in his works at that time of certain exaggerations and one-sided opinions, which he revised to a large extent in his later works (*Po and Rhine*, see this edition, Volume 16, and others). Such opinions include, in particular, his statements on the passivity of Russian soldiers, the special role of foreigners in the Russian army due to a lack of native talent, and that Russia in the past had triumphed only over weak opponents and suffered defeat from those equal to it in strength.

It must be said, however, that even though he possessed biased information, Engels assessed the operations of the belligerent powers objectively in the overwhelming majority of cases. This is demonstrated most strikingly by his many articles on the heroic eleven-month defence of Sevastopol by Russian troops. In the articles “The Siege of Sevastopol”, “A Battle at Sevastopol” and others, the brilliant operations of the defenders, the skill of the military engineers of the Sevastopol garrison, including the head of the engineering service Todtleben, and the excellent arrangement of the line of fire are contrasted by Engels with the Allied siege operations. He rates the latter very low, emphasising that “not a single siege can be shown in the annals of war, since that of Troy, carried on with such a degree of incoherence and stupidity” (see this volume, p. 155).

Noting the heroism and military fervour of the defenders of the Russian fortress, Engels praised their successful sorties in which they acted “with great skill combined with their usual tenacity” (see this volume, p. 116). He regarded as unprecedented in the history of warfare the creation by the besieged garrison during the defence of new fortifications which they set up in front of the first line, and commented most favourably on the Russians’ use of a tiered arrangement of batteries which enabled them to make good use of the terrain.
In the article "Progress of the War" Engels sums up his assessments of the operations by the organisers of and participants in the defence of Sevastopol as follows. "The justness and rapidity of glance—the promptness, boldness, and faultlessness of execution, which the Russian engineers have shown in throwing up their lines around Sevastopol—the indefatigable attention with which every weak point was protected as soon as discovered by the enemy—the excellent arrangement of the line of fire, so as to concentrate a force, superior to that of the besiegers, upon any given point of the ground in front—the preparation of a second, third and fourth line of fortifications in rear of the first—in short, the whole conduct of this defense has been classic" (see this volume, pp. 134-35). Later Engels often returned to the analysis of the Sevastopol campaign (in his articles on the national liberation uprising in India of 1857-59 and in his "Notes on the War" in 1870-71), regarding it as an outstanding example of active defence.

The experience of the defence of Sevastopol enabled Engels to make important generalisations in his articles on the art of warfare, especially with respect to the significance of fortresses in nineteenth-century warfare and their use in conjunction with field armies. From his analysis of other battles of the Crimean War and its general lessons he drew conclusions concerning the advantages of an offensive strategy and the concentration of forces in inflicting the main blow on the enemy's principal groupings, and on the often ephemeral nature of the surprise factor in cases when the consolidation and development of successes achieved in such a way are not ensured by corresponding means, etc.

In short, Engels in his work The Armies of Europe gave a broad picture of the level of development of warfare and the state of the armed forces in the middle of the nineteenth century. He analysed the equipment, recruiting method and special tactics of the armies of the different states to show the operation in this sphere of the basic laws of social development. This was to apply the basic principles of historical materialism by showing how the fighting efficiency of an army is determined primarily by the economy and the social and political system of the given country. Thus Engels pointed out that in the Prussian army, for example, the promising principle of recruiting and training of troops by means of a comparatively short period of military service for all those capable of it was frustrated by the representatives of the reactionary political system in order to have a "disposable and reliable army to be used, in case of need, against disturbances at home" (see this volume, p. 433). Again, Engels stressed that the fanning of national strife characteristic of
the Habsburg monarchy was also reflected in the Austrian army and had an adverse effect on its fighting efficiency. Engels similarly noted the influence of the surviving feudal relations on the armies of Russia, Turkey and a number of other states. Stressing that the general laws of the evolution of the armed forces manifest themselves in each country in a specific form, Engels showed the importance of national characteristics and traditions in the development of each army. At the same time he pointed out that the general progress of military technology and improvements introduced into warfare induce each army to take into account and use the experience of all the others. An important place in his work is occupied by criticism of the nationalistic tendencies in the treatment of military history by the ruling classes, in particular, in the thesis about the invincibility of this or that army at all times.

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The present volume contains 135 works by Marx and Engels. Seventy-six of the articles are published in English for the first time (six of them have been published in English in part). These include the great majority of articles published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, among them versions of items in the New-York Daily Tribune which Marx adapted for the German newspaper, and also the rough draft of Engels' "Crimean War", which is included in the section "From the Preparatory Materials". Thirty-seven of the articles contained in the present volume have not been reproduced in English since their first publication in English and American newspapers. Previous English publications of individual articles by Marx and Engels, in particular in The Eastern Question, London, 1897, are indicated in the notes.

In the absence of Marx's notebook for this period with entries concerning the dispatching of items to New York, authorship of articles by Marx and Engels in the New-York Tribune, which were usually printed anonymously, has been established mainly on the basis of information contained in correspondence, simultaneous publication in the European and American press, and peculiarities of content and style. During preparation of the articles the date when they were written was checked and most of the sources used by the authors were established.

Discrepancies of substance between the versions of the articles published simultaneously in the New-York Daily Tribune and the
Neue Oder-Zeitung are indicated in the footnotes. The same applies to other parallel publications (in the New-York Daily Tribune and The People's Paper, Engels' work The Armies of Europe which was published in Putnam's Monthly and the extracts from it that were translated into German by Marx for the Neue Oder-Zeitung, and other items). When the versions differ considerably, their texts are given in full. In quoting, Marx sometimes gives a free rendering rather than the exact words of the source. In the present edition quotations are given in the form in which they occur in Marx's text.

Misprints in quotations, proper names, geographical names, figures, dates, etc., discovered during the preparation of the present volume have been corrected (usually silently) on the basis of the sources used by Marx and Engels.

In the case of newspaper articles without a title, or of a number of those which formed part of a series, a heading or number has been provided by the editors in square brackets.

The volume was compiled, the text prepared and the preface and notes written by Stanislav Nikonenko and edited by Lev Golman (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU). The name index, the index of periodicals and the glossary of geographical names were compiled by Natalia Martynova, the subject index by Marlen Arzumanov, and the index of quoted and mentioned literature by Yevgenia Dakhina (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU).

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The volume was prepared for the press by the editors Yelena Kalinina, Alla Varavitskaya and Lyudgarda Zubrilova (Progress Publishers).
Frederick Engels

THE STRUGGLE IN THE CRIMEA

Immediately after the battle of the Alma, and the march of the Allies on Balaklava, we expressed the opinion that the ultimate result of the Crimean campaign must depend on which of the contending parties should first bring up new forces sufficient to render it superior to its antagonist in numbers and efficiency. The aspect of affairs has, since then, greatly altered, and many illusions have been destroyed; but, throughout the whole time, both the Russians and the Allies have been engaged in a sort of steeple-chase at reinforcements, and, in this effort, we are compelled to say that the Russians have the advantage. In spite of all the boasted improvements in mechanical skill and the means of transport, three or five hundred miles of road are still far easier traversed by an army of Russian barbarians than two thousand miles of sea by an army of highly-civilized French and English—especially when the latter make it a point to neglect all the advantages which their high civilization places at their disposal, and when the Russian barbarians can afford to lose two men to the Allies' one, without impairing their ultimate superiority.

But what can be in store for the Allies when one of their armies—the British—despairing of being destroyed by the Russians, deliberately sets about destroying itself with a systematic consistency, an eagerness, and a success which beat all its former achievements in any line whatever? Yet such is the case. The British force, we are now informed, has ceased to exist as an army. There are a few thousand men left, under arms, out of 54,000,

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but they themselves are reported “fit for duty” merely because there is no hospital-room for them to die in. Of the French, some 50,000 may be still under arms, out of twice that number; and, at all events, they have managed to keep in a serviceable state at least five times as many, in proportion, as the British. But what are fifty or sixty thousand men to hold the Heracleatic Chersonese the winter through; to keep Sevastopol blockaded on the south side; to defend the trenches, and—what may be left of them—to take the offensive in spring?

For the present, the British have ceased to send reenforcements. In fact Raglan, despairing of his army, does not appear to wish for any, not knowing how to feed, house and employ even what is left to him. The French may be preparing a fresh set of divisions for embarkation in March, but they have plenty to do to prepare against the eventuality of a great continental spring campaign, and there are ten chances to one that what they send will either be too weak or come too late. To remedy this state of things two steps have been taken, both of which denote the utter helplessness of the Allies to avert the fate which seems inevitably, though slowly, to approach their armies in the Crimea. First, in order to redress the colossal blunder of having attempted this expedition four months too late, they commit the incommensurably greater blunder of sending to the Crimea, four months after their own arrival, and in the depth of winter, the only remnant of a decent army which Turkey still possesses. That army which was already being ruined and dissolving itself at Shumla under the neglect, incapacity and corruption of the Turkish Government, once landed in the Crimea, will melt away, by cold and hunger, at a ratio which will put to the blush even the achievements of the English War-Office in this branch—that is, if the Russians have the sense to leave the Turks, for a time, to themselves, without attacking them. If the weather permits an attack they will be destroyed at once, though at a greater cost to the Russians, and with hardly any advantage, except a moral one.

Then the Allies have taken into their pay—for that is the only way to express it—fifteen to twenty thousand Piedmontese,3 who are to fill up the thinned ranks of the British army, and to be fed by the British Commissariat. The Piedmontese showed themselves brave and good soldiers in 1848 and ’49. Being mostly mountaineers, they possess an infantry which, for skirmishing and fighting in broken ground, is naturally adapted in even a higher degree than the French, while the plains of the Po furnish cavalry soldiers whose tall, well-proportioned stature reminds one of the
crack regiments of British horse. They have, besides, not passed through the severe campaigns of the revolution without profit. There is no doubt that these two Piedmontese divisions will turn out as good a "foreign legion" as will figure in this war. But what are these light-footed, agile, handy little fellows to do under the command of an old British martinet, a who has no idea of maneuvering, and who expects nothing from his soldiers but the dogged stubbornness which is the glory and at the same time the only military quality of the British soldier? They will be placed in positions unsuited to their mode of fighting; they will be prevented from doing what they are fit for, while they will be expected to do things which no sensible man would ever set them to. To lead a British army in that senseless, point-blank, stupid way to the slaughter-house, as was done at the Alma, may be the shortest way to make them settle the business before them. The old Duke b generally took matters quite as easy. German troops may be made to do the same thing, although the high military education of German officers will not stand such want of generalship in the long run. But to attempt such things with a French, Italian or Spanish army—with troops essentially fitted for light-infantry duty, for maneuvering, for taking advantage of the ground—with troops whose efficiency, in a great measure, is made up by the agility and quick glance of every individual soldier—such a clumsy system of warfare will never do. The poor Piedmontese, however, will probably be spared the trial of fighting in the English way. They are to be fed by that notorious body, the British Commissariat, which could never feed anybody but themselves. Thus they will share the fate of the fresh arrivals of British troops. Like them, they will die at the rate of a hundred a week, and furnish three times that number to the hospitals. If Lord Raglan thinks that the Piedmontese will stand his and his Commissaries' incapacity as quietly as the British troops, he will find himself sadly mistaken. There are none but British and Russians who would remain in submission under such circumstances; and, we must say, it is not to the credit of their national character.

The probable development of this melancholy campaign—as melancholy and bleak as the muddy plateau of Sevastopol—will be this: The Russians, when fully concentrated, and when the weather permits, will probably attack the Turks of Omer Pasha

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a Raglan.— Ed.
b Wellington.— Ed.
first. This is expected by British, French and Turks, so well aware are they of the unenviable position assigned to the latter; it shows, at all events, that the Turks are sent to the North with open eyes; and no better proof of the desperate condition of the Allies can be conceived than is contained in this involuntary admission of their own Generals. That the Turks will be beaten may be taken for certain. Then what will be the fate of the allied and Piedmontese armies? The bluster about an assault on Sevastopol is now pretty much abandoned. On this head we find in the London Times of Feb. 6, a letter from Col. E. Napier, to the effect that if the Allies attack the south side of Sevastopol, they will most likely get into it; but they will be pounded into dust by the overwhelming fire of the north forts and batteries, and at the same time besieged by the Russian army in the field. That army, he says, should first have been defeated, and then both the north and south sides of the place invested. As an instance in point, he recalls the fact that the Duke of Wellington twice raised the siege of Badajoz, in order to march against a relieving army. Col. Napier is quite right, and the Tribune said quite as much, at the time of the famous flank march to Balaklava. As to the Allies getting into Sevastopol, however, he appears to overlook the peculiar nature of the Russian defenses, which make it impossible to carry the place at one single assault. There are first, outworks, then the main rampart, and behind this the buildings of the town converted into redoubts; streets barricaded, squares of houses loopholed; and, finally, the loopholed rear walls of the strand-forts, every one of which, in succession, will require a separate attack—perhaps a separate siege, and even mining operations. But beside all this, the successful sorties of the Russians of late have sufficiently proved that the town has been approached to a point where the forces of the opponents are fully balanced, and the attack deprived of any superiority except in point of artillery. As long as sorties cannot be made impossible, all idea of an assault is preposterous; the besieger who cannot confine the besieged to the space of the actual fortress, is much less able to take that fortress by a hand-to-hand encounter.

Thus, the besiegers will continue to vegetate in their camp. Confined to it by weakness and the Russian army in the field, they will continue to melt away, while the Russians are bringing up

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fresh forces; and unless the new British Ministry brings into play some quite unexpected resources, the day must come when British, French, Piedmontese and Turks are swept from Crimean soil.

Written about February 9, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4323, February 26, 1855 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
London, February 9. Following their acceptance of new ministerial posts, Palmerston and Sidney Herbert have to submit to the formality of re-election to their parliamentary seats. For this reason both Houses were yesterday adjourned for a week. The statements by Lord Derby and the Marquis of Lansdowne in the House of Lords concerning the secret history of the ministerial crisis merely retold an oft-told tale. The sole item of importance was a remark by Derby which contained the key to Lord Palmerston's position. Palmerston is known to have no parliamentary party behind him, or any clique masquerading under that name. Whigs, Tories and Peelites regard him with equal suspicion. The Manchester School is in open conflict with him. His personal supporters among the Mayfair Radicals (as distinct from the Manchester Radicals) number a dozen at the most. Who and what, then, enables him to impose himself on the Crown and on Parliament? His popularity? No more so than unpopularity prevented Gladstone, Herbert, Graham and Clarendon from again seizing the helm of state. Or is the man who never belonged to a party, served all of them alternately, deserted them all in turn and invariably held the balance between them, is he the natural leader of defunct parties which seek to stem the tide of history by forming a coalition? This fact proves nothing at the present moment, since it was insufficient to put Palmerston rather than Aberdeen at the head of the coalition in 1852.

Derby has supplied the answer to the riddle. Palmerston is evidently Bonaparte's friend. His premature recognition of the
coup d'état in December 1851 was then ostensibly the reason for his expulsion from the Whig Ministry. Bonaparte therefore regards him as persona grata, and a trustworthy man. The alliance with Bonaparte is therefore decisive at the moment. Palmerston has thus used foreign affairs to tip the balance of ministerial groupings—and not for the first time, as closer examination of the history of British ministries between 1830 and 1852 would show.

Since at present the situation of the Crimean army can no longer be exploited for the purpose of cabinet intrigues, Lord John Russell went back on his pessimistic opinion in yesterday's sitting in the Commons, allowed the strength of the British army to grow by some 10,000 men and exchanged congratulations with the God-fearing Gladstone. Despite this "parliamentary resurrection" of the British army, there can be no doubt that at the present moment it has ceased to exist as an army. Some few thousand are still listed as "fit for service" because there is no room in the hospitals to receive them. Out of 100,000 the French still number some 50,000, but what are 50,000 or 60,000 men to hold Heracleatic Chersonese through the winter, to blockade the south side of Sevastopol, to defend the trenches and to take the offensive in the spring with those who are left? The French may hold in readiness fresh divisions for embarkation in March, but they are busy preparing for a spring campaign on the continent, and there is every probability that their shipments will be too few or will arrive too late.

That the English and French governments are helpless, indeed have given up the army in the Crimea for lost, is apparent from the two measures to which they have resorted in order to remedy their misfortunes.

In order to make good the error of having undertaken the expedition four months too late, they are committing the incomparably greater error of sending to the Crimea, the only remnants of the Turkish army that are still serviceable, four months after their own arrival and in mid-winter. This army, already broken and in the process of disintegration at Shumla as a consequence of the neglect, incompetence and corruption of the Turkish government, will in the Crimea melt away with cold and hunger to an extent which will even surpass British achievements in this field.

—a Lord John Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 8, 1855. The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—Ed.
As soon as the Russians have attained their full concentration and the weather permits field operations, they will probably first attack the Turks under Omer Pasha. This is expected by the British and French. Thus conscious are they of the unenviable position they have assigned to them. Thus clearly do they show that the strategic error of now throwing the Turks in on the northern side was committed with open eyes. The Turks would only be able to save themselves from ultimate destruction by the most incomprehensible errors on the part of the Russians.

Secondly, the Anglo-French have hired 15,000 Piedmontese for the purpose of swelling the sparse ranks of the British; they are to be fed by the British Commissariat. In 1848 and 1849 the Piedmontese showed themselves to be brave and good soldiers. For the most part mountain-dwellers, their infantry surpasses even the French in skirmishing, sniping and fighting on broken terrain. The plains of the Po on the other hand have produced a cavalry which bears comparison with the British Horse Guards. Finally, they have had a hard schooling in the most recent revolutionary campaigns. These fleet-footed, mobile, adroit little fellows are fit for anything, but not to be British soldiers, which is what they are to be turned into, nor for the direct, ponderous frontal attacks which are the only tactics Raglan knows. And on top of that, to be fed by a British Commissariat whose only previous experience was of feeding itself! The 15,000 Piedmontese will therefore probably prove to be a further blunder.

British reinforcements have been suspended for the present. Raglan himself appears to be refusing them, as he cannot even cope with the remnants he still has. It is hardly believable that the more the British camp is afflicted with disease, overwork and lack of rest, the more prevalent becomes the admirable practice of corporal punishment. Men who are fit only to be sent to hospital, who for weeks have slept and been on duty in wet clothes and on wet ground and have borne all this with almost superhuman tenacity—if these men are caught dozing in the trenches, they are treated to the cat-o'-nine-tails and the birch. "Fifty strokes for every vagabond!"—that is the only strategic order that Lord Raglan occasionally issues. Is it any wonder then that the soldiers of the perpetrator of the famous "flanking-march" to Balaklava follow suit and evade the birch with a "flanking-march" to the Russians? Desertions to the Russian camp are becoming more numerous every day, as The Times correspondent reported.a

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a Report by W. H. Russell in The Times, No. 21971, February 7, 1855.—Ed.
All the big talk about storming Sevastopol has of course ceased. The Russian army would first have to be beaten in the field. Thus Wellington twice raised the siege of Badajoz to march against a relief army. We have furthermore already seen that the newly-erected Russian defence works make it impossible for the place to be taken by storm. Finally, the most recent Russian sorties prove that the allied army is at present superior to the Russians only in artillery. As long as sorties cannot be prevented, any idea of storming is absurd; besiegers who are incapable of confining the besieged to the area of the actual fortress are even less capable of seizing the fortress in hand-to-hand combat. Thus the besiegers will continue to vegetate, confined to their camp by their own weakness and by the Russian army in the field. They will continue to melt away, whilst the Russians bring up fresh forces. The prelude to the European war being enacted in the Crimea will end with the destruction of the allied troops unless some completely unexpected resources, which cannot be foreseen, are discovered.

Written on February 9, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 71, February 12, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

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\(^{a}\) A reference to Engels' article "Critical Observations on the Siege of Sevastopol" (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 593-95).—*Ed.*
London, February 10. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer of dogmatism and Duns Scotus of finance, has provided a further demonstration of the old saying that faith moves mountains. By faith, Gladstone has resurrected the dead, and by faith increased the strength of the British army in the Crimea from 11,000 to 30,000 men. He is demanding the same faith from Parliament. Unfortunately the report from Dr. Hall, head of the medical department in the camp at Sevastopol, has just arrived. Not only has the 63rd Regiment entirely vanished, according to this report, and of the 46th, which left Britain last November 1,000 men strong, only 30 are still fit for service, but Dr. Hall declares that half of the troops still on active service should be in hospital and that there are at most 5,000-6,000 men really fit for service in camp. Anyone who is familiar with the tricks performed by pious apologists will not doubt that, like Falstaff, Gladstone will turn 6,000 rogues in buckram into 30,000. Has he not already told us in last Thursday's sitting that the two estimates arose from different points of view, e.g. the minimisers of the army in the Crimea were not counting the cavalry as he was, as though there had been any cavalry worth mentioning since the battle of Balaklava. For Gladstone it is a simple matter to count in those who are "not there". It would be hard to outdo the unctiousness with which in last Thursday's sitting he concluded his "budget" on the

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a Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons on February 8, 1855. The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—Ed.
b Published in The Times, No. 21972, February 8, 1855.—Ed.
c Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene 4.—Ed.
strength of the army—in which every debit figures as credit and every deficit as surplus—saying that "he forgave the opponents of the government their exaggerations". It would be equally hard to outdo the tone and posture with which he exhorted the Members of Parliament not to let themselves be carried away by "emotions". To bear the woes of others with humility and equanimity—so runs the God-fearing Gladstone's motto.

Written on February 10, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 73, February 13, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
London, February 12. Lord Palmerston is incontestably the most interesting phenomenon of official England. Although an old man, and almost uninterruptedly upon the public stage since 1807, he has contrived to remain news and to keep alive all the hopes commonly associated with promising and untried youth. With one foot in the grave, he is supposed to be still on the threshold of his true career. Were he to die tomorrow, all England would be surprised to learn that he had been a Minister for half a century. Though he is not a universal statesman, he is certainly a universal actor—equally successful in the heroic and the comic, the sublime and the vulgar style, in tragedy and in farce, although the last is, perhaps, better attuned to his nature. He is not a first-class orator, but is accomplished in debate. With a wonderful memory, great experience, consummate tact, never-failing presence of mind, refined flexibility and the most intimate knowledge of parliamentary artifices, intrigues, parties and personalities, he handles difficult cases with winsome ease, adapting himself to the prejudices of each audience in turn, shielded against all surprise by his nonchalance, against all self-betrayal by his egoistical facility, against impassioned ebullitions by his profound frivolity and aristocratic indifference. His happy wit enables him to insinuate himself with all and sundry. Because he always remains cool-headed, he impresses hot-headed opponents. If a general standpoint be wanting, he is ever prepared to spin a web of elegant generalities. If incapable of mastering a subject, he contrives to toy with it. If afraid to join issue with a powerful foe, he contrives to improvise a weak one.
Submitting to foreign influence in practice, he combats it in words. Since he has inherited from Canning—who, however, warned against him on his death-bed—England’s mission of disseminating constitutional propaganda on the Continent, he never, of course, lacks a theme with which to flatter national prejudice while simultaneously keeping alive the jealous suspicions of foreign powers. Having thus conveniently become the *bête noire* of continental courts, he could hardly fail to figure at home as a “truly English Minister”. Although originally a Tory, he has succeeded in introducing into his conduct of foreign affairs all those “shams” and contradictions that constitute the essence of Whiggism. He contrives to reconcile democratic phraseology with oligarchic views; to offset the bourgeoisie and their advocacy of peace with the overbearing language of England’s aristocratic past; to seem an aggressor when he assents and a defender when he betrays; to spare an ostensible enemy and embitter an alleged ally; to be at the decisive moment of the dispute on the side of the stronger against the weak, and to utter courageous words in the very act of turning tail.

Accused by one side of being in Russia’s pay, he is suspected by the other of Carbonarism. If, in 1848, he had to defend himself in Parliament against a motion calling for his impeachment for acting in collusion with Russia, he had the satisfaction in 1850 of being the object of a conspiracy between foreign embassies which succeeded in the House of Lords but came to grief in the House of Commons. When he betrayed foreign nations, it was always done with extreme courtesy. While the oppressors could always count on his active support, the oppressed never wanted for the pageantry of his noble rhetoric. Poles, Italians, Hungarians, etc., invariably found him at the helm when they were vanquished, but their conquerors always suspected him of having conspired with the victims he had allowed them to make. Having him for a foe has, in every instance up till now, spelled a likelihood of success, having him for a friend, the certainty of ruin. But though the art of his diplomacy is not manifest in the actual results of his negotiations abroad, it shines forth all the more brightly in the manner in which he has succeeded in [inducing] the English people to accept phrase for fact, fantasy for reality and high-sounding pretenses for shabby motivation.

Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, was appointed

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*a Marx uses the English word.—Ed.*
Junior Lord of the Admiralty in 1807, when the Duke of Portland formed his administration. In 1809 he became Secretary at War and retained this post until May 1828 in the Ministries of Perceval, Liverpool, Canning, Goderich and Wellington. It is certainly strange to find the Don Quixote of “free institutions”, the Pindar of the “glories of the constitutional system”, as an eminent and permanent member of the Tory administration which promulgated the Corn Laws, stationed foreign mercenaries on English soil, every now and then—to use an expression of Lord Sidmouth’s—“let the people’s blood”, gagged the Press, suppressed meetings, disarmed the nation at large, suspended regular courts of justice along with individual freedom—in a word declared a state of siege in Great Britain and Ireland! In 1829 Palmerston went over to the Whigs who, in November 1830, appointed him Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Save for the intervals between November 1834 and April 1835 and between 1841 and 1846, when the Tories were at the helm, he was in sole charge of England’s foreign policy from the time of the revolution of 1830 to the coup d’état of 1851. We shall survey his achievements during that period in another letter.

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 83, February 19, 1855]b

London, February 14. In recent weeks Punch has been wont to present Lord Palmerston in the guise of the clown of the puppet show. As everyone knows, that clown is a mischief-monger by profession, who loves noisy ructions, a concocter of pernicious misunderstandings, a virtuoso of rowdyism, at home only in the general hurly-burly he has created, in the course of which he throws wife, child and, at last, even the police out of the window, ending up, after much ado about nothing, by extricating himself from the scrape more or less intact and full of malicious glee at the turn the rumpus has taken. And, from a picturesque point of view, Lord Palmerston does indeed appear thus—a restless and untiring spirit who seeks out difficulties, imbroglios and confusion as the natural element of his activity and hence creates conflict where he does not find it ready-made. Never has an English Foreign Secretary shown himself so busy in every corner of the earth—blockades of the Scheldt, the Tagus, the Douro,15

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a Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
b The second instalment was published under the heading “Palmerston”—Ed.
blockades of Mexico and Buenos Aires,\textsuperscript{16} Naples expeditions, Pacífico expeditions, expeditions to the Persian Gulf,\textsuperscript{17} wars in Spain for "liberty" and in China for the importation of opium,\textsuperscript{18} North American border disputes,\textsuperscript{19} Afghanistan campaigns, bombardment of Saint-Jean-d’Acre,\textsuperscript{20} squabbles over the right to search shipping off West Africa,\textsuperscript{21} discord even in the "Pacific", and all this to the accompaniment of and supplemented by innumerable minatory notes, stacks of minutes and diplomatic protests. On average, all this noise would seem to dissipate itself in heated parliamentary debates which provide as many ephemeral triumphs for the noble lord. He appears to handle foreign conflicts like an artist who is prepared to go so far and no further, withdrawing as soon as they threaten to become too serious, and have provided him with the dramatic stimulus he requires. In this way, world history itself takes on the air of a pastime expressly invented for the private satisfaction of the noble Viscount Palmerston of Palmerston. This is the first impression Palmerston’s chequered diplomacy makes on the impartial observer. A closer examination reveals, however, that, strange to say, one country has invariably profited from his diplomatic zigzag course, and that country was not England but Russia. In 1841 [Joseph] Hume, a friend of Palmerston’s, declared:

"Were the Tsar of Russia\textsuperscript{a} to have an agent in the British Cabinet, his interests could not be better represented than they are by the noble Lord."

In 1837 Lord Dudley Stuart, one of Palmerston’s greatest admirers, apostrophised him as follows:

"How much longer [...] did the noble lord propose to allow Russia thus to insult Great Britain, and thus to injure British commerce? [...] The noble lord was degrading England in the eyes of the world by holding her out in the character of a bully—haughty and tyrannical to the weak, humble and abject to the strong."

At any rate it cannot be denied that all treaties favourable to Russia, from the Treaty of Adrianople to the Treaty of Balta-Liman\textsuperscript{22} and the Treaty of the Danish Succession,\textsuperscript{23} were concluded under Palmerston’s auspices. True, the Treaty of Adrianople found Palmerston in opposition, not in office; but for one thing he was the first to give the treaty his blessing, though in an underhand way and, for another, being then the leader of the

\textsuperscript{a} Nicholas I.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} From Stuart's speech in the House of Commons on March 17, 1837. \textit{Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates}, third series, Vol. XXXVII, London, 1837.—\textit{Ed.}
Whig Opposition, he attacked Aberdeen for his Austro-Turkish bias and declared Russia to be the champion of civilization. (Cf., for instance, the sittings of the House of Commons of June 1, 1829, June 11, 1829, February 16, 1830, etc.) On this occasion, Sir Robert Peel told him in the House of Commons that “he did not know whom Palmerston really represented”. In November 1830 Palmerston took over the Foreign Office. Not only did he reject France’s offer of joint intervention on Poland’s behalf because of “the relations between the Cabinet of St. James and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg”; he also forbade Sweden to arm and threatened Persia with war should she fail to withdraw the army she had already dispatched to the Russian frontier. He himself helped to defray the cost of Russia’s campaign in as much as, without parliamentary authorisation, he continued to pay out principal and interest on the so-called Russian-Dutch loan after the Belgian revolution had invalidated the stipulations governing that loan. In 1832 he allowed the mortgage on state demesnes which the National Assembly of Greece had guaranteed the English contracting party to the Anglo-Greek Loan of 1824, to be repudiated and transferred as security for a new loan effected under Russian auspices. His despatches to Mr. Dawkins, English representative in Greece, invariably read: “You are to act in concert with the agents of Russia.” On July 8, 1833, Russia extorted from the Porte the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi whereby the Dardanelles were closed to European warships, and Russia (cf. second article of the treaty) was assured of an eight years’ dictatorship in Turkey. The Sultan was forced to sign the treaty by the presence of a Russian fleet in the Bosphorus and of a Russian army outside the gates of Constantinople—allegedly as a protection against Ibrahim Pasha. Palmerston had repeatedly refused Turkey’s urgent plea that he intervene on her behalf, and had thus forced her into accepting the help of Russia. (He himself said as much in the House of Commons on July 11, August 24, etc., 1833 and March 17, 1834.) When Lord Palmerston entered the Foreign Office he found English influence clearly preponderant in Persia. His standing order to English agents was that they should “in all cases act in concert with

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a Presumably an error in the Neue Oder-Zeitung. On June 11, 1829, Parliament did not sit. The reference is to Palmerston’s speech on February 5, 1830 (see present edition, Vol. 12, p. 355).—Ed.
b From Peel’s speech in the House of Commons on February 16, 1830.—Ed.
c P. I. Rickmann.—Ed.
d Mahmud II.—Ed.
the Russian Ambassador”. With his support, Russia placed a Russian pretender on the Persian throne. Lord Palmerston sanctioned the Russo-Persian expedition against Herat. Only when this had failed did he order an Anglo-Indian expedition into the Persian Gulf, a stratagem that strengthened Russia’s influence in Persia. In 1836, under the noble lord, Russia’s usurpations in the Danubian Delta, her quarantines, her customs regulations, etc., were recognized by England for the first time. In the same year the confiscation of a British merchant vessel, the Vixen—and the Vixen had been sent out at the instigation of the British government—by a Russian warship in the Circassian Bay of Soujouk-Kale was used by him as a pretext to accord official recognition to Russian claims to the Circassian littoral. It transpired on this occasion that, as much as six years previously, he had secretly recognized Russia’s claims to the Caucasus. On this occasion the noble Viscount escaped a vote of censure in the House of Commons by a slender majority of sixteen. One of his most vehement accusers at the time was Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Redcliffe, English Ambassador at Constantinople. In 1836 one of the English agents in Constantinople concluded a trade agreement with Turkey which was advantageous to England. Palmerston delayed ratification and, in 1838, substituted another treaty so greatly to Russia’s advantage and England’s detriment that a number of English merchants in the Levant decided they would in future trade under the aegis of Russian firms. The death of King William IV gave rise to the notorious Portfolio scandal. At the time of the Warsaw revolution a collection of secret letters, despatches, etc. by Russian diplomats and ministers had fallen into the hands of the Poles when they captured the palace of the Grand Duke Constantine. Count Zamoyski, Prince Czartoryski’s nephew, took them to England. There, on the orders of the King and under Urquhart’s editorship and Palmerston’s supervision, they were published in The Portfolio. No sooner was the King dead than Palmerston denied all connection with The Portfolio, refused to pay the printer’s bills, etc. Urquhart published his correspondence with Backhouse, Palmerston’s Under-Secretary of State. Upon this The Times (26 January, 1839) comments:

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a Mohammed-Shah.—Ed.
b David Urquhart.—Ed.
c F. J. Shoberl.—Ed.
d The Times, No. 16948, January 25, 1839.—Ed.
"It is not for us to understand how Lord Palmerston may feel, but we are sure there is no misapprehending how any other person in the station of a gentleman, and in the position of a Minister, would feel, after the notoriety given to the correspondence...."

Written on February 12 and 14, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, Nos. 79 and 8 February 16 and 19, 1855
Marked with the sign X

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, February 16. The farce of Mr. Sidney Herbert's re-election as Member of Parliament for the southern division of Wiltshire took place yesterday in Salisbury Town Hall. Even among the English counties Wilts is notorious for a concentration of land-ownership which has turned the whole area into the property of fewer than a dozen families. With the exception of some districts in Northern Scotland, the land has nowhere been so thoroughly "cleared" of inhabitants, nor the system of modern agriculture applied so consistently. Except when family feuds happen to break out among its few landlords, Wilts never sees an electoral campaign.

No rival candidate had been put up against Sidney Herbert. The High Sheriff, who presided over the election, therefore declared him re-elected by all the forms of law at the very beginning of the meeting. Sidney Herbert then rose and addressed a number of very worn-out platitudes to his tenants and vassals. Meanwhile there had gradually gathered in the Town Hall an audience of townspeople who were not entitled to vote but whom the English Constitution fobs off with the privilege of boring the candidates at the hustings. Scarcely had Sidney Herbert sat down than a barrage of questions volleyed about his venerable head. "What about the green coffee-beans served to our soldiers?", "Where is our army?", "What did The Times say of

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a A report on the re-election was published in The Times, No. 21979, February 16, 1855. — Ed.
b E. L. Clutterbuck. — Ed.
c Marx uses the English word. — Ed.
Karl Marx

you yesterday?", "Why did you spare Odessa?", "Does your uncle, the Russian Prince Vorontsov, own palaces in Odessa?", etc. Naturally not the slightest notice was taken of these unparliamentary questioners. On the contrary, Sidney Herbert availed himself of the first lull to propose a vote of thanks to the Sheriff for his "impartial" conduct of the "proceedings". This was accepted amidst applause from the parliamentary audience, and hissing and groaning from the unparliamentary. There then followed a second volley of ejaculatory questions: "Who starved our soldiers? Let him go to war himself! etc." No more result than before. The Sheriff then declared the play, which had lasted little more than half an hour, to be over, and the curtain fell.

The first measures of the re-constituted ministry were by no means received with approval. As Lord Panmure, the new Secretary for War, is an invalid, the main burden of his administration falls to the Under-Secretary for War. The appointment of Frederick Peel, the younger son of the late Peel, to this important post arouses all the more displeasure since Frederick Peel is a notorious mediocrity. Despite his youth, he is the living incarnation of routine. Other men become bureaucrats. He came into the world as one. Frederick Peel owes his post to the influence of the Peelites. It was therefore necessary to balance the scales with a Whig in the other pan. Sir Francis Baring has therefore been appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Melbourne's Whig administration and at that time bore the well-deserved nickname of "Mr. Deficit". The most recent army appointments all remain true to the system of gerontocracy. Thus the octogenarian Lord Seaton has been appointed to the command of the army in Ireland. Lord Rokeby, old, gout-ridden, and deaf, has been dispatched to the Crimea as commander of the Brigade of Guards. Command of the Second Division there—formerly under Sir de Lacy Evans—has fallen to General Simpson, who is no Samson but on the contrary occupied a fitting retirement-post as veteran Lieutenant-Governor of Portsmouth. General Somerset, already a Brigadier in 1811, has been sent to India as commanding General. Finally Admiral Boxer, "that anarch old", as The Times calls him, a who threw the whole transport service into utter confusion in Constantinople, has now been ordered to Balaklava to put that harbour into "proper order".

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a The Times, No. 21979, February 16, 1855. The passage quoted below is from the same issue.—Ed.
"We fear," says The Times, "we must look elsewhere for Ministerial vigour. [...] It is vain for us to appeal to those who do these things against such cruel and wanton squandering of the best resources of the nation. Were they not infatuated by a long course of power, which only shifted from one portion of their own [...] class to another, they would scarcely have chosen this moment at least for the exhibition of such wanton and short-sighted selfishness. The instinct of self-preservation would have taught them better, but we solemnly ask the people of England whether they will suffer their countrymen to be thus sacrificed at the shrine of cruel apathy or helpless incapacity." The Times threatens: "It is not a Government, nor is it even a House of Commons. It is the British Constitution that is under trial."

The latest news from India is important because it describes the deplorable state of business in Calcutta and Bombay. In the manufacturing districts the crisis is slowly but surely advancing. The owners of spinning-mills of fine yarn in Manchester decided at a meeting held the day before yesterday only to open their factories four days a week from February 26 and in the meantime to call on the manufacturers in the surrounding area to follow their example. In the factories in Blackburn, Preston and Bolton notice has already been given to the workers that there will henceforth only be "short time". The fact that in the past year many manufacturers have tried to force the markets by circumventing the commission-houses and taking their export business into their own hands means that bankruptcies will be all the larger in number and in size. The Manchester Guardian, admitted last Wednesday that there was overproduction not only of manufactured goods but also of factories.

Written on February 16, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung. No. 85, February 20, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

*a February 14, 1855.—Ed.*
London, February 17. Parliament re-assembled yesterday. The House of Commons was obviously displeased. It appeared to be distressed by the conviction that the transactions of the last three weeks had completely broken its authority. There sat the old ministry once more, only reburnished. Two elderly Lords\(^a\) who could not abide each other had disappeared from it, but a third elderly Lord who had shared the vote of no-confidence with those two had not fallen down a rung, but simply up to the top rung. Lord Palmerston was received in solemn silence. No "cheers",\(^b\) no enthusiasm. Contrary to custom, his speech was received with visible indifference and ill-tempered scepticism. For once, too, his memory played him false, and he hesitated, hunting through the notes he had before him, until Sir Charles Wood in a whisper restored the broken thread. His audience seemed not to believe that the change of firm would save the old house from bankruptcy. His whole manner recalled Cardinal Alberoni's verdict on William of Orange:

"He was a strong man while he held the balance. He is weak now that he has used his own weight to tip the scales."

The most important fact however was undoubtedly the appearance of a new coalition in opposition to the new version of the old one—the coalition of the Tories under Disraeli and the most outspoken section of the Radicals, men like Layard, Duncombe, Horsman, etc. It was precisely amongst the latter, the Mayfair

\(^a\) Lord Aberdeen and Lord John Russell.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) Marx uses the English word.—\textit{Ed.}
Radicals,\textsuperscript{30} that Palmerston hitherto counted his loudest supporters. Layard had been disappointed in his hopes of receiving a junior post in the Ministry for War, so mutters one government paper. Let him have a post!—hisses another.

Lord Palmerston began the announcement of his new ministry with a brief account of the ministerial crisis. Then he praised his own creation. The ministry he had formed

"contains sufficient administrative ability, sufficient political sagacity, sufficient liberal principle, sufficient patriotism and determination to [...] fulfil its duties".\textsuperscript{a}

Lord Clarendon, Lord Panmure, Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham—each was duly complimented. Excellent though the ministry was, it had one great difficulty staring it in the face. Here was Mr. Roebuck, insisting on having his Committee of Inquiry nominated next Thursday. Why had the House need of a committee? He would remind them of an anecdote from the days of Richard II at the time of Wat Tyler's uprising. The young monarch is said to have encountered a troop of rebels, whose chief had just been slain before their eyes. Boldly going up to them, he is said to have exclaimed: "You have lost your leader; my friends, I will be your leader." "So I say" (the young (!) dictator Palmerston), "if you, the House of Commons, now forego this committee, the Government itself will be your committee."

This somewhat irreverent comparison of the House to a band of "rebels" and the unblushing demand of the cabinet to be appointed judge in its own cause, were received with ironical laughter. What do you want, cried Palmerston, raising his voice and tilting his head into that attitude of Irish audacity for which he is known. What is the purpose of a Committee of Inquiry? Administrative improvements? Very well! Hear all the things we intend to improve. Previously you had two Ministers of War, the Secretary at War\textsuperscript{b} and the Minister for War. Henceforth you shall have but one, the latter. In the Department of Ordnance, the military command will be transferred to the Commander-in-Chief (Horse Guards\textsuperscript{c}) and the civil administration to the Secretary for War. The Transport Board will be enlarged. Previously, under

\textsuperscript{a} Excerpts from the speeches by Palmerston and other participants in the House of Commons debate of February 16 are quoted from The Times, No. 21980, February 17, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Marx uses the English term.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} Horse Guards, the English term given by Marx, was used to denote the Commander-in-Chief of the British army, since he and his personnel were housed in what was originally the barracks of the Horse Guards.—\textit{Ed.}
The Act of 1847, the term of service was 10 years. It will now be made optional for men to enlist for any number of years they wish, from 1 to 10. No man will be enlisted below the age of 24 nor over 32. Now to the theatre of war! In order to introduce uniformity, vigour and order into the conduct and management of the war, Palmerston has chosen the unusual device of providing each post with a controller with unspecified powers. Lord Raglan remains Commander-in-Chief but General Simpson becomes Chief of Staff, and Raglan "will feel it his duty to adopt his recommendations". Sir John Burgoyne is recalled to service, and Sir Harry Jones becomes Chief of the Commissariat, with unspecified dictatorial power. At the same time however a civilian, Sir John MacNeill (author of the famous pamphlet *Russia's Progress in the East*), is ordered to the Crimea to inquire into misappropriation, incompetence and dereliction of duty by the Commissariat. New hospital arrangements in Smyrna and Scutari; reform of the medical department in the Crimea and at home, transport vessels for sick and wounded plying every 10 days between the Crimea and Britain. At the same time however the Minister for War\(^a\) will borrow three civilians from the Minister of Health\(^b\) and send them to the Crimea to make the necessary sanitary arrangements for the prevention of pestilence when the spring weather comes and to organise inquiries into the staff and management of the medical department. As one can see, there is excellent opportunity for conflicts of authority. In order to compensate Lord Raglan for his "command hedged about by constitutional institutions", he receives full authorisation to negotiate in Constantinople for a corps of 300 Turkish street-sweepers and grave-diggers whose task will be to consign the army of dead, the decaying horses and other ordure into the sea when the warm season comes. A separate department of land transport will be set up in the theatre of war. Whilst thus on the one hand, preparations are made for waging the war, in Vienna peace will be prepared by Lord John Russell, if that is expedient.

*Disraeli*: When one has heard the noble Lord extolling his colleagues' "administrative ability and political sagacity", it is [hard] to believe that he is speaking of the same "unparalleled blunderers" whom the House condemned 19 days before\(^c\)

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\(^a\) F. M. Panmure.— *Ed.*
\(^b\) B. Hall.— *Ed.*
\(^c\) A reference to the House of Commons debate of January 29, 1855. *The Times*, No. 21964, January 30, 1855.— *Ed.*
Supposing that the promised improvements are implemented and are what they are given out to be, what a satire they were on the ministry which alone had opposed them and which had declared a Commons inquiry into the previous mismanagement to be a vote of no-confidence in itself. Even Lord John Russell had declared he found the mysterious disappearance of the army inexplicable and an investigation of its secret causes to be unavoidable.\(^a\) Was the House to delude itself into rescinding the decision it had reached only 10 days ago? By so doing, it would irrevocably forfeit its public influence for years. What was the argument of the noble Lord and his reburnished colleagues to induce the House of Commons to stultify itself? Promises which would never have been made, had it not been for the threat of a Committee of Inquiry. He would insist on a parliamentary inquiry. Palmerston was commencing his new post by threatening Parliament’s freedom of movement. Never had a ministry met with such support and willingness from the opposition as had Lord Aberdeen’s, the “late” ministry, or how should he call it! There were two Dromios\(^b\) that confounded him; he would therefore say “the late Ministry and their present faithful representatives—their identical representatives on the government bench”.

Roebuck declared that next Thursday he intended to table a list of names for the Committee, which the House had already adopted. The administration was the old one, only the cards had been shuffled but had fallen into the same hands again. Nothing short of the direct intervention of the House of Commons could break the shackles of routine and remove the obstacles which prevented the government from carrying out the necessary reforms, even if it wished to do so.

**Thomas Duncombe:** The noble Lord had told them, he and the government would like to be their committee. They were mightily grateful! What the House wanted to do was to inquire into the conduct of the noble Lord and his colleagues! He had promised reforms, but who was to institute them? The very men whose administration had created the necessity for reforms. There had been no change in the administration. It was the *status quo ante*\(^c\) Roebuck. Lord John Russell had deserted his post in cowardly fashion. Lord Palmerston himself might be said to be the “faded

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\(^a\) John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on February 8, 1855. *The Times*, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) Characters from Shakespeare’s *The Comedy of Errors*.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The position as before [the motion by].—*Ed.*
gem” of 13 bygone administrations, from that of Lord Liverpool down to the present one. Therefore he must undoubtedly be possessed of “great experience as well as of high administrative talent”. His Lord Panmure was not even the equal of the Duke of Newcastle. The appointment of the committee was not a censure. It was a question of inquiry. Censure would probably follow on its heels. Concerning the negotiations in Vienna, here too the government was in opposition to the people. The people was demanding a revision of the treaties of Vienna of 1815 in the interests of the Poles, Hungarians and Italians. By war against Russia however, it understood the literal destruction of Russian preponderance.

One can see that Palmerston’s ministry is continuing from the point where Aberdeen’s ministry ended—with the fight against Roebuck’s motion. Between now and next Thursday every effort will be made to obtain by hook or by crook a ministerial majority against the Committee of Inquiry.

Written on February 17, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 88, February 22, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, February 19. The coalition between Tories and Radicals, the first signs of which we reported in our last contribution, is today being talked of as a fait accompli by the whole of the London daily press. The government Morning Chronicle observes on the subject:

"Yet there never yet was a revolution which was not accelerated from pique, wounded vanity, misplaced ambition, or sheer folly, by its predestined and unconscious victims; and the motley combination of Derbyites and Liberals who have coalesced with Mr. Roebuck are treading in the very footsteps of those members of the Chamber of Deputies who, when getting up the Reform banquets of 1848, sought only to displace a Ministry, and ended by upsetting a throne."

Roebuck, it asserts, is ready to play the part of a Robespierre or (a most remarkable or!) of a Ledru-Rollin. His intention is to form a "committee of public safety". He had had no qualms about proposing the following names for the committee which he had requested: Roebuck, Drummond, Layard, Sir Joseph Paxton (who built the palace for the Great Exhibition$^1$), Lord Stanley (Derby's son), Ellice, Whiteside, Disraeli, Butt, Lowe (a member of The Times' secret council) and Miles.

"It is useless," continues The Morning Chronicle, "to disguise that we are openly threatened with a revolutionary crusade against the aristocracy of this country. [...] The demagogues [...] are seeking the overthrow of Lord Palmerston's Administration..."

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$^a$ See this volume, pp. 24-25. — Ed.

$^b$ "The prudence, fairness and consistency of nominating Mr. Roebuck's committee...", The Morning Chronicle, No. 27504, February 19, 1855. The item containing the passage "It is useless to disguise..." which is quoted below was published in the same issue. — Ed.
tion, by skilfully playing off against it the associated, though not combined, forces of Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Roebuck. Democracy is seeking to bring about a revolution by methodically overthrowing one cabinet after another."

Finally, a government paper threatens the dissolution of Parliament, [an] "appeal to the people", as Bonaparte did a few months before the coup d'état.

The Economist, whose publisher Wilson is Secretary of the Treasury, declares "a representative Constitution" to be incompatible with the conduct of war. The former hat-maker Wilson therefore proposes that Members of Parliament who accept offices of state should be released from the obligation of re-election and cabinet ministers should ex officio be granted a seat and voice in the House of Commons. Thus the ministry is to become independent of electors and the House of Commons, but the House would become dependent on the ministry. With regard to this, The Daily News warns:

"The people of England must be on their guard, and prepared to make a resolute stand in defence of their representative institutions. [...] An attempt is about to be made to render Government more independent of the House of Commons. [...] This [...] would bring the [...] Government into conflict with the House of Commons. The result would be a revolution."

And in fact in Marylebone—considered to be one of the most radical districts of London—a meeting has been called for next Wednesday, to pass resolutions on "the government's attempt [...] to resist the parliamentary inquiry".

Whilst The Morning Chronicle is thus prophesying revolution and The Daily News an attempt at counter-revolution, The Times also is making reference to the February Revolution, although with regard not to the reform-banquets but to Praslin's murder. For a few days ago, in the Irish Court of Chancery, an inheritance case was brought in which the Marquis of Clanricarde—an English peer, ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg during Melbourne's administration and Postmaster-General during Russell's—

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a The concluding sentence given by Marx is not a direct quotation from The Morning Chronicle, but rather summarises the gist of several paragraphs.— Ed.

b "Two Much Needed Reforms", The Economist, No. 599, February 17, 1855.— Ed.

c The Daily News, No. 2731, February 19, 1855.— Ed.

d February 21, 1855.— Ed.

e From a letter written by parishioners to the St. Marylebone churchwarden, and published in The Times, No. 21982, February 20, 1855.— Ed.
appeared as the principal actor in a truly Balzacian drama of murder, adultery, legacy hunting and fraud.\(^3\)

"In the gloomy autumn of 1847," observes The Times, "when the mind of France was disturbed by the indefinable presage of approaching revolution [...] a great scandal in the very highest circles of Parisian life startled still further the already excited public and contributed most powerfully to accelerate the then impending catastrophe. Those who contemplate with attention the highly excited state of the public mind at this moment cannot contemplate without similar emotion the great scandal which has been disclosed to the public [...] in the Irish Court of Chancery."\(^3\)

Crimes within the ranks of the ruling caste, revealed at the same time in their arrogant helplessness and impotence, the destruction of the flower of the British army, the dissolution of old parties, a House of Commons without a majority, ministerial coalitions based on outlived traditions, the expense of a European war coincident with the most fearful crisis in commerce and industry—here are symptoms enough of an imminent political and social upheaval in Great Britain. It is of particular significance that the wreck of political illusions is taking place at the same time as the wreck of free-trade illusions. Just as the former ensured the government monopoly of the aristocracy, so the latter ensured the legislative monopoly of the bourgeoisie.

Written on February 19, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 92, February 24, 1855
Marked with the sign \(\times\)
Frederick Engels

THE WAR THAT LOOMS ON EUROPE

A few weeks more, and unless peace is made at Vienna with a promptitude that nobody in Europe now seems to expect, we shall witness the opening on that Continent of a war in comparison with whose events the Crimean campaign will sink into that insignificance which, in a war between three of the greatest nations on the face of the earth, it always ought to have worn. The hitherto independent operations in the Black Sea, and in the Baltic, will then be connected by a line of battle extending across the whole breadth of the Continent which separates those two colossal inland lakes; and armies whose magnitude is adequate to the almost boundless extent of the Sarmatian plain, will contend for its dominion. Then, and then only, can the war be said to have become truly a European one.

The Crimean campaign requires but a short additional notice at our hands. We have so often, and in such detail, described its character and its chances, that we have merely to record a few fresh facts in confirmation of our statements. A week ago we observed that it had degenerated into a steeple-chase of reinforcements, and that the Russians were likely to get the best of this race. There is now hardly a doubt that by the time when the season admits of uninterrupted operations, followed up according to a preconcerted plan, the Russians will have from 120,000 to 150,000 men in the Peninsula, to whom the Allies can, with superhuman efforts, oppose, perhaps, 90,000. Supposing, even, that both France and England had troops sufficient to send there, where are the transports to be found, as long as out of

See this volume, p. 3.—Ed.
every four steamers sent to the Black Sea, three are kept there under all possible pretexts? England has already completely disorganized her transatlantic mail steam service, and nothing is at present in greater demand there than ocean steamers; but the supply is exhausted. The only thing which could save the Allies, would be the arrival in the Crimea exactly at the time it is wanted, of an Austrian corps of some 30,000 men, to be embarked at the mouth of the Danube. Without such a reenforcement, neither the Piedmontese corps, nor the Neapolitan corps, nor the driblets of Anglo-French reenforcements, nor Omer Pasha's army, can do them any real good.

Now let us see what part of their respective forces England and France have already engaged in the Crimea. We shall speak of the infantry only, for the proportions in which cavalry and artillery are attached to such expeditions are so variable that no positive conclusions respecting them can be established. Besides, the whole active force of a country is always engaged in proportion as its infantry is engaged. Of Turkey we speak not, for with the army of Omer Pasha she engages her last, her only army, in this struggle. What is left to her in Asia is no army; it is but a rabble.

England a possesses, in all, 99 regiments, or 106 battalions of infantry. Of these, at least 35 battalions are on Colonial service. Of the remainder, the first five divisions sent to the Crimea took up about 40 b battalions more; and at least eight battalions have been sent since as reenforcements. There remain about 23 battalions, hardly one of which could be spared. Accordingly, England fairly acknowledges, by her last military measures, the peace establishment of her army to be entirely exhausted. Various devices are brought forward in order to make up for what has been neglected. The militia, embodied to the number of some 50,000, are allowed to volunteer for foreign service. They are to occupy Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, and thus to relieve about twelve battalions on Colonial service, which then may be sent to the Crimea. A foreign legion is decreed; but, unfortunately, no foreigners seem to come forward for enlistment under the rule of the cat-o'-nine-tails. Finally, on the 13th February, orders were issued to create second battalions for 93 regiments—43 of 1,000 men and 50 of 1,200 men each. This would give an addition of 103,000 men,

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Ed.

The text of this paragraph was used by Marx in his report "Parliamentary and Military Affairs" (see this volume, pp. 41-42).—Ed.

b Here the New-York Daily Tribune has a misprint: 46. The correct figure is given in the German version of this article published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung of April 23, 1855.—Ed.
besides about 17,000 more men for the cavalry and artillery. But not one of these 120,000 men has as yet been enlisted; and then, how are they to be drilled and officered? The admirable organization and general management of the British army has contrived to engage, one way or another, between the Crimea and the colonies, almost the whole of the infantry, with the exception of depot companies and a few depot battalions—not only the men, but the cadres too. Now, there are plenty of half-pay generals, colonels and majors on the British army list [who] can be employed for this new force; but of captains on half-pay, as far as we know, there are none, or very few, while lieutenants, ensigns and non-commissioned officers are nowhere to be had in the manufactured state. Raw material there is in plenty; but raw officers to drill raw recruits would never do; and old, experienced, steady non-commissioned officers, as everybody knows, are the mainstay of every army. Besides this, we know from the best authority—Sir W. Napier—that it takes full three years to drill the tag-rag-and-bobtail of Old England into what John Bull calls “the first soldiers of the world” and “the best blood of England.” If that is the case when the cadres are at hand waiting to be filled up, how long will it take, without subaltern or non-commissioned officers, to manufacture heroes out of the 120,000 men who are not yet found? We may consider the whole military force of England so far engaged in this war that, for the next twelvemonth, the utmost the British Government can do will be to keep up a “heroic little band” of forty or fifty thousand men before the enemy. That number could only be exceeded for very short periods, and with essential derangement of all preparation for future reenforcements.

France, with her larger army and far more complete organization, has engaged a far inferior proportional part of her forces. France possesses 100 regiments of infantry of the line, 3 of Zouaves, and 2 foreign legions, at 3 battalions each; beside 20 battalions of rifles, and 6 African battalions—together 341 battalions. Of these, 100 battalions, or one to each regiment of the

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a Here begins the text that was reproduced by Marx, with abridgements and alterations, in his report “Condition of the Armies” in the Neue Oder-Zeitung of February 24, 1855. The passage beginning with the words “France, with her larger army...” is preceded by the following paragraph: “We have seen that in the next twelve months England can put up against the enemy no more than 50,000 of her own troops, a fighting force which despite its numerical weakness is not to be despised given good leadership and sound administration. One need only recall the battle of Inkerman.” - Ed.
line, are considered as dépôt-battalions, for the reception and drilling of recruits; the two first battalions only are sent out for active service, while the dépôt prepares the reinforcements destined to keep up their full strength. Thus, 100 battalions must be at once struck off the number. If subsequently these dépôt-battalions are made use of as the groundwork for a third field battalion, as was more than once done under Napoleon, they can do so by having an extraordinary number of recruits made over to them, and then it is some time before they are fit for the field. Thus, the available force of the French army, at the present time, does not exceed 241 battalions. Of these, 25 at least are required for Algeria. Four are at Rome. Nine divisions of infantry, or at least 80 battalions, have been sent to the Crimea, to Constantinople and to Athens. Altogether, say 110 battalions engaged, or very nearly one half of the available infantry of France, upon the peace establishment; minus the dépôts. Now, the arrangements in the French army, the dépôt-bat- talions organized beforehand, the calling in of the soldiers dismissed on furlough during their last year of service, the faculty of calling out the full number of every year's conscription, beside extraordinary recruitings, and finally the aptitude of the French for military duty, allow the Government to double the number of their infantry in about a twelvemonth. Considering the quiet but uninterrupted armaments made since the middle of 1853, the establishment of ten or twelve battalions of Imperial Guards, and the strength in which the French troops mustered in their respective camps last autumn, it may be supposed that their force of infantry at home is now fully as strong as it was before the nine divisions left the country, and that, as regards the capability of forming third field battalions out of the dépôt-battalions, without much impairing their efficiency as dépôts, it is even stronger. If we estimate, however, at 350,000 men, the infantry force which France will have on her own territory by the end of March, we shall be rather above than below the mark. With cavalry, artillery, &c., such an infantry force would, according to the French organization, represent an army of about 500,000 men. Of these, at least 200,000 would have to remain at home, as cadres for the dépôts, for the maintenance of tranquillity in the interior, in the military workshops, or hospitals. So that by the 1st of April, France might take the field with 300,000 men, comprising about 200 battalions of infantry. But these 200 battalions would, neither in organization nor in discipline and steadiness under fire, be upon a par with the troops sent to the Crimea. They would contain many young recruits, and
many battalions composed for the occasion. All corps where officers and men are strangers to each other, where a hasty organization upon the prescribed plan has but just been completed in time before they march out, are vastly inferior to those old established bodies in which the habit of long service, of dangers shared together, and of daily intercourse for years, has established that esprit de corps which absorbs very soon, by its powerful influence, even the youngest recruits. It must, then, be admitted that the eighty battalions sent to the Crimea represent a far more important portion of the French army than their mere number indicates. If England has engaged, almost to a man, the best part of her army, France, too, has sent to the East nearly one-half of her finest troops.

We need not here go into a recapitulation of the Russian forces, having very recently stated their numbers and distribution. Suffice it to say that of the Russian active army, or that destined to act upon the western frontier of the Empire, only the third, fourth, fifth and sixth corps have as yet been engaged during the war. The Guards and Grenadiers corps are quite intact, as is the first corps also; the second corps appears to have detached about one division to the Crimea. Beside these troops, eight corps of reserve, equal in number of battalions, if not in numerical strength, to the eight corps of the active army, have been, or are still being formed. Thus, Russia brings up against the West a force of about 750 battalions, 250 of which, however, may be still forming, and will always be weak in numbers, while 200 more have suffered great losses during two campaigns. The Reserve, as far as the fifth and sixth battalions of the regiments are concerned, must principally consist of old soldiers, if the original plan of organization has been followed up; but the 7th and 8th battalions must have been formed of recruits, and be very inefficient, as the Russian, in spite of his docility, is very slow to learn military duties. The whole reserve, besides, is badly officered. Russia, therefore, has engaged at the present time about one-half of her regularly organized active army. But then, the Guards, Grenadiers, first and second corps, forming the other half, which has not yet been engaged, are the very flower of her army, the pet troops of the Emperor, the efficiency of which he watches over with especial care. And, moreover, by engaging

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a See Engels' article "The European War" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 609-14).—Ed.
one-half of her active army, what has Russia obtained? She has almost annihilated the offensive and defensive strength of Turkey; she has forced England to sacrifice an army of 50,000 men, and has disabled her for at least a twelvemonth; and she has, besides, forced France to engage a similar proportion of troops to those she herself engaged. And while the best African regiments of France are already before the enemy, Russia's own élite has not yet fired a shot.

So far, then, Russia has had the best of it, although her troops employed in Europe cannot boast of a single success, but have had, on the contrary, to give way in every action of moment, and to abandon every one of their enterprises. But the matter will change entirely as soon as Austria joins in the war. She has an army of some 500,000 men ready for the field, beside 100,000 more in the dépôts, and 120,000 more in reserve; an army, which, by very little extraordinary recruiting, may be brought to some 850,000 men. But we will take its number at 600,000, inclusive of dépôts, and omitting the reserve, which has not yet been called in. Of these 600,000 men, 100,000 are in the dépôts, about 70,000 more in Italy and other portions of the interior not menaced by Russia. The remaining 430,000 are assembled in several armies, from Bohemia through Galicia to the Lower Danube, and 150,000 men could be in a very short time concentrated upon any given point. This formidable army at once turns the balance against Russia, so soon as Austria begins to act against her; for since the whole of the late Russian army of the Danube has been drafted into the Crimea, the Austrians are superior to the Russians on every point, and can bring their reserves to the frontier quite as soon, in spite of the start the Russians have now got. There is only this to notice: that the Austrian reserve is far more limited in its number than that of the Russians, and that the 120,000 reserve soldiers once called in, all further increase must arise from fresh recruiting, and, therefore, be very slow. The longer, therefore, the Austrians hold back a declaration of war, the more advantage they give to Russia. To make up for this, we are told, a French auxiliary army is to march into Austria. But the road from Dijon or Lyons to Cracow is rather long, and unless matters are well

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a Instead of this sentence the German version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "Only the effect of diplomacy on the Western Powers' conduct of the war explains the results already achieved by Russia."—Ed.

b Here the New-York Daily Tribune has a misprint: 330,000. The correct figure is given in the German version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
arranged, the French army may arrive too late, unless the intrinsic value of the reorganized Austrian army should render it a match for even a moderately superior number of Russians.\(^a\)

Austria, then, is the arbiter of the situation. Ever since she took up a military position on her Eastern frontiers, she has maintained her superiority over the Russians. If well-timed arrivals of Russian reserves should for a moment deprive her of it, she may trust to her experienced generals—the only ones, save a very few Hungarians, who of late years have shown military genius—and to her well-organized troops, most of whom have been under fire. A few skilful maneuvers, a very slight step backward, would force her opponent to such detachments as to assure her a fair field. Militarily speaking, Russia is thrown completely on the defensive the very moment Austria moves her armies.\(^b\)

Another point must be mentioned. If France raises her domestic army to 500,000 men, and Austria increases her total forces to 800,000, either of these countries is capable of calling, within a twelvemonth, at least 250,000 men more under arms.\(^c\) On the other hand, the Czar, if ever he completes the seventh and eighth battalions of his infantry regiments, thereby raising his total active force to say 900,000 men, has done almost everything in his power for defense. His late recruiting is said to have everywhere met with considerable difficulties; the standard of height has had to be lowered, and other means resorted to, to get the requisite number of men. The decree of the Emperor, calling the whole of the male population of Southern Russia\(^36\) under arms, far from being an actual increase of the army, is a plain confession of the impossibility of further regular recruiting. This means was resorted to on the French invasion of 1812, when the country was actually invaded; and then in seventeen provinces only. Moscow then furnished 80,000 volunteers, or one tenth of the population of the province; Smolensk sent 25,000 men, and so forth. But, during the war they were nowhere; and these hundreds of thousands of volunteers did not prevent the Russians from arriving on the Vistula in as bad a state, and in as total a

\(^a\) Instead of the passage beginning with the words “and unless matters are well arranged” and ending with the words “a moderately superior number of Russians”, the version published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: “The longer the diplomats procrastinate the less the likelihood that it will arrive on time.”—*Ed.*

\(^b\) The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* further has: “Even a short-lived successful offensive could not alter this result.”—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* further has: “while England’s contingent would continually grow from the second year onwards.”—*Ed.*
dissolution as the French themselves. This new levy *en masse* means, besides, that Nicholas is resolved on war to the utmost.

But if Austria’s participation in the war, throws Russia, militarily speaking, on the defensive, this is not necessarily the case, politically speaking. The Czar’s great political means of offense—we have called attention to it more than once—is the raising of the Austrian and Turkish Slavons and the proclamation of Hungarian independence. How greatly these measures are dreaded by Austrian statesmen is known to our readers. No doubt, in case of necessity, the Czar will resort to this means; with what result, remains to be seen. We have not spoken of Prussia—she is likely to go, finally, with the West against Russia, though perhaps only after some storms which nobody can foresee. At all events, until some national movement takes place, her troops are not likely to play a* very important part, and, therefore, we may for the present take very little account of her.

Written about February 20, 1855

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4332, March 8, 1855, reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1022, March 13, 1855; an abridged German version was first published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 93, February 24, 1855

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*a* Here ends the text reproduced by Marx in his report “Condition of the Armies” in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung.*—*Ed.*
London, February 20. Although the House of Commons sat yesterday from 4 p.m. to 2 a.m. and voted away some £7.5 million sterling for the army, the debates lacked anything interesting enough to report. Therefore, we shall only note that Palmerston disconcerted his liberal opponents both by the deliberate triviality of his replies and by the provocatively confident insolence with which he delivered these trivialities. Having declared about the battle of Balaklava in the manner of Astley's Amphitheatre, he attacked Layard for "vulgar declamation against the aristocracy", for it was not the aristocracy that was dug-in in the Commissariat, in Transport and in the Medical department. He forgot that its lackeys are dug-in there. Layard rightly emphasised that the commissions invented by Palmerston are good for nothing but stirring up conflicts of competence in the expeditionary army. "What!" cried Palmerston (he saw himself again in the place of Richard II and Parliament in the role of Wat Tyler's mob). "You want to set up a parliamentary committee good for nothing but producing Blue Books, and you take exception to my commissions, which 'have to work'!" Palmerston treated Parliament with such superciliousness that for once he even found it superfluous to make his own jokes. He borrowed them from the ministerial morning papers which the Members of Parliament had in front of them on the table. They were spared neither the "Committee of Public Safety" of The Morning

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a An account of Palmerston's speech was published in The Times, No. 21982, February 20, 1855.— Ed.
Chronicle

nor the jibe of The Morning Post about transporting the inquisitorious Members to the Crimea—and leaving them there. Only a parliament constituted like this one could have stood for this.

So, while in Parliament Palmerston out-Aberdeen, he lets it be known—not directly, through his own papers, but through the gullible newspaper of the united victuallers, that he is not a free agent but bound in chains by the Court, etc.

As a peace congress is soon to meet in Vienna, it is time to speak of the war and to estimate the military forces at the disposal of the powers which have so far appeared—more or less—on the battlefield. This is not a question only of the numerical strength of the armies, but of that part of them which can be used in offensive operations. We shall give details only of the infantry, as the other arms must be proportionate.

England possesses, in all, 99 regiments, or 106 battalions of infantry. Of these, at least 35 battalions are on Colonial service. Of the remainder, the first five divisions sent to the Crimea took up 40 battalions more; and at least eight battalions have been sent since as reinforcements. There remain about 23 battalions, hardly one of which could be spared for service abroad. The militia, embodied to the number of over 50,000, are allowed to volunteer for foreign service. They are to occupy Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu, and thus to relieve about twelve battalions, which then may be sent to the Crimea. A foreign legion, as Palmerston stated in the House of Commons yesterday, will not be set up. Finally, on the 13th February, orders were issued to create second battalions for 93 regiments—43 of 1,000 men and 50 of 1,200 men each. This would give an addition of 103,000 men, besides about 17,000 more men for the cavalry and artillery. But not one of these 120,000 men has as yet been enlisted, and afterwards they have to be drilled and officered.

The admirable organisation existing at present has contrived to employ almost the whole of the infantry—with the exception of depot companies and a few depot battalions—between the Crimea and the colonies, and moreover not only the men but, though this

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a The Morning Chronicle, No. 27504, February 19, 1855.—Ed.
b The Morning Advertiser, which had published the articles "A Minister must be ambitious..." (No. 19863, February 17, 1855) and "Faithful are the wounds of a friend...", No. 19864, February 19, 1855.—Ed.
c The following paragraphs are largely based on Engels' article "The War That Looms on Europe", which was published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4332, March 8, 1855 (see this volume, pp. 32-39).—Ed.
seems incredible, the cadres as well. Now, there are plenty of half-pay generals, colonels and majors on the British army list and they can be employed for this new force. But there are hardly any captains on half-pay, and no lieutenants and non-commissioned officers at all. But it is well known that the non-commissioned officers form the cornerstone of every army. According to General Sir William Napier, the historian of the Peninsular war, the best authority in this field, it takes fully three years to drill the “tag-rag” and “bobtail” (the lumpenproletariat) of Old England into “the best blood of England”, “the first soldiers of the world”. If that is the case when the cadres are at hand and need only to be replenished, how long will it therefore take to manufacture heroes out of these 120,000 men? During the next twelvemonth, the utmost the British Government can do is to keep up a “heroic little band” of fifty thousand men before the enemy. That number could be exceeded for short periods, but only at the cost of considerably upsetting all preparation for future reinforcements.

The departure of the mail compels us to break off at this point.

Written on February 20, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 91, February 23, 1855
Marked with the sign √

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

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\[a\] This refers to W. F. P. Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, Vols. I-VI.—Ed.

\[b\] The words in quotation marks are given in English in the original.—Ed.
London, February 24. Yesterday, the House of Commons was packed, as ministerial statements on the breaking up of the first Palmerston administration had been announced. The closely-crowded Members waited impatiently for the arrival of the noble Viscount, who at last appeared, an hour after the House had opened, received with laughter by one side, with cheers by the other. The Ministers who had broken away—Graham, Gladstone and Herbert—took their seats on the benches of the so-called Radicals (the Manchester School), where Mr. Bright seemed to welcome them. One bench in front of them Cardwell, who had also resigned, sat enthroned. Lord Palmerston rose to move that the Roebuck Committee should be considered immediately. Sir James Graham then opened the ministers' case and was still on the threshold of his rhetorical phantasy building when Palmerston began to accompany him with unmistakable signs of healthy sleep.

Graham's polemic against the Committee of Inquiry was mainly confined to the claim that it represented an intrusion into the royal prerogatives by the House of Commons. As everyone knows, for a century and a half it has been the custom of English ministries to talk about the privileges of the House vis-à-vis the Crown and about the prerogatives of the Crown vis-à-vis the House. In fact Graham spoke threateningly about danger to the Anglo-French alliance in consequence of the Committee's investig-
ations. What was this but an insinuation that the French ally would prove to have been the main cause of the deplorable mishaps! As to his own resignation from the Ministry, the Ministry had regarded Roebuck's motion from the beginning simply as a disguised vote of no confidence. Aberdeen and Newcastle had therefore been sacrificed and the old Ministry dissolved. The new Ministry consisted of the old personnel with the exception of Canning and Panmure; how then should Roebuck's motion suddenly be capable of a new interpretation? Not he, but Lord Palmerston had changed his views from Friday to Tuesday. Not he, but his noble friend, was a deserter. In addition—and this was a naive admission—Graham gave as reason for his resignation from the renewed Ministry that he had become convinced

"that the present Administration [...] does not [...] possess in a greater degree the confidence of the House than that Administration which only a few weeks since retired".

During his statement Graham said *inter alia*:

"When the new Administration was formed I wished to know from my noble Lord" (Palmerston), "whether there was to be any change in the foreign policy of Lord Aberdeen's Administration [...] ; and also whether [...] there was any alteration with respect to the stipulated peace terms. Lord Palmerston gave me the fullest assurance that in these respects everything will remain as before."

(These words are quoted here as they were *spoken* in the House of Commons, not as they were *printed* in more circumscribed form in the newspapers.)

*Bright* at once took up this pronouncement by Graham, stating that he did not wish the Palmerston Government to be overthrown, that he had no personal animosity against the noble Lord, that rather he was convinced Palmerston and Russell possessed everything the unjustly persecuted Aberdeen had lacked, namely sufficient popularity to make peace on the basis of the four points.

*Sidney Herbert*: Roebuck's motion consisted of two quite different parts. First, he proposed to investigate the state of the army at Sevastopol; second, to investigate the conduct of the Government departments specifically in charge of the maintenance of the army. The House was entitled to do the second, but not the first. Presumably it was for that very reason that he, Herbert, had opposed the "second" on 26 January as violently as he now,

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*Herbert's speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. *The Times*, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—*Ed.*
on 23 February, opposed the "first"? When he (Herbert) took his position in the present Ministry, Lord Palmerston, in line with his speech of last Friday, had declared the Committee unconstitutional, abolished with the resignation of Aberdeen and Newcastle. Palmerston had not even doubted that the House would now reject Roebuck's motion without a debate. The Committee, in so far as its object was not a charge against the Government but an investigation of the state of the army, would prove an immense sham. Lord Palmerston, since he did not have the courage of his repeatedly expressed conviction, was weakening the Government. What was the use of a strong man if he pursued a weak policy?

Gladstone in fact added nothing to the statements of his colleagues except the kind of argumentation which, on the occasion of Gladstone's resignation from Peel's administration—it was then a question of the Maynooth college—moved the late Peel to declare that he believed he understood the reasons for his friend's resignation before his friend undertook to lay them before Parliament in a two-hour speech.

Palmerston considered it superfluous to enter into the explanations of his ex-colleagues. He regretted their resignations, but would be able to console himself. In his view the Committee did not intend any reproof but an investigation of the state of the army. He had opposed the setting up of the Committee but had become convinced that the decision of the House could not be rescinded. The country could not be without a government, hence he would remain the Government with or without the Committee. To Bright's question he replied that the peace negotiations were meant seriously and that Russell's instructions had been drafted on the basis of the four points. He told the House nothing of the position in his own Ministry.

It is incontestable, that in spite of the sudden breaking up of his first administration, Palmerston has already won some victories, if not in public opinion, then in the Ministry and in Parliament. By Russell's mission to Vienna he has got rid of a troublesome, temperamental rival. By his compromise with Roebuck he has transformed the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into a Government Commission which counts only as the fourth after the three appointed by himself. As Sidney Herbert says, he has put "immense sham" in place of a real thing. The resignation of the Peelites has enabled him to form a ministry consisting of nothing

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*February 16, 1855.—*Ed.
but ciphers with himself as the only figure. It is beyond question, however, that the formation of such a real Palmerston Ministry will have to struggle with almost insuperable obstacles.

Written on February 24, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 97, February 27, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, February 24. With Hume, the veteran of the House of Commons has died. His long parliamentary life was an accurate barometer of the radical bourgeois party which reached its highest point in 1831. In the initial period of the reformed House a kind of parliamentary Warwick or Member-maker, eight years later he figured with Daniel O'Connell and Feargus O'Connor as one of the originators of the People's Charter, which to this day forms the political programme of the Chartists and basically contains only the demand for a universal franchise together with the conditions which would make it a reality in England.

The break between the workers and the bourgeois agitators which soon followed found Hume on the side of the latter. At the time of the Russell Ministry he drafted the "Little Charter", which was adopted by the so-called "parliamentary and financial reformers" as their programme. Instead of the six points of the People's Charter it contains three points and replaces the "universal" franchise by a more or less "enlarged" franchise. Finally, in 1852, Hume proclaimed a new programme in which he even abandoned his "Little Charter" and demanded only one point: elections by ballot. For the rest, Hume was the classical representative of the so-called "independent" opposition, which Cobbett aptly and exhaustively described as the "safety-valve" of the old system. In his last days the habit of proposing motions and

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then, just before the closure, at the nod of a minister, withdrawing them again, became a veritable mania with him. His flirting with “economising public funds” had become proverbial. Each Ministry allowed him to fight and reduce minor items so as to get the big ones the more safely through the House.

Written on February 24, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 98, February 28, 1855
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Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, February 27. The outcry against the aristocracy has been answered ironically by Palmerston with a ministry of ten lords and four baronets—ten lords, moreover, of whom eight sit in the House of Lords. He has met the dissatisfaction occasioned by the compromise between the various factions of the oligarchy with a compromise between various families within the Whig group. For the Grey clan, the ducal Sutherland family and, finally, the Clarendon family have received indemnification in his ministry. Sir George Grey, the Home Secretary, is a cousin of Earl Grey, whose brother-in-law is Sir Charles Wood, First Lord of the Admiralty. Earl Granville and the Duke of Argyll represent the Sutherland family. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer, is a brother-in-law of the Earl of Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary. India alone has been allotted to a man without a title, Vernon Smith; but at any rate he married into one of the Whig families. "A kingdom for a horse!" shouted Richard III.4 "A horse for a kingdom!" shouts Palmerston, aping Caligula, and makes Vernon Smith Grand Mogul of India.40

"Lord Palmerston has given us not only the most aristocratic Administration of which we have any example in the history of the country", complains The Morning Advertiser, "but he has constructed his Government of the very worst aristocratic materials he could have selected."

The worthy Advertiser, however, finds comfort in the fact that

"Palmerston is not a free agent. [...] He is still in fetters and bonds".41

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4 Shakespeare, Richard III, Act V, Scene 4.—Ed.
40 "The Ministry of Titles", The Morning Advertiser, No. 19872, February 28, 1855.—Ed.
As we predicted, Lord Palmerston has formed a cabinet of ciphers, he himself being the only figure in it. Lord John Russell, who in 1851 had tumbled him undiplomatically out of the Whig cabinet, has been sent by him diplomatically on a journey. Palmerston has made use of the Peelites to enter upon Aberdeen’s heritage. As soon as he was sure of the premiership he dropped the Aberdeenites and filched from Russell, as Disraeli says, not only the clothes of the Whigs but the Whigs themselves. Despite the great similarity, almost identity, of the present government and Russell’s Whig administration of 1846-1852, nothing could be more erroneous than to confuse them. This time we have not a cabinet at all but Lord Palmerston in lieu of a cabinet. Although its members are largely the same as before, the posts have been distributed among them in such a way, its following in the House of Commons is so different and it is making its appearance under such completely changed circumstances that whereas before it was a weak Whig ministry it is now the strong dictatorship of a single man, provided Palmerston is not a spurious Pitt, Bonaparte not a spurious Napoleon, and Lord John Russell continues to travel. Though the English bourgeois has been annoyed by the unexpected turn of events he is at present amused by the unconscionable adroitness with which Palmerston has duped and cheated both friend and foe. Palmerston, says the merchant of the City, has once more proved himself “clever”. But “clever” is an untranslatable qualification, full of ambiguity and rich in connotations. It comprises all the attributes of a man who knows how to blow his own trumpet, and understands what profits him and what brings harm to others. Virtuous and respectable as the English bourgeois is, he nevertheless admires most the man who is “clever”, who does not bother about morals, who is not disconcerted by respect, who regards principles as snares in which to catch his fellows. If Palmerston is so “clever” will he not outwit the Russians just as he outwitted Russell? Thus speaks the politician of the English upper middle-class.

As for the Tories, they believe the good old times are back again, the evil coalition spell has been broken and the traditional Whig and Tory governmental seesaw has been restored. A real change, not confined to mere passive dissolution, could in fact

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a See this volume, p. 45.—Ed.
b Graham, Gladstone and Herbert.—Ed.
d Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
only come about under a Tory government. Only when the Tories are at the helm is tremendous pressure from without exerted and the inevitable transformations are put into effect. For example, the emancipation of the Catholics during Wellington’s ministry; the repeal of the Corn Laws during Peel’s ministry; and the same was true if not of the Reform Bill then at least of the reform agitation, which was more important than its result.51

When the English asked a Dutchman to come specially across the sea to become their King it was for the purpose of ushering in with the new dynasty a new epoch—the epoch of the association of the landed aristocracy with the financial aristocracy. Ever since then we find privilege bestowed by blood and privilege bestowed by gold in constitutional equilibrium. Blood, for instance, decides in the case of certain army posts, whose incumbents hold them by virtue of family connections, nepotism or favouritism; but gold gets its due since all army commissions can be bought and sold for cash. It has been calculated that the officers now serving in the various regiments have invested an amount of £6 million in their posts. In order not to forfeit the rights they have acquired during their service and not to be ousted from their jobs by some young money-bags, the poorer officers borrow money to secure their advancement and thus become encumbered with mortgages.

In the church as in the army, family connections and ready cash are the two factors that count. While part of the ecclesiastical offices is allotted to the younger sons of the aristocracy, the other part belongs to the highest bidder. Trade in the “souls” of the English people—in so far as they belong to the Established Church—is no less usual than the slave trade in Virginia. In this trade there exist not only buyers and sellers but also brokers. One such “clerical” broker, named Simpson, appeared yesterday before the Court of Queen’s Bench to demand the fee due to him from a certain Lamb, who, he claimed, had contracted to procure him the right to have the rector Josiah Rodwell presented for the West-Hackney parish benefice. Simpson had stipulated 5 per cent from both buyer and seller, besides some minor charges. Lamb, he said, had not fulfilled his obligations. The circumstances were as follows: Lamb is the son of a seventy-year-old rector holding two benefices in Sussex whose market price is estimated at £16,000.

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a Marx uses the English words “pressure from without” and gives the German translation.—Ed.
b William of Orange.—Ed.
c “Court of Queen’s Bench. Guildhall, Feb. 26”, The Times, No. 21988, February 27, 1855. Marx gives the name of the court in English.—Ed.
The price is naturally in direct proportion to the income from the parish and in inverse proportion to the age of the incumbent. Lamb junior is the patron of the livings held by Lamb senior and is also the brother of a still younger Lamb, the owner of the living and rector of West-Hackney. Since West-Hackney's rector is still very young, the market price of the next presentation to his sinecure is relatively low. Though it provides an annual income of £550 as well as a rectory, its owner has agreed to sell the right to the next appointment for only £1,000. His brother has promised him the Sussex parishes upon the death of their father, but wants to sell his thus vacated living in West-Hackney through Simpson to Josiah Rodwell for £3,000, thus pocketing a net profit of £2,000, and his brother obtaining a better benefice. The broker would have received a commission of 5 per cent., i.e., £300. It did not transpire why the deal did not go through. The court awarded the broker Simpson £50 in compensation "for work done".

Written on February 27, 1855
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No. 105, March 3, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
Karl Marx

THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION

London, March 2. While in every particular the British Constitution has failed at every point where the war has put it to the test, the coalition Ministry at home, the most constitutional of all ministries in the history of England, has broken up. Forty thousand British soldiers have died on the shores of the Black Sea—victims of the British Constitution! Officers, General Staff, Commissariat, Medical Department, Transport Service, Admiralty, Horse Guards, Ordnance Office, Army and Navy, all have broken down and have discredited themselves in the esteem of the world; yet all have had the satisfaction of knowing that they have simply done their duty in the eyes of the British Constitution! The Times spoke more truly than it surmised when it exclaimed with reference to this universal bankruptcy: “It is the British Constitution that is under trial.” It has been tried and found guilty.

But what is the British Constitution? Does it essentially consist of a representative system and a limitation of the executive power? These features distinguish it neither from the Constitution of the United States of North America nor from the constitutions of the innumerable British joint-stock companies which understand “their business”. The British Constitution is indeed nothing but an antiquated, obsolete, out-of-date compromise between the bourgeoisie, which rules not officially but in fact in all decisive spheres of civil society, and the landed aristocracy, which governs officially. Originally, after the “glorious” revolution of 1688, only a

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*a* Marx uses the English term.—*Ed.

*b* “Among all the political changes...”, The Times, No. 21979, February 16, 1855.—*Ed.*
section of the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy of finance,\textsuperscript{54} was included in the compromise. The Reform Bill of 1831 admitted another section, the millocracy\textsuperscript{a} as the English call it, i.e. the high dignitaries of the industrial bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{55} The history of legislation since 1831 is the history of the concessions which have been made to the industrial bourgeoisie, from the new Poor Law to the repeal of the Corn Laws\textsuperscript{56} and from the repeal of the Corn Laws to the death duties on landed property.

Even if the bourgeoisie—which is only the highest stratum of the middle classes—was on the whole acknowledged also politically as the ruling class, this was only on condition that the entire system of government in all its detail, even the executive department of the legislative power, i.e. the actual making of laws in both Houses of Parliament, remained safely in the hands of the landed aristocracy. [About] 1830 the bourgeoisie preferred the renewal of the compromise with the landed aristocracy to a compromise with the mass of the English people. Now the aristocracy, which, subject to certain principles laid down by the bourgeoisie, rules supreme in the Cabinet, in Parliament, in the administration, in the army and the navy—this section of the British nation, relatively the most important section, has just now been compelled to sign its own death warrant and to admit under the eyes of all the world that it no longer has the calling to govern Britain. One need only observe the attempts to galvanise its corpse! Ministry upon ministry is formed merely to go into dissolution after a regime of a few weeks. The crisis is permanent, the government only provisional. All political action is suspended, and everybody admits that his only aim is to keep the political machinery oiled sufficiently to prevent it from seizing up completely. The House of Commons does not even recognise itself in ministries created in its own image.

In the midst of this general helplessness not only has war to be waged, but an enemy even more dangerous than the Emperor Nicholas has to be fought. This enemy is the crisis in trade and industry which since last September is growing more violent and universal every day. Its iron hand immediately closed the mouths of the superficial apostles of free trade who preached for years that glutted markets and social crises had been banished forever into the shadowy realm of the past since the repeal of the Corn Laws. The glutted markets are there, but now nobody cries more loudly about the lack of prudence which prevented the manufac-

\textsuperscript{a} Marx uses the English term.— Ed.
turers from limiting production than the selfsame economists who five months ago still taught—with the infallibility of dogmatism—that too much could never be produced.

This disease had already revealed itself in chronic form at the time of the strike in Preston.57 Shortly afterwards the glut in the American market led to the outbreak of the crisis in the United States. India and China, though overstocked, as well as California and Australia, continued to form outlet channels for overproduction. As the English manufacturers could no longer sell their commodities in the home market without depressing prices, they resorted to the dangerous expedient of sending their commodities abroad on consignment, particularly to India, China, Australia and California. This makeshift enabled trade to proceed for a while with less disturbance than if the goods had been thrown on the market all at once. But no sooner did these shipments arrive at their destinations, than they determined prices there, and by the end of September the effect was felt here in England.

The crisis then changed its chronic character for an acute one. The first houses to collapse were the cotton printers, among them old established firms in and around Manchester. Then came the turn of the shipowners and the Australia and California merchants, then the Chinese houses, and finally the Indian. All took their turn, most of them suffered heavily, many had to suspend business, and the danger is not over for any of these branches of trade. On the contrary, it is constantly growing. The silk manufacturers were also hit; their industry is at the moment reduced to almost nothing, and the localities where it is carried on are experiencing the greatest distress. Now it will be the turn of the cotton spinners and manufacturers. Some of them have already succumbed and many more will yet have to share their fate. As we have seen earlier, the fine-yarn spinners are working only short-time, and the coarse-yarn spinners will soon have to resort to the same remedy. A section of them are already working a few days a week only. How long will they be able to stand it?

A few more months, and the crisis in the factory districts will reach the depth of 1842, if it does not exceed it. But no sooner will its effects be generally felt among the working classes, than the political movement which has more or less been dormant among these classes over the past six years, leaving behind only the cadres for a new agitation, will spring up again. The conflict

\[\text{See this volume, p. 23.}—\text{Ed.}\]
between the industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie will flare up again at the same time that the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy reaches its climax. Then the mask which has so far hidden the real features of Britain's political physiognomy from foreigners, will drop. Nevertheless, only those unfamiliar with the wealth of this country in human and material resources will doubt that it will emerge victorious and freshly rejuvenated from the impending great crisis.

Written on March 2, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 109, March 6, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
London, March 2. Layard, the great Nineveh scholar, in a speech to his constituents of Aylesbury the day before yesterday, made an interesting chapter public characterising the way in which the oligarchy distributes the most important state posts on the one hand, and the highly ambiguous attitude of the so-called liberal and independent Members of Parliament to this oligarchy on the other.

Layard told us that Lord Granville appointed him Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, where he served for three months, when Russell's Ministry was overthrown and the Derby Cabinet was being formed. Derby proposed to him that he should stay in his post until the successor appointed for him, Lord Stanley (Derby's son), returned from India. Then he would entrust him (Layard) with a diplomatic mission abroad.

"All my political friends," Layard said, "thought I ought to have accepted that offer. Lord J. Russell alone expressed a contrary opinion, which I unhesitatingly accepted."

So Layard rejected Derby's offer. Well! Lord Russell is Minister again and Layard is not forgotten. Russell now invites him to a ministerial banquet where he is to take his seat as Under-Secretary of the "Board of Control", i.e. the Ministry for India. Layard agrees. Suddenly, however, Russell remembers that an elderly Whig gentleman, by the name of Sir Thomas Redington, who in the past had been in charge of Irish, though

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a "Mr. Layard and His Constituents", The Times, No. 21990, March 1, 1855.— Ed.

b Marx uses the English term.— Ed.
never of Asiatic affairs, “is still unprovided for” (literally). He therefore gives Layard to understand that he should not stand in the way of the accommodation of the elderly gentleman. Layard resigns again. Russell, encouraged by the self-sacrificing modesty of the scholar, conveys to him that he should get right out of the way and accept a consular post in Egypt. This time Layard is infuriated, he refuses and becomes conspicuous in Parliament by making important speeches against the oriental policy of the Ministry.

Palmerston has no sooner formed his Cabinet than he seeks to compensate him by offering him the post of Secretary in the Ordnance Office. Layard rejects this, as he knows nothing at all about artillery, etc. How naive! As though the retiring Secretary—Mr. Monsell, one of the brokers of the Irish Brigade—had ever been able to tell an ordinary musket from a needle gun! Palmerston now offers him the Under-Secretaryship in the War Ministry. Layard accepts, but the next morning Palmerston has discovered that Frederick Peel—that bureaucratic nonentity—can at this moment not be spared from the War Ministry, of whose functions Peel notoriously understands nothing. As a substitute he finally offers Layard the Under-Secretaryship in the Colonial Office, in Russell’s name. Layard considers that the present situation is too difficult to engage in the study of fifty colonies with which he has never before been concerned. He refuses, and there this edifying story ends.

The only moral which the ministerial papers draw from it is: that Layard is still very inexperienced in the way of the world and has iniquitously forfeited his Assyrian fame.
Karl Marx

THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

Of course, the most interesting feature of the news from Europe by the Atlantic must be the death of the Czar and the influence of that event on the pending complications. But important as may be the intelligence on this subject, or on other continental affairs, in its interest for the thoughtful observer it can hardly surpass the gradual indications and developments of that momentous political crisis in which, without any will of their own, the British nation are now involved at home. The last attempt to maintain that antiquated compromise called the British Constitution—a compromise between the class that rule officially and the class that rule non-officially—has signally failed. The coalition ministry, the most constitutional of all, has not only broken down in England but the constitution itself has broken down in detail at every point where it has been tested by the war. Forty thousand British soldiers have died on the shores of the Black Sea, victims to the British Constitution. Officers, Staff, Commissariat, Medical Department, Transport Service, Admiralty, Horse Guards, Ordnance, Army and Navy, all and every one have broken down, have ruined themselves in the estimation of the world; but all and every one have failed with the satisfaction of knowing that they had but done their duty in the eyes of the British Constitution. The London Times spoke more truly than it knew, when it said, with respect to this universal failure, that it was the British Constitution itself which was on its trial!

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a Nicholas I died on March 2, 1855.—Ed.
b "Among all the political changes...", The Times, No. 21979, February 16, 1855.—Ed.
It has been tried, and found guilty. This British constitution, what is it but a superannuated compromise, by which the general governing power is abandoned to some sections of the middle class, on condition that the whole of the real Government, the Executive in all its details, even to the executive department of the legislative power—or that is the actual law-making in the two Houses of Parliament—is secured to the landed aristocracy? This aristocracy which, subject to general principles laid down by the middle class, rules supreme in the Cabinet, the Parliament, the Administration, the Army and the Navy—this very important half of the British constitution has now been obliged to sign its own death-warrant. It has been compelled to confess its incapacity any longer to govern England. Ministry after Ministry is formed, only to dissolve itself after a few weeks' reign. The crisis is permanent; the Government is but provisional. All political action is suspended; nobody professes to do more than to keep the political machine greased well enough to prevent it from stopping. That pride of the constitutional Englishman, the House of Commons itself, is brought to a dead stand. It knows itself no longer, since it is split up in numberless fractions, attempting all the arithmetical combinations and variations, of which a given number of units is capable. It can no longer recognize itself in the various Cabinets, which it makes in its own image, for no other purpose than to unmake them again. The bankruptcy is complete.

And not only has the war had to be carried on in the midst of this national helplessness, which, breaking out like a pestilence in the Crimea, has gradually seized all the branches of the body politic, but there is an opponent to contend with far more dangerous than Russia—an opponent more than a match for all the Gladstones, Cardwells, Russells and Palmerstons of past, present and future Cabinets put together. That opponent is the commercial and industrial crisis which, since September last, has set in with a severity, a universality, and a violence, not to be mistaken. Its stern, iron hand at once shut up the mouths of those shallow Free Traders who for years had gone on preaching, that since the repeal of the Corn Laws glutted markets were impossible. There the glut is, with all its consequences, and in its most acute form; and in view of it nobody is more eager to accuse the improvidence of manufacturers, in not reducing production, than those very economists, who told them only a few months before that they never could produce too much. We long since called attention to the existence of this disease in a chronic form. It has been aggravated, of course, by the late difficulties in
America, and the crisis that depressed our trade. India and China, glutted though they were, continued to be used as outlets—as also California and Australia. When the English manufacturers could no longer sell their goods at home, or would not do so rather than depress prices, they resorted to the absurd expedient of consigning them abroad, especially to India, China, Australia and California. This expedient enabled trade to go on for a while with less embarrassment than if the goods had been thrown at once upon the home market; but when they arrived at their destinations they produced embarrassment at once, and about the end of September last the effect began to be felt in England.

Then the crisis exchanged its chronic form for an acute one. The first houses that felt it were the calico printers; a number of them, including very old established houses in Manchester and that vicinity, broke down. Then came the turn of the shipowners and the Australian and Californian merchants; next came the China traders, and finally the Indian houses. All of them have had their turn; most of them losing severely, while many had to suspend; and for none of them has the danger passed away. On the contrary it is still increasing. The silk manufacturers were equally affected; their trade has been reduced to almost nothing, and the localities where it is carried on have suffered, and still suffer, the greatest distress. Then came the turn of the cotton-spinners and manufacturers. Some of them had already succumbed at our last advices, and a great many more must do so. The spinners of fine yarns, as we also learn, had begun to work only four days a week, and the coarse spinners would shortly have to do the same. But how many of them will be able to stand this for any length of time?

A few months more and the crisis will be at a height which it has not reached in England since 1846, perhaps not since 1842. When its effects begin to be fully felt among the working classes, then will that political movement begin again, which has been dormant for six years. Then will the working-men of England rise anew, menacing the middle classes at the very time that the middle classes are finally driving the aristocracy from power. Then will the mask be torn off which has hitherto hid the real political features of Great Britain. Then will the two real contending parties in that country stand face to face—the middle class and the working classes, the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat—and England will at last be compelled to share in the general social evolutions of European society. When England entered into the French Alliance she finally abandoned that isolated character
which her insular position had created for her, but which the
commerce of the world, and the increasing facilities for inter-
course, had long since undermined. Henceforth she can hardly
help undergoing the great internal movements of the other
European nations.

It is also a striking fact that the last moments of the British
Constitution are as prolific in evidences of a corrupt social state as
the last moments of Louis Philippe's monarchy. We have before
referred to the Parliamentary and Government scandals, to the
Stonor, the Sadleir, the Lawley\(^a\) scandals; but, to crown all, came
the Handcock and De Burgh revelations, with Lord Clanricarde, a
peer of the realm, as a principal though indirect party to a most
revolting deed.\(^60\) No wonder that this should seem to complete the
parallel, and that people, on reading the damming details, should
involuntarily exclaim "The Duc de Praslin! The Duc de Praslin!"
England has arrived at her 1847; who knows when and what will
be her 1848?

Written on March 2, 1855

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Tribune, No. 1027, March 30, 1855 and the
New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 707, March
31, 1855 as a leading article

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\(^a\) See the article "The Late British Government" by Marx and Engels (present
Karl Marx

THE BUYING OF COMMISSIONS.—
NEWS FROM AUSTRALIA

London, March 3. At the sitting the day before yesterday the House of Commons, as everybody knows, rejected Lord Goderich's motion allowing non-commissioned officers to reach the rank of captain. Palmerston used the old dilemma: a partial reform is impossible because one part of the old system depends upon the other. Individual practical reforms are thus impossible because they are theoretically impossible. The total reform of the system is impossible because that is not reform but revolution. Theoretical reform therefore is impossible because it is not practical. This House of Commons—a House which takes to heart the principle *principiis obsta* was eager to be convinced, or rather it did not need convincing as it had passed sentence before the trial.

Palmerston argued on this occasion that the system of selling officers' commissions was old, and he was right there. As we indicated earlier, it began with the "glorious" revolution of 1688, with the introduction of the National Debt, banknotes, and the Dutch succession. Already in the Mutiny Act of 1694 the necessity is stated of forestalling

"the great mischief of buying and selling Military Employment in his Majesties Armies", and it is enacted that "every commissioned officer" (only non-commissioned officers have *no* commissions) should swear that he has not bought his commission.

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a Palmerston's speech was reported in *The Times*, No. 21991, March 2, 1855.—Ed.

b Resist temptation (Ovidius, *Remedia amoris*, 91).—Ed.

c See Marx's article "Parliamentary News" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 605-08).—Ed.
This restriction was, however, not carried into effect; on the contrary, in 1702 Sir Nathan Wright, the Lord Keeper, decided in the opposite sense. On May 1, 1711, a statute of Queen Anne expressly recognised the system by decreeing

"that commissions shall no longer be sold without royal confirmation and that no officer may buy himself off unless he has served 20 years or has become incapacitated in the service, etc."

From this official recognition of the trade in military commissions it was but one step to officially regulating the market price of commissions. Accordingly, in 1719-20 market prices were fixed for the first time. The prices of officers' commissions were renewed in 1766, 1772, 1773, 1783, and finally in 1821, when the present prices were fixed. As early as 1766 War Minister Barrington published a letter which states:

"The consequence of this trade in officers' commissions frequently is that men who enter the army with the most ardent desire to serve, who have distinguished themselves at every opportunity, are kept for their whole lives in the lowest rank because they are poor. These deserving officers suffer the most cruel humiliation of being under the command of youths from wealthy families who entered the service much later but whose fortune enabled them to find entertainment outside the service, while the others, who are constantly at service quarters, carry out the duties of these gentlemen and have learnt their own."

It is true that England's common law declares it illegal to give a present or a "broker's fee" for any public office, just as the Rules of the Established Church place a ban on simony. Historical development, however, shows that the law does not determine practice nor does practice remove a contradictory law.

The latest news from Australia adds a new element to the general discomfort, unrest and insecurity. We must distinguish between the riot in Ballarat (near Melbourne) and the general revolutionary movement in the State of Victoria. The former will by this time have been suppressed; the latter can only be suppressed by far-reaching concessions. The former is merely a symptom and an incidental outbreak of the latter. Concerning the Ballarat riot, the facts are simply these: A certain Bentley, owner of the Eureka Hotel at the Ballarat goldfields, had got into all sorts of conflicts with the gold diggers. A murder which occurred at his house increased the hatred of him. At the coroner's inquest Bentley was discharged as innocent. Ten of the twelve jurymen, who functioned at the inquest, however, published a protest

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Marx uses the English expression.—*Ed.*
against the partiality of the coroner,\(^a\) who had attempted to suppress witnesses' evidence disadvantageous to the prisoner. At the demand of the people a second inquest was held. Bentley was again discharged despite very suspicious evidence by some witnesses. It became known, however, that one of the judges had financial interests in the hotel. Many earlier and later complaints show the dubious character of the government officials of the Ballarat district. On the day Bentley was discharged for the second time, the gold diggers held a tremendous demonstration, set his hotel on fire and then withdrew. Three of the ringleaders were arrested on a warrant issued by Sir Charles Hotham, the Governor-General of Victoria State. On November 27 a deputation of gold diggers demanded their release. Hotham rejected the demand. The gold diggers held a monster meeting. The Governor sent police and troops from Melbourne. It came to a clash, several dead remained on the scene, and according to the latest news, up to December 1, the gold diggers have hoisted the flag of independence.

Even this story, which is in the main taken from a government paper, does not put the English judges and government officials in a favourable light. It shows the prevailing distrust. There are actually two big issues around which the revolutionary movement in Victoria State is revolving. The gold diggers are demanding the abolition of the gold digging licences, i.e. of a tax directly imposed on labour; secondly, they demand the abolition of the property qualification for Members of the Chamber of Representatives, in order themselves to obtain control over taxes and legislation. Here we see, in essence, motives similar to those which led to the Declaration of Independence of the United States,\(^65\) except that in Australia the conflict is initiated by the workers against the monopolists linked with the colonial bureaucracy. In the Melbourne Argus we read of big reform meetings and, on the other hand, of large-scale military preparations on the part of the Government. It says among other things:

> "At a meeting of 4,000 persons it was decided that the [...] license-fee is an imposition and an unjustifiable tax on free labour. This meeting therefore pledges itself to take immediate steps to abolish the same, by at once burning all their licenses. That in the event of any party being arrested for having no licenses. [...] the united people will [...] defend and protect them".\(^b\)

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\(^a\) Marx uses the English term, with the German equivalent in brackets.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) "Ballarat. Wednesday, November 29th, 1854", *The Argus* (Melbourne), No. 2359, December 1, 1854.— *Ed.*
On 30 November Commissioners Rede and Johnson appeared with cavalry and police at Ballarat and demanded with drawn swords and fixed bayonets that the gold diggers show their licences. These, mostly armed, held a mass meeting and resolved to resist the collection of the hated tax to the utmost. They refused to show their licences; they declared they had burnt them; the Riot Act \(66\) was read, and so the revolt was complete.

To describe the joint actions of the monopolists lording it in the local legislatures and the colonial bureaucracy in league with them, it is sufficient to mention that in 1854 government expenditures in Victoria amounted to £3,564,258 sterling, including a deficit of £1,085,896, that is of more than one-third of the total income. And in face of the present crisis, of the general bankruptcy, Sir Charles Hotham demands for the year 1855 a sum of £4,801,292 sterling. Victoria has barely 300,000 inhabitants, and of the above sum £1,860,830 sterling, that is £6 sterling per head, are intended for public works, namely roads, docks, quays, barracks, government buildings, customs offices, botanical gardens, government stables, etc. At this rate of £6 per head, the population of Great Britain would have to pay £168,000,000 sterling annually for public works alone, i.e. three times as much as their total tax. It is understandable that the working population is indignant at this supertaxation. It is likewise evident what good business the bureaucracy and the monopolists between them must make with such extensive public works defrayed at other people's expense.

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Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Karl Marx

THE ENGLISH PRESS ON THE LATE TSAR

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 109, March 6, 1855]

London, March 3. Today's entire daily and weekly press carries, of course, leading articles on the death of the Emperor of Russia—a—but all, without exception, commonplace and dull. The Times has at least attempted to inflate its style to the heights of Timur Tamburlaine by exaggerated grandiloquence. We shall single out only two passages, both of them compliments for Lord Palmerston. The strain which had hastened the Emperor's death had been exacerbated by the appointment as Prime Minister of Palmerston, the "worst enemy of the Czar". Between 1830 and 1840 (the first decade of Palmerston's foreign policy), the Tsar had abandoned his policy of encroachment and world domination. The former assertion is as much worth as the latter.

The Morning Advertiser, on the other hand, distinguishes itself by the discovery that Michael is the Emperor's eldest son and thus the legitimate heir to the throne. The Morning Post, Palmerston's private Moniteur, in its funeral oration, reveals to the English public that

"The Conference at Vienna will, of course, be delayed for a short time, and will be renewed under new auspices;" and that "this very afternoon [...] Lord Clarendon will have an interview with the Emperor Napoléon, at Boulogne, in which [...] the ideas of the two Governments, with reference to this sudden and momentous event, will be interchanged and discussed".

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a Nicholas I.—Ed.  
b This refers to the items "Scarcely had the intelligence..." and "The Emperor of Russia is dead...." in The Times, No. 21992, March 3, 1855.—Ed.  
c "No event of greater importance...", The Morning Advertiser, No. 19875, March 3, 1855. Actually, the eldest son of Nicholas I was Alexander.—Ed.  
d "Nicholas Paulovitch, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias...", The Morning Post, No. 25325, March 3, 1855.—Ed.
The Daily News does not believe in the peaceful consequences of this “sudden event” for the Western powers could not withdraw before the fall of Sevastopol and Russia could not withdraw after it.\footnote{\textit{The Death of the Czar. (Communicated)"}, \textit{The Daily News}, No. 2742, March 3, 1855. — \textit{Ed.}}

\[\text{[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 116, March 10, 1855]}\]

London, March 6. The death of Emperor Nicholas has been the occasion for strange claims in the press here. Dr. Granville is surpassed by Mr. James Lee, who has made no medical observations.\footnote{The second instalment was published without a heading.— \textit{Ed.}}

In today's \textit{Morning Advertiser} he writes: “On the 6th of February I sent a letter [...] to you, in which I said, that the Emperor of Russia would be a corpse at the expiration of three weeks, dating the time from my letter.”

In a postscript, the editor of \textit{The Morning Advertiser} states that his paper had in fact received Lee's letter, but consigned it to the wastepaper basket as the figment of a sick brain. Lee goes even further. He offers to prophesy to the \textit{Advertiser} the early demise of another potentate, on the one condition that his communication be published. Lee's predictions seem to be cheaper than the books of the Sibyl.

Similarly, the Emperor's death has led \textit{Urquhart} who, as Highland Scot, possesses the gift of second sight, to make several Pythian utterances,\footnote{D. Urquhart, “On the Death of the Emperor Nicholas. To the Editor of \textit{The Morning Advertiser}, \textit{The Morning Advertiser}, No. 19877, March 6, 1855. Instead of “reunion of Slavonic races” “reunion of Slavonic faces” is printed in Urquhart's article.— \textit{Ed.}} of which the following is the most characteristic and also the most intelligible:

“There was blood between him [Nicholas] and the Poles, who could not be left behind to be watched, and whose five hundred thousand warriors were required. And it was well understood that the restoration of the white double-headed eagle—the symbol of that reunion of the Slavonic races announced in the Cathedral of Moscow by his predecessor, Alexander, was not to take place in his day.”\footnote{D. Urquhart, “On the Death of the Emperor Nicholas. To the Editor of \textit{The Morning Advertiser}, \textit{The Morning Advertiser}, No. 19877, March 6, 1855. Instead of “reunion of Slavonic races” “reunion of Slavonic faces” is printed in Urquhart's article.— \textit{Ed.}}

Urquhart thinks that now the moment has come when Russia will be absorbed by Slavdom, as the Muscovite empire had earlier been absorbed by Russia.
London, March 6. Today’s *Morning Herald* has surprised London by the following announcement:

“We have excellent authority for stating that the French Emperor has remonstrated against the committee for inquiring into the conduct of the war, and that he has said, that, in the event of its continuing to sit, the armies of the two nations cannot act together, although they may act for the same object. In order [...] to satisfy Louis Napoleon, without affronting the English people, a dissolution of Parliament will [...] take place\(^a\) as soon as possible.”

Without attributing too much importance to this paragraph in the *Herald*, we record it as one of the many symptoms which indicate that *secret forces on both sides of the Channel are working to bring about a dissolution of the Anglo-French alliance*.

In this context the statements made by ex-minister *Sir James Graham* should be recalled\(^b\): under pressure from the “Committee of Inquiry our Admiral” would be forced to reveal all the considerations which led to the postponement of the blockade, and the inquiry would include our relations with our great and powerful ally at a time when it is of the utmost importance that there should not be the least misunderstanding.

*Sidney Herbert*: He challenged the Committee to get to the bottom of the affair without taking the risk of insulting our army in the Crimea and possibly shaking the confidence of our allies. Unless one of its members were able to check the Committee when


\(^b\) The speeches of Graham, Herbert and Gladstone in the House of Commons on February 23 were reported in *The Times*, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) J. W. D. Dundas.—*Ed.*
it stepped on dangerous ground, great injustice would be done, and even the officers summoned by it might perhaps be sacrificed, since incriminating questions might be put to them, while they would not be permitted to answer because in so doing they might have to make dangerous and delicate revelations. He for one thought it his duty to prevent officers of the British army being placed in a position where they would be made the object of accusations while their hands were tied and they were unable to defend themselves.

Gladstone: Among other things, a committee would have to examine why a road from Balaklava had not been constructed earlier! If the Committee did not investigate this, it would achieve nothing. If however it investigated this question, the reply would be: shortage of labour. If it then asked what caused this shortage of labour, the reply would be that the men were digging trenches and that these were extensive owing to the proportion in which the lines had been distributed between the French and the English. I further declare that an investigation would be empty pretence unless you probed the question of the roads, and, if you probed that, the defence of the accused parties would directly disturb the most intimate relations between England and France.

Understandably these ministerial statements have forced the widely scattered seeds of distrust into abundant growth. National pride had already been severely wounded by the relegation of the British army in the Crimea to guard duty at Balaklava. Then came the semi-official article in the Moniteur with its “imperial” remarks on the British Constitution. It called forth caustic replies in the weekly press here. Then came the publication of the Brussels Mémoire, in which Louis Bonaparte is represented as the originator of the Crimean expedition on the one hand, and of the concessions to Austria on the other. By their ruthlessness, the comments on this Mémoire—as, for instance, that in The Morning Advertiser—remind one of the “Letters of an Englishman” on the coup d’etat of December 2. The following extract from the Chartist

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[a] Le Moniteur universel, No. 48, February 17, 1855.—Ed.

[b] The reference is to the anonymous pamphlet De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient., published in Brussels in 1855, which criticised the conduct of the Crimean campaign. The pamphlet was attributed, among other writers, to Prince Napoleon (Jérôme Bonaparte, Jr.).—Ed.

[c] The comparison is between the article “Secret History of the Crimean Expedition” (The Morning Advertiser, No. 19875, March 3, 1855) and the anonymous “Letters of an Englishman” by A. Richards, which were published in The Times between December 1851 and November 1852 and appeared in book form in 1852.—Ed.
organ, *The People's Paper*, will illustrate the repercussions of all this in the true popular press :

"He [Bonaparte] it was that lured England to the Crimea. [...] Our army, once in that snare, was placed by him in such a position, that it broke the edge of Russia’s strength before that strength could reach his own. [...] At Alma, at Balaklava, at Inkermann, at Sebastopol, the British were played into the post of danger. They had to bear the brunt—they had to suffer the chief loss; [...] England engaged to send only one-third as many men as France. That one-third had to fight nearly the whole of the battles. That one-third had to take more than half the lines before Sebastopol. Our army was destroyed, because they could not get the food and clothes which lay rotting at Balaklava. They could not get them because there was no road from Balaklava to Sebastopol, and there was no road from Balaklava to Sebastopol because Napoleon insisted that the British with less than one-third of the force [...] should do more than half the work in the trenches; and, therefore, they had no men to spare to make the road.[...] This is the secret at which Graham, Sidney Herbert, and Gladstone hinted.... Thus he, Napoleon, has deliberately murdered 44,000 of our soldiers, etc."

All these signs of suspicious vexation with the French ally gain importance because Lord Palmerston is at the head of the government—a man who on each occasion has reached his position by climbing up the ladder of the French alliance, then suddenly turned this alliance into almost unavoidable war between France and England. Thus it was in the Turko-Syrian affair of 1840, and the treaty of July 1569 with which he crowned his ten-year-old alliance with France. In reference to this, Sir Robert Peel remarked in 1842 that

"he had never clearly understood why the alliance with France of which the noble lord had always pretended to be so proud, had been broken."

And thus, once again, in 1847, on the occasion of the Spanish marriages. At the time, it was asserted by Palmerston—who, in 1846, was allowed to resume his post only after he had paid his respects to Louis Philippe, become reconciled to him with great ostentation, and flattered the Frenchman in a speech in the House of Commons—that it was Louis Philippe who had dissolved the alliance because the Treaty of Utrecht had been violated (a treaty lapsed in 1793 and never renewed since that time) and because he had committed an “act of perfidy” against the English Crown. As to the “act of perfidy” it was really committed, but, as the documents

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* The extract is from the speech delivered by Ernest Jones at St Martin’s Hall on February 27, 1855. Marx quotes from a report published in *The People’s Paper*, No. 148, March 3, 1855.—*Ed.*

subsequently published proved, Palmerston had manoeuvred the French Court into this act of perfidy in the most cunning manner so as to obtain a *pretext* for the break. While the wily Louis Philippe thought he was outwitting him, he simply fell into the carefully laid trap of the “facetious” viscount. The February revolution alone prevented the outbreak of war between England and France at that time.

Written on March 6, 1855

First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 115, March 9, 1855

Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
London, March 7. The rumour of an impending dissolution of Parliament, on the pretext that the Committee of Inquiry was compromising the French alliance, seems to be correct. A correspondent of *The Morning Advertiser* remarks in this connection:

"But who made the committee an open one? Lord Palmerston, who, they say, will dissolve the House [...]. Mr. Roebuck had demanded and compelled an inquest, and he desired secrecy—Lord Palmerston had refused and had been driven to an inquest, and he was for publicity. [...] He compels the Committee to pursue the course most obnoxious to our French Ally. That obnoxiousness then is to enable the Minister to dissolve the House, extinguish the Inquiry, and laugh in his sleeve at both!" \(^a\)

In a leading article on the same subject, *The Morning Herald* says, *inter alia*:

"When the allied armies took up their positions before Sebastopol the English contingent was the stronger of the two, and the subsequent destruction of our army was to be attributed entirely to the want of reserves in the Mediterranean and of an organised militia at home; from which causes it became impossible to supply the English army with those reinforcements [...]. The attempt to involve the name of our [...] allies in the discussion is an almost undisguised effort, on the part of desperate and unprincipled men, to screen themselves from that inquiry which they well know must be fatal to their future political existence. [...] Lord Clarendon has unconstitutionally sought an interview with the Emperor of the French, for the sole purpose of extracting from him some declaration of opinion which might be tortured and twisted into a disapproval of an inquiry [...]. Having obtained this, [...] it is the intention of these patriotic Ministers to attempt to intimidate

\(^a\) "The Reported Dissolution", *The Morning Advertiser*, No. 19878, March 7, 1855.— *Ed.*
the House of Commons [...] by a threat of dissolution, and an appeal to the country upon a cry that 'the French alliance is in danger!'".

It is obvious that, if this pretext of the English Government serves to get rid of the Committee of Inquiry, it serves no less to jeopardise the French alliance and so to prepare for the very thing which it pretends to be preventing. The conviction that the Committee was being abandoned because it would unearth "delicate and dangerous" mysteries, compromising to the French ally, effectively compromises that ally. The suppression of the Committee would speak more loudly against him than could the Committee itself. Besides, the slightest acquaintance with the tides of public opinion in England must convince anyone that consciousness of so great a concession to a foreign state as suppressing a parliamentary committee, or dissolving Parliament at Bonaparte's alleged request, would lead at the next opportunity to a terrible reaction against French influence in an attempt to redress the balance.

We have compiled General Sir de Lacy Evans' statements from reports on the first two sittings of the Committee of Inquiry. At Malta, whither a commissary had been sent some time before the army, he was surprised that no purchase of mules was made. No adequate preparation was made at Scutari for killing cattle or baking. Some of the Treasury regulations at this time proved very inconvenient. He firmly believed the war was commenced under the delusion that matters would be settled without any explosion of gunpowder, and that there was no necessity for any magazines at all. Though the Commissariat was under the control of the commander, yet it was closely connected also with the Treasury (and therefore with the Prime Minister), and the officers of the Commissariat must have been given to understand that it was extravagant to make the disbursements necessary for a real war. At Varna, hardly any preparations had been made for looking after the wounded. Evidently the predominant impression had been that this would be a war without wounds. Arrangements were not made to enable the army to take the field at once. When the Russians crossed the Danube Omer Pasha applied for assistance, and the answer was that the army had not the means of transport, which ought to have been provided long before. He

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a "A more audacious and unconstitutional attempt...", The Morning Herald, No. 22373, March 7, 1855.—Ed.

b Published in The Times, No. 21994, March 6, and No. 21995, March 7, 1855.—Ed.
thought the Government was still waiting for notes and protocols from Vienna, and no great exertions were made to put the army in a condition to move; it was, of course, the Government, not the Commissariat, that was responsible for this sort of delay. The Russians were carrying on the siege of Silistria, and still the army was not in readiness to move. The two departments entrusted with the procurement of food supplies were the Commissariat and the Department of the Quartermaster General. Clashes with the Commissariat were the order of the day. Its officials might have been efficient clerks in the Treasury: in fact, they spent most of their time writing letters to the Treasury. In the field they proved useless. Even eighteen miles from Varna, there was the greatest difficulty in getting provisions. There the Commissariat proved to be so short of staff that he had to lend 100 non-commissioned officers for service in the department. Mortality among troops at Varna was due mainly to low morale, a consequence of their trying and prolonged inactivity.

As to the situation of the troops in the Crimea, de Lacy partly repeats what is already common knowledge—lack of food, of clothing, of wooden huts, etc., etc. As to detail, we merely quote the following statements:

"Filder, as old as the hills, in charge of the Commissariat as far back as the Pyrenean campaign and now Quartermaster General never consulted with him as to the wants of his [Evans'] division; it was his duty to do so; he [Evans] wanted him to do it, but Mr. Filder declined. Mr. Filder was under the direct orders of Lord Raglan, but, of course, he carried on a correspondence with the Treasury." "It was very inconvenient that the cavalry and artillery horses should have been employed for the transport of forage. The consequence was that his [Evans'] guns were latterly not more than half hosed." "The road from Balaklava harbour to the camp had been frightfully churned up and waterlogged. [...] The work of 1,000 men for ten days would have secured a road from Balaklava [...] but he believed that all the men who could be spared [...] were set to work in the trenches".

Finally, on the melting away of the British army before Sevastopol, Evans declares

"...his conviction that neither the deficiency in the supply of clothes, food, or fuel would have produced the shocking sickness and death in the army, had not the troops been overworked in the trenches. It was the fatigue of the men that was so injurious. From the first the work cut out for them was entirely beyond their numerical strength. The overwork during the nights was decidedly the main cause of the suffering of the army".

Written on March 7, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 117, March 10, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, March 7. Today The Morning Post, Palmerston’s private Moniteur, prints the well-known Brussels Mémoire in an English translation with a brief foreword according to which Prince Napoleon is supposed to be the pamphlet’s author. Simultaneously the same paper prints a leading article full of vicious attacks on Napoleon Bonaparte, making the fulsomely often repeated point that “only a Russian spy” could be the author of the Mémoire.

Under the pretext of standing up for Louis Bonaparte against his cousin and of preserving the memory of the unsullied Achille Leroy, alias Florimond, alias de S[ain]t-Arnaud, the Post obviously only means to accumulate material for Anglo-French collisions. Saint-Arnaud was one of those saints who turn up in the calendar of French chevaliers d’industrie at any given period, e.g. Saint-Germain, Saint-Georges, etc. Credit is due to The Morning Post for having canonical them and transformed them into saints befitting their station. The assertion that the Mémoire made “military” revelations to the Russians is completely absurd. Neither in England nor in America or Germany have critics waited for the Mémoire to present the Crimean expedition as a failure. The Mémoire has added not one syllable to criticism made so far, although it does have the merit of supplying informal portraits of the mediocrities who were laying down the law at Sevastopol. It is

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a The reference is to the anonymous pamphlet De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient... (see this volume, p. 70) which was published in English under the title “Memoir Addressed to the Government of H. M. the Emperor Napoleon III” in The Morning Post, No. 25328, March 7, 1855. The leading article mentioned below was printed in the same issue.—Ed.
only in the interest of the Russians to keep alive illusions about the Crimean expedition, and the grandiloquence with which the Post holds forth about Russian agents and Russian spies reminds one of Aeschines, who similarly boasted that he was the first to see through the king of Macedonia’s plans, while reproaching Demosthenes with having been bribed by Philip. However, we are, of course, far from presenting Prince Napoleon Bonaparte as a Demosthenes.

Written on March 7, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 118, March 11, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, March 13. Ireland has revenged herself upon England, socially—by bestowing an Irish quarter on every English industrial maritime or commercial town of any size, and politically—by presenting the English Parliament with an “Irish Brigade”. In 1833, Daniel O'Connell decried the Whigs as “base, bloody and brutal”. In 1835, he became the most efficient tool of the Whigs; although the English majority was opposed to the Melbourne Administration, it remained in office from April 1835 to August 1841 because of the support it received from O'Connell and his Irish Brigade. What transformed the O'Connell of 1833 into the O'Connell of 1835? It was an agreement, known as the Lichfield-House Contract, according to which the Whig Cabinet granted government patronage in Ireland to O'Connell and O'Connell promised the Whig Cabinet the votes of the Irish Brigade in Parliament. “King Dan's” Repeal agitation began immediately the Whigs were overthrown, but as soon as the Tories were defeated “King Dan” sank again to the level of a common advocate. The influence of the Irish Brigade by no means came to an end with O'Connell's death. On the contrary, it became evident that this influence did not depend on the talent of one person, but was a result of the general state of affairs. The Tories and Whigs, the big traditional parties in the English Parliament, were more or less equally balanced. It is thus not surprising that the new, numerically small factions, the Manchester School and the Irish Brigade, which took their seats in the reformed Parliament, should

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a Marx uses the English word “Repeal” here and below.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English word here.—Ed.
play a decisive role and be able to turn the scale. Hence the importance of the “Irish quarter” in the English Parliament. After O’Connell left the scene it was no longer possible to stir the Irish masses with the “Repeal” slogan. The “Catholic” problem,77 too, could be used only occasionally. Since the Catholic Emancipation it could no longer serve as a permanent propaganda theme. Thus the Irish politicians were compelled to do what O’Connell had always avoided and refused to do, that is, to explore the real cause of the Irish malady and to make landed property relations and their reform the election slogan, that is to say a slogan that would help them to get into the House of Commons. But having taken their seats in the House, they used the rights of the tenants, etc.—just as formerly the Repeal—as a means to conclude a new Lichfield-House Contract.

The Irish Brigade had overthrown the Derby ministry and had obtained a seat, even though a minor one, in the coalition government. How did it use its position? It helped the coalition to burke measures designed to reform landed ownership in Ireland. The Tories themselves, having taken the patriotism of the Irish Brigade for granted, had decided to propose these measures in order to gain the support of the Irish M.P.s. Palmerston, who is an Irishman by birth and knows his “Irish quarter”, has renewed the Lichfield-House Contract of 1835 and has broadened its scope. He has appointed Keogh, the chief of the Brigade, Attorney-General\(^a\) of Ireland, Fitzgerald, also a liberal Catholic M.P. for Ireland, has been made Solicitor-General, and a third member of the Brigade\(^b\) has become legal counsel to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, so that the judicial general staff of the Irish government is now composed entirely of Catholics and Irishmen. Monsell, the Clerk of Ordnance in the coalition government, has been reappointed by Palmerston after some hesitation, although—as Muntz, deputy for Birmingham and an arms manufacturer, rightly observed—Monsell cannot distinguish a musket from a needle-gun. Palmerston has advised the lieutenants of the counties always to give preference to the protégés of Irish priests close to the Irish Brigade when nominating colonels and other high-ranking officers in the Irish militia. The fact that Sergeant Shee has gone over to the government side, and also that the Catholic Bishop of Athlone has pushed through the re-election of Keogh and that moreover

\(^a\) Here and below Marx gives the titles in English: Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Lord Lieutenant, Clerk of Ordnance, Sergeant.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) G. W. F. Howard.—\textit{Ed.}
the Catholic clergy has promoted the re-election of Fitzgerald shows that Palmerston's policy is already producing an effect. Wherever the lower ranks of the Catholic clergy have taken their "Irish patriotism" seriously and have stood up to those members of the Irish Brigade who deserted to the government, they have been rebuked by their bishops who are well aware of the diplomatic secret.

A protestant Tory newspaper\(^a\) exclaims in distress: "It is perfectly understood between Lord Palmerston [...] and [...] the Irish priests, that if Lord Palmerston hands over Ireland to the priests, the priests will return members who will hand over England to Lord Palmerston".

The Whigs use the Irish Brigade to dominate the British Parliament and they toss posts and salaries to the Brigade; the Catholic clergy permits one side to buy and sell to the other to sell on condition that both sides acknowledge the power of the clergy and help to extend and strengthen it. It is, however, a very remarkable phenomenon that in the same measure as the Irish influence in the political sphere grows in England, the Celtic influence in the social sphere decreases in Ireland. Both the "Irish quarter" in Parliament and the Irish clergy seem to be equally unaware of the fact that behind their back the Irish society is being radically transformed by an Anglo-Saxon revolution. In the course of this revolution the Irish agricultural system is being replaced by the English system, the system of small tenures by big tenures, and the modern capitalist is taking the place of the old landowner.

The chief factors which prepared the ground for this transformation are: 1847, the year of famine, which killed nearly one million Irishmen; emigration to America and Australia, which removed another million from the land and still carries off thousands; the unsuccessful insurrection of 1848, which finally destroyed Ireland's faith in herself; and lastly the Act of Parliament which exposed the estates of the debt-ridden old Irish aristocrats to the hammer of the auctioneer or bailiff, thus driving them from the land just as starvation swept away their small tenants, subtenants and cottagers.\(^78\)

Written on March 13, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 127, March 16, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

\(^{a}\) The Morning Herald, No. 22378, March 13, 1855.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE RESULTS IN THE CRIMEA

The illusions with which official incapacity and national self-love have surrounded the military operations in the Crimea, now begin to melt away, along with the sheet of snow which has covered the scene of action through the winter months. The recent pamphlet of Napoleon Bonaparte says distinctly, that while in the Crimea everything went wrong, the generals-in-chief

"must have been in possession of orders from their governments enjoining them to pass under silence and to dissimulate the obstacles which opposed themselves to the taking of Sevastopol".

This supposition is fully borne out by the reports of these generals, and especially by the repeated reports which they caused to be sent, indirectly, from the camp, as to the assault being fixed on such and such a day. Everybody recollects that from the 5th of November down to the beginning of March the European public was kept in constant expectation of this grand and final spectacle. Though continually postponed, every adjournment was to be for a short time only, and public curiosity was but increased by it. But
now matters begin to take a different turn, and the length of the siege has at last called into existence a sort of public opinion in the camp, based upon the views publicly expressed by officers who know something about these matters, and the gentlemen of the staff are no longer able to whisper about the camp, with all the importance and oracularity inherent to their position, that on such and such a day the assault will take place and the town will be overwhelmed. Every private now knows better. The nature of the defenses, the superiority of the enemy's fire, the disproportion of the besieging forces to the task before them, and, above all, the decisive importance of the North Fort, are by this time too well understood to admit of such preposterous tales being successfully repeated.

About the end of February, the Allies are said to have had before Sevastopol 58,000 French, 10,000 English, and 10,000 Turks—all together about 80,000 men, which agrees pretty nearly with our own computations at various epochs. Supposing they had even 90,000 men, they would still be unable to maintain the siege with one portion, and to detach the other upon an offensive movement against the Russians at Bakshisera; for this field army of the Allies could not arrive before Bakshisera with more than 40,000 men, while the Russians could bring at least 60,000 against them in an open field, where the advantages of the position between Inkermann and Balaklava would not exist, and where, therefore, the moral superiority of the allied army would be considerably affected by maneuvers which could not be effectually employed by superior numbers of Russians either at Balaklava or at Inkermann. Thus, the Allies must remain besieged on their Chersonese, until they are strong enough to advance beyond the Chernaya with something like 100,000 men. This shows the vicious circle in which they move: the more men they bring into this pestilential mouse-trap, the more they lose by sickness; and yet, the only way to get successfully out of it, is to send more men thither.

The other expedient they have hit upon to get out of the

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a Part of this sentence and the preceding sentence do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.

b The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: "We have even had reports of letters by English officers which permit no doubt on this point."—Ed.

c The end of the sentence beginning with the words "which agrees..." does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.

d The end of this sentence beginning with the words "and where, therefore the moral superiority..." does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
The Results in the Crimea scrape—the Turkish Expedition to Eupatoria—now turns out to be a perfect repetition of the original Crimean blunder. The Turks landed at Eupatoria are far too weak to advance into the interior. The intrenchments around the place appear to be so extensive that an army of some 20,000 men is required for their defense. The reports of the “battle” of February 17, before Eupatoria, lead to the conclusion that at least one-half of the 40,000 men assembled there found active employment in the defense. The extent of an intrenched camp intended to shelter 40,000 men must, besides, be such that about one-half of the men will be required for active service in case of an attack. Thus the town will require about 20,000 men for its defense, and 20,000 only remain disposable for field operations. But 20,000 men cannot venture more than a few miles out of Eupatoria without exposing themselves to all sorts of flank and rear attacks from the Russians, and to the risk of having their communications with the town intercepted. Now the Russians, having a double line of retreat either toward Perekop or toward Sympheropol, and being, besides, in their own country, can always avoid a decisive action with the 20,000 Turks who may emerge from Eupatoria.

Thus, 10,000 Russians, placed at a day’s march from the town, will always be able to keep in check the 40,000 Turks concentrated in it; if they retreat for another ten or twelve miles they will be a match for any number of Turks who can venture to advance to that distance from their base of operations. In other words, Eupatoria is another Kalafat; but with this difference, that Kalafat had the Danube in its rear, and not the Black Sea, and that Kalafat was a defensive position, while Eupatoria is an offensive one. If 30,000 men at Kalafat could maintain a successful defense, with occasional and equally successful offensive sallies, extending to a limited distance, 40,000 men at Eupatoria are far too many to defend a place which about 1,000 English and French held for five months; while they are far too few for any offensive operations. The consequence is, that a Russian brigade, or at the outside a Russian division will be abundantly sufficient to check the whole Turkish force at Eupatoria.

The so-called battle of Eupatoria was a mere reconnaissance on the part of the Russians. They advanced, 25,000 to 30,000 strong, against the place from the north-west, the only available side, as the south is sheltered by the sea, and the east by a marshy lake, called Sasik. The country to the north-west of the town is formed

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\[a\] This sentence does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung.* — Ed.
by low, undulating ground, which, to judge from the maps and from the experience of this action, does not command the town within effective field-gun range. The Russians, with a force inferior by 10,000 men to the garrison, and exposed besides, on both flanks, and especially on the right one, to the fire from the men-of-war in the bay, could never have had any serious intention of taking the place by assault. They consequently confined themselves to an energetic reconnaissance, opening a cannonade on the whole of the line, at a distance which precluded the possibility of serious damage; they then advanced their batteries nearer and nearer, keeping their columns as much as possible out of range, and then moved up these columns as if for attack so as to force the Turks to show their strength, and made one attack at a point where the shelter afforded by the monuments and shrubbery of a burying-ground allowed of their approaching close to the defenses. Having ascertained the situation and strength of the intrenchments, as well as the approximative numbers of the garrison, they retired, as every other army, judiciously commanded, would have done. Their object was attained; that their losses would be greater than those of the Turks, they knew beforehand. This very simple affair has been magnified by the allied commanders into a glorious victory. People must be very much in want of something to boast of, if they attempt to impose upon the public in such a barefaced way.¹

It certainly was a great mistake that the Russians allowed the Allies to maintain themselves in Eupatoria for five months, until the Turks came. A Russian brigade, with a sufficient number of twelve-pounders, might have driven them into the sea, and by a few slight earthworks on the shore, might even have kept the men-of-war at a respectful distance. If the allied fleets had detached an overwhelming force to Eupatoria, the place could have been burned down, and thus made valueless as a future base of operations for a landing force. But as it is, the Russians may be quite satisfied with having left Eupatoria in the possession of the Allies. Forty thousand Turks, the last remnant of the only respectable army Turkey ever possessed, blocked up in a narrow camp, where 10,000 Russians can keep them in check, and where they are exposed to all the diseases and sufferings of men crowded closely together—these forty thousand paralyzed Turks are a not inconsiderable deduction from the offensive forces of the Allies.

¹ Instead of this sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "What does this prove but the great demand for and the small supply of real victories?" — Ed.
The French and English, after having lost 50,000 to 60,000 men, are still besieged on the Heracleatic Chersonese, and the Turks are besieged at Eupatoria, while the Russians are in full communication with both the North and South sides of Sevastopol, whose defenses are much stronger than ever.\textsuperscript{a} Such is the glorious result of five months' experimenting in the Crimea!\textsuperscript{b}

Written about March 16, 1855

First published in the \textit{New-York Daily Tribune}, No. 4353, April 2, 1855, reprinted in the \textit{New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune}, No. 1028, April 3, 1855 and the \textit{New-York Weekly Tribune}, No. 708, April 7, 1855 as a leading article; the German version was first published in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}, No. 131, March 19, 1855, marked with the sign ×

\textsuperscript{a} In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the words "after having lost 50,000 to 60,000 men" and "whose defenses are much stronger than ever" do not occur.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} further has: "There are also military and political questions to be taken into account, which we shall consider in our next letter."—\textit{Ed.}
We published the other day some interesting extracts from the pamphlet lately issued by Prince Napoleon, which, we doubt not, were duly considered by our readers. That pamphlet\(^a\) reveals the striking and most important fact, that the Crimean Expedition was an original invention of Louis Bonaparte himself; that he elaborated it in all its details, without communicating with anybody; that he sent it in his own handwriting to Constantinople, in order to avoid the objections of Marshal Vaillant. Since all this is known, a great portion of the flagrant military blunders connected with this expedition is explained by the dynastic necessities of its author. In the council of war at Varna it had to be forced upon the Admirals and Generals present, by St. Arnaud, appealing, in the most direct manner, to the authority of the “Emperor,” while that potentate, in return, publicly branded all opposing opinions as “timid counsels.” Once in the Crimea, Raglan’s really timid proposal to march to Balaklava was readily adopted by St. Arnaud, as it led directly, if not into, at least to somewhere near, the gates of Sevastopol. The frantic efforts to push the siege, though without sufficient means—the eagerness to open the fire, which made the French neglect the solidity of their works to such a degree that their batteries were silenced by the enemy in a couple of hours—the consequent overworking of the troops in the trenches, which is now proved to have done as much as anything else toward the destruction of the British army—the inconsiderate and useless cannonade from the 17th of October to the 5th of November—the neglect of all defensive works, and

\(^a\) De la conduite de la guerre d’Orient…. —Ed.
even of a sufficient occupation of the ridge toward the Chernaya, which ended in the losses of Balaklava and Inkermann—
—all this is now as clearly explained as can be wished for. The Bonaparte dynasty was bound to take Sevastopol at any cost, and at the shortest notice; and the allied armies had to do it. Canrobert, if successful, would be made a Marshal of France, Count, Duke, Prince, whatever he liked, with unlimited powers to commit "irregularities" in financial matters; while if unlucky, he would be a traitor to the Emperor, and would have to go and join his former comrades, Lamoricière, Bedeau, and Changarnier, in their exile. And Raglan was just enough of an old woman to give way to his interested colleague.

All this, however, is but the least important feature of the consequences incumbent upon this Imperial plan of operations. Nine French divisions, equal to eighty-one battalions, have been engaged in this hopeless affair. The greatest efforts, the most lavish sacrifices have accomplished nothing; Sevastopol is stronger than ever; the French trenches are, as we now learn from authentic sources, still fully four hundred yards from the Russian works, while the British trenches are twice that distance; Gen. Niel, sent by Bonaparte to look into the siege works, declares that an assault is not to be thought of; he has changed the principal points of attack from the French to the British side, thereby not only causing delay in the siege, but directing the main attack toward a suburb which, even if taken, is still separated from the town by the Inner Harbor Creek. In short, device after device, dodge after dodge is resorted to, to keep up, not the hope, but the mere appearance of a hope of success. And when matters are come to this pitch, when a general war on the Continent is imminent, when a fresh expedition to the Baltic is preparing—an expedition which must do something this season, and therefore must be far stronger in land-troops than that of 1854—at this moment, obstinacy goads Louis Bonaparte to engage five more divisions of infantry in this Crimean slough, where men, and even whole regiments, vanish as by enchantment! And, as if that were not sufficient, he has made up his mind to go there himself, and to see the final assault carried out by his soldiers.

This is a situation to which the first strategic experiment of Louis Bonaparte has reduced France. The man who, with some sort of reason, thinks he is bound to be a great Captain, approaching, in some degree, the founder of his dynasty, turns out at the very beginning a mere presumptuous piece of incapacity. With very limited information, he forms the plan of the
expedition at some 3,000 miles from the spot, works it out in its details, and sends it off secretly and without consulting anybody, to his General-in-Chief, who, though but a few hundred miles from the point of attack, is yet equally ignorant as to the nature of the obstacles and the force of resistance likely to be encountered. The Expedition once commenced, disaster follows disaster; even victory is worse than sterile, and the only result obtained is the destruction of the expeditionary army itself. Napoleon, in his best days, would never have persisted in such an undertaking. In such a case, he used to find some fresh device, to lead his troops on a sudden to a fresh point of attack, and by a brilliant maneuver, crowned with success, make even temporary defeat appear as but contributive to final victory. What if he had resisted to the last at Aspern? It was only in the time of his decline, when the thunderstroke of 1812 had shaken his confidence in himself, that his energy of will turned into blind obstinacy, that, as at Leipsic, he clung to the last to positions which his military judgment must have told him were completely false. But here is just the difference between the two Emperors; what Napoleon ended with, Louis Napoleon begins with.

That Louis Bonaparte has the firm intention to go to the Crimea, and to take Sevastopol himself, is very likely. He may delay his departure, but nothing short of peace will shake his resolution. Indeed, his personal fate is bound up with this expedition, which is his first military effort. But, from the day he actually sets out, the fourth and greatest French revolution may be said to date its beginning. Everybody in Europe feels this. Everybody dissuades him. A shudder runs through the ranks of the French middle-class when this departure to the Crimea is mentioned. But, the hero of Strassburg is inflexible. A gambler all his life, a gambler accustomed of late to the very heaviest of stakes, he stakes his all upon the one card of his “star,” against the most fearful odds. Besides, he knows well enough that the hopes of the bourgeoisie, to escape the crisis by retaining him in Paris, are entirely hollow. Whether he be there or not, it is the fate of the French Empire, the fate of the existing social order of things, which is still approaching its decision in the trenches before Sevastopol. If successful there against hope, by his presence he will overstep the barrier between a highwayman and a hero, at least in the opinion of Europe; unsuccessful, his Empire is gone under all circumstances. That he calculates upon the possibility of such an

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a Saint-Arnaud.—*Ed.*
event, is shown by his taking with him his rival and heir presumptive, the young Jérôme Bonaparte, in the livery of a Lieutenant-General.

For the moment, this Crimean Expedition serves nobody better than Austria. This slough which drains off by army-corps after army-corps the strength of both France and Russia, must, if the struggle before Sevastopol lasts a few months longer, leave Austria the main arbiter of the Continent, where her 600,000 bayonets remain disposable, in a compact mass, to be cast as an overwhelming weight into the scale. But, fortunately, there is a counterpoise against this Austrian supremacy. The moment France is launched again in the revolutionary career, this Austrian force dissolves itself into its discordant elements. Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Italians, Croats are loosened from the forced bond which ties them together, and instead of the undetermined and hap-hazard alliances and antagonisms of today, Europe will again be divided into two great camps with distinct banners and new issues. Then the struggle will be only between the Democratic Revolution on one side and the Monarchical Counter-Revolution on the other.

Written about March 16, 1855

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Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

CRITICISM OF THE FRENCH CONDUCT
OF THE WAR

London, March 17. Now that the pamphlet of Jérôme Bonaparte (junior)\textsuperscript{a} has revealed the fact that the Crimean expedition was an invention of Louis Napoleon himself, that he had worked it out in every detail without consulting others, that he had sent it to Constantinople in his own handwriting in order to avoid the objections of Marshal Vaillant—since all this has become known, a large proportion of the most flagrant military blunders of this expedition is explained by the dynastic needs of its author. In the war council at Varna it had to be forced upon the generals and admirals present by S[ain]t-Arnaud’s direct appeal to the authority of the “Emperor”, who, in turn, publicly branded the opposing views as “timid counsel”. Once in the Crimea, Raglan’s really “timid counsel”—to march to Balaklava—was eagerly adopted by St.-Arnaud, as it led, although not directly into Sevastopol, at least close to its gates. The frantic efforts to push the siege ahead, though without sufficient means; the eagerness to open fire which made the French neglect the solidity of their works to such a degree that their batteries were silenced by the enemy in a couple of hours; the over-exertion of the troops in the communication trenches which is now proved to have contributed as much towards the destruction of the British army as did the Commisariat, the Transport Service, the Medical Department, etc.; the rash and useless cannonade from October 17 to November 5; the neglect of all defensive works—all this has been sufficiently explained. The Bonaparte dynasty required the capture of Sevastopol, and in the shortest time; and the allied army was to

\textsuperscript{a} De la conduite de la guerre d’Orient....—Ed.
carry it out. Canrobert, if successful, would be made Marshal of France, Count, Duke, Prince—whatever he desired, with unlimited powers in financial matters. If unsuccessful, his career was at an end. Raglan was enough of an old woman to give way to the self-interests of his colleague.

These, however, are not the most important consequences of the imperatorial plan of operation. Nine French divisions or 81 battalions have been engaged in this hopeless affair. It is recognised to be almost hopeless; the greatest efforts, the most lavish sacrifices have accomplished nothing; Sevastopol is stronger than ever; the French trenches, as we now know from an authentic source, are still fully four hundred yards from the Russian works, while the British trenches are twice as far away. General Niel, sent by Bonaparte to inspect the siege works, has declared that an assault is not to be thought of; he has shifted the principal point of attack from the French to the British side, thereby causing not only a delay in the siege, but directing the main attack toward a suburb which, even if taken, is still separated from the town by the inner harbour. In short, there is plan after plan, dodge after dodge, to keep up, not the hope of success, but the mere semblance of such a hope. And when things have come to this pass, when a general war on the continent is imminent, when a new expedition to the Baltic is being prepared—an expedition which, this time, must do something and therefore must dispose of far more landing troops than in 1854—at this moment Bonaparte is sending five fresh infantry divisions to the Crimean swamp where men vanish and regiments disappear as if by magic. Indeed, he is determined to go there himself, and go there he will, unless an improbable peace or significant events at the Polish border decide otherwise. That is the situation to which Bonaparte's first strategic experiment has reduced Bonaparte and "imperial" France. What drives him is not only obstinacy, but the fatalistic instinct that the destiny of the French empire will be decided in the trenches at Sevastopol. Up to now, there has been no Marengo to justify the second edition of the 18th Brumaire. 86

It may be regarded as historical irony that, however meticulously the restored empire copies its model, it is forced everywhere to do the opposite of what Napoleon did. Napoleon attacked the very heart of the states on which he made war; present-day France has attacked Russia in a cul-de-sac. It did not aim at great military operations, but at a fortunate coup de main, a surprise attack, an adventure. In this change of purpose lies the whole difference between the first and the second French empire and their
respective representatives. Napoleon used to enter the capitals of modern Europe as conqueror. His successor moved French garrisons into the capitals of ancient Europe, Rome, Constantinople and Athens under various pretenses—the protection of the Pope, the protection of the Sultan, the protection of the King of the Hellenes—a—in fact, there has been no increase in power, but merely a dispersal of strength. Napoleon's art consisted in concentration, that of his successor in dispersal. When Napoleon was obliged to conduct a war in two different theatres, as in his wars against Austria, he concentrated by far the greater part of his fighting force along the decisive line of operation (in the wars with Austria this was the line between Strasburg and Vienna), while leaving a comparatively minor fighting force in the secondary theatre of war (Italy), confident that, even if his troops should be defeated here, his own successes along the principal line would hinder the progress of the enemy army more certainly than any direct resistance. His successor, however, scatters the fighting force of France over many areas, concentrating a part in the very place where the least significant results—if any—must be achieved with the greatest sacrifices. Besides the troops in Rome, Athens, Constantinople and the Crimea, an auxiliary force is to be despatched to the Polish border in Austria, and another to the Baltic Sea. Thus the French army must be active in at least three theatres of war, separated from each other by at least a thousand miles. By this plan, the entire French fighting force would be as good as disposed of even before the war had seriously begun in Europe. Napoleon, if he found that an undertaking he had begun was not feasible (as at Aspern), would rather than persist in it, find some new turn, lead his troops in a surprise move to a fresh point of attack, and, by a brilliant manoeuvre crowned with success, make even temporary defeat appear to be but a contribution to final victory. It was only at the time of his decline, after 1812 had shaken his self-confidence, that the energy of his will turned into blind obstinacy which made him hold on to positions (as at Leipzig) which his military judgment must have rejected. His successor, however, is forced to begin where his predecessor ended. What with one was the result of unaccountable defeats, was the result of unaccountable good fortune with the other. For one his own genius became the star in which he believed; for the other, his belief in his star has to serve as a substitute for his lack of genius. One defeated a real revolution, because he was the only

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a Pope Pius IX, Sultan Abdul Mejid and King Otto I.—Ed.
man to carry it through; the other defeated the newly revived recollection of a past revolutionary epoch, because he bore that unique man's name, and hence was himself a recollection. It would be easy to demonstrate that the pretentious mediocrity with which the Second Empire is conducting this war is reflected in its internal administration, that here, too, semblance has taken the place of essence, and that the "economic" campaigns were in no way more successful than the military ones.

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Karl Marx

AGITATION AGAINST PRUSSIA.—A DAY OF FASTING

London, March 19. To show the attitude of the press here towards Prussia, we have chosen two extracts, one from The Morning Herald, the Tory organ, the other from The Morning Post, Palmerston's organ. Referring to the speech made by Sir Robert Peel, newly appointed Junior Lord of the Admiralty, to his constituents at Portsmouth, The Morning Herald remarks:

"Sir Robert Peel has most truthfully represented the people of England's sentiments when he demanded that Prussia should be urged to adopt an unequivocally stated policy, or our second expedition to the Baltic will be as futile as the first one. We have had enough of protocoling and 'points'; it is now high time to cut off Russia from her resources and to bring about repercussions within Russia."\(^a\)

The Morning Post has received the following report about General Wedell's mission from Paris:

"General Wedell has [...] communicated his new instructions to the Cabinet of Napoleon. And what are they? [...] General Wedell tells the Government of France—First: His Majesty the King of Prussia\(^b\) is deeply afflicted at the death of cousin Nicholas\(^c\); [...] Secondly; [...] Prussia quite agrees with the Western Powers about the protocol of Dec. 28, and is ready to subscribe to the same in any and every imaginable form! Ergo, Prussia must have a place at the Council board of Vienna.\(^d\) [...] But it happens that the protocol of December 28 does not bind any one to anything—it is only a diplomatic sketch for an historical work. And as [...] Prussia refuses to countersign the real alliance treaty between England, France and Austria, Mr. Wedell's mission is, I suppose, closed"\(^d\).

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\(^a\) "Portsmouth—Saturday", The Morning Herald, No. 22383, March 19, 1855.—\(Ed\).

\(^b\) Frederick William IV.—\(Ed\).

\(^c\) Nicholas I.—\(Ed\).

\(^d\) "Paris, Friday Evening", The Morning Post, No. 25338, March 19, 1855.—\(Ed\).
It is well known that the rulers of Tyre and Carthage assuaged the wrath of the gods, not by sacrificing themselves, but by buying children from the poor to fling them into the fiery arms of Moloch. Official England orders the people to humble themselves before the Lord, to do penance and fast for the disgrace the misrule of their former government brought upon them, the millions of pounds which it extorted from them to no purpose, and the thousands of lives of which it unscrupulously robbed them. For the Privy Council has ordered a Day of Fasting and Prayer for next Wednesday,

“to obtain pardon of our sins, and in the most devout and solemn manner send up our prayers and supplications to the Divine Majesty, imploring His blessing and assistance ‘on our arms, for the restoration of peace to her Majesty and her dominions’.”\(^{b}\)

Just like the Lord Chamberlain at Court ceremonies, the Archbishop of Canterbury\(^{c}\) has published a “set of rules” for these religious ceremonies, rules which prescribe how the divine Majesty is to be addressed. On the occasion of this extraordinary competition of the English State Church with that of Russia, which has also entreated God’s blessing for their arms, the latter obviously has the advantage over the former.

“Read by the Czar’s countrymen,” The Leader remarks, “the prayer prescribed by Canterbury is the prayer of cowards; read by Englishmen [...], it is the prayer of hypocrites. [...] Read by Dissenters, it is the prayer of one sect dictating to the rest; and read by the working people, it is the prayer of the rich who belong to that one sect, and who keep up these mummeries [...] through a belief that the mummeries are an indirect means of sustaining the monopolies of rank and office. The Archbishop’s unctuous verbiage has aroused the working classes in several parts of the country. A day of fast and humiliation is to them a reality. To the other ‘persuasions’, besides those of poverty, it only means the addition of fish and egg sauce to the usual dinner, with a closing of their place of business, as if it were Sunday. To the working men a ‘fast’ means stopped wages and the want of dinner.”

In a previous despatch we stated:

“The conflict between the industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie will flare up again at the same time that the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy reaches its climax.”\(^{d}\)

At a large meeting which took place at the London Tavern last Friday,\(^{e}\) this was manifestly demonstrated. We preface our report

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\(^{a}\) March 21, 1855.—Ed.


\(^{c}\) J. B. Sumner.—Ed.

\(^{d}\) See this volume, pp. 55-56.—Ed.

\(^{e}\) March 16, 1855.—Ed.
of this meeting with some particulars of the skirmishes which have recently taken place inside and outside Parliament between bourgeoisie and proletariat. A short time ago the manufacturers of Manchester held meetings where it was resolved to agitate for the removal of the official factory inspectors, since these inspectors not only presume to supervise the observance of working hours fixed by law, but even demand that the measures prescribed by Parliament to prevent damage to life and limb by machinery should actually be put into effect in the factories. The factory inspector for South Lancashire, the well-known Leonard Horner, has incurred their particular displeasure because, in his latest report, he insisted on a legally prescribed appliance in spinning mills, the neglect of which, as one manufacturer—a member of the Peace Society, of course—exclaimed naively, had “cost the lives of only five adult workers last year”.

This was extra parliamentary. Inside the House of Commons, Sir Henry Halford’s Bill, which declared the “stoppage of wages” illegal, was thrown out during the second reading. “Stoppage of wages” means deductions from the money wages, partly as penalty for infringements of factory regulations framed by the employer, and partly, in branches of industry where the modern system has not yet been introduced, deduction of rents, etc., for looms, etc., lent to workers.

The latter system prevails particularly in the stocking factories of Nottingham, and Sir Henry Halford has proved that, in many instances, instead of being paid by his employer, the worker has actually to pay his employer. For, under various pretexts, so many deductions are made from the money wages that the worker must give back an excess, which the capitalist notes down in the form of a debit. The worker is thus turned into his employer’s debtor, and is forced by him to renew his contract under ever more unfavourable conditions until he has become a bondsman in the fullest sense, but unlike the bondsman, he does not receive even the guarantee of physical survival.

While the House of Commons rejected Sir Henry Halford’s Bill, which was to put an end to this malpractice, at its second reading, it refused even to consider the Bill of Cobbett, son of the great

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a “Report of Leonard Horner, Esq., Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ended the 31st of October, 1854.”—Ed.

b Marx uses the English phrase “stoppage of wages” here and below.—Ed.

c In his speech in the House of Commons on March 8, 1855. The Times, No. 21997. March 9, 1855.—Ed.
English pamphleteer. The aim of this Bill was (1) to replace the ten-and-a-half hours law of 1850 by the “ten-hours law” of 1847; (2) to make the legal restrictions of working hours in factories a “reality” by the compulsory shutting down of machinery at the end of each legal working day.

Tomorrow we shall revert to the meeting at the London Tavern.

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*Submitted on March 16, 1855.—* Ed.
London, March 20. For several months *The Morning Advertiser* has endeavoured to set up a propaganda society under the name of National and Constitutional Association for the purpose of overthrowing the oligarchic regime. After many preparations, appeals, subscriptions, etc., a public meeting was at last called for last Friday at the London Tavern. It was to be the birthday of the new, much advertised Association. Long before the meeting opened the great hall was crowded with working men, and the self-appointed leaders of the new movement, when they appeared at last, had difficulty in finding room on the platform. Mr. James Taylor, made chairman, read letters from Layard, Sir George de Lacy Evans, Wakley, Sir James Duke, Sir John Shelley, and others, who gave assurances of their sympathy for the aims of the Association, but at the same time under various pretexts declined the invitation to appear in person. Then an “Address to the People” was read. In it, the conduct of the war in the East and the ministerial crisis were spotlighted and then followed the declaration that

“there were ‘practical men of every class, and especially the middle class, with all the attributes for governing the country’”.

This clumsy allusion to the special claims of the middle class was received with loud hisses.

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* A detailed account of this meeting, held on March 16, 1855, was published in *The Morning Advertiser*, No. 19887, March 17, 1855. Reports based on it appeared in other newspapers. Below Marx quotes from a report printed in *The Morning Post*, No. 25338, March 19, 1855.—*Ed.*
"The chief object of this Association," continues the address, "will be to destroy the aristocratical monopoly of power and place, which has proved fatal to the best interests of the country. Among its collateral objects will be included the abolition of the system of secret diplomacy [...]. It will be the peculiar mission of this Association to address itself to the constituencies of the United Kingdom, warning and exhorting them to be careful into whose hands they entrust the liberties and resources of the country and to shrink from bestowing their votes any longer on the mere nonentities of Aristocracy and Wealth, and their nominees...."

Thereupon Mr. Beale rose and seconded the first motion in a lengthy speech:

"...The perilous state of public affairs, and the manifest hopelessness of improvement under the present oligarchical system, which has usurped the functions of Government, monopolised place and privilege, and brought disgrace and disaster upon the country, makes it incumbent on the people to unite, in order to prevent a continuation of the existing [...] system. That an Association be therefore now formed; and be called 'The National and Constitutional Association'."

Mr. Nicolay, one of the Marylebone luminaries, supported the motion. So did Apsley Pellatt, M.P., saying the people would

"go about their work of reforming the Government with determination, temperance, steadiness, and the resolution of the Ironsides® of Cromwell. [...] The electors of England had it in their own hands to rectify every abuse, if they determined to send honest men to Parliament free of expense; but they could never expect to be honestly represented whilst a man like Lord Ebrington only got returned to Parliament for Marylebone at an expense of £5,000, and the unsuccessful candidate® had to spend upwards of £3,000".

Mr. Murrough, M.P., now rose, but after considerable opposition was forced to give way to George Harrison (a worker and Chartist from Nottingham).

"This movement," Harrison said, "was an attempt of the middle classes to get the government into their own hands, to divide amongst themselves the places and the pensions, and establish a worse oligarchy than that now in existence."

He then read an amendment® in which he denounced equally the landed aristocracy and monied aristocracy as enemies of the people and declared that the only way to regenerate the nation was to introduce the People's Charter® with its five points: universal suffrage, vote by ballot, equal constituencies, annual parliaments and abolition of the property qualification.

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a Marx uses the English word. Ironsides was the name given to Oliver Cromwell's soldiers in the English bourgeois revolution after Cromwell was referred to as "Old Ironsides" following the Battle of Marston Moor in 1644.—Ed.
b J. Bell.—Ed.
c Marx uses the French spelling.—Ed.
Ernest Jones (the Chartist leader, member of an aristocratic family) speaking in support of the *amendment* said among other things:

"The people would be destroying their own position were they to support this movement of the middle classes to get into their own hands place and power. There were no doubt many hungry prime ministers on the platform"—cheers—"many expectant placemen." (Cheers) "The people must not, however, ally themselves to the Cobdens, the Brights, and the moneyed interests. It was not the landed aristocracy, [...] it was the moneyed interest that opposed a humane Factory Act and turned down the Bill against the stoppage of wages," that had prevented the passing of a good partnership law—and it was the moneyed and manufacturing interest that always endeavoured to keep down and degrade the people. He had no objection to join at any moment in an endeavour to upset the influence of the Duke of Devonshire, et al., but he would not do so to establish in its stead that of the Duke of Devil's Dust or a Lord of Shoddy" (cheers and laughter). "It had been said the workers' movement, the Chartist movement, was dead. He declared to the reforming gentlemen of the middle class that the working class was sufficiently alive to kill any movement. It would not allow the middle class to move unless it decided to include the People's Charter and its five points in its programme. It had better not deceive itself. A repetition of the old deception was out of the question."

After some further discussion, amid considerable commotion, the chairman attempted to get rid of the *amendment*, by declaring that it was not an *amendment*, but he found himself compelled to change his mind. The *amendment* was put to the vote and passed with a majority of at least ten to one, with loud acclamation and waving of hats. After declaring the *amendment* passed, the chairman stated amid loud laughter that he still believed the majority of the people present was in favour of founding the Constitutional and National Association. They would therefore proceed with its organisation and later address another appeal to the public; he intimated, though covertly, that only persons with membership cards would be admitted in future to avoid opposition. The Chartists in high spirits complimented the chairman with a vote of thanks, and the meeting broke up.

It cannot be denied that logic was on the side of the Chartists, even from the standpoint of the publicly proclaimed principles of the Association. It wants to overthrow the oligarchy by an appeal from the Ministry to Parliament. But what is the Ministry? The creation of the parliamentary majority. Or it wants to overthrow Parliament by appealing to the electors. But what is Parliament? The freely elected representation of the electors. Hence there

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[a] Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

[b] Marx uses the English phrase "stoppage of wages".—*Ed.*
remains only: extension of the franchise. Those who refuse to broaden the franchise to cover the whole of the people by adopting the People's Charter are admitting that they wish to replace the old aristocracy by a new one. Vis-à-vis the existing oligarchy they wish to speak in the name of the people, but at the same time they would like to prevent the people from appearing in person when they call it.

Written on March 20, 1855
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Marked with the sign ×
London, March 20. The Duke of Newcastle has ordered the recall of Lord Lucan; Lord Panmure has published Raglan's letter attacking him, and Lord Hardinge, the fabulous Lord High Constable of the British Army, has refused him an investigation and a military tribunal. In spite of the opposition of two ministries, of the Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea and of the Commander of the Horse Guards\(^a\) in London, Lord Lucan proved in a detailed speech in the House of Lords yesterday that not he, but Raglan alone was responsible for the sacrifice of the Light Brigade at Balaklava\(^93\) and that the Aberdeen and Palmerston Ministries had sacrificed Lord Lucan to the displeased public in order to save the obedient, feeble-minded and tractable Commander in the Crimea. The public monster had to be satisfied. A half-completed letter found on the body of General Cathcart addressed to his wife and dated November 2, three days before the battle of Inkerman\(^94\) and a week after the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava, is decisive on this question. This letter says word for word:

"Neither Lord Lucan nor Lord Cardigan was to blame, but on the contrary, for they obeyed orders."\(^b\)

In an article on the Vienna Conference,\(^95\) The Times today makes the characteristic comment that should the Congress become a reality, the main difficulties were [to be] expected from the Turkish side.\(^c\) Within the framework of the four points the main

\(^a\) Marx uses the English expression "Horse Guards". The designation "Commander of the Horse Guards" referred to the Commander-in-Chief of the British army (see footnote on p. 24 of this volume).—Ed.

\(^b\) Cathcart's letter was quoted by Lucan in the House of Lords on March 19, 1855. The Times, No. 22006, March 20, 1855.—Ed.

\(^c\) "The Conferences at Vienna were opened in due form...", The Times, No. 22006, March 20, 1855.—Ed.
concessions would have to be extorted from the Sultan, not from the Tsar.

Yesterday *The Times* mystified its public yet again with the "authentic" announcement that the great bombardment and final storming of Sevastopol had undoubtedly taken place before March 19. Whence this sudden turn from desperate hopelessness to sanguine superstition? *The Times* began its Crimean campaign against the overthrown coalition and its "ceterum censeo" that a Committee of Inquiry was necessary at the very moment that Gladstone threatened its monopoly by the proposal to abolish the stamp duty and to limit the weight of newspapers that can be sent for one penny by post to four ounces—less than the weight of one copy of *The Times*. No sooner was Gladstone overthrown, than his successor, Sir George Cornewall Lewis withdrew the Bill, and *The Times*, hoping that everything would remain as before, suddenly transformed its bilious view of the Crimea into a mobile panorama, radiant with hope of success, in which even the army, whose obituary it published three months ago, has become active again. Today its view is again darkened, because yesterday Sir George Cornewall Lewis, against all expectations, himself brought in a Bill to abolish the newspaper stamp duty. The animosity of a writer of retrospective reviews to fresh news! *The Times* ejaculates. Lewis as everybody knows was editor of *The Edinburgh Review*.

We shall return to the Bill as soon as the details are laid before the House of Commons, but meanwhile note that it is a concession to the *Manchester School* which retains the merit of having untiringly agitated for the introduction of free competition in the field of the press. The concession of the Palmerston Ministry to the *Manchester School* is a *captatio benevolentiae* in case of the dissolution of the Lower House and new elections.

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\footnote{a}{Abdul Mejid, Alexander II.—*Ed.*}
\footnote{b}{*The Times*, No. 22005, March 19, 1855.—*Ed.*}
\footnote{c}{Something constantly repeated. The phrase derives from the famous dictum with which, after 157 B.C., Cato the Elder concluded every speech: "Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam" (For the rest I take the view that Carthage must be destroyed).—*Ed.*}
\footnote{d}{An attempt to curry favour.—*Ed.*}
London, March 21. At yesterday’s sitting of the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst, the old colleague of Liverpool and Castlereagh, brought in his long-expected motion “on the position of Prussia with reference to the Vienna Conference”. Two circumstances, he said, had lately imparted new interest to this question: The message of the dying Emperor of Russia a to the Prussian Court, and the manifesto of Alexander II, in which he promises to consummate the policies of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and his father. How Russia herself regarded Prussian policies can be seen from the following excerpt from a secret despatch which Pozzo di Borgo sent to Nesselrode shortly before the outbreak of the war of 1828-29. It reads in part:

“He then that Russia should undertake alone to put in execution those coercive means against Turkey, there is every reason to believe that Prussia would not in any manner oppose Russia. But, on the contrary, her attitude at once unfettered and friendly, would operate as a powerful check on other States and bring them to submit to results suited to the dignity and interests of Russia. It will be necessary to let the Cabinet of Berlin, to a certain extent, into our confidence, and to convince it that the part we assign to Prussia will contribute to increase the happy intimacy between the two Sovereigns and the two Courts.”

Was it possible, Lord Lyndhurst exclaimed, to anticipate in a more prophetic spirit the line which the Prussian Court has taken in the past six or twelve months? It was true that Prussia had joined in signing the protocols of December 5, January 13 and April 9. b The purpose of these protocols had been to bring about...

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a Nicholas I.—Ed.
b The despatch was quoted by Lyndhurst in the House of Lords on March 20, 1855. The speeches by Lyndhurst and Clarendon quoted in this article were reported in The Times, No. 22007, March 21, 1855.—Ed.
the evacuation of the Danubian principalities and to obtain guarantees for the protection of the Sultan’s independence and the integrity of Turkey. Had the Prussian Court acted in this spirit? On the occasion of the loan of 30 million taler for military operations Baron Manteuffel had declared that in these protocols Prussia had expressed her view on Russia’s policy, namely that a great injustice had been committed; but she did not consider herself obliged to go further and take an active part. Was this the language of a great nation? And was Prussia not expressly committed to the protection of Turkey by the Agreements of 1840 and 1841? Baron Manteuffel had added that Germany’s independence and German interests were not involved in the dispute and Prussia was therefore not obliged to make any sacrifices. Baron Manteuffel himself had, however, stated the opposite in another document. Besides, once the Tsar seized Constantinople, it would be superfluous to talk any more of German independence and German interests. They would then succumb to an overwhelming power. After Lord Lyndhurst had alluded to the dismissal of War Minister Bonin, to the recall of Ambassador Bunsen from London and to the rejection of an address of the Prussian Chambers in reply to a speech from the throne, he came to the “second act of this political drama”. After a considerable time had elapsed Austria had deemed it proper to demand of Russia that she evacuate the Danubian principalities. This demand was drafted and sent to Berlin for signature. Counter-proposals were sent from Berlin to Vienna, which were completely inadequate but caused delay in as much as they had to be communicated to the Allies for examination. In the meantime Russia had evacuated the principalities, but retained one part under occupation for military reasons, declaring that she wished to keep entirely on the defensive. Prussia had thereupon withdrawn from the confederation, because Russia had satisfied all reasonable claims. From this moment on Prussia had made every effort to thwart Austria’s plans. For this purpose she had, to a great extent with success, made proposals to the Federal Diet and to the individual German states. At the same time Russia had publicly thanked two German states for their refusal to join the Allies. He (Lyndhurst) was now coming to the third and last act of the drama. The Allies had arranged for a conference to be

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a This refers to Manteuffel’s speech in the Credit Committee of the First Chamber on April 22, 1854.—Ed.
b In his speech in the First Chamber on April 25, 1854, Manteuffel said: “Si vis pacem, para bellum…” (If you desire to maintain peace, be prepared for war).—Ed.
c Frederick William IV’s speech of November 30, 1854.—Ed.
held on August 8 in Vienna to decide what should be demanded of Russia as a basis for any provisional negotiations. Prussia had been informed of the meeting in the usual manner and repeatedly. Prussia had not expressly refused to attend, but in fact did not appear at the conference. In consequence of her absence the Allies, instead of drafting a Protocol, had signed a Note laying down the four points as a basis for future negotiations. The four points had then been submitted to Russia for her acceptance, but she had refused to accept them. Prussia for her part published and circulated a document in which she raised objections to the four points. She also continued to hinder, both at the Federal Diet and at the individual German courts, the adhesion of the small German states to the Allies. After the conclusion of the Agreement of December 2 Prussia was informed that room had been left for her accession. She refused to accede but declared that she was ready to conclude similar agreements with France and England separately. From the moment that these latter accepted this proposal, Prussia had in various negotiations and divers proposals demanded innumerable modifications, which France and England would certainly have to reject. When he (Lyndhurst) was speaking of Prussia, he was referring to the official Prussia. He knew that the vast majority of the Prussian nation was anti-Russian. It was incomprehensible that Prussia, after refusing to accede to the Agreement of December 2, could demand to be invited to the Vienna negotiations. He hoped the Allied Powers would not admit a Prussian envoy on any pretext: for if they did, Russia would have two votes at the Vienna Congress instead of one. Prussian diplomacy had not changed since Frederick the Great. He recalled 1794, the time just before and after the battle of Austerlitz, etc.

Lord Clarendon: He would confine himself to filling in a few gaps in respect of the communications which had taken place between England and Prussia. After the Russian Government had rejected the conditions of the Allies a conference of the respective plenipotentiaries had been called, which, however, could not be held since the representative of the Prussian Government would not attend. It was true that later the Prussian Ambassador in London had informed him [Clarendon] that his Government would give the requested permission to its plenipotentiary in Vienna. He (Clarendon) had declared, however: "It was too late."

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a A. Bernstorff.—Ed.
b H. F. Arnim-Heinrichsdorf-Werbelow.—Ed.
The correspondence between Prussia and Austria had helped Russia. Before the signing of the Agreement of December 2 Prussia had already been invited to accede, but in vain. Prussia had demanded to be admitted unconditionally to the new conference because it was a continuation of the earlier conference, which had not yet been concluded and from which she had by no means withdrawn. With respect to the latter, the British Government referred to the fact that at an earlier occasion no conference could be held because Prussia would not attend, although repeatedly asked. Moreover, the new conference was not at all a continuation of the old one, for, when in October and November Austria requested France and England to resume it, she received the reply that the time for protocols and conferences had passed, but that if Austria would enter into a military commitment with them, they would see whether peace was realisable. This had led to the Agreement of December 2. Later, they had been prepared to enter into special treaties with Prussia.

“But, to admit Prussia to claim all the privileges without incurring any of the risks—to admit her unconditionally to a conference that might end in peace, but which might lead to war on a more extended sphere—without her telling us what were her intentions or her policy—without entering into any engagement with us, either immediate or prospective—without knowing whether she entered on the conference as a neutral, as a foe, or as a friend—was utterly impossible.”

The special missions sent later by Prussia had been received with equal friendliness in London and Paris, but so far had not led to anything. He did not, however, regard the negotiations as broken off. Only three days ago new proposals had been made. Unfortunately, the Vienna conferences had opened, however, while Prussia remained excluded by her own action. A great power like Prussia should not restrict itself to the narrow German confines. They had repeatedly remonstrated against this attitude. The constant reply was that Prussia's policy was peace. In fact her policy was neither “European nor German nor Russian”, more likely to thwart Austria than to keep Russia in check. In spite of all this Prussia could not long remain in isolation when important European interests were at stake. She could not side with Russia in opposition to national feeling in Prussia and Germany. She knew well that on Russia's side against Austria she would become dependent on the former. She did not want to take Austria's side. On the contrary, she had taken an unfriendly attitude to Austria.

“I say, therefore, that Prussia is in an insular and in a false position [...]. This may be satisfactory to her enemies, but it is deeply regretted by her allies, and by the noble-minded and patriotic of her own population.”
He declared finally that every effort would be made to win Prussia's co-operation.

In the Lower House Lord William Graham asked the Prime Minister

"whether the Austrian Ambassador\(^a\) had called upon Lord Clarendon for any explanation of the words [...] used by Sir Robert Peel, when he was re-elected that no settlement of the Eastern question would be satisfactory unless Hungary and Poland were restored?"\(^b\)

Lord Palmerston, instead of giving some reply to this question, began by congratulating himself on Sir Robert Peel's having accepted a post in his administration. Concerning Hungary, Austria had long known that England would regard its separation from the imperial state as a great calamity for Europe, since the imperial state as a totality in the centre of Europe was an essential element in the balance of powers. Concerning Poland (considerable laughter was here caused by a little pause in Palmerston's reply and the peculiar manner in which he resumed his speech) it was his opinion that the Kingdom of Poland, as now constituted and as now possessed, was a constant threat to Germany. Nevertheless, stipulations concerning a re-organisation of Poland formed no part of the points now being negotiated in Vienna. England and France had, however, reserved the right, according to circumstances and the events of war, to add to the four points, on the basis of which the negotiations were now being conducted, further stipulations which appeared to them essential for the future security of Europe.

Written on March 21, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 141, March 24, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) F. de Paula Colloredo-Wallsee.— Ed.
\(^b\) Graham's question in the House of Commons on March 20, 1855, and Palmerston's reply were reported in The Times No. 22007, March 21, 1855.— Ed.
"If Croesus does pass the Halys, he will destroy a great empire." This answer, given to the Lydian King by the oracle of Delphi, might, with equal aptness, now be sent to Louis Bonaparte on his Crimean excursion. It is not the Russian Empire which this journey is calculated to destroy, but his own.

An extraordinary, anomalous position creates anomalous necessities. Every other man, in his place, would be considered a fool if he undertook this trip, whose unfavorable chances are to the favorable as ten to one. Louis Bonaparte must be quite aware of that fact, and nevertheless he must go. He is the originator of the whole expedition; he has got the allied armies into their present unenviable position, and is bound, before all Europe, to get them out of it again. It is his first military feat, and upon its issue will depend, for some time at least, his reputation as a general. He answers for its success with no less a pledge than his crown.

There are, besides, minor reasons, which equally contribute to make this hazardous journey a matter of State necessity. The soldiers in the East have shown, on more than one occasion, that their expectations of the military glories of the new Empire have been sadly disappointed. At Varna and Bazardshik, the paladins of the mock Charlemagne were saluted by their own troops with the title of "apes." "A bas les singes! Vive Lamoricière!" was the cry of the Zouaves when St. Arnaud and Espinasse had sent them into the Bulgarian desert, to die of cholera and fever. Now it is no longer the banished generals alone whose fame and popularity are opposed to the commanders of doubtful reputation, now leading the French army. The singular conduct of Napoleon Jérôme junior, while in the East, has recalled to the mind of the old

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a Herodotus, History, I, 53.—Ed.
Algerian soldiers the far different behavior of the Orleans Princes in Africa, who, whatever else may be said against them, were always at the head of the troops and did their duty as soldiers. The contrast between young Aumale and young Napoleon was certainly strong enough to make the soldiers say: If the Orleans were still in power, the Princes would be with us in the trenches, sharing our dangers and fatigues; and yet, their name was not Napoleon! Thus the soldiers do speak, and what is to be done to stop them? The man who “is permitted to wear the uniform of a General of Division,” has managed to throw a stain upon the military traditions of the name of Napoleon; the remainder of the family are all very quiet civilians, naturalists, priests, or else unmitigated adventurers; old Jérôme cannot go on account of his age, and because his warlike feats of old throw no great halo of glory around his head; so Louis Napoleon cannot but go himself. Then the rumor of the Crimean journey has been made known in the remotest hamlets of France, and has been hailed with enthusiasm by the peasantry; and the peasantry it was that made Louis Napoleon Emperor. The peasantry are convinced that an Emperor of their own make, and who bears the name of Napoleon, must actually be a Napoleon redivivus; his place is, in their eyes, at the head of the troops, who, led by him, will rival the legions of the great Army. If Sevastopol is not taken, it is only because the Emperor has not yet gone there; let him but once be on the spot, and the ramparts of the Russian fortress will crumble into dust like the walls of Jericho. Thus, if ever he wished to retract his promise to go, he cannot now do so, since the report has once gone forth.

Accordingly, everything is being prepared. The ten divisions now in the Crimea are to be followed by four new ones, two of which are to form, in the beginning of the campaign, an army of reserve at Constantinople. One of these divisions is to consist of the Imperial Guard, another of the combined élit companies, or the Grenadiers and Voltigeurs of the army of Paris; the two other divisions (11th and 12th) are already getting embarked or concentrated at Toulon and Algiers. This fresh reinforcement

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a Napoleon risen from the dead.—Ed.
b The army of Napoleon I which invaded Russia in 1812.—Ed.
c Here begins the text of the German version of Engels’ articles “Napoleon’s Last Dodge” and “A Battle at Sevastopol”, which was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 143, March 26, 1855 under the title “On the Latest Events in the Crimea”. The opening sentence in it reads as follows: “While the peace talks continue in Vienna, the war preparations are being stepped up in France.”—Ed.
would bring the French troops in the Crimea to some 100,000 or 110,000 men, while, by the end of April, the 15,000 Piedmontese troops, and numerous British reinforcements will be arriving. But yet, it can hardly be expected that the Allies can well be in a position to open the campaign in May, with an army of 150,000 men. The state of the Heracleatic Chersonese, which has been turned into one great and wretchedly managed burial-ground, is such that with the return of hot and damp weather, the whole must form one hotbed of pestilence of all kinds; and whatever portion of the troops will have to stop in it, will be exposed to losses by sickness and death far more terrific than at any previous time. There is no chance for the Allies to break forth with an active army from their present position, before all their reinforcements are up; and that will be somewhere about the middle of May, when the sickness must have already broken out.

In the best event the Allies must leave 40,000 men before the south side of Sevastopol, and will have from 90,000 to 100,000 men at liberty for an expedition against the Russian army in the field. Unless they maneuver very well and the Russians commit great blunders, this army, on debouching from the Chersonese, will have first to defeat the Russians, and drive them back from Sympheropol, before it can effect its junction with the Turks at Eupatoria. We will, however, suppose the junction to be effected without difficulty; the utmost reinforcement which the Turks will bring to this motley body of French, English and Piedmontese, will be 20,000 men not very well adapted for a battle in the open field. Altogether this would make an army of some 120,000 men. How such an army is expected to live in a country exhausted by the Russians themselves, poor in corn, and whose main resource, the cattle, the Russians will take very good care to drive off toward Perekop, it is not very easy to see. The least advance would

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*The further text in the version of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* up to the end of the article is abridged and changed: “Apart from all difficulties of a purely local character, there remains the principal objection to this mode of campaigning in the Crimea, viz., that it consigns a whole quarter of France's disposable forces to a secondary theatre of war, where even the greatest success decides nothing. The fictitious value that has been attributed to the successes and defeats in the Crimea rebounds with redoubled force upon the originator of the scheme. Sevastopol is far from being Russia for Alexander II, but it has become France for Bonaparte.—As for the local difficulties, it is clear that Chersonese, at present the burial-ground of thousands of people and animals, will with the first ray of sun turn into a hothouse of pestilential diseases. Assuming that the Allies will bring up their army to 150,000 men, keeping them supplied with provisions in a Crimea already grazed down by the Russians and poor in corn will be the harder for the fact that the Russians will not fail to drive off the cattle in good time before their own retreat.” —*Ed.*
necessitate extensive foraging and numerous detachments to secure the flanks and the communications with the sea. The Russian irregular cavalry, which has hitherto had no chance to act, will then commence its harassing operations. In the meantime, the Russians will also have received their reenforcements; the publicity with which the French armaments have been carried on for the last six weeks, has enabled them to take their measures in time. There can be no doubt that at this present moment two or three Russian divisions, either from the army of Volhynia and Bessarabia, or from the new-formed reserves, will be on the march so as to maintain the balance of power there.

The greatest detachment to be made from the allied army, must, however, be the force which has to inclose Sevastopol on the north side. For this purpose, 20,000 men will have to be set aside, and whether the remainder of their forces will then be sufficient, fettered as they must be by difficulties of sustenance, embarrassed with trains of carriages for stores and provisions, to drive the Russian field army out of the Crimea, is very doubtful.

So much is certain, that the laurels by which Louis Bonaparte intends to earn the name of a Napoleon in the Crimea are hung up rather high, and will not be so very easily plucked. All the difficulties, however, which have been hitherto mentioned, are of a merely local character. The great objection to this mode of campaigning in the Crimea is, after all, that it transfers one-fourth of the disposable forces of France to a minor theater of war, where even the greatest success decides nothing. It is this absurd obstinacy about Sevastopol, degenerating into a sort of superstition, and giving to successes, but also to reverses, fictitious values, which forms the great fundamental mistake of the whole plan. And it is this fictitious value given to events in the Crimea which rebounds with redoubled force upon the unfortunate originator of the scheme. For Alexander, Sevastopol is not Russia, far from it; but for Louis Bonaparte, the impossibility of taking Sevastopol is the loss of France.

Written about March 23, 1855

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Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
Our columns, this morning, contain the official French, English, and Russian reports of a contest between the antagonists at Sevastopol. It was sufficiently important to require, in addition to the official documents, some words of explanation and comment from us.

About a month ago, from the generally-successful sorties of the Russians, we came to the conclusion that the trenches had been pushed forward to a point at which the force of the besieged was equal to that of the besiegers; in other words, that the proximity of the trenches was such as to enable the Russians to bring, in a sally, to any portion of the trenches, a force at least equal to what the Allies could bring up during the first hour or two hours. As an hour or two are quite sufficient to destroy the rivettings, and to spike the guns of a battery, the natural consequence was, that beyond this point the Allies could not push their approaches. Since then the siege came to a stand, until the arrival of three French brigades (one of the Eighth, and two of the Ninth Division) allowed them to relieve part of the English infantry, and to establish stronger trench-guards. At the same time, the arrival

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a See this volume, pp. 5-7.—Ed.
b Here follows the continuation of the German version of Engels’ articles “Napoleon’s Last Dodge” and “A Battle at Sevastopol”, published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 143, March 26, 1855 under the title “On the Latest Events in the Crimea”. Instead of the preceding text this paragraph has: “As regards the obstacles created to the siege of Sevastopol, in particular by Russian engineers (partly Frenchmen), the affair of Malakhov provides an instructive illustration. As is generally known, about a month ago the siege came to a stand, but the arrival...”.—Ed.
of Generals Niel and Jones, of the Engineers, gave fresh activity to
the siege operations, and remedied mistakes caused, principally, by
the obstinacy of the French General Bizot, and by the numeric
weakness of the British infantry. New approaches were now
pushed forward, especially on the English side, where a parallel
was opened at about 300 yards from the Russian works on the hill
of Malakoff. Some of the batteries now erected were so far toward
the Inkermann side that they would have taken part of the
Russian batteries in the rear, or enfiladed them, as soon as their
fire could be opened. Against these new lines the Russians have
just taken a step which has been carried out with uncommon skill
and boldness.\textsuperscript{a}

The Russian lines, as every plan shows, extend in a semicircular
arch round the town, from the head of the Quarantine Bay to that
of the inner war harbor, and thence to the head of the Careening
Bay. This latter bay is a small creek, formed by the extremity of a
deep ravine, extending from the great harbor or Bay of
Sevastopol far up the plateau on which the Allies are en-
camped.\textsuperscript{a} On the western side of this ravine extends a range
of heights forming the Russian lines; the most considerable of
these elevations is the hill of Malakoff, forming, by its com-
manding position, the key of the whole Russian right. On the eastern
side of the ravine and the Careening Bay, another elevation is
situated, which, being completely under the fire both of the Russian
batteries and of their men-of-war, remained out of the reach of
the Allies as long as they could not completely interrupt the
communication of Sevastopol with Inkermann, which was pro-
tected by the fire of the forts and batteries on the north side of
the harbor. But since the Allies had found positions to the east
and south-east of Malakoff, for batteries to take in the Russian
lines, flank and rear, this neutral hill had become important.
Accordingly, on the night of February 21, the Russians sent a
party of workmen to erect on it a redoubt, planned beforehand by
their engineers.\textsuperscript{b} In the morning the long trench and a beginning
of parapets behind it, were visible to the Allies. They appear to
have been entirely unable to understand the meaning of this;
accordingly, they were content to let well alone. Next morning,
however, the redoubt was all but complete, at least in its outline,
for the sequel showed that the profile, that is, the depth of the
ditch and strength of the parapet, was still very weak. By this time

\textsuperscript{a} This sentence does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The Selenghinsk redoubt; in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the end of this sentence
beginning with the words “planned beforehand” does not occur.—\textit{Ed.}
the Allies began to find out that this work was admirably situated to enfilade their own enfilading batteries, and thus to make them all but useless. The engineers protested that this work must be taken at any cost. Accordingly, Canrobert organized with the greatest secrecy, a storming column, consisting of about 1,600 Zouaves and 3,000 Marines. The orders having to be given at a late hour, and all on a sudden, some delay occurred in collecting the troops at the rendezvous, and it was 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th before they could start for the assault, the Zouaves leading. A short march brought them up to twenty yards from the ditch. As usual in assaults, not a shot was to be fired; the soldiers were made to take off the percussion-caps from their guns to prevent their being entangled in useless and dilatory firing. All at once, a few Russian words of command were heard; a strong body of Russians in the interior of the redoubt, rose from the ground, leveled their guns over the top of the parapet, and poured a volley into the advancing column. From the darkness and the well known inveterate habit of soldiers in intrenchments to fire always straight across the parapet, this volley can have had but little effect upon the narrow head of the column.\(^a\) The Zouaves, hardly detained by the sloping sides of the incomplete ditch and rampart, in a moment were in the redoubt, and rushed at their opponents with the bayonet. A terrible hand-to-hand struggle took place. After some time the Zouaves possessed themselves of one-half of the redoubt, and, at a later period, the Russians entirely abandoned it to them. In the mean time, the marines, following the Zouaves at a short distance, either lost their way, or from some other reason, stopped on the brink of the hill. Here they were assailed in each flank by a Russian column, which, after a desperate resistance, drove them down the hill. During or shortly after this struggle, daylight must have dawmed, for the Russians speedily retired from the hill—leaving the redoubt in the possession of the Zouaves—upon whom now opened all the Russian artillery which could be brought to bear on the spot. The Zouaves lay down for a moment, while some rifle volunteers, who had accompanied them, crept up to the Malakoff works, trying to fire at the Russian gunners through the embrasures. But the fire was too heavy; and, before long, the Zouaves had to retreat on the side toward Inkermann, which sheltered them against most of the batteries. They profess to have carried all their wounded with them.

This little affair was carried out with great bravery by the

\(^a\) This sentence does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung.*—Ed.
Zouaves and a Gen. Monet, and with great skill combined with their usual tenacity by the Russians. They consisted of the two regiments of Selenghisnk and Volhynia, the strength of which, after several campaigns, cannot have exceeded 500 men per battalion, or 4,000 men in all. Gen. Kroushoff commanded them. Their arrangements were so admirable that the French declare that the whole plan of attack must have been known to them. The attack upon the marines was completely and almost instantaneously successful, while their retreat out of the incomplete redoubt had the effect of exposing the unfortunate and unsupported Zouaves to an overwhelming fire, which must have remained silent as long as the struggle within the redoubt was going on.

Gen. Canrobert found that this defeat had a very great effect on his troops. Their impatience which had made itself remarkable on various occasions, now broke out with full force. The assault upon the town was demanded by the soldiers. The word of treason, that everlasting excuse for a defeat suffered by the French, was loudly pronounced, and Gen. Forey, without any apparent reason, was even nominally pointed out as the party who betrayed to the enemy the secret resolutions of the French Council of War. So confused was Canrobert, that in one breath he wrote an order of the day representing the whole affair as a brilliant though relative success, and a note to Lord Raglan proposing an immediate assault, a proposal which Lord Raglan, of course, declined.

The Russians, on their part, maintained their new redoubt, and have since been busy completing it. This position is of great importance. It secures the communication with Inkermann and the arrival of supplies from that direction. It menaces the whole right of the allied siege-works, by taking them in flank, and necessitating fresh approaches to paralyze it. Above all, it shows the capability, in the Russians, not only to hold their ground, but even to advance beyond it. In the latter part of February they pushed trenches of counter-approach toward the allied works from their new redoubt. The reports do not, however, state the exact direction of these works. At all events, the presence of the two regiments of the line in Sevastopol proves that the garrison,

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The last two sentences do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.

Instead of this paragraph the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “General Forey was loudly accused in the French camp of having communicated the secret decisions of the Council of War to the enemy.”—Ed.

The identical text of the English and German versions ends here. In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the article closes as follows: “Lastly, with its capture the Russians have taken the offensive.”—Ed.
hitherto consisting of marines and sailors only, has been considerably reenforced, and is strong enough for any eventuality.

It is now reported that by the 10th or 11th of March, the Allies would be in a position to open their batteries upon the Russian defenses, but, with the resources of the Russians and the difficulties of the Allies, how is it to be expected that the first condition will be fulfilled, namely: That the besiegers' fire will be superior to that of the besieged, and so far superior, too, as to silence the Russian batteries before the English and French have exhausted their stores of ammunition? But let us suppose even this result is obtained. Suppose even that at this decisive moment the Russians in the field should neglect attacking the positions of Inkermann and Balaklava. Suppose the assaults attempted upon the first Russian line, and suppose that line even carried: What then? Fresh defenses, fresh batteries, strong buildings converted into small citadels requiring a new set of batteries to bring them down, are before the storming columns; a hail of grape and musketry drives them back, and it is as much as they can do if they hold the first Russian line.

Then follows the siege of the second, then that of the third line—not to mention the numerous minor obstacles which the Russian engineers, as we now have learned to know them, cannot have failed to accumulate in the interior of the space intrusted to their care. And during this time, wet and heat, and heat and wet alternately, on a ground impregnated with the animal decay of thousands of men and horses, will create diseases unknown and unheard of. The pestilence, it is true, will reign within the town as well as without; but which party will have to give in to it first?

Spring will carry along with it terrible things on this little peninsula of five miles by ten, where three of the greatest nations of Europe are fighting an obstinate struggle; and Louis Bonaparte will have plenty of reason to congratulate himself when his great expedition comes to develop its full fruit.

Written about March 23, 1855

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Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, March 24. The Press, the organ of Disraeli, last week raised a storm in a teacup by maintaining that "Emperor Louis" was the only obstacle to the conclusion of peace and had tied Austria to himself by a secret "agreement" of which Austria was endeavouring to rid itself. Until now the Tories had maintained that the Anglo-French alliance was their own handiwork. Had not their Lord Malmesbury sealed the union with Bonaparte\textsuperscript{105}? Had not Disraeli in Parliament showered sarcasms on Graham and Wood, who had wickedly calumniated the coup of December 2 before their electors? Had not the Tories for two years, in speeches and in the press, been the loudest heralds of war? And now, suddenly, without transition, entirely without any mitigating circumstances, insinuations are made against the French Alliance, and caustic remarks about "Emperor Louis" and the homily on peace? The Morning Herald, the senile organ of the High Tories, uninitiated into the secret of the Party leaders, shook its head doubtfully, and murmured violent protests against the, to it, incomprehensible hallucinations of The Press.\textsuperscript{a} The latter nevertheless returns today to the fateful subject. The following announcement appears in bold letters at its top:

"Important circumstances have transpired. When we last wrote there was a prospect of the Congress breaking up 're infecta',\textsuperscript{b} and of Lord John Russell returning abruptly to England. [...] The altered tone adopted to Russia by Austria since the death of the Emperor Nicholas [...] and especially the declaration of the

\textsuperscript{a} This refers to an item published in The Morning Herald, No. 22385, March 21, 1855, in reply to the statement of The Press cited above.—Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} Without achieving its purpose.—Ed.
Austrian Emperor to Alexander II, have doubtless mainly contributed to this result. We have reason to believe that the Emperor of the French has removed the obstacles which existed to a general pacification, and that France will consent to the complete evacuation of the Crimea without any conditions as to the demolition or diminution of any of the fortresses of that province."

To elucidate the meaning of the oracle The Press refers to the "authentic details of its leading article". Oddly enough, these very details refute the conclusion allegedly based on them and stated beforehand.

According to the leading article "...the situation of affairs in Vienna is becoming every hour less rational and satisfactory; and it is of importance that enlightened opinion on both sides of the Channel should exercise its influence to prevent results which may become alike mortifying and deplorable. [...] Had the Anglo-French alliance been sincere on the part of our Ministers in 1853, we should, probably, never have had occasion to embark in war; but, had such an appeal proved necessary, its conduct, in all probability, would have been triumphant and effective. Instead of acting cordially with France [...] a year was wasted by the British Government in obtaining what they styled 'the adhesion of the great German Powers' [...]. Nothing could justify a war with Russia but a determination, on the part of the Western Powers, materially to reduce its empire in the South. This is the only solution of the Eastern question. The occasion in 1853 was favourable, it has been lost. Time, treasure, armies, reputation, have been alike squandered. Had we acted cordially with France in 1853 the German Powers must have followed in our wake. What has now happened? The Emperor of Austria has assured the Emperor Alexander of Russia, 'That Austria seeks neither to diminish the limit of his empire, nor to inflict on his territory any dishonor'. There is only one meaning which can be attributed to these words. With reference to an allusion, which we made earlier, to the secret engagements entered into between France and Austria, we are assured, on high authority, that 'while those engagements [...] indicate a [...] probably permanent union between the two empires there is nothing in those engagements that would necessarily lead to an invasion of Russia on the part of Austria'. [...] The Emperor of Russia is prepared to submit to terms of peace, which, though they offer no solution of 'the Eastern question', are, unquestionably, an admission of baffled aggression, and, in some degree, an atonement for the outrage. We believe that the opportunity for the higher policy has been lost, and that the combination of circumstances which [...] might have secured the independence of Europe, will not speedily recur; but a peace, on the whole, advantageous to Europe, beneficial to Turkey, and not discreditable to the Western Powers, may still be obtained. [...] We have reason to fear that such a peace will not be negotiated. What is the obstacle? The Emperor of the French. If the Emperor of the French, notwithstanding the [...] adverse circumstances [...] were still of opinion that the solution of the Eastern question ought to be attempted, we are not prepared to say that England should falter, but it reaches us that the views of his Imperial Majesty are of a very different order [...]. Between the reduction of the Russian limits and the negotiation of the projected peace, the Emperor of the French has devised a mezzo termine, which is perilous, and may be fatal. There is to be a campaign of brilliant achievement,

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a Francis Joseph I.— Ed.
b Quoted from The Press, No. 99, March 24, 1855. The long quotation below is from the leading article in the same issue.— Ed.
c Middle road.— Ed.
which is to restore the *prestige*, and then conclude with a peace, which will not affect the present territorial arrangement of Europe or Asia one whit more than the Austro-Russian propositions to which [...] her Majesty's Plenipotentiary Extraordinary at Vienna was prepared to accede. We will not dwell on that part of this scheme which would sacrifice many thousands of human lives to the mere restoration of *prestige*. We hold that the impolicy of this project is as flagrant as its immorality. Suppose the campaign of *prestige* do not succeed? In addition to the obstacles presented by the Russian army in the Crimea pestilence is as likely to be at hand as war. [...] If the campaign of *prestige* fail, where will be France and England? On whose side will then be arrayed the great German Powers? The vista is no less than the decline and fall of Europe. Even if the odds were not against us, are we justified in running such a chance—not even in favour of a policy, but of a demonstration? It may be mortifying to the ruler of France that a great opportunity has been lost: [...] it is not less mortifying to the people of England. But statesmen must deal with the circumstances before them. Neither France, nor England, nor Russia, in 1855, are in the position they respectively occupied in the year 1853. Woe to the men who have betrayed the highest interests of Europe! May they meet the doom they deserve! The ruler of France and the Queen of England are guiltless; but they must not, like bewildered gamesters, persist in backing their ill luck in a frenzy of disappointment, or in a paroxysm of despair”.

The same paper refers to Girardin’s pamphlet *La Paix*, in which the simultaneous disarming of Sevastopol and Gibraltar is extolled as the true solution for peace.

“Remember,” *The Press* exclaims, “this pamphlet, or rather its sale, is authorised by the French Government, and its author is the dear and intimate friend, adviser and companion, of the heir presumptive to the Throne Imperial.”

Here we shall only allude to the fact that the Derbyites, whose organ *The Press* is, are working for a coalition with the (peaceable) Manchester School and that the Ministry for its part is also trying to win round the Manchester School by the newspaper stamp Bill (to which we shall return). The idea of a campaign designed to be a mere display of force, of a European war not to endanger the hostile power but to save one’s own *prestige*, of a war resembling a spectacular show, must certainly discontent every sober Englishman. Query: is this not one of the *idées napoléoniennes* as understood and bound to be understood by the restored empire?

Written on March 24, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 145, March 27, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

a Lord John Russell.—*Ed.*
b Victoria.—*Ed.*
c Prince Jérôme Bonaparte, Jr.—*Ed.*
d See this volume, 121-23.—*Ed.*
e An allusion to Louis Bonaparte’s book *Des idées napoléoniennes* published in 1839.—*Ed.*
London, March 27. We learn from the best source that Bonaparte’s visit to St. James’s Palace—expected on April 16—will occasion a great counter-demonstration. For the Chartists have invited the French refugee Armand Barbès also to visit London on April 16, when he is to be received with a public procession and a big meeting. There is, however, some question whether his state of health will permit a sea voyage.

The Bill to abolish the newspaper stamp passed its second reading in the House of Commons yesterday. The main articles of this Bill are as follows: 1. The compulsory newspaper stamp is abolished; 2. Periodicals printed on stamped paper will continue to enjoy the privilege of free distribution through the post. A third clause concerns the size of printed matter distributed through the post, and another decrees that stamped newspapers will have to furnish security in case of any action for libel. The old newspaper duty system is sufficiently characterised by two facts. The publication of a daily paper in London requires a capital of at least £50,000 to £60,000. The whole English press, with very few exceptions, raises a shameless and disgraceful opposition to the new Bill. Is further proof needed that the old system was a protective tariff system for the established press and a system prohibiting free mental production? Press freedom in England up to now has been the exclusive privilege of capital. The few weekly journals which represent the interests of the working class—daily papers were, of course, out of the question—manage to survive thanks to the weekly contributions of the workers, who in England are making very different sacrifices for public purposes
than those on the Continent. The tragicomic, blustering rhetoric with which the Leviathan of the English press—The Times—fights pro aris et focis a i.e., for the newspaper monopoly, now modestly comparing itself with the Delphic oracle, now affirming that England possesses only one single institution worth preserving, namely The Times; now claiming absolute rule over world journalism, and, without any Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, a protectorate over all European journalists.

All this cant b by The Times was properly disposed of in yesterday's sitting of the Lower House by the whimsical Drummond:

"Nowadays the press was a mercantile speculation, and nothing else.... Why Messrs. Walter", the principal shareholders of The Times, "should not set up a manufactory of gossip just as well as Mr. Bright should set up a manufactory of calico?... The Times seemed to him to carry on their business [...] better than their rivals [...] The Walter family have always found a convenient man [...]—a seven years' barrister or some one of that stamp, who was ready to take up anything. [...] There was Barnes, Alsager, Sterling, Delane, Morris, Lowe and Dasent. [...] These gentlemen were all of different opinions. Now, the foolish papers who did not understand the matter, like The Morning Chronicle, for instance, took up with some particular party. One was a Peelite 108, another a Derbyite, etc. When the Peelite party was thriving the paper threw too, but when the Peelites went down, down went the paper. It was quite clear these were not men of business. The thing was to get a set of gentlemen of different opinions"—and The Times is a master of this—"and to set them writing. Of course, you could accuse no one man of inconsistency; he might always have held the same opinions; and so individually these were most consistent, while, collectively, nothing in the world could be more inconsistent. It seemed to him that the very perfection of journalism was—individual honesty, and collective profligacy, political and literary. There was [...] a great advantage in this, and The Times newspaper always put him very much in mind of one of his farmers. When he suggested draining a bit of bog the farmer [...] replied, 'No, no! don't drain it. In wet weather there's something for the cow, and if there's nothing for the cow there's something for the pig, and if there's nothing for the pig, there's something for the goose.' [...] As to the bribery of newspapers there was positive proof respecting The Times of which Napoleon said, 'You have sent me The Times,—that infamous Times, the journal of the Bourbons'—and it was stated in a work by Mr. O'Meara c that the Bourbons paid The Times 6,000 f. [...] a month. He had found the receipt for the money, signed by the editor. Mr. O'Meara also stated that before he was exiled to Elba Napoleon received several offers [...] from the editors of newspapers, and among them offers from The Times, to write for them. Napoleon declined to accept the offers made to him, but afterwards regretted the course he took." d

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a For hearth and home. The reference is to an article on the Bill to lift stamp duty, published in The Times, No. 22011, March 26, 1855.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
c O'Meara's diary Napoleon in Exile, or A Voice from St. Helena, published in 1822.—Ed.
d Drummond made this speech in the House of Commons on March 26, 1855. The Times, No. 22012, March 27, 1855.—Ed.
In this context we merely observe that in 1815 *The Times* urged that Napoleon, whom it presented as the centre of European demagogy would be shot under martial law. In 1816 this same paper wanted to bring the United States of North America, “this disastrous example of successful insurrection”, back under English despotism.

Written on March 27, 1855

First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 151, March 30, 1855

Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
London, March 28. The Committee of Inquiry of the Commons has now held more than a dozen meetings, and the results of its findings are in great part available to the public. Witnesses from the most divers walks of life have been heard, from the Duke of Cambridge to Mr. Macdonald of The Times, and rarely has a hearing of witnesses been distinguished by so much agreement of the testimony. The various branches of the administration have been reviewed and all have been found to be not only deficient but in an appallingly shocking state. The Army Staff, the Medical Department, the Board of Ordnance, the Commissariat, the Transport Service, the Hospital Administration, the Health Inspection, and the Harbour Police of Balaklava and Constantinople have all been condemned without any opposition. But bad as every department was shown to be on its own, the full glory of the system was displayed only in their contact and collaboration with each other. The regulations were so beautifully arranged that as soon as they came into force nobody knew where his authority began and ended, or to whom to turn. Read the descriptions of the condition of the hospitals, of the infamous brutalities committed through neglect or indolence on the sick and wounded in the transport ships and on arrival at their destination. Nothing more horrible occurred on the retreat from Moscow. And these things happened in Scutari, opposite Constantinople, a big city with multifarious resources, not during a hasty retreat with Cossacks on the heels of the fleeing soldiers, cutting off their supplies but as a result of an up-till-then successful campaign, in a place secure from all hostile attack, in the big central depot where

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a The retreat of Napoleon’s army in 1812.—Ed.
Great Britain stores its supplies for the army. And those who caused all these horrors were no barbarians but gentlemen belonging to the "Upper Ten Thousand", mild men in their way. *Fiat* the regulations, *pereat* the army! "Turn to another department, the matter is not our responsibility." "But to whom should we turn?" "It is no part of our responsibility to know which department is responsible, and even if it was, we would not be authorised to tell you." "But the sick need shirts, soap, bedding, housing, medicines, arrowroot, b port. They are dying in their hundreds." "I am indeed very sorry to hear that the best blood of England is so rapidly ebbing away, but we are unable to help. We cannot provide anything, even if we have it, without the necessary requisitions, signed by half a dozen persons, of whom two-thirds are absent in the Crimea or elsewhere." And like Tantalus, the soldiers had to die in the face, even within smelling distance of the comforts which could have saved their lives. Not a single man there possessed the energy to break through the network of routine, to act on his own responsibility, as the needs of the moment demanded, and in defiance of the regulations. Only one person dared to do that, and that was a *woman*, Miss Nightingale. Once she had made sure that the things required were there, she chose a number of sturdy fellows and committed what amounted to burglary of Her Majesty's stores. She told the horror-stricken suppliers:

"Now I have got what I needed. Now go and report at home what you have seen. I take it all upon myself."

The old wives in authority in Constantinople and Scutari, far from being capable of such a bold enterprise, were cowards to a degree which would seem incredible if we did not have their own candid admissions. One of them, a certain *Dr. Andrew Smith*, for example, for a time chief of the hospitals, was asked by the Committee of Inquiry whether there were no funds available in Constantinople for purchases and no markets where the necessary commodities could be procured?

"Oh yes," he replied. "But after forty years of routine and drudgery at home I assure you that it was months before I could convince myself that such a power to spend money was vested in me." c

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a Let there be regulations, though the army perish—a paraphrase of the Latin saying, *Fiat justitia—pereat mundus* (Let justice be done though the world perish).—*Ed.*

b Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*

c "The State of the Army before Sebastopol", *The Times*, No 22007, March 21, 1855.—*Ed.*
And it was to such old wives that the British Army was entrusted! Indeed, the most eloquent descriptions in the press and in Parliament seem colourless compared with the reality as it unfolds in the witnesses' evidence. And what shall we say of the Herberths, the Gladstones, the Newcastles and *tutti quanti,*\(^a\) of Peel's fashionable clerks\(^b\) who in Parliament repeatedly denied all the facts that have now been proved, rejecting them with a passionate bitterness with which these " eminent" gentlemen had not hitherto been credited! These dandies of Exeter Hall, the elegant Puseyites, for whom the difference between "transubstantiation" and "real presence" is a life-and-death question,\(^{110}\) with their characteristically modest arrogance, undertook the conduct of the war and were so successful with the "transubstantiation" of the British Army that its "real presence" was nowhere. "Yes, it is somewhere," Gladstone replied. "On January 1 the British Army in the Crimea amounted to 32,000 men." Unfortunately, we have the evidence of the Duke of Cambridge that on November 6, after the battle of Inkérmán,\(^{111}\) the British Army did not number 13,000 bayonets, and we know that since November and December it has lost about 3,000 men.

In the meantime the news of the uproar in the Commons against the Ministers, of Roebuck's Committee and of the popular indignation in England, has reached the Crimea. Welcomed by the soldiers with jubilation, it struck the generals and department heads with horror. A week later the news arrived that commissioners were on their way with authority to investigate and to negotiate. This had the effect of a galvanic battery on paralytics. Meanwhile the railway workers set to work unfettered by precedence, regulations or office habits. They secured a landing place, set shovels in motion, erected wharves, huts, dams, and before the quaint old gentlemen had any idea the first rail had been laid. Insignificant as the railway probably is for the siege—all its advantages could be obtained more cheaply and simply—it proved of the greatest use by the mere example, by the live contrast of modern industrial England to the helpless England of routine. The "Forward" operations of the railwaymen broke the spell which had held the whole British Army paralysed, the spell generated by an illusion of phantastic impossibilities which had brought British officers and men close to the stolid fatalism of the Turks, and induced them calmly to watch certain ruin as if it were

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\(^a\) The whole lot.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) Marx uses the English word.— *Ed.*
an inescapable fate. With the railway workers the adage *Aide-toi et le ciel t'aidera* revived in the army. Within six weeks everything took on a new look. Raglan and his staff, divisional and brigade generals are daily in the trenches, inspecting and giving orders. The Commissariat has discovered horses, carts and drivers, and the troops have found means of bringing their sick under cover, and some of the troops as well. The medical staff has removed the most flagrant horrors from the hospital tents and barracks. Ammunition, clothing, even fresh meat and vegetables are beginning to be available. A certain degree of order has begun to prevail, and though a great deal of the old trouble still remains, the improvement in the conditions is indisputable and amazing.

Written on March 28, 1855

First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 158, March 31, 1855

Marked with the sign X

Printed according to the newspaper

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“God helps those who help themselves.”—Ed.
Karl Marx

THE BRITISH ARMY

We have now before us the report of some dozen sittings of the famous Committee appointed by the House of Commons to investigate the condition of the British army in the Crimea. Witnesses have been examined of every rank and station, from the Duke of Cambridge down, and their testimony is surprisingly unanimous. All departments of the administration have been passed in review, and all have been found to be not only deficient, but scandalously so. The staff, the medical department, the purveyor’s department, the commissariat, the transport service, the hospital administration, the sanitary and disciplinary police, the harbor police of Balaklava, have one and all been condemned without an opposing voice.

Bad as every department was in itself, the full glories of the system were, however, developed only by the contact and cooperation of all. The regulations were so beautifully arranged that as soon as they came to be put in force, when the troops first landed in Turkey, nobody knew where his authority began nor where it ended, nor to whom to apply for anything; and thus, from a wholesome fear of responsibility, everybody shifted everything from his own shoulders to those of somebody else. Under this system, the hospitals were scenes of infamous brutality. Indolent neglect did its worst upon the sick and wounded on board the transports and after their arrival. The facts revealed are incredible; indeed, there was nothing more horrible in the retreat from Moscow. And yet, they actually happened at Scutari, within sight of Constantinople, a large city, with all its resources in labor and material comforts. They happened, not on a hasty retreat,

\[^a\] Of Napoleon’s army in 1812.—Ed.
with the Cossacks at the heels of the fugitives and cutting off
their supplies, but in the course of a partially successful campaign,
at a place sheltered from all hostile attack, at the great central
depot where Great Britain had heaped up her stores for the army.
And the authors of all these horrors and abominations are no
hard-hearted barbarians. They are, every one of them, British
gentlemen of good extraction, well-educated, and of mild,
philanthropic and religious dispositions. In their individual capa-
city, they no doubt were ready and willing to do anything; in their
official capacity, their duty was to look coolly and with folded arms
upon all these infamies, conscious that the case was not provided
for in any part of her Majesty’s regulations affecting themselves.
Perish a thousand armies sooner than infringe upon her Majesty’s
regulations! And Tantalus-like, the soldiers had to die within sight,
almost within reach of the comforts which would have saved their
lives.

Not a man on the spot had the energy to break through the
net-work of routine, to act upon his own responsibility as the
necessities of the case demanded, and in the teeth of the
regulations. The only party who has dared to do this is a woman,
Miss Nightingale. Having once ascertained that the things wanted
were in store, she is reported to have taken a handful of stout
fellows and to have actually committed a burglary upon the
Queen’s store-houses! The old women in authority at Constant-
tinople and Scutari, far from being capable of such daring, were
cowards to a degree we could scarcely credit, were it not openly
admitted by themselves. One of them, Dr. Andrew Smith, for a
time chief of the hospitals, was asked if there were in Constan-
tinople no funds to buy, and no market to supply, many of the
things wanted?

“Oh, yes,” he replied, “but after forty years’ routine and drudgery at home, I assure
you I could hardly for some months realize the idea that I actually had funds placed at my
command!”

The very blackest descriptions of the state of matters which had
been given in both newspapers and Parliamentary speeches, are
far outdone by the reality, as it now is brought before us. Some of
the most glaring features had been broached, but even these now
receive a gloomier coloring. Although the picture is as yet far
from complete, we can see enough of it to judge of the whole.
Excepting the female nurses sent out, there is not one redeeming
feature in it. One group is as bad and as stupid as the other, and

\[a\] “The State of the Army before Sebastopol”, *The Times*, No. 22007, March 21,
1855.—*Ed.*
if the Committee, in their report, have the courage to speak out according to evidence, they will be embarrassed to find in the English language words strong enough to express their condemnation.

In view of these disclosures it is impossible to repress a strong glow of indignation and contempt not only for the immediate actors, but above all for the Government which arranged the expedition, and which, with the facts staring it in the face, had the impudence to declare they were mere fictions. Where, now, is that great Coalition of All the Talents, that galaxy of statesmen with whose advent the Golden Age was to dawn upon England? Between Whigs and Peelites, Russellites and Palmerstonians, Irishmen and Englishmen, Liberal Conservatives and Conservative Liberals, they have been huckstering and bargaining among themselves, and every man they have put into place turns out to be an old woman or an unmitigated fool. These statesmen were so sure the machine they had been managing for thirty years would work admirably, that they did not even send out a person invested with extraordinary powers for unforeseen circumstances; unforeseen circumstances, of course, could never occur under a well-regulated Government! Subalterns by nature and by habit, these British ministers, suddenly placed in a position of command, have achieved the utter disgrace of England. There is old Raglan, all his life a head-office-clerk to Wellington; a man that never was permitted to act upon his own responsibility; a man bred to do just as he was bid, up to his 65th year; and this man is all of a sudden appointed to lead an army against the enemy, and to decide everything at once and for himself! And a pretty mess he has made of it. Vacillation, timidity, total absence of self-confidence, firmness and the initiative, mark every one of his steps. We know now how feebly he behaved in the council of war where the Crimean expedition was resolved upon. To be taken in tow by a blustering blackguard like St. Arnaud, whom old Wellington would have silenced forever with one dry, ironical word! Then his timid march to Balaklava, his helplessness at the siege\(^a\) and during the sufferings of the winter, when he found nothing better to do than to hide himself. Then there is Lord Hardinge, equally subaltern in character, who commands the army at home. An old campaigner as he is, one would judge from his administration, and the way he defends it in the Lords, that he had never been out of his barracks or his office. To say he is

\(^a\) Of Sevastopol.—Ed.
totally ignorant of the very first requisites of an army in the field, or too lazy to recollect them, is the most favorable aspect that can be given to his case. Then come Peel’s clerks—Cardwell, Gladstone, Newcastle, Herbert, and tutti quanti. They are well-bred, good-looking young gentlemen, whose elegance of manners and refinement of feeling do not permit them to handle a thing roughly, or to act with even a show of decision in the matters of this world. “Consideration” is their word. They take everything into consideration; they keep everything under consideration; they hold everybody in consideration; in consideration of which they expect to be held in consideration by everybody. Everything with them must be round and smooth. Nothing is so objectionable as the angular forms which mark strength and energy.

Whatever reports came from the army as to its being ruined by mismanagement were impudently denied by these mild, veracious and pious gentlemen, who being a priori convinced of the perfection of their Government, had the best authority for such denials; and when the subject was persevered in, and even the official reports from the seat of war compelled them to admit part of these statements, their denials were still made with a degree of acrimony and passion. Their opposition to Roebuck’s motion for an inquiry is the most scandalous instance on record of public perseverance in untruth. The London Times, Layard, Stafford, and even their own colleague, Russell, gave them the lie, but they persevered. The whole House of Commons, by a majority of two out of three, gave them the lie, and they still persevered. Now they stand convicted before Roebuck’s Committee; but, for aught we know, they are persevering still. But their perseverance has now become a matter of small account. With the truth disclosed to the world in all its horrible reality, it is impossible that there should not be a reform in the system and administration of the British Army.

Written on March 28, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4364, April 14, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1032, April 17, 1855 as a leading article

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This refers to the speeches made by Layard, Stafford and Russell in the House of Commons on January 26 and 29, 1855 during the discussion of Roebuck’s motion for setting up a committee to inquire into the condition of the army at Sevastopol. The Times, Nos. 21962 and 21964, January 27 and 30, 1855.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

While the diplomats assembled at Vienna are discussing the fate of Sevastopol, and the Allies are trying to make peace on the best terms they can, the Russians in the Crimea, profiting by the blunders of their opponents, as well as by their own central position in the country, are again taking the offensive on every point. It is a curious state of things, considering the boasts with which the Allies began their invasion, and looks like a vast satire on human presumption and folly. But though it thus has its comic side, the drama is deeply tragic, after all; and we once more invite our readers to a serious examination of the facts, as they are disclosed by our latest advices received here on Sunday morning by the America's mails.¹¹⁴

At Eupatoria, Omer Pasha is now actually hemmed in on the land side. Their superiority in cavalry permits the Russians to place their picquets and videttes close to the town, to scour the country by patrols, intercepting supplies, and in case of a serious sally, to fall back upon their infantry. Thus they are doing what we predicted they would do—holding the superior force of Turks in check by a body perhaps not more than one-fourth or one-third their number.⁶ Accordingly Omer Pasha is waiting for additional cavalry to come up, and in the meantime has been to the Anglo-French camp to inform his allies that for the present he can do nothing, and that a reinforcement of some 10,000 French troops would be very desirable. No doubt it would; but no less desirable to Canrobert himself, who, by this time, must have found out that he has both too many troops, and too few—too many for the mere carrying on of the siege, such as it is, and for the

¹¹⁴ See this volume, pp. 82-85.—Ed.
defense of the Chernaya; but not enough to debouch from the Chernaya, drive the Russians into the interior, and invest the North Fort. To send 10,000 men to Eupatoria, would not enable the Turks to take the field with success; while their absence would cripple the French army at the time when, with the reenforcements arriving in spring, it is expected to take the field.

The siege is now becoming a very sorry affair, indeed. The night attack of the Zouaves on Feb. 24, was even more disastrous in its results than we stated a week ago. It appears from Canrobert's own dispatch that he did not know what he was about when he ordered this attack. He says:

"The purpose of the attack being now attained, our troops retired, as nobody ever could think of our establishing ourselves on a point so completely commanded by the fire of the enemy."b

But what was the purpose thus attained? What was there to do if the point could not be held? Nothing whatever. The destruction of the redoubt was not accomplished, and could not have been accomplished under the enemy's fire, even if the Zouaves, as the first report pretended, had for a moment exclusive possession of the work. But that they never had; the Russian report denies it most positively, and Canrobert does not pretend to anything of the kind. What, then, was meant by this attack? Why, plainly this: that Canrobert, seeing the Russians establishing themselves in a position very embarrassing and equally humiliating to the besiegers, without any reflection, without giving himself the trouble of examining the probable issue of the affair, sent his troops to the charge. It was a downright, useless butchery, and will leave a serious stain upon Canrobert's military reputation. If any excuse can be found, it is only in the supposition that the French troops having become impatient for the assault, the General intended giving them a slight foretaste of what the assault would be. But this excuse is quite as discreditable to Canrobert as the charge itself.

By the affair of Malakoff the Russians ascertained their superiority on the ground immediately in front of their defenses. The work situated on the crest of the hill, and vainly attacked by the Zouaves, is called by them the Selenghinsk redoubt, from the regiment which defended it. They at once proceeded to follow up their advantage and act upon the certitude thus obtained. Selenghinsk was enlarged and strengthened, guns were brought

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a See this volume, pp. 115-16.—Ed.
b Canrobert's dispatch of February 27, 1855 was published in The Times, No. 22008, March 22, 1855.—Ed.
up to it, though they must have passed under the heaviest fire of the besiegers, and counter-approaches were made from it, probably with a view to erect one or two minor works in its front. On another spot, too, in front of the Korniloff bastion, a series of new redoubts was also thrown up 300 yards in advance of the old Russian works. From former British reports, the possibility of such a step seems astonishing, for we were always told the Allies had thrown up their own trenches at less than that distance from the Russian lines. But as we were enabled to state, upon first-rate professional authority about a month since, the French lines were still some 400 yards from the Russian outworks, and the British even twice that distance. Now, at last, The Times' correspondent's letter of March 16 confesses that even up to that date the British trenches were still 600 to 800 yards off, and that, in fact, the batteries about to open upon the enemy were but the same which opened their fire on the 17th of October last! This, then, is that great progress in the siege—that pushing forward the trenches, which cost two-thirds of the British army their lives!

Under such circumstances, there was plenty of room for erecting these new Russian works in the intermediate space between the two lines of batteries; but it nevertheless remains a most unparalleled act, the boldest and most skilful thing that was ever undertaken by a besieged garrison. It amounts to nothing less than opening a fresh parallel against the Allies, at from 300 to 400 yards from their works; to a counter-approach on the grandest scale against the besiegers, who thereby are at once thrown back into a defensive state, while the very first essential condition of a siege is that the besiegers shall hold the besieged in the defensive. Thus the tables are completely turned, and the Russians are strongly in the ascendant.

Whatever blunders and fantastical experiments the Russian engineers may have made under Schilder, at Silistria,\(^1\) the Allies have, here at Sevastopol, evidently a different set of men to deal with. The justness and rapidity of glance—the promptness, boldness, and faultlessness of execution, which the Russian engineers have shown in throwing up their lines around Sevastopol—the indefatigable attention with which every weak point was protected as soon as discovered by the enemy—the excellent arrangement of the line of fire, so as to concentrate a force, superior to that of the besiegers, upon any given point of the ground in front—the preparation of a second, third and fourth

\(^{a}\) W. H. Russell.—Ed.  
\(^{b}\) The Times, No. 22014, March 29, 1855.—Ed.
line of fortifications in rear of the first—in short, the whole conduct of this defense has been classic. The late offensive advances on Malakoff hill and to the front of the Korniloff bastion are unparalleled in the history of sieges, and stamp their originators as first-rate men in their line. It is but just to add that the Chief Engineer at Sevastopol is Col. Totleben, a comparatively obscure man in the Russian service. But we must not take the defense of Sevastopol as a fair specimen of Russian engineering. The average between Silistria and Sevastopol is nearer the reality.

People in the Crimea, as well as in England and France, now begin to discover, though very gradually, that there is no chance of Sevastopol being taken by assault. In this perplexity the London Times has applied to "high professional authority," and has been informed that the proper thing to do is to act on the offensive, either by passing the Chernaya, and effecting a junction with Omer Pasha's Turks, before or after a battle against the Russian Army of Observation, or by a diversion against Kaffa, which would force the Russians to divide themselves. As the allied army is now supposed to number from 110,000 to 120,000 men, such movements should be in their power. Now, nobody knows better than Canrobert and Raglan that an advance beyond the Chernaya and a union with Omer Pasha's army would be most desirable; but, unfortunately, as we have proved over and over again, the 110,000 to 120,000 Allies on the heights before Sevastopol do not exist, and have never existed. On the 1st of March they did not number above 90,000 men fit for duty. As to an expedition to Kaffa, the Russians could wish for nothing better than to see the allied troops dispersed over three different points, from 60 to 150 miles distant from the center one, while at neither of the two points which they now hold have they sufficient strength to perform the task before them! Surely, the "high professional authority" must have been hoaxing The Times in seriously advising it to advocate a repetition of the Eupatoria expedition!

Written about March 30, 1855

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4366, April 17, 1855 and in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1032, April 17, 1855 as a leading article

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a See "The last accounts from the Crimea...", The Times, No. 22012, March 27, 1855.—Ed.
b See, e.g., this volume, pp. 32-33.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE SITUATION IN THE CRIMEA

London, March 30. The reports on the progress of the peace negotiations fluctuate wildly from one day to the next. Today peace is certain, tomorrow war. Palmerston's article in the Post bristles with swords and cannon—evidence that he would like to make peace as soon as possible. Napoleon orders his press to write hymns of peace—the surest proof that he intends to continue the war. The course of events in the Crimea by no means indicates that the fall of Sevastopol is imminent. Omer Pasha is now in fact firmly trapped at Eupatoria, on the land-side. The superiority of their cavalry allows the Russians to station their pickets and mounted sentinels quite close to the town, to despatch patrols into the surrounding territory to cut off supplies and, in the event of a serious attack, to fall back on the infantry stationed further off. As we assumed earlier, they are succeeding in keeping a superior Turkish force in check with a quarter or a third of their number. The attack made by the Turkish cavalry under Iskander Bey (the Pole Iliński, who earned himself such a glorious reputation at Kalafat) was repulsed by a simultaneous charge by three Russian detachments which attacked from three different points. Like all cavalry which is badly trained and lacking in confidence the Turks, instead of charging headlong at the Russians with sabres drawn, halted at a respectful distance and began firing their carbines. This clear sign of indecision drove the Russians onto the offensive. Iskander Bey attempted an attack with one squadron but was left in the lurch by everybody except the bashi-bazouks and had to force his retreat right through the

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\( ^a \) "The discussion upon the Third Point...", *The Morning Post*, No. 25348, March 30, 1855.—*Ed.*

\( ^b \) A reference to the German version of Engels' article "The Results in the Crimea" (see the English version in this volume, pp. 81-85).—*Ed.*
ranks of the Russians. Omer Pasha awaits the arrival of cavalry reinforcements and has been in the meantime to the Anglo-French camp to inform the allies that for the moment he can do nothing, and that reinforcements of some 10,000 French troops would be very desirable. No doubt, but it is no less desirable for Canrobert himself, who has already discovered that he has at one and the same time too many and too few troops at his disposal. Too many to besiege Sevastopol in the old way and to defend the Chernaya; not enough to sally forth from the Chernaya, to drive the Russians into the interior and surround the northern fortress.\(^a\) Detaching 10,000 men to Eupatoria would not enable the Turks to enter the battle successfully, but would weaken the French army for operations in open country. The *siege* is daily becoming a more critical affair for the besiegers.

We have seen that, on February 24 the Russians held the redoubt on the Sapun hill (in front of the Malakhov fortifications).\(^b\) They have now extended and strengthened this redoubt, mounted cannon on it, and have made counter-approaches from it. Similarly a series of new redoubts have been constructed in front of the Kornilov bastion, 300 yards beyond the old Russian fortifications. The reader of *The Times* must find this inexplicable, for according to that newspaper the allies had long since thrown up their own trenches at less than that distance from the Russian lines. Now at last, e. g. in his letter of March 16, the *Times* correspondent\(^c\) admits that even at the time of his latest reports the British trenches were still 600-800 yards away, and that the *batteries on the point of firing on the enemy are the same ones that opened fire on October 17 last year.*\(^d\) This then is the great progress, made in the siege, these are the advances made with the building of trenches, which cost two-thirds of the English army their lives or their health. Under these circumstances there was sufficient space between the two lines of batteries to construct the new Russian fortifications. This can be regarded as the opening-up of a new parallel against the besiegers at a distance of 300-400 yards from their fortifications, as a counter-approach on the largest scale against the besieging army. Thus the besiegers are forced onto the defensive, whereas the first and most essential condition for a siege is that the besiegers should force the besieged onto the defensive.

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\(^a\) In the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*: the “town side”.— Ed.
\(^b\) A reference to the German version of Engels' article “A Battle at Sevastopol” (see the English version in this volume, pp. 113-17).— Ed.
\(^c\) W. H. Russell.— Ed.
\(^d\) *The Times*, No. 22014, March 29, 1855.— Ed.
Just as in the camp at Sevastopol people in England are now beginning to discover that there is no likelihood of taking Sevastopol by storm. In this awkward situation The Times has sought the aid of a “high military authority” and learned that it is necessary to take the offensive, either by crossing the Chernaya and effecting a link-up with the Turks under Omer Pasha, whether it be before or after a battle with the Russian observation army, or by means of a diversion towards Kaffa which would force the Russians to split up. As the allied army now numbers 110,000-120,000 men movements of this kind must be within its capabilities. Thus says The Times.\footnote{"The last accounts from the Crimea...", The Times, No. 22012, March 27, 1855.— Ed.}

Now no one knows better than Raglan and Canrobert that a link-up with Omer Pasha’s army is highly desirable, but unfortunately the allies do [not] as yet have 110,000-120,000 men at their disposal on the heights above Sevastopol, but at the outside 80,000-90,000 men fit for service. As for an expedition to Kaffa the Russians could not wish for anything better: the allied troops dispersed in three different locations, 60-150 miles from the central point, whilst not being strong enough at either of the two positions they are holding to carry out the task before them! It would appear that The Times has taken its advice from “Russian” military experts.

Since at least some of the men of the 11th and 12th French divisions are on their way and the rest as well as the 13th and 14th divisions and the two Piedmontese divisions are about to follow, the allied army will by the end of May be brought up to a strength which will both enable it and force it to advance from its defensive position on the Chernaya. The troops will be concentrated at Constantinople and probably shipped together, so that they will have to spend as little time as possible on the ill-starred Chersonese. This measure will cause some delay but will bring great advantages. The reinforcements, which up to now were sent to the Crimea in small detachments—although when taken together they form a whole army—never strengthened the expeditionary forces sufficiently to enable them to launch offensive operations.

Written on March 30, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 155, April 2, 1855

Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
A SCANDAL IN THE FRENCH LEGISLATURE.—
DROUYN DE LHUYS' INFLUENCE.—
THE STATE OF THE MILITIA

London, April 3. We are informed by a correspondent in Paris:

"In the Bonapartist *corps législatif* there occurred a scene, which has failed to get into the English press. During the debate on the *Replacement Law* Granier de Cassagnac jumped up—after Montalembert's speech—and in his fury he let the cat out of the bag. Only when this law comes into force, he said, will the army become what it ought to be, dedicated to law and order and the Emperor, and we shall never again witness the shameful sight of soldiers turning their muskets round" (*soldats à baionnettes renversées*). "The conclusion of this speech, in which the janissary system was openly preached as an ideal for the army, provoked loud protests even in *this* assembly, and Granier was obliged to sit down. Another member of the legislature jumped to his feet and made a scathing attack on Granier. The scandal was so great that even Morny had to challenge Cassagnac" (it is well known that he was called *le roi des drôles* by Guizot when he was still editing his little rag, the *Globe*) "to explain himself. Granier made a formal apology with the greatest meekness, and personally moved that the incident be passed over in silence in the *Moniteur*. The sitting was as stormy as in the finest days of Louis Philippe's Chamber of Deputies."

"The British public," writes *The Morning Chronicle* today, "have come to the conclusion that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is gone to Vienna to act as a kind of prompter or fly-flapper to Lord John Russell whose proceedings hitherto have not given satisfaction either to his own compatriots or to our Allies. [...] The noble lord is famous for his fits and starts of patriotism and liberalism; for his extreme public spirit while in Opposition, or when in need of political capital, and his sudden collapses when the immediate necessity is over. Something of this kind seems to have happened to him on the present occasion; and the people are beginning to grumble. Since M. Drouyn de Lhuys has come to London a more decided tone is perceptible in high quarters. It has even transpired that his mission has so far been successful, that the peaceful aspirations of Lord John Russell have been officially frustrated, and that *our 'man of vigour'* (Palmerston) "has

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*a* King of the rascals.—*Ed.*

*b* April 3, 1855.—*Ed.*
reluctantly assented to an ultimatum which Russia [...] is likely to reject with disdain."

The English Army has vanished, and the English militia is in the process of vanishing. The militia, which was created by Act of Parliament in 1852 under Lord Derby, should by law not be called up for more than 28 days each year under normal circumstances. In the case of a war of invasion, however, or for any other important and urgent reason, it could be incorporated into the army for permanent service. But by an Act of Parliament of 1854 all men recruited after May 12, 1854 were obliged to serve for the duration of the war. The question has now been raised what the obligations were of those recruited under the Act of 1852. The Crown lawyers declared that they considered this category also to be liable for permanent service during the war. But a few weeks ago Lord Panmure in contradiction with this juridical decision, issued an order permitting all those recruited before the Act of 1854 to leave but granting them a cash-payment of £1 if they re-enlist for a further five years. As at present the cash-payment for recruits enlisting for two years in the regular army is £7 for the infantry and £10 for the cavalry, a payment of £1 for five years’ service in the militia was the most infallible means of dissolving it. Lord Palmerston, who hesitated to call up the militia for almost a year, seems to want to be rid of it again as soon as possible. Accordingly we learn that in the last fortnight one militia regiment after the other has lost from $\frac{2}{3}$ to $\frac{5}{8}$ of its strength. Thus in the First Regiment of the Somerset Militia 414 men out of 500 have left, in the North Durham Militia 770 out of 800, in the Leicester Militia 340 out of 460, in the Suffolk Artillery 90 out of 130, etc.

Written on April 3, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 163, April 7, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, Tuesday, April 10, 1855

Allow me once more to resume my long-interrupted correspondence with the Tribune. Yesterday and to-day will most likely be the first two decisive days in the Vienna Conferences, as they were to open on the 9th in the presence of Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, and as, at the same time, the Russian Ambassador was expected to have received his instructions relative to the Third and Fourth Points. The journey of Drouyn de Lhuys was at first puffed up on every Stock Exchange as a certain symptom of peace; for such an eminent diplomatist, it was said, surely would not go to take personal part in these debates unless he were sure of success. As to the "eminence" of this diplomatist, it is of a very mythical cast, and exists principally in the paid newspaper articles by which he magnifies himself into a second Talleyrand, as though his long career under Louis Philippe had not long since established his "eminent" mediocrity. But the real reason of his journey is this: Lord John Russell has managed within a few weeks, through his notorious ignorance of the French language, to embroil the Allies in concessions which he never intended to make, and which it will take extraordinary efforts to retrieve. Lord John's French is of the real John Bull species, such as "Milord" speaks in Fra Diavolo, and other theatrical pieces formerly popular in France; it begins with "Monsieur l'Aubergiste," and ends with "Très bien;" and if he understands but one-half of what is said to him, he is revenged in the consciousness that other people understand still less of what

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a A. M. Gorchakov.—Ed.
b Lord Cockburn, a character in a comic opera by the French composer D. F. E. Auber (libretto by A. E. Scribe).—Ed.
c "Mr. Innkeeper".—Ed.
he utters. It was for this very reason that his friend and rival, Lord Palmerston, sent him to Vienna, considering that a couple of blunders on that stage would be sufficient finally to demolish poor little John. And so it has turned out. Half the time he could not make out what was going on, and a quick and unexpected interpolation from Gorchakoff or Buol was sure to draw an embarrassed "Très bien" from the unfortunate diplomatic débutant. In this way Russia, and to some degree Austria, lay claim that several points are settled, at least so far as England is concerned, which poor Lord John never intended to concede. Palmerston, of course, would have no objection to this, as long as the blame falls exclusively upon his hapless colleague. But Louis Bonaparte cannot afford to be cheated into peace that way. To put a stop to this sort of diplomacy, the French Government at once resolved to bring matters to an issue. They fixed upon an ultimatum, with which Drouyn de Lhuys went to London, got the adhesion of the British Government, and then took it with him to Vienna. Thus, at present, he may be considered the joint representative of France and England, and there is no doubt that he will use his position to the best interest of his master. And as the only, the exclusive interest of Louis Bonaparte is not to conclude peace until he has reaped fresh glory and fresh advantages for France, and until the war has served to the full its purpose, as a "moyen de gouvernement," Drouyn's mission, far from being peaceful, will turn out, on the contrary, to have for its object to secure a continuance of the war under the most decent pretext available.

With the middle-classes both of France and England this war is decidedly unpopular. With the French bourgeoisie it was so from the beginning, because this class was ever since the 2d of December in full opposition against the government of the "savior of society." In England, the middle-class was divided. The great bulk had transferred their national hatred from the French to the Russians; and although John Bull can do a little annexation business himself now and then in India, he has no idea of allowing other people to do the same in other neighborhoods in an uncomfortable proximity to himself or his possessions. Russia was the country which in this respect had long since attracted his anxious notice. The enormously increasing British trade to the Levant, and through Trebizond to Inner Asia, makes the free navigation of the Dardanelles a point of the highest importance to

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[a] "Means of government".— Ed.
[b] December 2, 1851, the date of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état in France.— Ed.
England. The growing value of the Danubian countries as granaries forbids England to allow their gradual absorption into Russia, and the closing of the navigation of the Danube by the same power. Russian grain forms already a too important item in British consumption, and an annexation of the corn-producing frontier-countries by Russia would make Great Britain entirely dependent upon her and the United States, while it would establish these two countries as the regulators of the corn-market of the world. Besides, there are always some vague and alarming rumors afloat about Russian progress in Central Asia, got up by interested Indian politicians or terrified visionaries, and credited by the general geographical ignorance of the British public. Thus, when Russia began her aggression upon Turkey, the national hatred broke forth in a blaze, and never, perhaps, was a war as popular as this. The peace-party was for a moment interdicted from speaking; even the mass of its own members went along with the popular current. Whoever knew the character of the English must have felt certain that this warlike enthusiasm could be but of short duration, at least so far as the middle-class was concerned; as soon as the effects of the war should become taxable upon their pockets, mercantile sense was sure to overcome national pride, and the loss of immediate individual profits was sure to outweigh the certainty of losing, gradually, great national advantages. The Peelites, adverse to the war, not so much out of a real love of peace, as from a narrowness and timidity of mind which holds in horror all great crises and all decisive action, did their best to hasten the great moment when every British merchant and manufacturer could calculate to a farthing what the war would cost him, individually, per annum. Mr. Gladstone, scorning the vulgar idea of a loan, at once doubled the income-tax and stopped financial reform. The result came to light at once. The peace-party raised their heads again. John Bright dared popular feeling with his own well-known spirit and tenacity, until he succeeded in bringing the manufacturing districts round to him. In London the feeling is still more in favor of the war, but the progress of the peace-party is visible, even here; besides, it must be recollected that the peace-society never, at any time, commanded any mentionable influence in the capital. Its agitation, however, is increasing in all parts of the country, and another year of doubled taxation, with a loan—for this is now considered to be unavoidable—will break down whatever is left of warlike spirit among the manufacturing and trading classes.

With the mass of the people in both countries, the case is
entirely different. The peasantry in France have, ever since 1789, been the great supporters of war and warlike glory. They are sure, this time, not to feel much of the pressure of the war; for the conscription, in a country where the land is infinitesimally subdivided among small proprietors, not only frees the agricultural districts from surplus labor, but also gives to some 20,000 young men, every year, the opportunity of earning a round sum of money, by engaging to serve as substitutes. A protracted war only would be severely felt. As to war-taxes, the Emperor cannot impose them upon the peasantry, without risking his crown and his life. His only means of maintaining Bonapartism among them, is to buy them up by freedom from war-taxation; and thus, for some years to come, they may be exempted from this sort of pressure. In England, the case is similar. Agricultural labor is generally over-supplied, and furnishes the mass of the soldiery, which only at a later period of the war receives a strong admixture of the rowdy-class from the towns. Trade being tolerably good, and a good many agricultural improvements being carried out, when the war began, the quota of agricultural recruits was, in this instance, supplied more sparingly than before, and the town-element is decidedly preponderant in the present militia. But even what has been withdrawn has kept wages up, and the sympathy of the villagers is always accompanying soldiers who came from among them, and who are now transformed into heroes. Taxation, in its direct shape, does not touch the small farmers and laborers, and until an increase of indirect imposts can reach them, sensibly, several years of war must have passed. Among these people, the war-enthusiasm is as strong as ever, and there is not a village where is not to be found some new beer-shop with the sign of "The Heroes of the Alma," or some such motto, and where are not, in almost every house, wonderful prints of Alma, Inkermann, the charge at Balaklava,\textsuperscript{124} portraits of Lord Raglan and others, to adorn the walls. But if in France, the great preponderance of the small farmers (four-fifths of the population), and their peculiar relation to Louis Napoleon, give to their opinions a great deal of importance, in England the one-third of the population forming the countrypeople has scarcely any influence, except as a tail and chorus to the aristocratic landed proprietors.

The industrial working population has, in both countries, almost the same peculiar position with regard to this war. Both British and French proletarians are filled with an honorable national spirit, though they are more or less free from the antiquated national prejudices common, in either country, to the peasantry.
They have little immediate interest in the war, save that if the victories of their countrymen flatter their national pride, the conduct of the war, foolhardy and presumptuous as regards France, timid and stupid as regards England, offers them a fair opportunity of agitating against the existing governments and governing classes. But the main point, with them, is this: that this war, coinciding with a commercial crisis, only the first developments of which have, as yet, been seen, conducted by hands and heads unequal to the task, gaining at the same time European dimensions, will and must bring about events which will enable the proletarian class to resume that position which they lost, in France, by the battle of June, 1848, and that not only as far as France is concerned, but for all Central Europe, England included.

In France, indeed, there can be no doubt that every fresh revolutionary storm must bring, sooner or later, the working-class to power; in England, things are fast approaching a similar state. There is an aristocracy willing to carry on the war, but unfit to do so, and completely put to the blush by last winter's mismanagement. There is a middle class, unwilling to carry on that war which cannot be put a stop to, sacrificing everything to peace, and thereby proclaiming their own incapacity to govern England. If events turn out the one, with its different fractions, and do not admit the other, there remain but two classes on which power can devolve: the petty Bourgeoisie, the small trading class, whose want of energy and decision has shown itself on every occasion when it was called upon to come from words to deeds—and the working-class, which has been constantly reproached with showing far too much energy and decision when proceeding to action as a class.

Which of these classes will be the one to carry England through the present struggle, and the complications about to arise from it?

Written on April 10, 1855


Signed: Karl Marx

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
Napoleon III, in his quality as chief editor of the *Moniteur*, has published a long leading article on the Crimean Expedition,\(^a\) the important portions of which we have duly published. The purpose of this manifesto is evidently to console the French nation for the failure of the enterprise, to shift the responsibility of it from the Imperial shoulders, and at the same time to reply to the famous pamphlet lately issued by Prince Napoleon.\(^b\) In that half familiar, half dignified style, characteristic of the man who writes at the same time for French peasants and for European Cabinets, a sort of history of the campaign is given, with the alleged reasons for each step. Some of these reasons merit a special examination.\(^c\)

The Imperial adventurer informs us\(^d\) that the allied troops were brought up to Gallipoli, because otherwise the Russians might have crossed the Danube at Rustchuk, and turning the lines of Varna and Shumla, passed the Balkan and marched upon Constantinople. This reason is the worst ever given for the landing

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\(^a\) See “Paris, le 10 avril. Expédition d'Orient”, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 101, April 11, 1855. In the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* this passage is preceded by the following words: “The public, even in France, seems to have uncovered the mysteries surrounding the siege of Sevastopol. Therefore Louis Bonaparte...”.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) *De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient...* (see this volume, pp. 76-77).—*Ed.*

\(^c\) Instead of this sentence the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: “The document is in the highest degree unpatriotic because it is exceedingly feeble and inadequate. Yet the ‘pressure from without’ must have been dangerously strong if Bonaparte has had to come forward in this way and defend himself.” The phrase “pressure from without” is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

\(^d\) In the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* this sentence begins as follows: “After a ponderous introduction he recounts part of the instructions received by St. Arnaud at the beginning of the campaign and explains...”.—*Ed.*
at Gallipoli. In the first place Rustchuk is a fortress, and not an open town, as the illustrious editor of the Moniteur seems to fancy. As to the danger of such a flank march of the Russians, it is well to recollect that an army of 60,000 Turks, firmly established between four strong fortresses, could not safely be passed without leaving a strong corps to observe them; that such a flank march would have exposed the Russians, in the ravines of the Balkan, to the fate of Dupont at Baylen, and of Vandamme at Culm; that in the most favorable case they could not bring more than 25,000 men to Adrianople; and that whoever thinks such an army dangerous to the Turkish metropolis, may have his opinions corrected by reading Major Moltke's well-known observations on the campaign of 1829 lately republished in English at London.\footnote{H. K. B. Moltke, Der russisch-türkische Feldzug in der europäischen Türkei 1828 und 1829. The English translation appeared in London in 1854 under the title The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia... There is no reference to it in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.}

In case there should be no danger to Constantinople, the Allies were, as we learn from the Moniteur, to push some divisions to Varna, and to end any attempt at besieging Silistra. This done, two other operations would offer themselves—a landing near Odessa, or the seizure of the Crimea. Both were to be discussed by the allied Generals on the spot. Such were the instructions to St. Arnaud, which wound up with some sound military advice in the form of maxims and apothegms:

Always know what your enemy is doing; keep your troops together, divide them on no account; or if you must divide them, manage so that you can reunite them on a given point in twenty-four hours—and so forth.

Very valuable rules of conduct, no doubt, but so trite and common-place, that the reader must at once conclude St. Arnaud to have been, in the eyes of his master, the greatest dunce and ignoramus in the world. After this, the instructions wind up with:

"You have my entire confidence, Marshal. Go, for I am certain that, under your experienced leadership, the French eagles will earn new glory!"

As to the main point, the Crimean Expedition, Mr. Bonaparte confesses that it was certainly a favorite idea with him, and that at a later period he sent another batch of instructions to St. Arnaud

\footnote{The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has the following sentence, which does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune: "This recalls the historical howler made by the Moniteur in its obituary for Emperor Nicholas [Le Moniteur universel, No. 86, March 27, 1855] in which, in particular, the Treaty of Adrianople was confounded with the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji."—Ed.}
respecting it. But he denies having elaborated the plan in its details, and sent it to headquarters; according to him the Generals still had the choice of landing near Odessa. As a proof of this, a passage from his fresh instructions is given. In it he proposes a landing at Theodosia (Kaffa), on account of its offering a safe and capacious anchorage to the fleets, which must form the base of operations of the army. What a base of operations is he had explained to St. Arnaud in his first instructions, in terms which leave no doubt that the illustrious Marshal was supposed never to have read any standard work whatever upon his profession. From this point—Kaffa—the army was to march upon Sympheropol, drive the Russians into Sevastopol, before the walls of which a battle would probably be fought, and, finally, to besiege Sevastopol. "Unfortunately" this "plan was not followed up by the allied generals"—a circumstance very fortunate for the Emperor, as it allows of his shuffling off the responsibility of the whole affair, and leaving it on the shoulders of the generals.

The plan of landing 60,000 men at Kaffa and marching thence upon Sevastopol is indeed original. Taking as a general rule that the offensive strength of an army in an enemy's country decreases in the same ratio as its distance from its base of operations increases, how many men would the Allies have brought to Sevastopol after a march of more than 120 miles? How many men were to be left at Kaffa? How many to hold and fortify intermediate points? How many to protect convoys, and to scour the country? Not 20,000 men could have been collected under the walls of a fortress requiring three times that number barely to invest it. If Louis Napoleon ever goes to the war himself, and conducts it upon this principle, he may as well order quarters at Mivart's Hotel,129 London, at once, for he will never see Paris again.\footnote{a In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the end of this sentence reads as follows: "and conducts it upon this principle, then one and the same family will certainly represent the most astounding contrast in the history of wars."—\textit{Ed.}}

As to the safety of the anchorage at Kaffa, every mariner in the Black Sea knows, and every chart shows that it is an open roadstead, with shelter against northerly and westerly winds alone, while the most dangerous storms in the Black Sea are from the south and south-west. Of this the storm of the 14th of November is an instance. Had the fleets then been at Kaffa they would have been driven upon a lee-shore.\footnote{b The \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} further has a sentence which does not occur in the \textit{New-York Daily Tribune}: "Now comes the most ticklish part of the article."—\textit{Ed.}} In this way our hero clears himself
from the responsibility thrown upon him by his cousin; but it would never do to sacrifice Raglan and Canrobert. Accordingly, to show the cleverness of the said Generals, a very decent sketch is given of siege-operations according to Vauban—a sketch which, from the total ignorance of the subject it supposes in the reader, might have been written for the benefit of Marshal St. Arnaud. This sketch, however, but serves to show how Sevastopol was not to be taken, for it winds up with the assertion that all these rules were inapplicable to Sevastopol. For instance,

"in a common siege where one front is attacked, the length of the last parallel would be about 300 yards, and the whole length of trenches would not exceed 8,000 yards; here the extent of parallel is 3,000 yards, and the whole linear length of all the trenches is 41,000 yards."

This is all true enough, but the question here is why has this enormous extent of attack been adopted, when every circumstance called for the greatest possible concentration of fire upon one or two determined points? The answer is:

"Sevastopol is not like any other fortress. It has but a shallow ditch, no masonry scarps, and these defenses are replaced by abattis and palisades; thus our fire could make but little impression on the earth breastwork."

If this was not written for St. Arnaud, it is surely written for the French peasantry alone. Every sub-lieutenant in the French army must laugh at such nonsense. Palisades, unless at the bottom of a ditch, or at least out of the sight of the enemy, are very soon knocked over by shot and shell. Abattis may be set on fire, and must be at the foot of the glacis, about 60 or 80 yards from the breastwork, else they would obstruct the fire of the guns. Moreover, these abattis must be large trees laid on the ground, the pointed branches toward the enemy, and the whole firmly connected together; but where such trees could have come from, in a woodless country like the Crimea, the Moniteur does not say. The absence of masonry scarps has nothing to do with the protracted siege, for according to the description in the Moniteur itself, they only come into play when the breaching batteries have been established on the top of the glacis—a position from which the Allies are yet far distant. That palisades are an improvement upon masonry scarps, is certainly new; for these wooden ramparts

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a Prince Napoleon (Jérôme Bonaparte, Jr.), the presumed author of the pamphlet De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient....—Ed.
b In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the end of this sentence beginning with the words "according to Vauban" does not occur.—Ed.
c This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
can be very easily destroyed by enfilading fire, even at the bottom of the ditch; and thus they allow of an assault as soon as the defending guns are silenced.

In conclusion, we are told by this new military authority, that all the facts show that the allied generals have done what they could—have done more than, under the circumstances, could have been expected from them—and have, indeed, covered themselves with glory. If they could not properly invest Sevastopol—if they could not drive away the Russian army of observation—if they are not yet in the place—why, it is because they are not strong enough. This is also true: but who is responsible for this greatest of all faults? Who but Louis Bonaparte! Such is the final conclusion which the whole French public must inevitably draw from this wordy, round-about, shuffling, and ridiculous explanation of their Emperor.

Written about April 14, 1855

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a The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: "Dubious glory if it needs to be proved, and is proved in this manner!"—Ed.

b Instead of this last sentence the article in the Neue Oder-Zeitung has the following concluding passage: "That is the inevitable conclusion following from the leading article in the Moniteur. What impression it produced in Paris is shown by the following passage from the letter of the otherwise servile Paris correspondent of The Times: 'There are persons [...] who [...] consider it as [...] preliminary to the abandonment of the Crimea altogether [...] and in some Legitimist circles [...] these words have been made use of:—’We were led to expect a war à la Napoleon; but it seems we are now to have a peace à la Louis Philippe.’ On the other hand [...] an impression of a similar kind” prevails “in the minds of the working classes of the Faubourg St. Antoine.” They “interpret it as an avowal of weakness [...]." (The Times, No. 22028, April 14, 1855.)—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL

The siege of Sevastopol continues to drag on its weary course, barren of events and decisions, scarcely enlivened, now and then, by some resultless encounter or desultory attack, every one of which looks exactly like all its predecessors and successors. Always excepting the superiority evinced by the defense in the engineering department, it is certain that very few campaigns have been carried on for an equal length of time with such a degree of mediocrity in the commanding officers as has now been developed. The whole affair is becoming a public nuisance to the world in general, and to those, in particular, who have to expose, in the Press, the different phases assumed by this eminently stationary operation.\(^a\)

The French and English reports of the affair of March 23 we published some days ago; a Russian detailed report we have not yet received. As usual, the dispatches of the Allied Generals are conceived in so obscure a style that we cannot learn anything distinct from them. With the help of private letters published in Europe and the reports of newspaper-correspondents, of which we now have several at hand, we are enabled to make out the following summary view of the facts.

The “right attack” of the Allies, directed against the southeastern fronts of Sevastopol, from the head of the inner harbor to that of the Careening Bay, has been carried forward to the distance of some 600 yards from the first Russian line, by three lines of approaches or zig-zags, connected with each other at their

\(^a\) This sentence does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*
ends by what is called the second parallel. Beyond this, the three zig-zags are still being pushed forward, though irregularly and slowly, and it is intended to unite them by a third parallel, and to form, on the central approach, a *place d'armes*, or covered rallying-ground, spacious enough to hold a reserve force. Of these three approaches, the middle one is in the hands of the English, and the right and left are occupied by the French. These two flank approaches have been pushed on rather quicker than the central one, so that the French trenches here are, perhaps, fifty yards nearer to the place than the position occupied by the English.

Before daybreak of the 23d of March, a considerable Russian force, amounting to about twelve battalions, advanced from the town upon the siege-works. Well aware that the trenches had been constructed with an utter neglect of the habitual and prescribed precautions, that their flanks were neither thrown back sufficiently nor defended by redoubts, that consequently a bold dash upon the extreme flanks of the parallel must lead the assailants into the trenches, the Russians began their attack by a sudden and rapid movement, by which the eastern and western extremities of the parallel were turned. A front attack occupied the trench-guard and their reserves, while the outflanking columns, gallantly but vainly resisted by the French, descended into the works and swept the trench until they came upon the central position defended by the British. The British lines being secure from serious annoyance in front, were not molested until the fusillade going on to the right and left had brought up part of their reserves; and even then, the front attack was of no great vehemence, as the strength of the sortie was concentrated in the turning columns. But these too, from the great extent of trench they had overrun, had already spent their first ardor, and when they came upon the British, their officers had to bear constantly in mind the chance of ultimate retreat. Accordingly, the struggle very soon came to a point where each party held its ground, and that is the moment when a sallying detachment should look out for a safe retreat. This the Russians did. Without attempting seriously to dislodge the British, they maintained the fight until most of their troops had got a fair start homeward, and then the rearguard, heavily pressed, by this time, by the French and British reserves, made the best of its way toward Sevastopol.

The Russians must have expected to find many guns and a deal of ammunition and other material in the second parallel, for to destroy such could have been the only purpose of this sortie. But
there was very little of the sort, and thus the only advantage they gained by the attack was the certainty that at this distance from their own lines they might still, in the first hour or two of a sortie, and before the enemies’ reserves could come up, show the strongest front. This is worth something, but hardly worth the losses of such an attempt. The material damage done to the siege-works was repaired in a day or two, and the moral effect gained by this sortie was null. For, as every sortie must necessarily end in a retreat, the besiegers will always believe that they have been the victors; and unless the losses of the besieged are disproportionately small compared with those of the besiegers, the moral effect is generally more encouraging to the latter than otherwise. In this instance, when Raglan and Canrobert were more than ever in want of an apparent success, this sally, with its comparatively worthless fruits, and its final precipitate retreat, was a real godsend for them. The French troops give themselves enormous credit for having followed up the enemy to the very lines of Sevastopol—which in such a case is not so difficult, as the guns of the place cannot play for fear of hitting their own troops; while the British, passing over in silence their exceptional retired position, which gave them the character of a reserve more than that of a body of troops in the front line of battle, are again, with less cause than ever, blustering about their own invincibility and that unflinching courage which forbids the British soldier ever to give way a single inch. The few British officers in the hands of the Russians, taken in the midst of these unflinching soldiers and carried off safely into Sevastopol, a must know what all these big words mean.

In the meantime, the great strategists of the British press have gone on declaring, with considerable emphasis, that before the storming of Sevastopol could be thought of, the new outworks erected by the Russians must needs be taken; and that they hoped they would be taken shortly. This assertion is certainly as true as it is common-place; but the question is, How are they to be taken, if the Allies could not prevent their being completed under their very batteries? The attack upon the Selenghinsk redoubt b showed clearly enough that, with great sacrifice of life, such a work can be taken for a moment; but of what use that is to be, when it cannot even be held for the time necessary to destroy it, it is not easy to

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a The words “Colonel Kelley and others” are added in commas in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
b The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: “(on Mount Sapun)”.—Ed.
The fact is, that these new Russian works, being flanked and commanded in the rear by their main line, cannot be taken unless the same means are put into operation against them as against the main line. Approaches will have to be made up to a convenient distance, covered parallels with places d'armes will have to be completed, and batteries to engage the Russian main line will have to be erected and armed, before an assault of, and lodgment in, these outworks can be seriously thought of. The London Times, which was foremost in its outcry for the capture of these works, has not attempted to specify the new method by which this very desirable but very difficult object was to be accomplished "within the very few hours" within which it expected, the other day, to hear of the feat having been performed. But unfortunately, hardly had that journal uttered this fond hope, when a letter arrived from its Crimean correspondent stating that the new Russian outworks not only appeared quite untakable, but that they were evidently the first landmarks only of an intended further advance of Russian counter-approaches. The rifle-pits in front of the Mamelon redoubt have been connected with each other by a regular trench, thus forming a new line of defense. Between the Mamelon redoubt and Mount Sapun, or the Selenghinsk redoubt, a rather curiously-shaped trench has been dug out, forming three sides of a square and enfilading part of the French approaches, by which, in part, it is said again to be enfiladed. The situation and line of this new work are, however, so incompletely described that neither its exact position nor its intended use can be as yet clearly made out. Thus much is certain, that a complete system of advanced works is contemplated by the Russians, covering Malakoff on both sides and in front, and aiming, perhaps, even at an ultimate attempt at a lodgment in the allied trenches, which, if obtained, would of course be tantamount to a breaking through of the siege lines on that side. If during six months the Allies have barely held their ground, and rather strengthened than advanced their batteries, the Russians have in one single month advanced

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a The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: "which form an integral part of the Russian defences".—Ed.
b The Times, No. 22028, April 14, 1855.—Ed.
c This refers to a report by W. H. Russell published anonymously in The Times, No. 22028 (second edition), April 14, 1855.—Ed.
d The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: "(called Kamchatka by the Russians)".—Ed.
e This sentence and the end of the preceding one beginning with the words "by which, in part" do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
considerably upon them and are still advancing. Surely, if many a
defense has been quite as glorious as that of Sevastopol, not a
single siege can be shown in the annals of war, since that of Troy,
carried on with such a degree of incoherence and stupidity.

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Frederick Engels

GERMANY AND PAN-SLAVISM

I

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 185, April 21, 1855]

We are assured by the best of sources that the present Tsar of Russia has sent certain courts a dispatch saying, among other things:

"The moment Austria irrevocably allies itself with the West, or commits any openly hostile act against Russia, Alexander II will place himself at the head of the Pan-Slav movement and transform his present title, Tsar of all the Russians, into that of Tsar of all the Slavs." (?)

This declaration by Alexander, if authentic, is the first straight word since the outbreak of war. It is the first step towards giving the war the European character which until now has been lurking behind all manner of pretexts and allegations, protocols and treaties, sections from Vattel and citations from Pufendorf.\(^a\) The independence, even the existence of Turkey has thereby been pushed into the background. The question is no longer who is to govern in Constantinople, but who is to rule the whole of Europe. The Slav race, long divided by internal disputes, pushed back towards the East by the Germans, subjugated, partly, by Germans, Turks and Hungarians, quietly reuniting its branches after 1815, by the gradual growth of Pan-Slavism, now for the first time asserts its unity and thus declares war to the death on the Roman-Celtic and German races, which have hitherto dominated Europe. Pan-Slavism is not merely a movement for national independence, it is a movement that strives to undo what the history of a thousand years has created, which cannot attain its ends without sweeping Turkey, Hungary and half Germany off

\(^a\) E. Vattel, *Le Droit des gens...* and S. Pufendorf, *De jure naturae et gentium.*—Ed.
the map of Europe, a movement which—should it achieve this result—cannot ensure its future existence except by subjugating Europe. Pan-Slavism has now developed from a creed into a political programme, with 800,000 bayonets at its service. It leaves Europe with only one alternative: subjugation by the Slavs, or the permanent destruction of the centre of their offensive force—Russia.

The next question we have to answer is: how is Austria affected by Pan-Slavism which has been uniformed by Russia? Of the 70 million Slavs who live east of the Bohemian forest and the Carinthian Alps, approximately 15 million are subject to the Austrian sceptre, including representatives of almost every variety of the Slavonic language. The Bohemian or Czech branch (6 million) falls entirely under Austrian sovereignty, the Polish is represented by about 3 million Galicians; the Russian by 3 million Malorussians (Red Russians, Ruthenians) in Galicia and North-East Hungary—the only Russian branch outside the borders of the Russian Empire; the South Slav branch by approximately 3 million Slovenians (Carinthians and Croats) and Serbs, including scattered Bulgars. The Austrian Slavs thus fall into two categories: one part consists of the remnants of nationalities whose own history belongs to the past and whose present historical development is bound up with that of nations of different race and language. To crown their sorry national plight these sad remnants of former grandeur do not even possess a national organisation within Austria, but rather they are divided between different provinces. The Slovenians, although scarcely 1,500,000 in number, are scattered through the various provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia and Southwest Hungary. The Bohemians, although the most numerous branch of the Austrian Slavs, are partly settled in Bohemia, partly in Moravia and partly (the Slovak line) in Northwest Hungary. Therefore these nationalities, though living exclusively on Austrian territory, are in no way recognised as constituting distinct nations. They are regarded as appendages of either the German or the Hungarian nation, and in fact they are no more than that. The second group of the Austrian Slavs consists of fragments of different tribes which in the course of history have been separated from the main body of their nation, with their focal points therefore lying outside Austria. Thus the Austrian Poles have their natural centre of gravity in Russian Poland, the Ruthenians in the other Malorussian provinces united with Russia, and the Serbs in Turkish Serbia. It goes without saying that these fragments detached from their respective
nationalities gravitate towards their natural centres, and this
tendency becomes more conspicuous as civilisation and hence the
need for national-historical activity becomes increasingly wide-
spread amongst them. In both cases the Austrian Slavs are merely
*disjecta membra*, striving for re-unification, either amongst them-
selves or with the main body of their particular nationalities. This
is the reason why *Pan-Slavism is not a Russian invention but an
Austrian one*. In order to achieve the restoration of each particular
Slav nationality the various Slavonic tribes in Austria are beginning
to work for a link-up of all the Slavonic tribes in Europe. Russia,
strong in itself, Poland, conscious of the indomitable tenacity of its
national life and furthermore openly hostile to Slavonic Russia—
clearly neither of these two nations were apt to invent Pan-
Slavism. The Serbs and Bulgars of Turkey, on the other hand,
were too barbaric to grasp such an idea; the Bulgars quietly
submitted to the Turks, while the Serbs had enough on their
hands with the struggle for their own independence.

II

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 189, April 24, 1855]

The first form of Pan-Slavism was purely literary. *Dobrovský*, a
Bohemian, the founder of the scientific philology of the Slavonic
dialects, and *Kollár*, a Slovak poet from the Hungarian Car-
pathians, were its inventors. Dobrovský was motivated by the
enthusiasm of the scientific discoverer, in Kollár political ideas
soon predominated. But Pan-Slavism was still finding its satisfac-
tion in elegies; the splendour of the past, the ignominy, the
misfortune and the foreign oppression of the present were the
main themes of its poetry. “Is there then, O God, no man on
earth who will give the Slavs justice?” The dreams of a Pan-Slav
empire, dictating laws to Europe, were as yet hardly even alluded
to. But the period of lamenting soon passed, and with it the call
for mere “justice for the Slavs”. Historical research, embracing the
political, literary and linguistic development of the Slav race, made
huge progress in Austria. *Šafařík*, *Kopitar* and *Miklosich*
as linguists, *Palacký* as an historian placed themselves at the head,
followed by a swarm of others with less scientific talent, or none
whatsoever, such as *Hanka*, *Gaj*, etc. The glorious epochs of
Bohemian and Serbian history were depicted in glowing colours,
in contrast to the downtrodden and broken-spirited present of these nationalities; and just as politics and theology were subjected to criticism under the cloak of "philosophy" in the rest of Germany, so in Austria, before the very eyes of Metternich, philology was employed by the Pan-Slavists to preach the doctrine of Slav unity and to create a political party whose unmistakable goal was to transform the conditions of all the nationalities in Austria and to turn it into a great Slavonic empire.

The linguistic confusion prevailing east of Bohemia and Carinthia to the Black Sea is truly astonishing. The process of de-nationalisation among the Slavs bordering on Germany, the slow but continuous advance of the Germans, the invasion of the Hungarians, which separated the North and South Slavs with a compact mass of 7 million people of Finnish race, the interposition of Turks, Tartars and Wallachians in the midst of the Slavonic tribes, have produced a linguistic Babel. The language varies from village to village, almost from farm to farm. Bohemia itself counts among its 5 million inhabitants 2 million Germans alongside 3 million Slavs, and is furthermore surrounded on three sides by Germans. This is also the case with the Austrian Slavonic tribes. The restitution of all originally Slavonic territory to the Slavs, the transformation of Austria except for the Tyrol and Lombardy into a Slavonic empire, which was the goal of the Pan-Slavists, amounted to declaring the historical development of the last thousand years null and void, cutting off a third of Germany and all Hungary and turning Vienna and Budapest into Slav cities—a procedure with which the Germans and Hungarians in possession of these districts could hardly be expected to sympathise. In addition, the differences between the Slavonic dialects are so great that with few exceptions they are mutually incomprehensible. This was amusingly demonstrated at the Slav Congress at Prague in 1848,134 where after various fruitless attempts to find a language intelligible to all the delegates, they finally had to speak the tongue most hated by them all—German.

So we see that Austrian Pan-Slavism lacked the most vital elements of success: mass and unity. Mass, because the Pan-Slavist party, limited to a section of the educated classes, exerted no influence on the people and therefore did not have the power to offer resistance simultaneously to the Austrian government and to the German and Hungarian nationalities which it was challenging. Unity, because its principle of unity was purely an ideal which collapsed on its first attempt at realisation on account of the fact of linguistic diversity. As long as Pan-Slavism remained a purely
Austrian movement it constituted no great danger, but the centre of mass and unity which it needed was very soon found for it.

The national movement of the Turkish Serbs at the beginning of the century soon drew the attention of the Russian government to the fact that in Turkey some 7 million Slavs were living whose language resembled Russian more than any other Slavonic dialect, whose religion and holy language—Old or Church Slavonic—was completely identical to that of the Russians. It was among these Serbs and Bulgars that Russia first began a Pan-Slavist agitation, helped by its position as head and protector of the Greek Church. When the Pan-Slavist movement had gained some ground in Austria, Russia soon extended the ramifications of its agencies into the area of its ally. Where it encountered Roman Catholic Slavs, the religious aspect of the issue was dropped and Russia simply depicted as the centre of gravity of the Slav race, as the kernel around which the regenerated Slavonic tribes were to crystallise, as the strong and united people, destined to make a reality of the great Slavonic empire from the Elbe to China, from the Adriatic Sea to the Arctic Ocean. Here, then, they had found the unity and mass that had been lacking! Pan-Slavism immediately fell into the trap. It thus pronounced its own sentence. In order to re-assert imaginary nationalities the Pan-Slavists declared their readiness to sacrifice 800 years of actual participation in civilisation to Russian-Mongolian barbarism. Was not this the natural result of a movement that began with a determined reaction against the course of European civilisation and sought to turn back world history?

Metternich, in the best years of his power, recognised the danger and saw through the Russian intrigues. He suppressed the movement with all the means at his disposal. All his means, however, could be summarised in one word: repression. The only appropriate means, free development of the German and Hungarian spirit, more than sufficient to scare off the Slavonic spectre, had no place in the system of his petty politics. Consequently, after Metternich’s fall in 1848, the Slav movement broke out stronger than ever and embracing wider strata of the population than ever before. But at this point its thoroughly reactionary character straightway emerged into the open. While the German and Hungarian movements in Austria were decidedly progressive, it was the Slavs who saved the old system from destruction, and enabled Radetzky to march on the Mincio and Windischgrätz to conquer Vienna. In order to complete the dependence of Aus-
ria on the Slav race, the great *Slav reserve*, the Russian Army, had to descend on Hungary in 1849 and there dictate peace to her.

But if the adhesion of the Pan-Slav movement to Russia was its self-condemnation, Austria likewise acknowledged its lack of viability by accepting, indeed by asking for this Slav aid against the only three nations among its possessions which have and demonstrate historical vitality: Germans, Italians and Hungarians. After 1848 this debt to Pan-Slavism constantly weighed on Austria, and her awareness of it was the mainspring of Austrian policies.

The first thing Austria did was to act against the Slavs on its own ground, and that was only possible with a policy that was at least partly progressive. The privileges of all the provinces were abolished, a centralised administration supplanted a federal one; and instead of the different nationalities an *artificial* one, the *Austrian*, was to be the only one recognised. Although these innovations were partly aimed at the German, Italian and Hungarian elements too, their greatest weight fell on the less compact Slavonic tribes, giving the German element a position of considerable ascendency. If the dependence on the Slavs inside Austria had thus been eliminated, there remained the dependence on Russia, and the necessity of breaking this direct and humiliating dependence, at least temporarily and to some extent. This was the real reason for Austria’s anti-Russian policy in the Eastern question, a policy which although vacillating was at least publicly proclaimed. On the other hand Pan-Slavism has not disappeared; it is deeply offended, resentful, silent and, since the Hungarian intervention, regards the Tsar of Russia as its predestined Messiah. It is not our purpose here to inquire whether Austria—should Russia emerge openly as the head of Pan-Slavism—can reply with concessions to Hungary and Poland, without jeopardising its existence. This much is certain: it is no longer Russia alone, it is the Pan-Slavist conspiracy that threatens to found its empire on the ruins of Europe. The union of all Slavs, because of the undeniable strength which it possesses and may yet acquire, will soon force the side confronting it to appear in an entirely new form. In this context we have not spoken of the Poles—most of whom are to their credit definitely hostile to Pan-Slavism—nor of the allegedly democratic and socialist form of Pan-Slavism, which ultimately differs from the common, honest Russian Pan-Slavism solely in its phraseology and its hypocrisy. Neither have we discussed the German speculation, which from
lofty ignorance has sunk to being an organ of Russian conspiracy.\footnote{An allusion to Bruno Bauer, who propounded Pan-Slavist ideas in his pamphlets \textit{Russland und das Germanenthum} (1853), \textit{Deutschland und das Russenthum} (1854), \textit{Die jetzige Stellung Russlands} (1854), \textit{Russland und England} (1854) and others.—Ed.}

We shall deal in detail with these and other questions relating to Pan-Slavism later.

Written about April 17, 1855
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Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
The all-absorbing facts in the news brought by the *Atlantic*, are the breaking off of the Vienna Conferences, and the partial if not total separation of Austria from the Allies. For both of these events we were not unprepared. The rejection by Russia of any plan of settlement which should not substantially admit all she claimed before the war, was, in the present state of that war, a matter of course. The return of Austria to her old expectant, wavery policy was also the result of certain circumstances of great importance, which we proceed to explain.

The French Government discovered some time since, and the fact could not be denied by the British Cabinet, that Lord John Russell had committed a great blunder at Vienna in allowing those of the points before the Conference in which Austria was directly interested to be first disposed of. These points were the freedom of the Danube and the question of the Principalities. From this moment Austria appeared satisfied. Expecting, as she does, to share sooner or later in the partition of Turkey—Servia, Bosnia, and Albania are provinces which she cannot allow to fall into any other hands than her own. It is her interest to keep the question respecting the Christians in Turkey an open one. And as she can never expect to cope with Russia’s naval power in the Black Sea, she has but little interest in humiliating her in that quarter. From this point of view, then, Austria has every reason to be satisfied with what she has obtained, and to turn the weight of her seemingly impartial arbitration against England and France. But this diplomatic success has very little to do with her present

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a On Russell’s role at the Conference of Vienna see this volume, pp. 141-45.— *Ed.*
wavering. The cause of this is of a far more overpowering nature.

Some six months ago we alluded to the private and confidential dispatch by which Nicholas informed both Austria and Prussia, that in case they allied themselves with the West against him he would reply to such a treaty of alliance by a proclamation of Hungarian independence and Polish restoration. At that time, and whenever we have considered the chances of a war in Poland and Volhynia, we have always taken into consideration the great military advantage which such a proclamation might give to Russia, if put forth after the conquest of Galicia and from the heights of the Carpathians, with Hungary open to her victorious armies. On that account, especially, we have always pointed out the fact that Austria could not undertake a war against Russia unless she was in a state at once to take the offensive and to parry, by successful battles and an advance upon Russia, the effects of such a proclamation. So long, therefore, as the Austrian army in Galicia and the Principalities was strong enough to march upon Warsaw or Kiev there was little immediate danger from such a step.

This dispatch of Nicholas has, however, as we now learn, lately been followed up by another from his successor, which contains quite different and far more serious menaces. The moment Austria shall irrevocably ally herself to the West, it says, or commit any overt act of hostility against Russia, Alexander II will place himself at the head of the Panslavist movement, and change his title of Emperor of all the Russians into that of Emperor of all the Slavonians.

At last! Let Alexander take such a step, and the struggle concerning the Christians in Turkey, the independence of the Porte, Sevastopol, the Principalities, and other such local trifles, may now be considered at an end. This declaration of Alexander's is the first plain-spoken word since the war began; it is the first step toward placing the war upon the continental theater, and giving it, frankly and openly, that European character which has hitherto been lurking behind all sorts of pretexts and pretenses, protocols and treaties, Vattel phrases and Pufendorf quotations. Turkey—her independence and existence—is thrown into the background. Who is to rule in Constantinople? would then no

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\[\text{a} \text{ The reference is presumably to the article } \text{"Progress of the War" by Marx and Engels (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 546-52).—Ed.}\]

\[\text{b} \text{ See this volume, pp. 37-39.—Ed.}\]

\[\text{c} \text{ E. Vattel, } \text{Le Droit des gens. } \text{and S. Pufendorf, } \text{De jure naturae et gentium.}—\text{Ed.}\]
longer be the question—but who is to command all Europe? The Slavonic race, long divided by internal contests; repelled toward the East by Germans; subjugated, in part, by Turks, Germans, Hungarians; quickly reuniting its branches, after 1815, by the gradual rise of Panslavism, would then for the first time assert its unity, and, in doing so, declare war to the knife against the Romano-Celtic and Germanic races which have hitherto ruled the Continent. Panslavism is not a movement which merely strives after national independence; it is a movement which, thus acting upon Europe, would tend to undo what a thousand years of history have created; which could not realize itself without sweeping from the map Hungary, Turkey and a large part of Germany. Moreover, it must subjugate Europe in order to secure the stability of these results, if they are ever obtained. Panslavism is now, from a creed, turned into a political programme, or rather a vast political menace, with 800,000 bayonets to support it.

Nor are these 800,000 soldiers all the forces it could command. A word from the Russian Emperor at the head of an army, marching upon the Carpathians, and nine or ten millions of Slavonians in Austria would be agitated as in 1848; a victory over the Austrians, and they would be in full insurrection; while Hungary and Italy would be hardly less plowed by revolutionary agitation. Here is a danger which might well make Francis Joseph pause; for unless he could at once defeat the great Slavonian army on his frontiers and carry the war into the enemy's country, he might as well give up the contest before entering the lists.

Written about April 17, 1855

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL AGITATION

London, May 7. In times of major political agitation in England the City of London has never been able to put itself in the vanguard. Up to now the fact that it joined a campaign merely indicated that the purpose of the agitation had been achieved and become a fait accompli. So it was with the Reform Movement, in which Birmingham took the initiative. So it was with the Anti-Corn Law Movement, which was led from Manchester. The Bank Restriction Act of 1797 was an exception. The meetings of the bankers and merchants of the City of London made it easier for Pitt at that time to prohibit the Bank of England from continuing cash-payments—after the directors of the Bank had informed him a few weeks earlier that the Bank was tottering on the brink of bankruptcy and could only be saved by a coup d'état, by a fixed rate of exchange for bank-notes. Circumstances at the time required just as much resignation on the part of the Bank of England to letting itself be prohibited from making cash-payments, as on the part of the city merchants, whose credit stood or fell with the Bank, to supporting Pitt's prohibition and recommending it to the country man.* The salvation of the Bank of England was the

* It is incredible that even in the most recent histories of political economy the conduct of the City at that time is cited as evidence of English patriotism. It is even more incredible that in his work on Russia (3rd vol., 1852) Herr von Haxthausen is gullible enough to maintain that by suspending the cash-payments of the Bank, Pitt was preventing the money from going abroad. What may a man who is so credulous have swallowed in Russia? And what indeed are we to think of the Berlin criticism who believe implicitly in Herr von Haxthausen, and by way of proof plagiarize him?

a A. Haxthausen, Studien über die innern Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands, Dritter Theil.—Ed.
salvation of the City. Hence their “patriotic” meetings and their “agitational” initiative. The initiative taken by the City at present with the meetings held last Saturday\(^a\) in the London Tavern and the Guildhall, and the founding of an “Association for Administrative Reform”,\(^b\) has the merit of novelty, the merit, rare in England, of having no precedent. Moreover, there was no eating or drinking at these meetings, which is also a new feature in the annals of the City, whose “turtle-soup patriotism” has been immortalised by Cobbett. Finally another novelty was the fact that the meetings of the City merchants in the London Tavern and the Guildhall were held in business hours, in broad daylight. The current stagnation in business may have something to do with this phenomenon, as indeed it may altogether form a leaven in the fermentation of the City mind, and a considerable leaven too. For all that, the importance of this City movement cannot be denied, however hard the West End may try to laugh it off. The bourgeois reform papers—*The Daily News*, *The Morning Advertiser*, and *The Morning Chronicle* (the last having belonged to this category for some time now)—seek to demonstrate to their adversaries the “great future” of the City Association. They overlook the more obvious aspects. They have failed to realise that very vital, very decisive points have already been decided by the mere fact of these meetings: 1. The breach between the ruling class outside Parliament and the governing class *within* it; 2. a dislocation of those elements of the bourgeoisie that have hitherto set the tone in politics; 3. the disenchantedment with Palmerston.

As we know, *Layard* has announced that he intends to table his reform proposals in the House of Commons tonight. As we know, about a week ago he was shouted down, hissed and booed in the House of Commons. The princes of the English merchant world in the City replied at their meetings with frantic cheers for Layard. He was the hero of the day at the London Tavern and the Guildhall. The *cheers* of the City are a provocative retort to the *groans*\(^b\) of the Commons. If the House of Commons proves tonight to have been intimidated, its authority is lost, it abdicates. If it repeats its groans, the cheers of its opponents will resound all the more loudly. And from the tale of the *Abderiten*\(^c\) we know to what happenings the rivalry between cheers and groans may lead.\(^140\) The City meetings were a blatant challenge to the House of Commons,

\(^a\) May 5, 1855.—Ed.

\(^b\) Here and below Marx uses the English words “cheers” and “groans”—Ed.

\(^c\) Ch. M. Wieland, *Die Abderiten, eine sehr wahrscheinliche Geschichte*.—Ed.
similar to Westminster’s election of Sir Francis Burdett in the first decade of this century.\footnote{141} Until now, of course, the Manchester School with its Brights and Cobdens has stood at the head of the movement of the English bourgeoisie. The manufacturers of Manchester have now been ousted by the merchants of the City. Their orthodox opposition to the war convinced the bourgeoisie, which in England can never remain static for a moment, that they have at least temporarily lost their vocation to lead it. At present the Manchester gentry can only maintain their “hegemony” by outbidding the City gentlemen. This rivalry between the two most important factions of the bourgeoisie actually demonstrated by the City meetings, from which the Brights and Cobdens were excluded and from which they excluded themselves, augurs well for the popular movement. In evidence of this we can already cite the fact that the secretary of the City committee\footnote{a} has addressed a letter to the Chartists in London requesting them to appoint a member to its standing committee. Ernest Jones has been delegated by the Chartists to this committee. The merchants do not, of course, stand in such direct opposition to the workers as do the manufacturers, the millocracy,\footnote{b} and thus they are able, at least initially, to take joint action, which the Chartists and the Manchester men could not do.

Palmerston—this is the last major fact emerging from the City meetings—has, for the first time, been booted and hissed by the most important constituency in the country. The magic of his name has been dispelled forever. What brought him into discredit in the City was not his Russian policy, which is older than the Thirty Years’ War.\footnote{142} It was the careless disdain, the pretentious cynicism, and above all the “bad jokes” with which he affected to cure the most terrible crisis England has ever known. This outraged the bourgeois conscience, however well it may go down in the corrupt House of “Commons”.\footnote{c}

Administrative reform \textit{with} a Parliament such as now constituted: everyone recognises the illogical nature of these pious wishes at first glance. But our century has seen reforming popes.\footnote{143} We have seen reform banquets headed by Odilon Barrot.\footnote{144} No wonder,
then, that the avalanche that will sweep away Olde England appears at the outset as a snowball in the hand of the reforming City merchants.

Written on May 7, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 215, May 10, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Frederick Engels

FROM SEVASTOPOL

The mails of the America, received here on Saturday evening, once more enable us to lay before our readers some clear account of the state of the war in the Crimea, though still the contradictory and indefinite nature of the official reports as well as of the newspaper letters renders our task no easy one. It is manifest that the failure of Vienna was attended by greater alertness and activity in the allied camp at Sevastopol, and that though the bombardment may be said to have been given up on April 24, yet the fortnight succeeding was not wholly unimproved. Still it is very difficult to say what advantages have been gained; indeed one writer pretends that the Russian advanced works, Selenghinsk, Volhynsk and Kamtchatka, as well as the rifle trenches in front of the whole line, have been abandoned by the defense. As this is certainly the very utmost advantage obtained by the Allies we will for the present assume it to be true. Some correspondents report that the Flagstaff bastion itself had been stormed by the French and a lodgment effected therein, but this deserves no credit. It is a mere ignorant exaggeration of the affair of April 21, when the French, by blowing up mines, formed an advanced trench in front of that bastion.

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a Reports on the bombardment of the Flagstaff bastion by the Allies appeared in The Times, Nos. 22043-22045, May 2-4, 1855.—Ed.

b Instead of this opening paragraph the version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "As far as the public is concerned, the opening of telegraphic communication from Balaklava to London and Paris has so far only served to make the information offered to it more confused.

"The British Government publishes nothing at all or at most vague assurances about successes achieved; the French Government publishes dispatches under the
We will then assume it to be correct that the Russians are thrown back upon their original line of defense, although it is very remarkable that no reports of the occupation of Mount Sapun and the Mamelon by the Allies have yet been received. But even if the redoubts on these hills are no longer in the hands of the Russians, nobody can dispute the great advantages they have drawn from them. They have held Sapun from Feb. 23, and the Mamelon Kamtschatka redoubt from March 12 to the end of April, during which time the allied trenches were either enfiladed or taken under close front fire by them, while the key of the whole position—Malakoff—was completely sheltered by them during the fifteen days' cannonade. After having turned them to such good use, the Russians could afford to lose them.

The various night attacks by which the Allies made themselves masters of the Russian rifle-trenches and counter-approaches, need not be described here, no more than the sally undertaken by the Russians to recover them. Such operations possess no tactical interest except for such as know the ground from personal inspection, being mainly decided by the intelligence, the dash and tenacity of the subaltern officers and soldiers. In these qualities the Anglo-French are superior to the Russians, and consequently they have made good their footing in some places close to the Russian works. The distance between the combatants has been reduced, here and there, to the range of hand-grenades, that is to some twenty or thirty yards from the Russian covered way, or from forty to sixty yards from the main rampart. The Russians say

name of Canrobert, but cut and distorted to such an extent that it is almost impossible to glean anything from them. For example, the bastion against which the main French attack is directed was hitherto invariably called the Flagstaff Bastion or Bastion du Mât. Now we learn that great advantages have been gained in action against the Central Bastion, and then against Bastion No. 4. A careful collation of these dispatches with earlier reports, particularly Russian ones, has shown that what is meant is still our old acquaintance, the Bastion du Mât, but it is given different names and appellations. This kind of mystification is thoroughly tendentious and therefore, to a certain extent, also 'providential'.

"But if the telegraph holds no benefits for the public, it has indisputably brought some life to the allied camp. Beyond doubt the first dispatches received by Canrobert contained strict orders to act more resolutely and achieve some sort of success at any cost. An unofficial report asserts that the Russians have evacuated all advanced works, Selenghinsk, Volhynsk and Kamchatka, as well as the rifle trenches in front of their whole line." — Ed.

\footnote{In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the passage beginning with the words "After having turned them to such good use" and ending with the words "close to the Russian works" does not occur. The next sentence begins: "Through the Allies' latest successes the distance between the combatants...:" — Ed.}
the besiegers are at thirty sagenes\(^a\) or sixty yards from it.\(^b\) This is the case especially in front of the Flagstaff bastion, the Middle bastion and the Redan, where the ground forms dead angles, with hollows so situated that the Russian guns cannot be sufficiently depressed to plunge their shot into them. As the Russian artillery is anything but silenced, the communications with these hollows and the turning them into a complete system of trenches is a matter of great difficulty, and the flanking fire of the Russians will be very sorely felt by the Allies.\(^c\) Indeed, so long as the allied batteries are about four or five hundred yards to the rear of the advanced trenches, it is not to be explained how they expect to hold such exposed positions against sallies undertaken on a sudden and with a sufficient force; and after the acknowledged failure of the bombardment it will be some time before new and more advanced batteries can be brought into play.

This sudden advance of the Allies to the very foot of the Russian ramparts, different as it looks from their previous sloth and indecision, is yet quite of a piece with it. There never was either system or steady consistency in the conduct of this siege; and as a siege is essentially a systematic operation in which every step gained must be at once turned to some fresh advantage, under penalty of proving fruitless, it is plain that the Allies have conducted this upon the worst possible plan. Notwithstanding the disappointment in the minds of the allied generals when they first beheld the place, notwithstanding the errors committed last Autumn, during what we may call the first siege, they might yet have made greater progress. We leave the north side of the town entirely out of the question, as the allied generals did so themselves. They had once for all made up their minds to attack the south side separately and to run the risk of getting into a place commanded by a fortress to them inaccessible. But here an alternative arises: either the allied generals felt themselves strong enough to take the south side, and then they must now admit that they were unpardonably mistaken; or they felt themselves too weak, and then why did they not procure reinforcements? The fact is now beyond denial that blunder has succeeded blunder in this "memorable and unparalleled" siege. The hardships of the Winter-quarters appear to have imparted a spirit of unconquera-

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\(^a\) An old Russian unit of length equal to 2.1336 metres.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) This sentence does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^c\) This sentence and the end of the preceding one beginning with the words "where the ground forms dead angles" do not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}
ble drowsiness, apathy and languor to both army and generals. When the Russians, in February, boldly came out of their lines and formed fresh ones in advance, it should have been a sufficient incentive to them to muster up their energies; yet Canrobert could use this very serious admonition to no other purpose than to cool the zeal of the Zouaves by an attack which he knew beforehand could lead to no good. The work in the trenches was resumed, but more in order to form covered roads for storming columns than to push the batteries nearer to the enemy. Even after six months spent before the place, every act shows that no definite plan had been settled, no point of chief attack singled out, nay, that the old fixed idea of taking Sevastopol by a *coup de main* still reigned supreme in the heads of the Allies, crossing every sensible proposal, frustrating every attempt at systematic progress. And what little was done was executed with three times the slowness of regular siege operations, while the inconsistency and want of plan characterizing the whole, did not even impart to it the certainty of success inherent in such regular operations.\(^a\)

But everything was expected from the late opening of the fire. That was the great excuse for all delays and do-nothings. Though it is difficult to say what was expected from this grand event—from batteries at from 600 to 1,000 yards from their object, at last the fire did open. About 150 rounds per gun the first two or three days, then 120 rounds, then 80, then 50, finally 30 were fired; after which the cannonade was suspended. The effect was hardly visible, except in the used-up guns and emptied magazines of the Allies. Five days cannonading with full force would have done more harm to the Russians and opened more chances of advantage to the Allies than fifteen days of a fire beginning with great fury and slackening down as fast as it was

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\(^a\) Sudden attack.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) Instead of this paragraph the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: “Even this sudden advance of the Allies is only another in the series of desultory moves characteristic of this siege, in which systematic blockade, assault in force and wishful *coup de main* go together in utter confusion. The very first bombardment of October 17 to November 5 was preceded by the Allies’ decision to leave the north side of the town entirely out of account and attack the south side separately, thus running the risk of getting into a position commanded by a fortress impregnable to them. Moreover, in that first bombardment the fire, instead of being concentrated upon one or two points, was dispersed over an enormous front. The five months between the first and the second bombardment were not used to single out main points of attack, but merely to work out in detail, and with maximum sluggishness, the plan for a simultaneous attack on all points of a huge semicircle, which meant a repetition of the original error.”—*Ed.*
begun. But with their ammunition spent and their guns rendered unserviceable, would the Allies have been in a position to seize these favorable chances? Quite as much as now, while the Russians, from witnessing the slackening of the fire and from being spared the infliction of a hail of 50,000 projectiles per day during five successive days, are in a far better position than they would have been.\(^{a}\) This prolongation of the cannonade, by reducing its intensity is so great and unaccountable a deviation from all military rules, that political reasons must be at the bottom of it. When the first and second days' fire had disappointed the expectations of the Allies, the necessity of keeping up a semblance of a cannonade during the Vienna Conferences must have led to this useless waste of ammunition.

The cannonade ends, the Vienna Conferences are suspended, the telegraph is completed. At once the scene changes. Orders arrive from Paris to act promptly and decisively. The old system of attack is given up; partial assaults, lodgments by mining explosions, a struggle of rifles and bayonets, succeed the resultless roar of artillery. Advanced points are gained and even maintained against a first sally of the besieged. But unless it is found practicable to construct batteries within short distances from the Russian lines, and to make these lines too hot for the besieged, nothing is gained. The advanced points cannot be held without great and daily repeated losses, and without regularly recurring combats of doubtful and wavering issue. And supposing even that these batteries of the second and third parallel are to be constructed, and that it was necessary for their opening first to dislodge the Russians from their rifle-trenches—how long will it be before these fresh batteries will have guns enough to reply successfully to that Russian fire which in two cannonades has proved equal to that of the Allies? The nearer the batteries are placed to the enemy's works, the more destructive a crossfire can be concentrated upon them, and the more confined becomes the space for placing guns; in other words, the more equal becomes the fire of the attack to that of the defense, unless the latter has been previously subdued by the more distant batteries, which here is not the case.\(^{b}\)

How, then, has it been possible for the Russians so successfully to withstand the attacks of the Allies? First, by the mistakes and vacillations of the Allies themselves; secondly, by the bravery of

\(^{a}\) The last two sentences do not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) The German version of this article, published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, ends here.—*Ed.*
the garrison and the skill of the directing engineer, Col. Todtleben; thirdly, by the natural strength of the position. For it must be admitted that the position is a strong one. The bad maps which up to a very recent period have alone been accessible represented Sevastopol as situated at the lower end of a slope and commanded by the heights in the rear; but the latest and best maps prove that the town stands on several rounded, isolated hills, separated by ravines from the slope of the plateau, and actually commanding quite as much of it as has any command over the town. This disposition of the ground seems fully to justify the hesitation to assault the place in September last; though it has appeared much too imposing to the allied generals, who did not even attempt to make the enemy show what strength he could muster for the defense. The Russian engineer has turned these natural advantages to the greatest possible use. Wherever Sevastopol presents a slope toward the plateau, two and even three rows of batteries have been constructed on its sides, one above the other, doubling and trebling the strength of the defense. Such batteries have been constructed in other fortifications (for instance on the slope of Mont Valérian at Paris), but they are not generally approved of by engineers, who call them shell-traps. It is true that they offer a larger object of aim to the besieger, whose shot may hit the battery above or below, if they miss the one they are fired at, and they will always cause greater losses to the defense on this account; but where a fortress is not even invested, like Sevastopol, such a drawback counts for nothing against the enormous strength they impart to the defending fire. After this siege of Sevastopol, we fancy we shall have very few complaints about these shell-traps. For fortresses of the first order, containing plenty of material and difficult to invest, they can be most advantageously used where the ground favors them. Beside these shell-traps, the Russians have deviated in another point from the usual engineering routine. According to the old-fashioned systems of bastioned fortifications, fifteen or seventeen bastions would have been insufficient to encircle the place and would have defended it very badly. Instead of this, there are only six bastions on projecting heights, while the curtains connecting them are broken in such angular lines as to give a flanking fire independent of that of the bastions, and heavy guns from these salient points sweep the ground in front. These curtains are armed with guns for nearly their whole extent, which again is an innovation, as the curtains in regular bastioned fortresses are generally armed with one or two guns only for special purposes, and the whole of the defense by fire is intrusted
to the bastions and demi-lunes. Without entering into further technical details, it will be seen from the above that the Russians have made the most of their means, and that if ever the Allies should come into possession of the Flagstaff or Malakoff bastions, they may be sure to find a second and a third line of defense before them which they will have to put all their wits together to reduce.

Written about May 8, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4401, May 28, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1045, June 1, 1855 and the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 716, June 2, 1855 as a leading article; an abridged German version was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 217, May 11, 1855, marked with the sign ×

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, May 9. The Morning Chronicle, Advertiser, The Daily News, etc., all end their philippics against the assassin Pianori with more or less timid criticisms of the issue of the Moniteur, which published the indictment of Pianori at the same time as the decree ordering to pay the Napoleonic legacy of 10,000 francs to the former French N.C.O. Cantillon, now on the shelf in Brussels, as the reward for his attempted assassination of Wellington. Especially amusing are the twists and turns of the Chronicle, a paper that is serious by profession. Napoleon III, it says, must be ignorant of this strange, and at the present moment so tactless tribute to Napoleon I. The name “Cantillon” must have strayed into the morally spotless columns of the Moniteur by a lapsus penae. Or some officious junior civil servant must have endowed Cantillon with the 10,000 francs off his own bat, etc. The worthy Chronicle seems to imagine that the French bureaucracy is formed on the English pattern, where it is indeed possible, as we have seen from the last hearing of the parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, for a junior civil servant of the Board of Ordnance to place an order for a certain type of rocket, involving thousands of pounds, of his own accord and without informing his superiors or, as Palmerston has told the House of Commons, for diplomatic documents to be withheld from Parliament for weeks because the “person” in the Foreign Office entrusted with the translation of

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147

Marx uses the English term.— Ed.
the said documents happens to be suffering from a cold or from rheumatism.

For the last few days the London press has been trying to edge away from its admiration for Austria and prepare its readership for an abrupt transition into an opposite key. As usual it is left to "our own correspondents"\(^a\) to break the ice. Thus *The Morning Chronicle* carries the following report from Berlin:

"No positive act of deception or formal breach of promise can be laid to the charge of the Prussian Cabinet [...].

"If Western Cabinets have been deceived, it has been their own fault, or those whose business it is to open their eyes. But can the same be said of Austria? Has her conduct been as undisguised [...] as that of Prussia? The latter has done all the mischief in her power to the West openly and undisguisedly. She defies and laughs at us without mask or restraint. The former has dallied with England and France during twenty months; laughed at us [...] in her sleeve; held out hopes officially as well as privately; lured us on from concession to concession\(^b\); given assurances of the most formal character; and, as long since predicted by those who were not blinded by overweening confidence, is now on the eve, it appears, of leaving us in the lurch if we do not assent to conditions of peace, [...] upon terms the most advantageous to Russia, and utterly [...] detrimental to France and England [...]. So, in fact, Austria after having served as a shield to Russia on the Pruth, and enabled Gorchakoff to detach nearly the whole of his force from Bessarabia to the Crimea, is to step forward and insist on a peace, which shall 'leave things as they are' [...]. If this be all we have to expect from Austrian friendship, then the sooner the mask is thrown aside the better."\(^c\)

On the other hand, *The Times* carries this report from Vienna\(^d\):

"...Baron Hess, the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd and 4th armies, has recently drawn up and presented to his Imperial master\(^e\) a memorial, in which it is demonstrated that it would not, under present circumstances, be advisable for Austria to declare war against Russia. A cry will probably be raised against me for thus publicly touching on such a delicate matter, but in my opinion it is a service rendered to the British and French nations to tell them that they must depend on their own resources, and that Austria is not likely to come to their assistance. If she could have persuaded Prussia and the Bund to cover her left flank with an army of 100,000 men, she would probably, in spite of numerous impediments [...] long since have pledged herself to assume the offensive against Russia. It is not positively known what arguments Baron Hess employed in his memorial, but the Austro-Russians, who [...] are always best informed on such matters, say that it contained matter something like the following: The Western Powers, having proved to demonstration that they require all their own resources and those of Turkey in order to make head against the Russians in

\(^a\) Marx uses the English words "our own correspondents".—*Ed.*

\(^b\) The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has "from commission to commission". Presumably a misprint.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) "Banks of the Spree, May 6", *The Morning Chronicle*, No. 27571, May 9, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^d\) From its own correspondent Bird T. O'M. The report was dated May 4 and published in *The Times*, No. 22049, May 9, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^e\) Francis Joseph I.—*Ed.*
the Crimea, it would be highly imprudent for Austria, unless she can induce her federal allies to support her, to engage in a war with Russia. It is acknowledged [...] that the latter has an army of 250,000 men, including the Guard and Grenadier Corps, in Poland; and, as it is posted within the rayon of seven of the strongest fortresses in the empire, no force that was not at least twice as large could hope to obtain any advantage over it. It is also said that mention is made of the disordered state of the finances, of the inability of France to place a hundred thousand men at Austria's disposal, of the helplessness displayed by the British Government, and of the little reliance that can be placed on Prussia. Since Sunday last another argument has been added to the foregoing, [...] on the mutability of things in general, [...] the uncertainty of the life of man, and [...] the dilemma Austria would be in should anything happen to Louis Napoleon while she was engaged in a war with Russia."

Written on May 9, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 219, May 12, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
Frederick Engels

THE NEW MOVE IN THE CRIMEA

The letter of our Paris correspondent published yesterday gave the outlines of the plan which, according to the best sources of information at Paris, the Allies propose to follow in the Summer campaign in the Crimea; and a scheme substantially the same having been divulged by Gen. Canrobert in the camp, we may fairly conclude that in this respect at least the truth is now known. It is simply that 25,000 men of the French reserves now distributed at Maslak, Gallipoli and Adrianople, are to be brought to the Crimea, to be followed by from 30,000 to 40,000 additional troops—Piedmontese and French. As soon as the reserves arrive, and without waiting for the additional reinforcements, the French army will proceed to cross the Chernaya, flog the Russians on the field if it can penetrate to Sympheropol and then with the coming reenforcements to help out the operation, go on to clear the peninsula of Russians, and to occupy and fortify Perekop; after which the main army will return and finish the siege of Sevastopol at leisure.\(^a\) In the mean time the steamers of the fleets are to attack Kaffa and Kertch, and if they succeed in reducing those

\(^a\) Instead of the preceding text, the version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "London, May 11. The impatience of the French army has forced Canrobert to divulge the Allies' plan of operations. The 25,000 men of the reserve army are to be brought to the Crimea, to be followed by another 30,000 to 40,000 men—French and Piedmontese. As soon as the reserve army arrives the French
places, to occupy them as possible pivots or points of retreat for
the active army in the field.

This is certainly the only thing to be done by the Allies if they
expect ever to bring the operations in the Crimea to a satisfactory
conclusion. But thus to act in the field requires that the balance of
forces should be considerably in their favor; otherwise they cannot
expect to obtain any important advantage over the Russian army
of observation. How, then, does the balance of strength stand at
present?

The French have in the Crimea nine divisions of infantry and
one brigade of cavalry (Chasseurs d'Afrique'). At 7,000 men to a
division, this gives a force of 63,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.
The English have five divisions of infantry amounting at a very
high estimate to 6,000 men each, and a division of say 2,000
horse. Then there are the remains of the Turkish force originally
sent to the Crimea, which cannot possibly exceed 6,000 infantry.
Add to these the troops which Omer Pasha can withdraw from
Eupatoria, where he must leave at least 15,000 men to garrison
the extensive works erected there, and we shall increase the
number of the allied army by say 20,000 infantry and perhaps
3,000 or 4,000 cavalry. These troops, as we learn from our
respondent at London, have already been transported to the
Chersonese and are encamped at Kadikoi, back of Balaklava,
ready for the expected field movements. This is a much more
judicious disposition than to attempt to effect a junction by a
separate inland movement of both the Anglo-French and Turkish
armies, exposing them to be separately attacked by a superior
Russian force. Our correspondent states the number of men Omer
has brought to Kadikoi at a higher figure than we have estimated
it, but he allots a corresponding English force to make up the
garrison at Eupatoria, so that on the whole his estimates do not
vary from ours. With these forces we must take into our account
20,000 men of the French army of reserve who may be expected
to arrive by the time Canrobert intends to take the field, and the
4,000 Piedmontese landed on the 9th of May. The allied strength in
the Chersonese will then be as follows:

will take the field, cross the Chernaya, attack the Russians wherever they encounter
them, try to link up with Omer Pasha's troops somewhere near the Alma and
Kacha and then act according to circumstances."—Ed.

a African riflemen.—Ed.
b In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the text beginning with the words "Add to these the
troops" and ending with the words "do not vary from ours" does not occur.—Ed.
Whether the French reserves have any cavalry with them we do not know, or if they have, whether it will arrive in season for the commencement of operations is uncertain; however, to make as liberal a calculation as possible for the Allies, let us add 2,000 horse to the above figures, which would give a total cavalry force of 9,500.\(^b\)

A part of the plan is to continue to carry on the siege, and for this at least as many troops will be required as are now engaged in that service—that is to say:

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<tr>
<td>French divisions at</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>28,000 men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Three English divisions at</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>each</td>
<td>18,000 men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<td>46,000 men</td>
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To this number must be added the sailors and the troops intrusted with guarding Balaklava and the line of intrenchments to Inkermann, and who at the same time serve as an army of reserve to the besieging corps. We put these down at a low estimate at 12,000. Estimating the sailors and marines at 4,000, we shall therefore have to deduct 56,000 men from the above 143,000, leaving available for field operations 87,000 infantry and artillery and 9,500 cavalry, or altogether about 96,500 men.\(^c\) And this, as we have said, is a very liberal computation.

\(^a\) The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* gives the following figures:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{French infantry} & 83,000 & \text{Cavalry} & 1,500 \\
\text{English } & 30,000 & \text{"} & 2,000 \\
\text{Turkish } & 6,000 & \text{"} & 4,000 \\
\end{array}
\]

Total: Infantry 119,000 cavalry 3,500.\(^*\)—*Ed.*

\(^b\) In the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*: "5,500".—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* gives the following calculation: “Estimating the sailors and marines at 4,000, we shall have to deduct 54,000 from the total of 119,000, leaving available for field operations 65,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, altogether somewhat more than 70,000.”

The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* further has: “One should also take into account Omer Pasha's corps at Eupatoria, roughly 35,000 infantry and 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry. Of these, 15,000 must stay back for garrison duty, so that Omer Pasha will probably take the field with 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, 24,000 all told.
Now, according to a Russian military correspondent of the Augsburg Gazette, who has always put down the Russian forces at very low estimates, the Russians have now in the Crimea, of

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<tr>
<td>Regular Infantry</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sailors, Marines, &amp;c.</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chornomorski* Cossacks</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, Engineers, &amp;c.</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Infantry</strong></td>
<td><strong>120,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular and irregular Cavalry</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cavalry</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
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The distribution of this force may be approximatively stated as follows:

For the defense of the south side of Sevastopol (infantry, artillery, &c.), men .............................................................. 26,000
As Garrison to the North Fort and Intrenched Camp .................. 24,000
Total ....................................................................................... 50,000

This leaves as available for the field, 70,000 infantry and artillery and 20,000 cavalry.

In point of infantry the Allies will thus have a striking superiority, their numbers exceeding those of their antagonists by 26,500 men. As to the relative strength in artillery we are in the dark; but from the difficulty the Allies have always found in procuring horses, and from the large proportion of guns accompanying every Russian army, it is probable that the Russians will be superior to their opponents. In cavalry they will certainly have the advantage. Even if from their 20,000 horse we must subtract 8,000 Cossacks, who would at all events come in for patrolling, outpost and orderly duties, they still retain 12,000 cavalry intact from detachment service, against 9,500 of the Allies,

"Hence we have the following sum total of allied troops for field operations in two separate corps:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Army at Sevastopol</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army at Eupatoria</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
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—* Ed.

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* Black Sea.—* Ed.

b The source in question—the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 125 (supplement), May 5, 1855—gives the following figures: infantry, 90,000; artillery, 15,000.—* Ed.

c Instead of the two preceding paragraphs the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “At the lowest estimate, the one the Russians themselves give of their present forces in the Crimea, we get 120,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry. One must deduct 50,000 of these for the defence of Sevastopol—26,000 for the south side and 24,000 as garrison for the North Fort and the entrenched camp.”—* Ed.

d This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—* Ed.
of which number, on a day of battle, no more than 7,000 can be brought forward in line.\textsuperscript{a}

The advance of the Allies toward the interior can hardly be made otherwise than on the road toward Mackenzie's farm and the space between this road and the head of Sevastopol Bay or Inkermann; because east of Mackenzie's farm the steep ridge encircling the Baidar Valley extends south-eastward until it joins the southern ridge of the Crimea near Yalta, forming a rocky barrier impassable for cavalry and artillery, and practicable for infantry by a few footpaths only. From Yalta there is indeed a road crossing the hills, but this can be defended by a very few troops, and has no doubt been fortified by the Russians long since, as well as the footpath passes. Besides, the direction of this road, the distance of Yalta from Balaklava, and the chance it offers to the Russians to cut off any corps operating on this line, will hardly admit of its being used by the Allies as their main line of operations.\textsuperscript{b}

The road by Mackenzie's farm to the Alma and Sympheropol is defended by a double row of intrenchments; first on the ridge overhanging the Chernaya, and secondly on the north side of a ravine running down from the edge of the rocky range, near Mackenzie's farm, to the head of Sevastopol Bay. This second and main line of defense, which is not more than two English miles in extent, is said to be very strongly intrenched, and here the first decisive action will have to be fought—an action deciding whether the Allies are to continue imprisoned on the Heracleatic Chersonese or to gain the interior of the country. This position will cost a harder struggle to carry than the Alma, for the forces will be more equally balanced, unless the Russians commit the mistake of dispersing their troops. They can easily concentrate 75,000 men

\textsuperscript{a} Instead of the last sentence the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: "As regards infantry, the Allies' joint forces are superior to the Russians', but separately each of their two fighting corps is weaker. The Russians' greatest advantage, however, is their position. Deployed over the triangle between the Alma, Sevastopol and Simferopol, they hold a consolidated position against Omer Pasha along that river in the North, which can be maintained with 15,000 infantry along the front, while a flanking movement of the Russian cavalry threatens to cut off the Turks from Eupatoria. If therefore Omer Pasha himself advanced up to the Alma, he would never be able to cross it until the English and the French had thrown the Russians back to Simferopol and thus forced them to give up the Alma. In this case the two corps could link up. An advance of the Anglo-French army is therefore the basic condition of any success."—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The text beginning with the words "and the space between this road" to the end of the paragraph does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}
for the defense of these intrenchments, and if the Allies attack with from 80,000 to 90,000 men, this superiority will in a great measure be made up by the intrenchments, and by the narrow front on which the Allies must necessarily act. If the Russians behave as they should, they must here check the advance of the Allies at once and force them back into their stronghold on the Chersonese. But if the Russians are defeated and the position carried, there remains nothing for them but to retire upon the Belbek and attempt to hold that line. In this case the garrison of the north side of Sevastopol would have to be observed by the Allies, whose army in the field would thereby be weakened by some 8,000 or 10,000 men; and if even then the Russians suffered a second defeat, their superiority in cavalry would secure them a safe retreat, although their line of retreat would lie in the prolongation of their left wing—a very unfavorable position unless made up for by some countervailing advantage.

These are a few of the considerations offering themselves on this new turn of affairs in the Crimea. They are far from exhausting the subject, to which we shall therefore soon return.

Written about May 11, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4402, May 29, 1855; reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1045, June 1, 1855 as a leading article; the German version was first published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 221, May 14, 1855, marked with the sign X

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a Instead of the text beginning with the words "This position will cost" and ending with the words "their stronghold on the Chersonese", the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "The narrow front on which the Allies must act here is to the Russians' advantage."—Ed.

b The Neue Oder-Zeitung further has: "while a detached corps keeps the Turks in check on the Alma".—Ed.

c In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the article ends as follows: "Even if the Russians were defeated here, their superiority in cavalry and the Allies' inadequate transport facilities making it impossible for the latter to take up positions far from the coast, would enable the Russians to retreat from the area controlled by the Allies. Their line of retreat would lie in the prolongation of their left wing, which is of course a very unfavourable route. However, it is probable that the Russians will try from the beginning to keep the Allies busy on the Chernaya and throw the bulk of their forces against Omer Pasha in order to encircle and crush him with their cavalry and then turn their total forces against the Anglo-French troops."—Ed.
London, May 14. Palmerston's private organ, The Morning Post, today carries a threatening article against Prussia, which includes the following:

"It was in the month of April, 1854, that permission was given, by an Order in Council, to import Russian produce into the United Kingdom in neutral bottoms, and of this permission we find that Prussia availed herself with astonishing rapidity. The following returns" (taken from official tables presented to Parliament) "will show the comparative amount of our imports of tallow, hemp, and flax, from the last-named country, during the years 1853 and 1854; the difference clearly indicating the quantity of Russian produce which has found its way through Memel and Danzig to the British market, notwithstanding our strict blockade of the Russian ports in the Baltic:

"Imported from Prussia into the United Kingdom

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<th>1853</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tallow</td>
<td>54 cwt</td>
<td>253,955 cwt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hemp</td>
<td>3,447 &quot;</td>
<td>366,220 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax</td>
<td>242,383 &quot;</td>
<td>667,879 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax- and linseed</td>
<td>57,848 qrs</td>
<td>116,267 qrs</td>
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"These figures sufficiently indicate the value of this new traffic to Prussia [...]. The result is that in spite of our blockade Russia is enabled to sell her produce as freely as in time of peace, while we have to pay some 50 per cent more for it, in the shape of dues and profits to the Prussian trader [...]. We admit that our present policy is grossly inconsistent, but the remedy is to be sought not by raising the blockade of the enemy's ports, but by stopping to the utmost of our power the overland traffic through the Prussian dominions."

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a The Morning Post, No. 25386, May 14, 1855.—Ed.
b The Morning Post has: "the enemy's ports".—Ed.
The anti-aristocratic movement in England can only have one immediate result: to bring the Tories, i.e. the specifically aristocratic party, to the helm. If not, it must necessarily subside at first into a few Whig platitudes, a few administrative mock-reforms not worth mentioning. Layard’s announcement of his motion on the “state of the nation” and the reception that announcement received in the House of Commons, produced the City meetings. But close on the heels of the City meetings followed Ellenborough’s motion in the House of Lords, whereby the Tories appropriate the new reform agitation, and transform it into a ladder to office. Layard himself has altered the words “aristocratic influence” in his motion to “family influence”—a concession to the Tories. Every movement outside the House assumes, inside the House, the form of the squabble between the two factions of the governing class. In the hands of the Whigs the Anti-Corn Law League became a means of bringing down the Tories. In the hands of the Tories, the Administrative Reform Association became a means of bringing down the Whigs. Only one must not forget that in this way one base of the old regime after another was sacrificed alternately by the two factions—and the regime itself remained intact, we may add. We have already stated our view that only the Tories are forced to make major concessions, because only under them does the pressure from without assume a threatening, indeed revolutionising character. The Whigs represent the real oligarchy in England, the domination of a few great families such as the Sutherlands, Bedfords, Carlises, Devonshires, etc.; the Tories represent the squireocracy, they are the Junker party, if you will, although broad demarcation lines must be drawn between the English squire and the North German Junker. The Tories are therefore the receptacles of all the old English prejudices regarding Church and State, protection and anti-Catholicism. The Whigs, the oligarchs, are enlightened, and have never hesitated to discard prejudices standing in the way of their hereditary tenancy of the offices of state. By their friendship the Whigs have constantly prevented the middle classes from moving; by their friendship the Tories have always thrown the masses into the arms of the middle classes, who put them at the disposal of the Whigs...

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a A. H. Layard’s speech in the House of Commons on April 27, 1855. The Times, No. 22040, April 28, 1855.—Ed.
b E. L. Ellenborough’s speech in the House of Lords on May 14, 1855. The Times, No. 22054, May 15, 1855.—Ed.
c See this volume, pp. 50-51.—Ed.
d Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
At the present moment there is no longer any difference between Whigs and Tories except that the latter represent the plebs of the aristocracy and the former its haute-volée. The old aristocratic phrase is on the side of the aristocratic plebs; the liberal phrase on the side of the aristocratic haute-volée. In fact, however, since the High Tories (Lord Bolingbroke, etc.) quit the scene the Tory Party has always been ruled by parvenus such as Pitt, Addington, Perceval, Canning, Peel and Disraeli. The homines novi were always to be found in the ranks of the Tories. When Derby (himself a renegade Whig) formed his ministry, it contained, apart from himself, perhaps two other old names. All the others were plain squires plus one man of letters. On the other hand, the Whigs, who never hesitated for a moment to trim their sails and their views to the wind and who apparently forever renewed and metamorphosed themselves, needed no new men. They were able to perpetuate the family names. If one surveys English history since the "glorious" revolution of 1688, one finds that all the laws directed against the mass of the people have been initiated by the Whigs, from the Act for a Seven-Year Parliament to the latest Workhouse and Factory legislation. But the Whig reaction has always taken place in agreement with the middle classes. The Tory reaction has been directed even more against the middle class than against the masses. Hence the Whigs' reputation for liberality.

Written on May 14, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 227, May 18, 1855
Marked with the sign X

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English in full for the first time

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\[a\] Upper crust.—Ed.
\[b\] New men.—Ed.
London, May 15. The galleries of the House of Lords were packed full yesterday afternoon before the sitting even commenced. A sensational show had been announced—Lord Ellenborough's motion, and a regular battle between the Ins and Outs.\(^a\) In addition to this, it was piquant to see with one's own eyes the hereditary legislators playing the part of crusaders against the aristocracy. The performance was a poor one. The actors kept forgetting what parts they were playing. The play began as drama and ended in farce. During the mock-battle not even the illusion, the artistic illusion, was maintained. It was evident at first glance that the noble warriors were trying reciprocally to preserve not only themselves but even their weapons unscathed.

Insofar as the debate revolved around the criticism of the conduct of the war up to now it failed to rise to the level of any run-of-the mill debating club\(^b\) in London, and it would be sheer waste of time to dwell on it for a moment. We will attempt, however, to indicate in a few strokes how the noble lords conducted themselves as the champions of administrative reform, as the opponents of the aristocratic monopoly of government and as an echo of the City meetings. The right man in the right place, cried Lord Ellenborough.\(^c\) And as proof that honour falls to merit, and merit alone, he cited the fact that he (Ellenborough) and Lord

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\(^a\) Marx uses the English words “Ins” and “Outs” (referring to the party in the government and the opposition).—Ed.

\(^b\) Here and below Marx uses the English words “debating club”.—Ed.

\(^c\) The debate in the House of Lords on May 14, 1855 was reported in The Times, No. 22054, May 15, 1855.—Ed.
Hardwicke sat in the Lords because their fathers had worked their way into the House of Lords by their own merit. This seems, on the contrary, to be precisely an instance of how men can benefit from the merits of others, namely their fathers, to secure not merely a post for life but the dignity of a legislator of England. And what were the merits by which the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench, Ellenborough senior, and Mr. Charles Yorke, Lord Hardwicke’s father, made their way into the House of Lords? The story is an instructive one. The late Ellenborough, an English lawyer and subsequently judge, managed to earn himself the reputation of a Jeffreys en miniature in the press trials, conspiracy trials and police-spy trials that were constantly taking place under Pitt and his successors. Under Ellenborough’s leadership the special jury attained a reputation in England that even the “jurés probes et libres” of Louis Philippe never possessed. That was the merit of Ellenborough senior, and that paved his way into the House of Lords. As for Mr. Charles Yorke, the ancestor of Lord Hardwicke, he has even outdone old Ellenborough in the matter of merit. This Charles Yorke, the Member for Cambridge for twenty years, was one of the chosen band entrusted by Pitt, Perceval and Liverpool “to do the dirty work for them”. Each of the “loyal” terror measures of that time found its Pindar in him. In every petition against the openly practised sale of seats in the House of Commons, he discerned “Jacobin machinations”. Every motion opposing the shameless system of sinecures, at a time when pauperism was coming into being in England, was denounced by Charles Yorke as an attack on the “blessed comforts of our sacred religion”. And on what occasion did this Charles Yorke celebrate his Ascension to the House of Lords? In 1810 the Walcheren expedition had produced similar effects in England as the Crimean expedition did in 1855. Lord Porchester tabled a motion in the House of Commons to set up a committee of investigation. Charles Yorke opposed it violently, he spoke of plots, the stirring up of discontent, etc. Nevertheless, Porchester’s motion was carried. But then Yorke decided to withhold the inquiry findings from the public, insisting, on the basis of an old and absurd parliamentary privilege, that the public galleries be cleared of listeners and reporters. This was done. A Mr. Gale Jones, the

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a Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English words “special jury”.—Ed.
c “Honest and free juries.”—Ed.
d Marx uses the English phrase.—Ed.
chairman of a London debating club, then published an advertisement announcing that the subject to be discussed at the next meeting of the club would be the infringement of the freedom of the press and Charles Yorke's gross insult to public opinion. Charles Yorke promptly had Gale Jones summoned before the House of Commons for libel of a Member and breach of "parliamentary privilege", whence, in contravention of all English laws, he was immediately dispatched to Newgate Prison, without inquiry or reference to a judge, "to be confined there as long as it should please the Commons". While performing these heroic deeds, Charles Yorke assumed great airs of independence. He claimed to be acting only as an upright "country squire", as a "friend of the King", as a "loyal anti-Jacobin". Not three weeks had elapsed since his closing of the gallery before it became known that meanwhile he had presented his account to the Perceval ministry and obtained a lifetime sinecure as *Teller of the Exchequer*\(^a\) (similar to "The Guardian of the Green Wax"), i.e. a life emolument of £2,700 per annum. On accepting this sinecure Charles Yorke had to submit himself to his constituents in Cambridge for re-election. At the election meeting he was greeted by booes and hisses, rotten apples and eggs, and was forced to run for it. As compensation for this indignity Perceval elevated him to the peerage. Thus it was that Charles Yorke was transformed into a lord, and thus, Lord Ellenborough informs Lord Palmerston, merit must be able to make its way in a well-ordered economy. Discounting this extremely naive and characteristic *lapsus linguae*\(^b\) Ellenborough—who bears an unmistakable likeness to the Knight of the Doleful Countenance\(^c\)—adhered more to the phraseology of the City meetings.

His friend Derby strove to restrict even the purely rhetorical concession. He rejected the rumour that he had allied himself with Layard. He whose entire talent consists of discretion, accused Layard of indiscretion. There was, he said, a lot of truth in the views of the City men, but they had proceeded to draw extravagant (!!) conclusions. A minister had to seek his colleagues in Parliament, and not merely in Parliament but in the party to which he belongs, and not merely in this party but within the circle of men in his party possessing parliamentary influence.

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\(^a\) Marx uses the English term.— *Ed.*  
\(^b\) Slip of the tongue.— *Ed.*  
\(^c\) Don Quixote.— *Ed.*
Within this circle ability should, of course, be decisive, and this had hitherto often been neglected. The fault, Derby claimed, lay in the parliamentary reform of 1831. The “rotten places”, “the rotten boroughs”, a had been expunged, and it was precisely these rotten boroughs 155 that had furnished the sound statesmen of England. They had enabled influential men to introduce talented but impecunious young people into Parliament and thence into the service of the state. Thus even according to Lord Derby no administrative reform is possible without parliamentary reform—but, a parliamentary reform in the opposite sense, restoration of the “rotten boroughs”. Derby’s complaint does not seem entirely justified if one considers that 85 seats in the House of Commons still belong to some 60 little “rotten boroughs” (in England alone), none of which have more than 500 inhabitants, with some electing two members.

Lord Panmure, on behalf of the ministry, brought the Lords debate back to the real point. You want, he stuttered, to exploit the cry outside the walls of Parliament in order to declaim us out of office and put yourselves in. Why did Derby not form a ministry three months ago when charged to do so by the Queen? Ah, replied Derby with a smirk, three months ago! Things have changed in the last three months. Three months ago Lord Palmerston was l’homme à la mode, b the great and indispensable statesman. Palmerston has discredited himself, and now it’s our turn.

The debate in the House of Lords has shown that neither side possesses the stuff that men are made of. As to the House of Commons, Ellenborough rightly observed that it has become insipid, that it has lost its credit and that political influence is no longer to be sought within the House, but outside it.

The debates in the Lords clearly showed the mala fides c of the aristocratic opposition, which intends to conjure away the bourgeois movement and simultaneously to use it as a battering-ram against the ministry. In a subsequent letter we shall have the opportunity of similarly demonstrating the mala fides of the City reformers towards the working class, with whom they intend to play just as the aristocratic opposition does with them. From this one may draw the conclusion that the present movement in

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a Here and below Marx uses the English phrase.—Ed.
b A popular man.—Ed.
c Insincerity.—Ed.
England is extremely complex and, as we have indicated earlier,\(^a\) simultaneously contains two antithetical and hostile movements.

Written on May 15, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 228, May 19, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 186-88.—*Ed.*
London, May 16. The resentment of the bourgeois opposition caused by the vote in the House of Lords on the occasion of Ellenborough's motion is a symptom of weakness. On the contrary, they ought to celebrate the rejection of the motion as a victory. To force the House of Lords, the supreme council of the aristocracy, in solemn public debate to declare its satisfaction with the way the war has hitherto been conducted, loudly to acknowledge Palmerston as their champion and representative, and definitely to reject mere pious wishes for administrative reform, for any kind of reform—what more favourable results could the enemies of the aristocracy expect from Ellenborough's motion? Above all they had to seek to discredit the House of Lords, the last bastion of the English aristocracy. But they complain that the House of Lords disdains fleeting popularity at the cost not of its privileges but of the existing cabinet. It is in the order of things for The Morning Herald to complain, being the Tory organ, the organ of all the prejudices of "our incomparable constitution". For The Morning Herald it was a comforting prospect, after the Whig oligarchy performing as the friends of the bourgeoisie and of "liberal progress" for a century and a half, to see the roles change and the Tories now entrusted for another century and a half with the role of "aristocratic" representatives of the bourgeoisie and of "liberal progress". The Morning Herald has a right to complain, a good, solid right. But the bourgeois opposition? Did it perhaps imagine that a moderate demonstration of City merchants would be

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a This refers to an article on the debate in the House of Lords on May 14, 1855, published by The Morning Herald, No. 22432, May 16, 1855.—Ed.
enough to force the aristocracy into committing suicide, into abdicating? The truth, however, is that the bourgeoisie desires a compromise, that it expects flexibility from the other side to enable it too to be flexible; that it would like, if possible, to avoid a real struggle. As soon as the struggle becomes a real one, the "million", as they call the "lower" classes, too, will rush into the arena, not just as spectators, not just as referees, but as a party. And the bourgeoisie would like to avoid this at all costs. It was a similar reason that kept the Whigs out of the Cabinet from 1808-1830. They wanted to throw out their opponents at any price except the price of real concessions to the bourgeoisie, without whose aid the Tories could not be thrown out, except the price of a parliamentary reform. We have seen the ambiguous, off-hand way and the aloof, ironically non-committal manner in which Ellenborough and Derby set themselves up as supporters of the bourgeois administrative reform, while doing everything to ward off their supposed allies. We now see, on the other hand, how timidly and perfidiously the reforming businessmen of the City first tried to forestall any opposition from the Chartists and temporarily secure their silence, so as to juggle them out of the positions they had voluntarily granted them. In the case of the City merchants no less than in that of the Tories, fear and dislike of the supposed ally outweighs hostility towards the supposed enemy. The course of events was briefly this.

The "Administrative Reform Association" feared opposition from the Chartists, who, as the reader will remember, had got the better of the "National and Constitutional Association" at two large meetings in St. Martins Hall and Southwark, forcing it to retreat from the territory it had chosen itself. On April 26 they sent Mr. James Acland (a former Anti-Corn Law lecturer) to the rooms of Ernest Jones, where he announced himself as an "envoy" of the Administrative Reform Association, which was counting on the support of the Chartists, it being its wish to abolish the "class legislation" and install a popular government. He invited Ernest Jones to a meeting the next day with the committee of the said administration. Jones declared that he was not entitled to reply in the name of the Chartist party. He had to decline to attend the meeting until he had consulted the London

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a Probably a reference to Marx's article "A Meeting" (see this volume, pp. 98-100).—Ed.
b Marx uses the English words "Anti-Corn Law lecturer".—Ed.
c See this volume, pp. 166-69.—Ed.
executive committee of the Chartists,\textsuperscript{156} which was to meet the following Sunday.

On Sunday evening, April 29, Jones informed the Chartist committee of the whole affair. He was authorised to proceed with the negotiations. The following morning Jones had a meeting with Mr. Ingraham Travers, the leader of the City movement, who personally accredited Mr. James Acland as the authorised agent and representative of his party. Mr. I. Travers assured Jones that their intention was to form a popular government. The resolutions as printed in \textit{The Times}\textsuperscript{a} were only \textit{provisional}; the means of achieving their goal had to be decided first by the executive committee to be elected at the London Tavern meeting. As evidence of their sympathy for the cause of administrative reform the Chartist should appoint a speaker to represent them at the meeting. He would be called upon by the chairman to support one of the resolutions. Further, the Chartist should appoint a representative who, at the suggestion of the provisional committee of the City merchants, would be appointed a permanent member of the executive committee of the Reform Association at the Tavern meeting. Finally it was agreed that, admittance being by ticket only, the Chartist would receive their due share of these tickets. Jones declined to let the matter be left to a purely verbal agreement and informed Mr. Ingraham [Travers] that he would have to put forward all the points mentioned in a letter to the Chartist’s executive committee.

This was done. The letter arrived, overflowing with assurances. However, when the time came for the delivery of the admission tickets, only 12 tickets arrived. When the Chartist committee complained about this breach of promise, the others apologised saying there were no more tickets left. However, if the Chartist committee would station two of its members at the door of the Tavern, they would be authorised to admit whoever they pleased, even without a ticket. Messrs. Slocombe and Workman were elected by the Chartist for this purpose and received Mr. Travers’s authorisation. To eliminate all suspicion the Administrative Reform Association sent a special messenger with a letter for Jones on the day of the meeting,\textsuperscript{b} a few hours before its commencement, to remind him that the chairman would request him to speak in favour of resolution 4, and that he would be proposed to the meeting as a member of the executive committee, in his status as representative of the Chartist.

\textsuperscript{a} “Administrative Reform”, \textit{The Times}, No. 22040, April 28, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} May 5, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
About an hour before the meeting, large numbers of Chartists assembled outside the Tavern. As soon as the doors were opened, Messrs. Slocombe and Workman were forbidden to admit anyone without a ticket. Eight tickets were reluctantly distributed in order to gain time at a moment when the pressure from outside seemed to be getting serious. This time was used to bring along a unit of police waiting in readiness in a sidestreet. From this moment on nobody else was admitted except “well-known merchants and bankers”. Indeed, people in working-class dress, in the familiar corduroy jackets, were turned away even if they had entrance tickets. To deceive the crowd of workers waiting in the street, the doors were suddenly locked and notices put up saying, “The hall is full. Nobody else will be admitted”. At the time, however, the hall was not even half full, and “gentlemen” arriving in their carriages were admitted through the windows and by way of a back-door through the kitchen. The crowd of workers dispersed calmly, since they did not suspect any treachery. Although Ernest Jones showed his “platform ticket” at the meeting, he was not allowed up on the platform, much less permitted to speak of course. The Association had achieved two aims—to prevent any opposition from the Chartists, and to be able to point to the crowd in the street as their supporters. But these were only supposed to appear as extras in the street.

Ernest Jones, in an appeal to the workers of England, relates this comedy of intrigues and on behalf of the Chartists throws down the gauntlet to the Administrative Reform Association.3

Written on May 16, 1855
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3 E. Jones, “Political Felony. Infamous Chicanery and Fraud of Administrative Reform Association”, The People’s Paper, No. 158, May 12, 1855.—Ed.
London, May 19. According to the optimists of the press here the economic crisis in England has now ended, and commerce and industry are once again taking an upward course. They draw this consoling conclusion from the fact that there has been an easing of the money market. For on the one hand there has been an increase in the gold reserve in the vaults of the Bank of England, and on the other the bank has lowered its rate of interest. Whilst on January 20, 1855, the value of the gold holdings was only £12,162,000, on May 12, 1855, it had risen to £16,045,000—an increase of £3,883,000. The rate of interest, which stood at 5 per cent on January 20, 1855, was lowered by the Bank to 4½ per cent on March 31, and to 4 per cent on April 28. However, those gentlemen have overlooked the fact that an accumulation of gold in the vaults of the Bank and a fall in its rate of interest can be caused by something other than an economic boom—namely the very opposite: stagnation of business and, linked with that, a falling-off in the demand for capital. That the latter is really the cause on this occasion is shown by the tables published every week by the Bank of England. Only one should not, like those optimists, look exclusively at two columns contained in the tables, gold holdings and rate of interest. One has to compare two other columns—those showing reserve bank-notes and discounted bills. As is generally known, the Bank of England is split into two different departments, the Issue Department\(^a\) and the Banking Department. We can describe the former as the mint of the Bank of England. It is engaged solely in manufacturing bank-notes. Robert Peel’s Act

\(^a\) Here and below Marx uses the English terms.—*Ed.*
of 1844 laid down legal limitations on the issue of bank-notes. That is to say, above the sum of £14 million, which is the amount of capital it is owed by the state, the Bank can issue no more bank-notes than there is gold in its vaults. If then, for example, the Bank issues bank-notes to the value of £20 million there has to be gold worth £6 million in its vaults. The Issue Department of the Bank is engaged solely in manufacturing and issuing bank-notes in accordance with the restrictions described. It transfers all the bank-notes it manufactures in this way to the Banking Department, the actual Bank, which does business with the public like any other deposit and discount bank, and which puts bank-notes into circulation by discounting bills, advancing money on interest-bearing papers, paying dividends to state creditors, paying off deposits it holds, etc. Robert Peel cleverly devised both this division of the Bank of England into two self-contained departments and this method of regulating the amount of notes to be issued, because he fancied this would make it possible to guard against any future monetary crisis arising, and to adjust the amount of paper currency to that of metallic currency by means of an automatic and mechanical law. What the celebrated statesman overlooked was the not insignificant fact that his restriction only regulated circulation between the Issue Department and the Banking Department, between two offices of the Bank of England, but by no means determined circulation between the Banking Department and the outside world. The Issue Department of the Bank transfers to the Banking Department as many bank-notes as it is allowed by law to manufacture, for example £20 million if there are £6 million gold in its coffers. However, what proportion of these £20 million actually goes into circulation depends on the state of business, and on the requirements and demand in the world of commerce. The remainder, which the Bank cannot dispose of and which is thus left in the coffers of the Banking Department, appears in the accounts rendered by the Bank under the heading of reserve bank-notes.

Seeing, as we have, that, from January 20, 1855, to May 12, 1855, the gold holdings of the Bank increased by £3,883,000, we also find that during the same period the quantity of bank-notes held in reserve rose from £5,463,000 to £9,417,000, i.e. by £3,954,000. The greater the quantity of reserve bank-notes, i.e. the notes left in the coffers of the Banking Department, the smaller is the quantity of notes actually circulating amongst the public. However, from the figure just quoted it follows that the
accumulation of gold in the vaults of the Bank has been accompanied by a decline in the quantity of bank-notes circulating amongst the public. What is the reason for this contraction in circulation? Simply a decline in trade and a fall in business transactions. Any doubt as to the accuracy of this view will be dispelled when one sees from the same accounts rendered by the Bank that the value of bills discounted by the Bank was £25,282,000 on January 20, 1855, whereas on May 12, 1855 it had fallen to £23,007,000—a decrease of £2,275,000. But the value of bills discounted by the Bank is the most reliable gauge of the quantity of business transacted between the Bank and the world of commerce. The evidence is even more conclusive if one considers that the Bank lowered its rate of interest to 4 per cent on April 28, and thus offered its commodity—capital—20 per cent cheaper than in the previous January. And from April 28, when the Bank lowered its rate of interest, to May 12 the quantity of bank-notes spent on discounting bills fell instead of rising—proof that under the present state of the economy capital is still too expensive at 4 per cent to find even the demand it found at the beginning of January at 5 per cent; proof that the fall in the rate of interest cannot be ascribed to a greater influx of capital but rather to a reduced demand on the part of commercial and industrial enterprises; proof, finally, that the increase in the metal held in the vaults of the Bank is only an increase in idle capital which, at this moment, cannot be utilised.

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As we write, the field operations in the Crimea, to which we alluded some days since as in preparation,\(^a\) must have commenced. With these operations, the war, so far as it is confined to the peninsula, enters into a new and probably decisive stage of development. The rapid arrival of the Piedmontese and French reserves, and particularly the sudden change by which Canrobert left his command for that of a single corps, while Pélissier takes the command in chief, are sure indications that the time for a change in the tactics of the Allies is at hand.

For a general description of the ground to which the theater of operations is to be transferred and a general statement of the forces about to be engaged we refer to our former article. It will be recollected that the Russian army of observation in communication with the north side of Sevastopol has its main position on the plateau between Inkermann and the point where the road from Balaklava to Sympheropol crosses the mountain-ridge, separating the valleys of the Chernaya and the Belbek. This position, of great natural strength, has been completely intrenched by the Russians. It extends for about four miles between the head of the bay of Sevastopol and the impassable range of mountains, and the Russians will be able to concentrate there at least 50,000 or 60,000 men, of infantry and artillery, which number is fully sufficient for the defense.

To attack this position in front would require a great numerical superiority and involve terrible sacrifices, while the Allies cannot

\(^a\) Here and below Engels refers to his article "The New Move in the Crimea" (see this volume, pp. 180-85).—*Ed.*
afford either. Even if they succeeded in carrying the intrenchments, their losses would be so severe as to disable them from an energetic continuance of the campaign. They must therefore attempt to draw a number of Russians away from it and to find means to turn it. For this purpose the mysterious expedition to Kertch was sent out. About 15,000 allied troops embarked, were seen by the Russians to pass Yalta, sailed to Kertch, and returned again. Why they did not attempt a landing is sought to be explained by a telegraphic order from Paris. At all events, this mere apology for a demonstration must be pronounced an utter failure; no General in his senses would be induced to divide his troops by an expedition which does not venture to show even a semblance of fight. An attempt on Kaffa, if even it was under contemplation at headquarters, seems also to have been finally abandoned. To transport troops to Eupatoria and sally forth from that place cannot be under consideration, else the Piedmontese and French reserves would have been sent thither at once. And, as there is no other harbor or good roadstead on the coast between Balaklava and Kaffa, nor between Sevastopol and Eupatoria, the idea of turning the Russians by sea seems to have been finally given up, and nothing remains but to turn them by land, which, as we have already stated, must prove an exceedingly difficult operation.

There is, beside the road occupied by the Russians above Inkermann, but one other high road leading from Balaklava to Sympheropol. It runs along the south coast as far as Alushta, where it turns to the interior, passes the mountains east of Chatyr Dagh or Tent Mountain, the highest in the Crimea, at a point 2,800 feet above the sea and descends to Sympheropol by the valley of the Salghir, the main river of the Crimea. From Balaklava to Alushta there are four marches, from Alushta to Sympheropol three—together about 95 English miles. But as no side-roads exist allowing the troops to march in several parallel columns, the whole army would have to advance on this one road in one enormously extended column, requiring them to march at least for four or five days in one continuous defile. Near Alushta and on the pass there are some old fortifications, and we may be sure that the pass itself will be found strongly intrenched. Instead of seven days the army would perhaps require twelve before even the pass of Chatyr Dagh could be crossed—time enough for the Russians to make an attempt on the corps remaining to protect the siege, or to march with the greater part of their forces against the enemy and meet him with superior numbers on debouching from
the hills, while light, movable columns sent along the foot-paths of the Upper Katsha and Alma would fall upon his flank and rear. The greatest fault of a flank movement by way of Alushta would, however, be its utter want of a base of operations. The open roadstead of Alushta forbids the idea of turning that place even into a temporary base; so that even before Alushta is passed, Russian light infantry descending by the foot-paths across the hills, may interrupt the communication with Balaklava quite effectually.

The march by Alushta, therefore, can hardly be undertaken. Its risks far outweigh its possible advantages. There is, however, another way of turning the Russians. If in the march by Alushta all the advantages offered to the Allies by the high road are far outweighed by the means of attack given to the Russians by the foot-paths, cannot these same foot-paths be turned to the same advantage by the Allies? This would imply an entirely different operation. In this case the Allies would place the main body of their field-troops, including the corps destined to invest the north side of Sevastopol, directly opposite the Russian camp above Inkermann, forcing their opponents thereby to keep the great body of their troops concentrated in the intrenchments. Meantime, Zouaves, Chasseurs, Light Infantry, British Rifles, and even the mounted Chasseurs d'Afrique, and what can be got together of mountain-artillery, would be formed into as many columns as there are foot-paths leading from the valley of Baidar and from the South Coast near Alupka, 30 miles from Balaklava, into the valleys of the Belbek and Katsha. A night march would conveniently bring the troops destined to turn the extreme Russian left across the valley of Baidar to the South Coast, where the enemy could no longer perceive them. Another march would bring them to Alupka. Above Alupka is the steep range of the Yaila mountains, forming on their northern slope an elevated plain about 2,000 feet above the sea, affording good pasturage for sheep, and descending by rocky precipices into the glens of the rivulets Biuk Uzen and Uzen Bash, which by their junction form the Belbek river. Three foot-paths lead up to this plain near Alupka, and pass into the glens of the two Uzens. All this ground is perfectly practicable for infantry such as the Zouaves and Chasseurs, who in Africa have got accustomed to mountain warfare of a far more difficult character. Then, from the valley of the Upper Chernaya, better known as the Baidar Valley, at least two foot-paths lead to the valley of the Upper Belbek, and finally one branches off from the Balaklava and Sympheropol road just
before the mountain pass, and traverses the ridge three miles south-east of Mackenzie's farm, leading immediately to the left of the Russian intrenched position. Now if these paths be ever so difficult they must be practicable for the French light troops from Africa. "Where a goat passes, a man can pass; where a man, a whole battalion; where a battalion, a horse or so may get through with a little trouble; and finally, you will perhaps manage even to pass a field-gun."4 In fact we should not be at all astonished if these sheep-tracks and foot-paths marked on the maps, should even turn out to be country roads, bad enough, but quite practicable for a flanking movement, in which even artillery might accompany the columns. In that case the turning should be carried out with as large a force as possible, and then the Russians will soon have to give up their intrenchments, even without a serious front attack. But if these paths should be impracticable for field-guns (rockets and mountain howitzers can go anywhere), the turning parties will take the character of mere movable columns, drive back the Russian troops as far as they can from the upper valleys of the Belbek, pass into that of the Katsha, menace the Russian rear, intercept their communications, destroy their convoys, collect trustworthy information, reconnoiter the country, draw upon themselves as many Russian detachments as possible, until that road which offers the least difficulties is made so far practicable as to admit of the passage of artillery. Then a strong force may be sent after them, and the Russian rear be so seriously menaced as to force an evacuation of the intrenchments. That an advance of mere infantry and light cavalry across these mountains on the left flank and rear of the Russians can have that effect we do not believe, as they could not seriously menace the Russian communications without descending into a country where artillery regains its full effect, and thereby secures the advantage to the party possessed of it. But there is no doubt that with a little ingenuity artillery can be made to follow the turning columns. At Jena,157 Napoleon exhibited what can be done with a simple foot-path winding up a steep hill; in five hours the road was wide enough for guns, the Prussians were taken in flank, and the next day's victory secured. And where a Crimean araba can pass, a field-gun can pass too; some of the pathways in question, particularly those from the Chernaya to the Belbek, appear to be such old araba country roads.

But to carry out such a movement the possession of sufficient

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4 A free rendering of one of Napoleon I's principles of mountain warfare.—Ed.
forces is the first condition. The Russians will certainly have the advantage of numbers and of the better knowledge of the ground. The first may be done away with by a bold advance of Omer Pasha from Eupatoria to the Alma. Though the Russian superiority in cavalry will not allow him to move fast or far, yet by good maneuvering and well-secured communications he may force Prince Gorchakoff to detach more infantry against him. But for the Allies to depend upon any such collateral operation would be a matter of great uncertainty. In order to carry out, therefore, the advance from Balaklava, the best thing for them would be to transfer (as they were some time since reported to have done\(^a\)), a day or two before the actual attack, some 20,000 Turks to the Chersonese, where they would be worth twice their number in Eupatoria. This would allow them to attack the Russians with nearly 110,000 men, including about 6,000 cavalry, to which force the Russians could oppose about 65,000 or 75,000 infantry (including 15,000 to 20,000 men from the garrison of the north side) and 10,000 cavalry. But as soon as the turning corps should begin to tell upon the left flank and rear of the Russians, the force to be opposed to it would be comparatively weak, as the drafts from the north side could not expose themselves to be cut off from their intrenched camp around the citadel; and therefore the Allies, being enabled to employ the whole of their available field-army wherever they like, would have a great superiority. In this case then they might with certainty count upon success; but if they attack the Russians single-handed, and the numerical proportions of both armies as stated by the most trustworthy authorities be correct, they stand but little chance. Their flanking corps would be too weak, and might be entirely neglected by the Russians, who by a bold sally from their lines could drive the weakened Allies down the precipices into the Chernaya.

Another movement on the part of the Allies has been suggested—an immediate assault on the south side of Sevastopol. We are even told that a peremptory order to undertake this assault had been telegraphed from Paris, and that Canrobert resigned because he did not feel warranted in executing a movement which in his opinion would imply a loss of 40,000 men. Now, from what we have seen of the military notions of Louis Bonaparte as displayed in his interference with the present campaign, it is not at all incredible that such an order should have

\(^a\) The words in parenthesis were probably added by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
been given. But what is less probable is that even a reckless *sabreur*\(^a\) like Pélissier should lend himself to execute such an order. The last month must have given the French soldiers a pretty good idea of what the resistance is like which they are to meet with on storming. And an operation which cannot be carried out without the loss of some 40,000 men—above one-third of the whole army available for the assault—has certainly very few favorable chances of success. Pélissier may eagerly wish to pick up the Marshal’s baton which has slipped from the hands of Canrobert, but we very much doubt whether he is enough of a Bonapartist to stake his fortune and reputation against such odds. For supposing even that the assault was successful; that not only the first line of defense but also the second line was taken; that even the barricades, crenellated houses and defensive barracks forbidding the approach to the shore forts—that these shore forts too were carried and the whole of the south side in the hands of the Allies, at a loss we will say of only 30,000 to a Russian loss of 20,000—what then? The Allies would have lost 10,000 men more than the Russians, the place would instantly have to be abandoned; and the campaign in the field would become even more difficult than before.

But there is one fact which at once precludes the idea of an immediate general assault. From some half-official reports we were induced in a former article on the siege\(^b\) to admit, merely for argument’s sake, that the Russians had been driven out of their new outworks in front of the place. We stated at the same time that we had every reason to doubt the correctness of such reports, as any such advantage gained would have been loudly and distinctly announced by the Allies. Now we are indeed positively informed by the Russians that the Kamtschatka (the Mamelon), Selenghinsk and Volhynsk redoubts are still in their possession, while evidence from the allied camp not only goes to confirm this, but also acknowledges that further outworks have been thrown up by the besieged. Thus the advantage gained by the Allies in pushing their advanced approaches nearer to the fortress has been fully made up for by the counter-approaches of the Russians, and the line where both parties can meet each other in equal strength is very distant yet from the main ditch. Now, an assault becomes advisable only when the line, where the force of the attack for common siege operations is equal to that of the defense, lies in the main ditch itself; otherwise it is clear that the

\(^a\) War-horse.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) See this volume, p. 170.—*Ed.*
storming columns would be broken down and shattered before they could reach the top of the breastwork. Thus as long as the Russians cannot be driven back across the main ditch, it will be impossible to assault the main rampart situated behind this main ditch. As to carrying the second line constructed behind that ditch, it is entirely out of the question at the present time.

There may be a chance for partial assaults on the left or town side from the Quarantine to the Flagstaff Bastion where the main French attack is carried on. But here the policy of the French Government keeps us in utter darkness as to the extent and strength of the Russian outworks, and the recent Russian dispatches, of late being all telegraphic, contain no definite and detailed description. On the Flagstaff Bastion, however, it is acknowledged by the Russians themselves that the French works are close to the main rampart and that a mine has been sprung under it, though without any considerable results. Here, then, a local assault might be successful but from the salient position of this bastion and the commanding ground behind (the Russian Jasonovsky Redoubt⁴) it is very doubtful whether anything would be gained by the conquest of the bastion, which must have been isolated from the remainder of the works by one or two cross-ramparts in its rear, thereby preventing the storming columns from establishing themselves in it or at least from penetrating any further.

Thus whether the assault is attempted, or field operations are undertaken, the Allies will have to struggle with considerable difficulties. But at any rate the drowsy style of warfare pursued since the arrival of the Allies before Sevastopol is drawing to a close; and more stirring events and operations of real military interest may now be looked for.

Written about May 21, 1855

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⁴ The *New-York Daily Tribune* has: “the Russian Garden Battery”.—*Ed.*
Karl Marx

ON THE REFORM MOVEMENT

London, May 21. Today all the London newspapers publish an address from the City reformers, or rather their executive committee, to the “People of England”. The style of the document is dry, businesslike, not quite as lofty as that of the trade circulars that periodically emanate from the same source, offering for sale coffee, tea, sugar, spices and other products of the tropical countries in a more or less tastefully arranged fabric of phrases. The Association promises to provide the material for a veritable physiology of the various government departments and to disclose all the mysteries of Downing Street, Downing Street which is full of hereditary wisdom. This is what it promises. For its own part, it demands that the electoral districts of England send to Parliament candidates freely chosen according to their hearts’ desire and recommended solely by merit, instead of, as hitherto, imposed on them by the aristocratic clubs. It thus recognises the existing privileged electoral districts as normal, the selfsame districts which, in their corruptibility, their reliance on a few clubs, their lack of independence, it admits to being the birthplace of the present House of Commons, and thus of the present government. It does not want to dissolve these exclusive districts, nor to extend them, but simply to moralise. Why not then appeal directly to the conscience of the oligarchy itself, instead of threatening it with the abolition of its privileges? It should at any rate be an easier job to convert the oligarchical heads than the oligarchical electoral

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a Excerpts from this address were later published in The People’s Paper, No. 160, May 26, 1855.—Ed.
b The Administrative Reform Association (see this volume, pp. 166-69).—Ed.
c 10 Downing Street is the British Prime Minister’s official residence.—Ed.
districts. The City Association would obviously like to bring into existence an anti-aristocratic movement, but a movement within the limits of the legal (as Guizot called it), the official England. And how do they intend to rouse the stagnant bog of electoral districts? How to drive them into emancipating themselves from interests and customs which make them the vassals of a few select clubs and the pillars of the governing oligarchy? With a physiology of Downing Street? Not entirely. Also by means of pressure from without, by mass meetings and the like. And how are they going to set the non-official, non-enfranchised masses in motion so as to influence the privileged circle of electoral districts? By inviting them to renounce the People's Charter (which basically contains nothing but the demand for universal suffrage and the conditions under which alone it can become a reality in England), and to acknowledge the privileges of these electoral districts which, by the admission of the City reformers themselves, are in the process of decay. The City Association must be aware of the example of the "financial and parliamentary reformers". It knows that this movement, headed by Hume, Bright, Cobden, Walmsley and Thompson, failed because it sought to replace the People's Charter by the so-called Little Charter, because it merely wanted to make concessions to the masses, merely to reach a compromise with them. Do they imagine that without concessions they can achieve what the others could not achieve despite their concessions? Or do they deduce from the Anti-Corn Law movement that it is possible to set the English people in motion for partial reforms? But the object of that movement was very general, very popular, very tangible. The symbol of the Anti-Corn Law League was, as is well known, a big thick loaf of bread in contrast to the diminutive loaf of the Protectionists. A loaf of bread, particularly in the famine year 1846, naturally speaks quite a different popular dialect from a "physiology of Downing Street". We need not recall a well-known booklet, The Physiology of the City. There it is demonstrated with the greatest precision that however well the gentlemen may run their own businesses, in the management of common enterprises, for example the various insurance companies, they more or less faithfully follow the official pattern of Downing Street. Their management of the railways, with the glaring frauds, swindles and total neglect of safety

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\(^3\) The reference is to D. M. Evans' pamphlet The City; or, the Physiology of London Business, published anonymously. Marx quotes a passage from it in Volume III of Capital.—Ed.
precautions, is so notorious that the question has been raised more than once in the press, in Parliament and outside Parliament whether the railways should not be placed under direct state control and taken out of the hands of the private capitalists! The physiology of Downing Street, then, will accomplish nothing—as the English say, "This will not do, sir!"

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No. 237, May 24, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

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a Marx uses the English phrase.—Ed.
London, May 23. The menacing discontent in the allied Army and Navy outside Sevastopol caused by the recall of the Kerch expedition has found an echo, if only a weak, faint one, in the London press. People are beginning to fear that the unity and artistic course of the war drama in the Crimea are threatened less by the Russians than by the presumptuous and capricious intervention of a deus ex machina, the military genius of Napoleon III. The exhibition of this genius in the well-known strategic didactical “essay” in the Moniteur is in fact anything but soothing and reassuring. Until now, however, the distance between the theatre of war and the Tuileries has provided a kind of guarantee against actual interference by the military dilettantism of Paris. Now submarine telegraph has eliminated the distances, and with the distances the guarantee, and John Bull, who is wont to call himself “the most thinking people of the world”, is beginning to reflect, to grumble and complain that the British Army and Navy are expected to furnish the corpus vile for the inherited and providentially existing “military genius”, to perform his experiments on.

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a Literally “a god from a machine” (in the ancient Greek and Roman theatre, actors playing gods appeared on the stage with the help of machinery); in a figurative sense, a person or event that appears suddenly and solves a difficult situation.—Ed.
b This refers to the leading article “Paris, le 10 avril. Expédition d'Orient”, published in Le Moniteur universel, No. 101, April 11, 1855. The article contained Napoleon III’s instructions to Marshal Saint-Arnaud. For a critique of it see this volume, pp. 146-50.—Ed.
c Marx uses the English words.—Ed.
d Literally “worthless body”.—Ed.
Today's *Morning Herald* asserts positively that the expedition has been recalled because Bonaparte has revived his dangerous idea of storming Sevastopol from the south side. We do not doubt for a moment that the military genius of the Tuileries is obsessed by this *idée fixe*, but we cannot persuade ourselves that even a simple *sabreur* such as Pélissier is capable of carrying out such a senselessly ruinous plan. Hence we believe that it has been decided to attempt a mass crossing of the Chernaya and that it was deemed inadvisable to split the main force by detaching a corps of 12,000 men. In fact, instead of detaching these 12,000 men, just before the army sets out, 15,000-20,000 Turks ought to be embarked in Eupatoria and incorporated into the main army, only leaving behind a garrison of sufficient size to hold the place. As stated in an earlier letter, the entire success of the campaign depends on the strength of the army that crosses the Chernaya. However that may be, the recall of the Kerch expedition is fresh evidence of the uncertainty and vacillation and the shilly-shallying bungling that are nowadays passed off as "idées napoléoniennes".

Meanwhile the heroes improvised for the purpose of the *coup d'état* wear out with incredible rapidity. The array was headed by Espinasse, who after his ignominious campaign in the Dobrudja was forced by the Zouaves to retreat head over heels to Paris. This *Espinasse* is the same man who, after being entrusted with guarding the building of the National Assembly, handed it over to its enemies. The second in the line of descent was *Leroy*, alias *Saint-Arnaud*, the War Minister of December 2. He was followed by *Forey*, so bold in the persecution of the unfortunate peasants of south-east France, and so considerately humane towards the Muscovites. The army's suspicion that he was revealing the secrets of the French Council of War to the Russians made it necessary to remove him from the Crimea to Africa. Finally *Canrobert* was demoted on account of notorious incompetence. The irony of history has appointed *Pélissier* as his successor, and thus more or less commander-in-chief of the Anglo-French army—the same Pélissier of whom in 1841 it was asserted over and over again in Parliament, in London officers' clubs and at country-meetings, in *The Times* and in *Punch*, that no honourable English officer could

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*a* "Siege of Sebastopol", *The Morning Herald*, No. 22438, May 23, 1855.—Ed.

*b* War-horse.—Ed.

*c* See this volume, p. 137.—Ed.

*d* An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's book *Des idées napoléoniennes* published in Paris in 1839.—Ed.

*e* Marx uses the English words "country-meetings".—Ed.
ever serve alongside “that ferocious monster”\textsuperscript{a}. And now the British Army is not only serving alongside him, but under him—the entire British Army! Just after the Whigs and their Foreign Secretary Palmerston had been defeated by the Tories, Palmerston called a meeting of his constituents in Tiverton and proved his right to break the Anglo-French alliance and unite with Russia by the fact that the French government, that Louis Philippe was employing such a “monster” as Pélissier in his service. It must be admitted that while the French Army is paying dearly for its revolt in December, things are not all “roses” for England either, in its alliance with the restored empire.

The Ministry suffered a defeat in the Commons yesterday, which proves nothing except that Parliament occasionally avenge itself on the Ministers for the scorn it enjoys “out of doors”\textsuperscript{b}. A certain Mr. Wise tabled the motion, that

“it is the opinion of this House that complete revision of our diplomatic establishments recommended in the report of the Select Committee of 1850 on Official Salaries should be carried into effect”.\textsuperscript{c}

Mr. Wise is a friend of Palmerston. His motion has been drifting about on the agenda of the House for about two years without coming up for discussion. Chance yesterday cast it before the discontented Commons. Wise made his speech, thinking that, after a few remarks by Palmerston, he would be able to play the usual game and withdraw his motion. But in contravention of the agreement Mr. Baillie picked up the motion that Wise had dropped and it was carried, despite Wise and Palmerston, by a majority of 112 to 57. This defeat did not in the least worry an old experienced tactician like Palmerston for he knows that in order to preserve an appearance of independence the House must occasionally condemn a ministerial motion to death and promote an anti-ministerial motion to life. Disraeli’s motion, on the other hand, had the effect of an electric shock on the ministerial benches.\textsuperscript{162} Palmerston himself, a master at parliamentary play-acting, congratulated “the writers and actors of this unforgettable scene”. This was not irony. It was the involuntary tribute of an artist to his rival when the latter beats him at his own game. In the Monday sitting\textsuperscript{d} Palmerston had toyed so skilfully with Milner

\textsuperscript{a} Marx uses the English phrase.—Ed.
\textsuperscript{b} Marx uses the English words.—Ed.
\textsuperscript{c} Wise’s motion in the House of Commons and the following debate were reported in \textit{The Times}, No. 22061, May 23, 1855.—Ed.
\textsuperscript{d} May 21, 1855.—Ed.
Gibson and Gladstone and Herbert and Bright and Lord Vane that it seemed certain that all debates on foreign policy would be postponed until after Whitsun, the Ministry and House being obliged to proceed in a particular manner, and that the noble Viscount could be sure of a dictatorship of several weeks' duration. The only day still available for debate, Thursday, a was reserved for Layard's reform motion. So no one could prevent Palmerston from concluding peace over Whitsun and, as he has done more than once, surprising the House when it re-assembled with one of his notorious treaties. The House, for its own part, might not have been unwilling to submit to this fate of surprise. Peace made behind its back, even peace à tout prix, was acceptable with a few post festum gestures of protest for decency's sake. But the moment the House and the Ministry were obliged to declare their views before the adjournment, the latter could no longer spring any surprises, nor the former let itself be taken unawares. Hence the consternation when Disraeli got up and tabled his motion and Layard relinquished his day to Disraeli. This "conspiracy between Layard and Disraeli", as the Post called the affair, thus brought to naught all the skilful manoeuvring since the "end" of the Vienna Conference, which has not yet been concluded. 163

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Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

a May 24, 1855.—Ed.
It is certain that Gen. Canrobert’s resignation of the command of the French army in the Crimea did not take place a moment too soon. The morale of the army was already in a very unsatisfactory and doubtful state. After they had been made to undergo the hardships and dangers of an unparalleled Winter campaign, the soldiers had been kept in something like order and good spirits by the return of Spring and by ever-repeated promises of a speedy and glorious termination of the siege. But day after day passed away without making any progress, while the Russians actually advanced out of their lines and constructed redoubts on the disputed ground between the two parties. This roused the spirit of the French soldiers, the Zouaves mutinied, and the consequence was that on February 23 they were led to the butchery on Mount Sapun. A little more bustling—it can hardly be called activity—was then shown on the part of the allied commanders; but there was evidently no distinct aim, and no definite plan was followed up consistently.

Again, the spirit of mutiny among the French was kept down by the continued sallies of the Russians and by the opening of the second bombardment which was—positively for the last time—to end in the grand spectacle of the assault. But the fire went on, slackened, and slackened still more, and at last ceased without any attempt at an assault. Then came engineering operations, slow, difficult and barren of those results which keep up the spirits of soldiers. Soon they got tired again of nightly trench-fighting, where hundreds fell to no visible purpose. Again the assault was demanded, and again Canrobert had to make promises which he knew he could not fulfill. Then Pélissier saved him from a renewal
of disorderly scenes by the night attack of the 1st of May; it is stated that not only did Péllissier plan this attack, but even execute it in spite of a counter-order from Canrobert arriving the moment the troops were put in motion. This affair is said to have revived the courage of the soldiers.

Meantime the reserve and the Piedmontese arrived. The Chersonese became crowded. The soldiers considered that these reenforcements enabled them to do anything. Why was nothing done? The expedition to Kertch was resolved upon, and sailed. But before it had reached the offing of that town a dispatch from Paris induced Canrobert to recall it. Raglan of course gave in at once. Brown and Lyons, the commanders of the British land and sea forces on this expedition, besought their French colleagues to attack the place in disobedience to the order; in vain—the expedition had to sail back, and it is even stated that Canrobert had in his hurry misread the order, which was merely conditional. Now the exasperation of the troops was no longer to be mastered. Even the English spoke in unmistakable terms; the French were in a state bordering on mutiny. Accordingly there was nothing left for Canrobert but to resign the command of an army over which he had lost all control and influence. The only possible successor was Péllissier. The soldiers were sick of these young generals, advanced to the highest honors in the quick hotbed of Bonapartism. They had all the while been clamoring for a leader of long standing of the old African school—a man who had held a responsible command in the Algerian wars, and held it with credit. Péllissier was almost the only man of the sort at the command of the Emperor; he had been sent there with the evident intention of being, sooner or later, made the successor of Canrobert. Whatever else his qualifications might be, he had the confidence of the troops, and that is a great deal.

But he takes his command under difficult circumstances. He must act, and speedily too, before the men lose the freshness of the enthusiasm which the certainty of immediate action must have inspired them with. The assault being impossible, nothing remains but to take the field, and that can be done only by turning the Russian position in the manner we have previously described. Indeed, we find our views on this subject confirmed by a British officer in the London Morning Herald, who says that it is the general opinion among competent men that there is no other way to take the field with success.

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*a* See this volume, pp. 201-07.—*Ed.*
There is however one very serious difficulty in carrying out this plan. The French with all their army have no more means of transport than will supply 30,000 men for a very short distance from the coast. As to the English, their means of transport would be exhausted if they had to supply one single division no further off than Chorgun on the Chernaya. How then is the field to be taken, in case of success the north side of Sevastopol invested, the enemy pursued to Bakshiserai and a junction effected with Omer Pasha? Of course the Russians will take very good care to leave nothing but ruins behind them, and a supply of carts, horses or camels can only be obtained after the Allies have completely routed their enemy. We shall see how Pélissier will extricate himself from this difficulty.

Written about May 24, 1855
First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4414, June 12, 1855, reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1049, June 15, 1855 as a leading article

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*
London, May 24. No sooner had Disraeli's motion\textsuperscript{166} presented the prospect of a regular battle between the \textit{Ins} and \textit{Outs}\textsuperscript{a} in the House of Commons than Palmerston sounded the alarm and, a few hours before the commencement of the sitting, he asked his ministerial retinue along with Peelites, Manchester School and so-called Independents to come to his official residence in Downing Street.\textsuperscript{b} Two hundred and three M.P.s turned up, including Mr. Layard who felt incapable of resisting the ministerial siren-call. Palmerston played the diplomat, the penitent, the apologist, the appeaser, the wheedler. Smilingly he bore with the censorious rebukes of Messrs Bright, Lowe and Layard. He left it to Lord Robert Grosvenor and Sir James Graham to mediate with the “agitators”. From the moment he saw the malcontents clustering about him in his official residence, mingling with his faithful followers, he knew he had them in his pocket. They were disgruntled but anxious for reconciliation. Thus the result of the sitting in the Commons was anticipated; nothing more remained but the parliamentary performance of the comedy before the public. The crisis was over. We shall be sending a brief account of this comedy as soon as the final act has been played out.

The types of illness peculiar to the spring and summer season in the Crimea have been reactivated by the return of warm, humid weather. Cholera and ague have again made their appearance in

\textsuperscript{a} Marx uses the English words “Ins” and “Outs” (the reference is to the supporters and opponents of the government).—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} 10 Downing Street is the official residence of the British Prime Minister. These details are contained in “The Ministry and Its Supporters” published in \textit{The Times}, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
the allied camp, not as yet in particularly virulent form but sufficiently so to provide a warning for the future. Also in evidence is the miasma given off by the mass of putrefying animal matter that is buried only a few inches below ground throughout the entire extent of the Chersonese. The morale of the besieging army is also in a very unsatisfactory state. After they had undergone the hardships and dangers of an unparalleled Winter campaign, the soldiers had been kept in something like order and good spirits by the return of Spring and by ever-repeated promises of a speedy and glorious termination of the siege. But day after day passed away without making any progress, while the Russians actually advanced out of their lines and constructed redoubts on the disputed ground between the two parties. The Zouaves became unruly and were consequently led to the slaughter on Mount Sapun on February 23. A little more bustling—it can hardly be called activity—was then shown on the part of the allied commanders; but there was evidently no distinct aim, and no definite plan was followed up consistently.

Again, the spirit of mutiny among the French was kept down by the continued sallies of the Russians which kept them occupied and by the opening of the second bombardment which was this time definitely to end in the grand spectacle of the assault. A deplorable fiasco ensued. Then came engineering operations, slow, difficult and barren of those results which keep up the spirits of soldiers. Soon they got tired again of nightly trench-fighting, where hundreds fell to no visible purpose. Again the assault was demanded, and again Canrobert was compelled to make promises which he knew he could not fulfil. Then Pélissier saved him from a renewal of disorderly scenes by the night attack of the 1st of May; it is stated that Pélissier executed it in spite of a counter-order from Canrobert arriving the moment the troops were put in motion. The success of this affair is said to have revived the courage of the soldiers. Meantime the Piedmontese reserve arrived; the Chersonese became crowded. The soldiers considered that these reinforcements enabled them to go into action immediately. Something had to be done. The expedition to Kerch was resolved upon, and sailed. But before it had reached the offing of that town a dispatch from Paris induced Canrobert to recall it. Raglan of course gave in at once. Brown, and Lyons, the commanders of the British land and sea forces on this expedition, besought their French colleagues to attack the place in spite of the countermand; in vain—the expedition had to sail back. Now the exasperation of the troops was no longer to be mastered. Even the
English spoke in unmistakable terms; the French were in a state bordering on mutiny. Accordingly there was nothing left for Canrobert but to resign the command of an army over which he had lost all control and influence.

Pélissier was the only possible successor, since the soldiers, long sick of generals who had shot up in the forcing-house of Bonapartism, had been repeatedly calling for a leader of the old African school. Pélissier enjoys the confidence of the soldiers but he is taking command under difficult circumstances. He must act, and act quickly. Since an assault is impossible, there is no other choice than to move into the field against the Russians, not, however, in the manner we have previously described when the entire army would have to march along one single road that had, moreover, been heavily barricaded by the Russians, but by distributing the army over the numerous small upland paths and tracks mostly used only by shepherds and their flocks, which would make it possible to outflank the Russian position. One difficulty arises here. The French have only sufficient means of transport to supply about 30,000 men for a very short distance from the coast. The means of transport of the English would be exhausted if they had to convey a single division no further than Chorgun on the Chernaya. Given this lack of transport it is difficult to see how then is the field to be taken, in case of success the north side of Sevastopol invested, the enemy pursued to Bakshiserai and a junction effected with Omer Pasha? Especially since the Russians in accordance with their custom will take good care to leave nothing but ruins behind them, so that a supply of carts, horses, camels, etc., can only be obtained after the Allies have completely routed their enemy. We shall see how Pélissier will extricate himself from this difficulty.

We have previously drawn attention to a number of peculiar circumstances connected with Pélissier's appointment. However there is a further aspect to be considered here. When the war began, that Bonapartist general par excellence, S[ain]t-Arnaud, was entrusted with the supreme command. He did his emperor the service of promptly dying. Not one of the Bonapartists of the first rank was appointed in his place, neither Magnan, nor Castellane, nor Roguet, nor Baraguay d'Hilliers. Recourse was had to Canrobert, a man tarred neither so heavily nor so long with the Bonapartist brush, but having greater African experience. Now, with another change of command, the Bonapartists du lendemain\(^{b}\)

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a See this volume, pp. 212-13.—Ed.
b Of tomorrow.—Ed.
have been passed over in the same way as those de la veille, and the post awarded to a simple African general of no pronounced political complexion, but with many years of service and a name in the army. Must not this descending line inevitably lead to Changarnier, Lamoricière or Cavaignac, i.e. away from Bonapartism?

"Unfitness for peace no less than for war—such is our situation!" observed a day or two ago a French statesman for whom everything is at stake with the imperial régime. Every action of the restored empire, right up to the appointment of Pélissier, proves that he was right.

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a Of the day before.—Ed.
London, May 26. Further details have become known regarding the Comité du Salut Ministériel called by Lord Palmerston the day before yesterday before the opening of the House of Commons, characteristic of the parliamentary mechanism and the position of the various factions which have provided the Ministry with a majority of 100 votes. Right at the outset Palmerston threatened resignation if Disraeli's motion were carried. He threatened the prospect of a Tory Ministry. The so-called radical parliamentarians, poor fellows, have enjoyed the privilege of having this great and ultimate threat suspended over them since 1830, whenever they break out in mutiny. It never fails to recall them to a sense of discipline. And why? Because they fear the mass movement that is inevitable under a Tory Ministry. How literally correct this view is may be gathered from the confession of a radical who is himself a minister at the moment, if only Minister responsible for the Crown Forests, Sir William Molesworth. This job is well suited for a man who has all along possessed the talent of not being able to see the wood for the trees. M.P. for Southwark, a part of London, he received an invitation from his constituents to attend a public meeting for Southwark held last Wednesday. (N.B. At this meeting, as at the majority of those hitherto held in the provinces, a resolution was passed that administrative

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a Committee of Ministerial Safety. (See this volume, p. 218).—Ed.
b In his speech in the House of Commons on May 25, 1855, a report on which was published in The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—Ed.
c Marx uses the English words "poor fellows".—Ed.
d May 23, 1855.—Ed.
reform without prior parliamentary reform is *sham* and *humbug*. Molesworth did not appear but sent a letter and in this letter the radical and Cabinet minister declared: "If Mr. Disraeli’s motion is carried the need for administrative reform will become more evident." Which "evidently" means: If the Tories take over the government the reform movement will become serious. The threat of resignation, though, was not the biggest gun that Palmerston fired off. He alluded to the *dissolution of Parliament* and to the fate of the many unfortunates who scarcely three years ago had bought their way into the "honourable House" at tremendous sacrifice. This argument was irresistible. It was no longer just a question of *his* resignation. It was a question of *their* resignation.

Although Palmerston thus secured a majority of 100 votes against Disraeli’s motion, by threatening some with *his* resignation, and others with *their* ejection from the House of Commons, presenting some with the prospect of peace and others with the prospect of war—the newly founded coalition immediately collapsed again, this happening during the public performance of the agreed farce. The statements which the ministers were induced to make during the debate neutralised the statements they had made *en petit comité*. The mortar which loosely held together the reluctant groupings crumbled away, not in a hurricane but in the parliamentary wind. For in yesterday’s sitting Roebuck put a question to the Prime Minister about the rumoured re-opening of the Vienna Conferences. He demanded to know whether the British ambassador in Vienna was instructed to take part in these conferences. Ever since the return of Russell, that hapless diplomat, from Vienna, Palmerston, as is common knowledge, had rejected all debates on war or diplomacy on the pretext of not jeopardising the "admittedly interrupted but by no means concluded Vienna Conferences". Milner Gibson had withdrawn or postponed his motion last Monday because according to a statement by the noble Lord "the conferences were still pending". On that occasion Palmerston had expressly emphasised that the British government was leaving it to Austria, "our ally within certain limits", to devise new starting-points for peace negotiations. The continued existence of the Vienna Conference was, he said, beyond all doubt. Though Russell had left Vienna, Westmorland was continuing to reside in Vienna, where, moreover,  

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*a* Marx uses the English words "sham" and "humbug".—*Ed.*  
*b* In a small circle.—*Ed.*  
*c* J. F. Westmorland.—*Ed.*  
*d* May 21, 1855.—*Ed.*
the plenipotentiaries of all the great powers were engaged in consultations; in other words, all the elements of a permanent conference were present.\(^a\)

Since Monday, the day Palmerston favoured Parliament with these revelations, a major change had occurred in the situation. Disraeli's motion and a day spent debating it\(^b\) separated the Palmerston of Monday from the Palmerston of Friday, and Disraeli had motivated his motion with the misgiving that the government might "drift into a shameful peace" during the recess, just as it had "drifted" into a shameful war under Aberdeen's auspices. Thus the outcome of the vote hung on Palmerston's answer to Roebuck's question. This time he could not call up the ghost of the Vienna Conference and inform the House that in Vienna they were deciding, while in the Halls of St. Stephen's\(^c\) they were debating; that here they were proposing but there they were disposing. This was all the more impossible as only the previous evening Russell had disowned Austria and the peace projects and the Vienna Conference. Accordingly he replied to Roebuck: the Vienna Conference had not been resumed, and the British envoy had no permission to attend a new conference without special instructions from Downing Street. Then Milner Gibson got up in a state of moral indignation. A few days ago, he said, the noble Lord had declared that the Conference was merely suspended, and that Westmorland possessed absolute authority to negotiate at it. Had he been deprived of this authority, if so, when?—Authority! replied Palmerston, his authority is as complete as ever, but he has not the power to use it. To possess authority and to be permitted to use it are two different things. This answer to Roebuck's question broke the ties between the Ministry and the peace-at-any-price party augmented by the Peelites. But this was neither the only nor the most important "misunderstanding". The day before yesterday Russell was stretched on the rack by Disraeli and tortured and pricked with red-hot pins for hours. With one hand Disraeli displayed the rhetorical lionskin in which the Whig Aztec likes to parade; with the other, the diminutive gutta-percha manikin hiding beneath the

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\(^a\) Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on May 21, 1855. The Times, No. 22060, May 22, 1855.—Ed.

\(^b\) May 24, 1855. Below Marx quotes a passage from Disraeli's speech and mentions the speeches of Gladstone and Russell at that sitting. The Times, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—Ed.

\(^c\) The House of Commons met in St. Stephen's Chapel, Westminster Palace, since 1547.—Ed.
skin. Although Russell is armed against harsh words by his long parliamentary experience and adventures like the invulnerable Siegfried against wounds, he was unable to remain composed in the face of this ruthless, naked exposure of his true self. He pulled faces while Disraeli spoke. He twisted and turned in his seat uneasily and incessantly while Gladstone followed with his sermon. When Gladstone made a rhetorical pause Russell got up and was only reminded by the laughter of the House that his turn had not yet come. At last Gladstone fell silent for good. At last Russell could unburden his oppressed heart. He now told the House everything that he had wisely concealed from Prince Gorchakov and Herr von Titov. Russia, whose "honour and dignity" he supported at the Vienna Conference, now seemed to him to be a power unscrupulously striving for mastery of the world, making treaties as pretexts for wars of conquest, making wars so as to spread poison with treaties. Not only England but all Europe seemed to him to be threatened, nothing short of a war of annihilation would do. He alluded to Poland too. In short, the Vienna diplomat was suddenly transformed into a "street demagogue" (one of his favourite expressions). In a cunningly calculating way Disraeli had launched him into this odic style.

But immediately after the division Sir James Graham, the Peelite, rose to speak. Was he to believe his ears? Russell had declared a "new war" on Russia, a crusade, a war to the death, a war of the nationalities. The matter was too serious for the debate to be concluded now. The House was even more in the dark about the intentions of the ministers than before. Russell thought that after the vote he could cast off the lionskin in his usual way. He therefore did not beat about the bush. Graham had "misunderstood" him. He only sought "security for Turkey”. There you are! cried Disraeli, you who have acquitted the Ministry of the charge of "ambiguous language" by rejecting my motion, you now hear how honest he is! This Russell retracts after the vote the whole of the speech that he made before the vote! I congratulate you on your voting!

The House could not resist this demonstratio ad oculos; the debate was adjourned until after the Whitsun recess; the victory won by the Ministry had been lost again in a moment. The comedy was only supposed to consist of two acts, and to end with the division. Now it has had an epilogue added to it that threatens

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a Graham's speech in the House of Commons on May 25, 1855.—Ed.
b Visual proof.—Ed.
to be more serious than the grand historical drama. In the meanwhile the parliamentary recess will enable us to analyse the first two acts more closely. It remains unprecedented in the annals of Parliament that the debate should only start in earnest after the vote. Hitherto, parliamentary battles have usually ended with the vote just as romantic novels end with the wedding.

Written on May 26, 1855
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Marked with the sign ×

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Published in English for the first time
London, May 28. The Commons were offered a “rich menu”, as the elegant Gladstone put it, in the choice between Disraeli’s motion and Baring’s amendment to Disraeli’s motion, between Sir William Heathcote’s sub-amendment to Baring’s amendment and Mr. Lowe’s counter-sub-amendment against Disraeli, Baring and Sir William Heathcote. Disraeli’s motion contains a censure of the ministers and an address on the war to the Crown, the former definite and the latter flexible, both connected by a link accessible to the parliamentary thought process. The feeble form in which the war address was wrapped was soon explained. Disraeli had to apprehend mutiny in his own camp. One Tory, the Marquis of Granby, spoke against it, another, Lord Stanley, spoke for it, but both in a spirit of peace. Baring’s amendment was a ministerial one. It suppresses the vote of censure against the Cabinet, and adopts the bellicose part of the motion with Disraeli’s own terminology, only prefacing it with the words that the House “has seen with regret that the Conferences of Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities”. He is blowing hot and cold in the same breath. The “regret” for the peace lobby, the “continuation of the war” for the war lobby, no definite obligation on the part of the Cabinet to either lobby—a shell-trap for votes, black and white, a part for the flute and a part for the trumpet. Heathcote’s sub-amendment rounds off Baring’s two-tongued amendment in a thoroughly idyllic turn of phrase by adding the words: “that the

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a Disraeli’s motion and the amendments to it, and his speech in the House of Commons on May 24, 1855, were reported in The Times, No. 22063, May 25, 1855; the amendments and the speech by Lowe in the Commons on May 25, 1855 were published in The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—Ed.

b Marx uses the English expression.—Ed.
House is still cherishing the hope” (“cherishing”\(^a\) is a thoroughly
cosy expression) “that the communications in progress may arrive
at a successful issue”. Lowe’s amendment, on the other hand,
declares the peace negotiations closed with the rejection of the
Third Point\(^{160}\) by Russia and thus motivates the war address to the
Crown. It can be seen that the eclectic amendment of the Ministry
has both sides, which it sought to hush up and neutralise,
independently and peacefully confronting each other. Continu-
ation of the Vienna Conferences! cries Heathcote. No Vienna
Conference! retorts Lowe. Vienna Conference and warfare!
whispers Baring. We shall hear the themes of this terzetto
performed in a week’s time, and for the moment return to the
debate on Disraeli’s motion, on whose first night\(^b\) only three
principal political personages appeared, Disraeli, Gladstone
and Russell, the first pungent and drastic, the second smooth and
casistic, the third banal and blustering.

We do not agree with the objection that in his personal attack
on Russell, Disraeli lost sight of the “actual issue”. The secrets of
the Anglo-Russian war are not to be found on the battlefield but
in Downing Street.\(^c\) Russell, Foreign Secretary at the time of the
Petersburg Cabinet’s secret communications, Russell, envoy ex-
traordinary at the time of the last Vienna Conference, Russell, at
the same time Leader\(^a\) of the House of Commons; he is Downing
Street personified, he is its secret revealed. Not because he is the
soul of the Ministry but because he is its mouth-piece.

Towards the end of 1854, relates Disraeli, Russell gave a blast
on the trumpet of war, and among loud cheers\(^a\) told a full House:

> “England could not lay down arms until material guarantees are obtained, which,
reducing Russia’s power to proportions innocuous for Europe, will afford perfect
security for the future.”

This man was a member of a Cabinet that approved the Vienna
Protocol of December 5, 1853, in which the English and French
plenipotentiaries stipulated that the war should not lead to a
reduction or alteration of the “material conditions” of the Russian
Empire.\(^{170}\) Clarendon, questioned by Lyndhurst about this pro-
tocol, declared on behalf of the Ministry:

> “It might be the will of Austria and of Prussia, but it was not the will of
England and France that a reduction of Russian power in Europe should be brought
about.”

\(^{a}\) Marx uses the English word.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^{b}\) May 24, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^{c}\) The Prime Minister’s official residence.—\textit{Ed.}
To the House Russell denounced the conduct of Emperor Nicholas as "false and fraudulent". In July 1854 he flippantly announced the invasion of the Crimea, declaring that the destruction of Sevastopol was a matter of European necessity. He finally brought about the fall of Aberdeen for, in his opinion, conducting the war too feebly. So much for the lionskin, now for the lion. Russell was Foreign Secretary for two or three months in 1853, at the time when England received the "secret and confidential correspondence" from Petersburg in which Nicholas openly demanded the partition of Turkey, to be attained chiefly through his pretended protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey, a protection which, as Nesselrode admits in his last despatch, has never existed. What did Russell do? He addressed a despatch to the British ambassador in Petersburg,\(^a\), which literally says:

"The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional 'protection' which he has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though, no doubt, prescribed by duty and sanctified by treaty."

Thus Russell concedes the point at issue from the start. He not only declares the protection legal but obligatory. He traces it back to the Treaty of Kainardji.\(^b\) And what does the "Fourth Point" of the Vienna Conference\(^b\) state? That "the erroneous interpretation of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji was the principal cause of the present war". If we see Russell at the outbreak of war as the advocate of Russian rights—now renounced even by Nesselrode—at the end of the first stage of the war, at the Vienna Conference, we observe him as the champion of Russia's honour. As soon as the real business, the discussion of the Third Point,\(^172\) began on March 26, the Russian-eater Russell rose and solemnly declared:

"In the eyes of England and of her allies, the best and only admissible conditions of peace would be those which, being the most in harmony with the honour and dignity of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for the security of Europe, etc."

On April 17 the Russian envoys therefore refused to take the initiative in making proposals for the Third Point, being convinced after Russell's statement that the conditions offered by the allied envoys would be conceived more in the Russian spirit than any that Russia herself could devise. But was the limitation of Russian naval forces "most in harmony with Russia's honour"? In his latest

\(^{a}\) G. H. Seymour.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{b}\) In this paragraph the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has "Vienna Congress" instead of "Vienna Conference".—\textit{Ed.}
circular Nesselrode therefore adhered firmly to Russell's concessions of March 26. He quotes Russell. He asks him whether the proposals of April 19 are “the best and only admissible ones”. Russell appears as the patron of Russia on the threshold of war. He appears as her patron at the end of the first stage of the war, at the green table in Count Buol's palace.

Thus far Disraeli against Russell. He then traced both the disasters at the front and the discord in the country itself back to the contradictory actions of the Ministry, which is working for war in the Crimea and peace in Vienna, combining warlike diplomacy with diplomatic warfare.

Disraeli exclaimed:

“I deny that all you have to do to make war is to levy taxes and to fit out expeditions. [...] You must keep up the spirit of the people. You cannot do this if you are perpetually impressing on the country that peace is impending and [...] that the point of difference between ourselves and our opponents is, [...] after all, [...] comparatively speaking, of a very petty character. Men will endure great sacrifices if they think they are encountering an enemy of colossal power [...]. A nation will not count the sacrifices which it makes if it supposes that it is engaged in a struggle for its fame, its existence, and its power; but when you come to a doubled and tripled income tax, when you come to draw men away from their homes for military service, when you darken the hearts of England with ensanguined calamities—when you do all this, men must not be told that this is merely a question of whether [...] Russia shall have four frigates or eight in the Black Sea.... If you would carry on war, it is necessary not merely to keep up the spirit of the nation, but also to keep up the spirit of foreign Powers; but you may rest assured that so long as you appeal to a foreign Power as a mediator that foreign Power will never be your ally.... Lord Palmerston told us that he was not going to make an ignominious peace [...]. The noble lord is witness for himself, but who will be witness for the noble lord?...

“...You cannot, however, extricate yourselves from these difficulties by conferences at Vienna. You will only increase your difficulties and augment your dangers if you trust to diplomacy. Your position is one that is entirely deceptive; and you never can carry on war with success unless [...] you are supported by an enthusiastic people, and unless [...] you can count upon allies [...] who know that you are determined to support them.

“...I want this House by its decision tonight to put an end to that vicious double system by which we have so long carried on [...] war and diplomacy. I want it to say openly and in distinct language that the time for negotiations has passed. No man, I think, will be inclined to deny that proposition who has read Nesselrode's circular.”

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a In Disraeli's speech: “hearths”.—Ed.
London, May 29. Gladstone’s kind of eloquence has never been given more complete and exhaustive expression than in his “speech” on Thursday evening. Polished blandness, emptiness not without poisonous ingredients, the velvet paw not without the claws, scholastic distinctions both grandiose and petty, *quaestiones* and *quaestiuniculae*, the entire arsenal of probabilism with its casuistic scruples and unscrupulous reservations, its unhesitating motives and motivated hesitation, its humble pretensions of superiority, virtuous intrigue, intricate simplicity, Byzantium and Liverpool. Gladstone’s speech revolved not so much around the question of war or peace between England and Russia as the examination of why Gladstone, who until a short while ago had been a member of a Ministry engaged in war, had now become the Gladstone of the peace-at-any-price party. He analysed, he scrutinised the limits of his own conscience in all directions with all manner of subtleties, and with characteristic modesty demanded that the British Empire move within the limits of the Gladstonian conscience. His speech thus had a diplomatic-cum-psychological colouring which may have brought conscience into diplomacy, but even more definitely brought diplomacy into conscience.

The war against Russia was originally a just one, but we have now reached the point where its continuation would be sinful.

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*a* Marx uses the English word.— *Ed.*

*b* The speeches of Gladstone and Russell in the debate on Disraeli’s motion in the House of Commons on May 24, 1855 were published in *The Times*, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.— *Ed.*

*c* Minor questions.— *Ed.*
Since the start of the Eastern troubles we have gradually raised our demands. We have followed an ascending line with our conditions, while Russia has been moving down from the heights of her intransigence. At first Russia claimed not only a spiritual, but also a temporal protection over the Greek Christians of Turkey. She was unwilling to give up any of the old treaties, and would agree to evacuate the Danubian provinces only under certain conditions. She refused to attend any congress of the powers at Vienna, and summoned the Turkish ambassador to St. Petersburg or to the Russian headquarters. That was Russia's language up to February 2, 1854. What a distance between the demands of the Western powers at that time, and the Four Points! And as late as August 26, 1854, Russia declared that she would never accept the Four Points except after a long, desperate and calamitous struggle. Again, what a distance between Russia's language in August 1854 and her language of December 1854, when she promised to accept the Four Points "unreservedly"! These Four Points are the nodal point to which our demands can rise, and Russia's concessions descend. Whatever lies beyond the Four Points lies outside the pale of Christian morality. Well! Russia has accepted the 1st point; she has accepted the 2nd point, and has not rejected the 4th point, for it has not been discussed. That only leaves the 3rd point, i.e. only a quarter, and not even the whole of the 3rd point but only a half of it, thus a difference of only one-eighth. For the 3rd point consists of two parts: No. 1, the guarantee of Turkish territory; No. 2, the reduction of Russian power in the Black Sea. Russia has stated that she is more or less willing to accept No. 1. So that only leaves the second half of the 3rd point. And even here Russia has not said that she objects to the limitation of her superiority at sea; she has merely declared her opposition to our methods of carrying it out. The Western powers have suggested one method, while Russia suggests not merely one but two alternative methods, thus here again she is ahead of the Western powers. As regards the method proposed by the Western powers, it is an affront to the honour of the Russian Empire. But one must not affront the honour of an empire without reducing its power. On the other hand, one must not reduce its power because one is thereby affronting its honour. These are different views on "method", a difference of one-eighth of a point, and as it is a matter of "method" it can be regarded as 1/32 of a point—and for that another half a million men is to be sacrificed? On the contrary, it must be stated that we have attained the aims of the war. Should we therefore continue it for pure
prestige, for military glory? Our soldiers have covered themselves with glory. If England has nevertheless fallen into discredit on the Continent,

“For God’s sake,” cried the honourable gentleman, “don’t let us seek to avenge that discredit—don’t let us wipe it out by human blood, but rather by sending abroad more correct information”.

And, indeed, why not “correct” the foreign newspapers? Further successes on the part of the allied forces—where do they lead to? They force Russia to resist more stubbornly. Allied defeats? They make the Londoners and Parisians excited and force them to make bolder attacks. What is the result of waging war for war’s sake? Originally Prussia, Austria, France and England were united in their demands on Russia. Prussia has already withdrawn. If we go on, Austria, too, will withdraw. England would be isolated except for France.

If England continues the war for reasons shared by no other power but France, “the moral authority of its position is greatly weakened and undermined”. But on the other hand a peace with Russia, if it forfeits the prestige that is of this world, will strengthen its “moral authority”, which neither moth nor rust doth corrupt. Moreover, what do the people want who do not accept Russia’s method of carrying out the second half of the 3rd point? Do they intend to dismember the Russian Empire? Impossible without provoking a “war of the nationalities”. Will Austria, can France support a war of the nationalities? If England undertakes a “war of nationalities” it must undertake it alone, i.e. “it will not undertake it at all”. So nothing is possible except to demand nothing that Russia has not already conceded.

That was Gladstone’s speech in spirit, if not in letter. Russia has changed her language: proof that she has backed down in substance. For the honourable Puseyite the language is the only issue. He too has changed his language. He is now uttering jeremiads over the war; he is overwhelmed by the suffering of all mankind. He uttered apologies when he inveighed against the Committee of Inquiry and found it quite in order to abandon an English army to all the sufferings of death from starvation and the plague. Of course! Then the army was being sacrificed for peace. The sin begins when it is sacrificed for war. He is, however, fortunate in demonstrating that the British government was never in earnest in the war against Russia, fortunate in demonstrating that neither the present British government nor the present

\[ a \text{ Matthew 6:20.— Ed.} \]
French government would be able or willing to wage serious war on Russia, fortunate in demonstrating that the *pretexts* for the war are not worth a single bullet. But he forgets that these “pretexts” belong to him and his former colleagues, the “war” itself however was forced on them by the British people. The leadership of the war was for them simply a pretext for paralysing it and maintaining their positions. And from the history and metamorphoses of the false pretexts under which they waged war he successfully concludes that they could make peace under equally false pretexts. He finds himself at variance with his old colleagues only on one point. He is Out, they are In. A false pretext good enough for the ex-minister is not a false pretext good enough for the minister, although what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Gladstone’s terrible confusion of ideas gave *Russell* the long-awaited signal. He got up and painted Russia black where Gladstone had painted her white. But Gladstone was “Out” and Russell was “In”. After blustering forth all the familiar, and despite their triviality, true platitudes about Russia’s plans for world conquest, he came to the point, to Russell’s point. Never, he declared, had such a great national issue been so totally degraded as this had been by Disraeli. True enough: can one degrade a national issue, indeed a matter of world history, further than by identifying it with little\(^b\) Johnny, with Johnny Russell? But it was in fact not Disraeli’s fault that *Europe versus Russia* at the beginning and end of this first stage of the war appeared as *Russell versus Nesselrode*. The little man performed some odd contortions when he came to the Four Points. On the one hand, he had to show that his peace terms were related to the Russian horrors he had just exposed. On the other hand, he had to show that true to his voluntary, unprovoked promise to Titov and Gorchakov, he had proposed terms “which harmonised best with the honour of Russia”. Hence he proved, on the one hand, that Russia exists only *nominally* as a naval power, and so can well afford a limitation of this merely imaginary power. On the other hand, he proved that the navy, scuttled by Russia herself, is a terrible thing for Turkey and hence for European equilibrium, i.e. “the second half of the 3rd point” formed one great whole. Many a man is caught by his opponent between the two horns of a dilemma. Russell impaled himself on

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\(^a\) Marx uses the English words “Out” and “In” (the reference is to the opposition and the government).— *Ed.*

\(^b\) Marx uses the English word.— *Ed.*
both horns. He gave new samples of his diplomatic talent. Nothing could be expected of Austria's active alliance because a battle lost would bring the Russians to Vienna. This is the way he encourages an ally.

"We say," he continued, "that Russia intends to get possession of Constantinople, and to rule there, as Turkey is obviously in a state of decay; and I do not doubt that Russia harbours the same opinion of the intentions of England and France in the case of the break-up of that country."

All that was lacking was for him to add: "She is wrong, however. Not England and France, but England alone must take possession of Constantinople." In this way the great diplomat encouraged Austria to take sides; thus he betrayed to Turkey the "obvious" opinion of her saviours and supporters. He has, however, improved as a parliamentary tactician on one count. In July 1854, when he was bragging about the seizure of the Crimea, he let himself be so startled by Disraeli that he ate his heroic words before the House divided. This time he postponed this process of self-consumption—the retraction of his proclaimed world struggle against Russia—until after the vote had been taken. A great improvement!

His speech also contained two historical illustrations, his extremely comical account of the negotiations with Emperor Nicholas over the Treaty of Kainardji, and a sketch of German conditions. Both deserve a mention in extract. As the reader will remember, Russell had conceded Russia's protection at the outset, based on the Treaty of Kainardji. The British ambassador in Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, turned out to be more awkward and more sceptical. He made inquiries of the Russian government, the story of which Russell is naive enough to recount as follows:

"Sir Hamilton Seymour asked the late Emperor of Russia to have the goodness to point out the part of the Treaty [...] upon which the right he claimed was founded. His Imperial Majesty said [...] 'I would not point out to you the particular article in the treaty on which my claim ' (to protection) 'is based. You may go to Count Nesselrode and he will show you the article.' Hamilton Seymour did go to Count Nesselrode [...]. Count Nesselrode replied he was not very conversant with the articles of the treaty and told Hamilton to go to Baron Brunnow or refer his government to him and the Baron would tell him what part of the treaty it is which gives the Emperor the right he claims.' I believe Baron Brunnow never attempted to point out any such article in the treaty."

About Germany the noble Lord related:

"In Germany she [Russia] is connected with many of the smaller Princes by marriage. Many of the Princes of Germany, I am sorry to say, live in great fear of
what they think the revolutionary disposition of their subjects, and rely on their armed forces for protection. But what are those armed forces? The officers of those forces are seduced and corrupted by the Russian Court. That Court distributes rewards, orders and distinctions among them, and in some cases Russia regularly supplies them with money to pay their debts so that Germany which ought to be in a state of independence—Germany which should stand forward for the protection of Europe against Russian domination—has for years been corrupted, and has been undermined in its vital strength and independence, by Russian arts and Russian means."

And in order to precede Germany like a column of fire and rouse it to the "categorical imperative", duty, Russell declared himself at the Vienna Conference the champion of the "honour and dignity of Russia" and let Germany hear the proud language of the free and independent Englishman.

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Karl Marx

A CRITIQUE
OF PALMERSTON'S LATEST SPEECH

London, June 1. If Gladstone deceives by his air of profundity, Palmerston deceives by his air of superficiality. He knows how to conceal his real intention with true artistry beneath loosely connected phrases meant for effect and commonplace concessions to the opinion of the day. His Cabinet speech has now lain before the public for a week. The daily and weekly press has ventilated, scrutinised and criticised it. His enemies say that after keeping to the language of old Aberdeen for many months he has now found it appropriate to speak the language of old Palmerston again for an evening. They say: the noble lord is witness for himself, but who will be witness for the noble lord? They regard his speech as a clever feat since he manages to avoid giving any definite account of his policies, and adopts such an elastic, airy form that it is impossible to pin him down anywhere. His friends, on the other hand, do not hesitate to hail the wind he expended on his rhetorical organ-playing as the music itself. From the beginning he correctly grasped the situation in which he had to present himself to the House and to the country. Who confronts me?

"...There are those who think, on the one hand, that we have not been sufficiently vigorous in the prosecution of the war while there are those who wish, on the other hand, to drive the country to a peace upon ignominious terms; on the one hand, there are those who reproach us for having opened negotiations with Austria that are pointless and only paralyse the war, but, on the other, those

a A report on Palmerston's, Disraeli's, and Layard's speeches in the House of Commons on May 25, 1855 was published in The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.— Ed.

b A quotation from Disraeli's speech in the House of Commons on May 24, 1855 (see this volume, p. 230).— Ed.
who think that we have not gone far enough in these negotiations and have wrecked them by making extravagant demands.”

Thus he took up the stance of a man of the true centre. He repulsed the attacks of the war men by referring them to the peace men and the attacks of the peace men by referring them back to the war men. The about-turn against the committed peace men then gave him the opportunity to indulge in well-calculated outbursts of patriotic fervour, loud protestation of energy and all the brave words which he has so often used to bamboozle the ninnies. He flattered national pride by listing the great resources that England has at its disposal—his sole reply to the accusation that he is incapable of handling large resources.

“The noble lord,” said Disraeli, “reminds me [...] of that parvenu who used to recommend himself to his mistress's good graces by enumerating his possessions. 'I have a house in the country, a house in town, a gallery of pictures, a fine cellar of wines.'”

Thus England has a Baltic fleet and a fleet in the Black Sea, and an annual national income of £80 million, etc. However, among all the rhetorical trivialities in which Palmerston's speech petered out, he succeeded in throwing in one definite statement, to which he can return later at a suitable opportunity and which he can proclaim as the principle of his policy, sanctioned by the House. No English newspaper has emphasised it, but the art of Palmerstonian oratory has always consisted of concealing its own point and sweeping it away from the memory of his listeners in the smooth, shallow flow of his phraseology. But as it is not simply a question of momentary success for Palmerston, as it is for Russell, because he plans ahead, he does not merely content himself with the oratorical expedients of the moment but carefully lays the foundation for his subsequent operations. The statement mentioned above says literally:

“...We are engaged in a great operation in the Black Sea. We trust and hope that we shall be successful in that operation. We think success in that operation will lead to the obtaining those conditions which [...] we have thought, in the present state of the conflict, Britain, France and Austria have a right to demand.”

In other words, however protracted the operations in the Black Sea may be, the diplomatic basis of the war remains the same. However great the military success may be, final success is determined in advance, and limited to what are called the Four Points. And Palmerston makes this declaration when only a few hours earlier Layard had stripped the Four Points of their Russophile mask. But Palmerston diverted attention from Layard's
criticism, he avoided dealing with the real question, the value of the ostensible aims and objectives of the war, by defending the second half of the 3rd point against Gladstone and advancing this half of the point as the entire thing.

Palmerston's speech was interrupted by an incident that is worthy of mention. An English bigot by the name of Lord Robert Grosvenor preached a penitential sermon at him because he had discussed military successes and the chances of war without taking into account the grace and favour of the Almighty, without even "mentioning the name of God". So he called down divine judgment on his nation. Palmerston immediately did penance, beating his breast and proving that if necessary he, too, can preach and roll his eyes just as well as Lord Robert Grosvenor. But the parliamentary episode received a popular sequel. The citizens of Marylebone (a part of London) had called a large meeting in the School Room, Cowper Street, to protest against the "Bill for the Suppression of Trade on Sundays". As their constituents were involved here, Lord Ebrington and Lord Robert Grosvenor appeared to defend the Bill, which they themselves had tabled in Parliament. Instead of relying on the protection and grace of God, however, they had taken pains to place a dozen paid clappers and trouble-makers at various spots in the meeting. The secret was soon discovered, and the hired agents of bigotry were immediately seized by the good citizens and thrown out into the street. Incapable of facing the hissing, booing and whistling that now broke out, the "noble lords" resumed their seats in a state of embarrassment. As soon as they left the meeting, an "unpaid" mob followed their carriage with unmistakable manifestations of sinful scorn and hardness of heart.

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a See this volume, pp. 232-33.—Ed.
THE ASSOCIATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.
[—PEOPLE'S CHARTER] 

London, June 5. The Association for Administrative Reform has gained a victory in Bath. Its candidate, Mr. Tite, has been elected a Member of Parliament by a large majority against the Tory candidate. This victory, gained on the territory of its "legal" country, is being celebrated as a great event by today's Liberal papers. Bulletins about the poll are being published with no less ostentation than those about the bloodless successes on the Sea of Azov. Bath and Kerch! is the motto of the day. But the press—pro-reform and anti-reform, Ministerial, Opposition, Tory, Whig and Radical papers alike—says nothing about the defeats and disappointments which the Association for Administrative Reform has suffered in the last few days in London, Birmingham and Worcester. To be sure, this time the battle was not fought on the well defined territory of a privileged electoral body. Nor were its results such as to draw cries of triumph from the opponents of the City reformers.

The first truly public meeting (i.e., one without admission tickets) which the Reform Association held in London took place in Marylebone last Wednesday. One of the Chartists countered the resolutions of the City reformers by moving the amendment

"that the money aristocracy represented by the City men is as bad as the landed aristocracy; that, under the pretext of reform, it merely wants to climb, on the shoulders of the people, into Downing Street, and there to share offices, salaries

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a Q. C. Whateley.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
c May 30, 1855. A report on the meeting was published in The People's Paper, No. 161, June 2, 1855.—Ed.
d M'Dickey.—Ed.
and ranks with the oligarchs; that the Charter with its five points is the only programme of the people's movement”.

The chairman of the meeting, one of the City illuminati, voiced a number of misgivings, first, whether he should put the amendment to the vote at all, then, whether he should first take a vote on the resolution or on the amendment, and lastly, how he should take the vote. The audience, being tired of his indecision, tactical considerations and troublesome manoeuvres, declared him incapable of presiding further, called on Ernest Jones to replace him in the chair, and voted by a vast majority against the resolution and for the amendment. In Birmingham, the City Association called a public meeting in the Town Hall with the Mayor in the chair. The resolution proposed by the Association was countered by an amendment similar to that moved in London. The Mayor, however, flatly refused to put the amendment to the vote unless the word “Charter” was replaced by a less objectionable one. If not, he would withdraw from the chair, he said. The word “Charter” was therefore replaced by “universal suffrage and voting by ballot”. Thus edited, the amendment was passed by a majority of 10 votes. In Worcester, where the City reformers held a public meeting, the victory of the Chartists and the defeat of the Administrative Reformers were even more complete. There the Charter was proclaimed without more ado.

The extremely embarrassing success of these large meetings in London, Birmingham and Worcester decided the Administrative Reformers to circulate in all the bigger and more populous towns petitions to be signed by people holding similar views, rather than to make public appeals to the vox populi. The City notables' manifold links with businessmen in the United Kingdom, and the influence these gentlemen exert upon their clerks, warehousemen and “minor” commercial friends will no doubt enable them to fill the petitions with names very quietly, behind the back of the public, and then to send them to the “Honourable House” with the label, Voice of the People of England. But they are mistaken if they think they can intimidate the Government with signatures collected by cadging, intrigue and stealth. The Government observed with ironical self-satisfaction that the Administrative

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\textsuperscript{a} H. Farrer.\textemdash Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} The meeting was held on May 21, 1855. A report on it was published in The People's Paper, No. 160, May 26, 1855.\textemdash Ed.

\textsuperscript{c} The meeting was held at the end of May. A report on it appeared in The People's Paper, No. 161, June 2, 1855.\textemdash Ed.

\textsuperscript{d} Marx uses the English word.\textemdash Ed.
Reformers were hissed out of the *theatrum mundi*. Its organs are silent for the time being, partly because they would otherwise have to register the successes of Chartism, and partly because the ruling class is already toying with the idea of putting itself at the head of the Administrative Reformers should the people's movement become importunate. They keep a "misunderstanding" in reserve should this danger set in: a misunderstanding allowing them sometime in the future to regard the Administrative Reformers as the spokesmen of the masses. Such misunderstandings are an essential element of England's "historical" development, and no one is more familiar with handling them than the free-thinking Whigs.

The *Charter* is a very laconic document; besides the demand for *universal suffrage*, it contains only the following five points, which are all prerequisites for exercising it: 1) vote by ballot; 2) *no* property qualifications for Members of Parliament; 3) payment of Members of Parliament; 4) annual Parliaments; 5) equal electoral districts. After the experiments which undermined *universal suffrage* in France in 1848, the continentals are prone to underrate the importance and meaning of the English *Charter*. They overlook the fact that two-thirds of the population of France are peasants and over one-third townspeople, whereas in England more than two-thirds live in towns and less than one-third in the countryside. Hence the results of universal suffrage in England must likewise be in inverse proportion to the results in France, just as town and country are in the two states. This explains the diametrically opposite character which the demand for universal suffrage has assumed in France and England. In France the political ideologists put forward this demand, which every "educated" person could support to a greater or lesser extent, depending on his convictions. In England it is a distinguishing feature roughly separating the aristocracy and bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people, on the other. There it is regarded as a political question and here, as a social one. In England agitation for universal suffrage had gone through a period of historical development before it became the slogan of the masses. In France, it was *first* introduced and *then* started on its historical path. In France it was the practice of universal suffrage that failed, whereas in England it was its ideology. In the early decades of this century, universal suffrage as propounded by Sir Francis Burdett, Major Cartwright and Cobbett was still a very vague and idealistic concept, so that it could become the pious wish of all sections of the population that did not belong directly to the ruling classes.
For the bourgeoisie, it was in fact simply an eccentric, generalised expression of what it had attained through the parliamentary reform of 1831. In England the demand for universal suffrage did not assume its concrete, specific character even after 1838. Proof: Hume and O'Connell were among those who signed the Charter. The last illusions disappeared in 1842. At that time Lovett made a last but futile attempt to formulate universal suffrage as a common demand of what are known as Radicals and the masses of the people. Since that day there has no longer been any doubt about the meaning of universal suffrage. Nor about its name. It is the Charter of the people and implies the assumption of political power as a means of satisfying their social needs. Universal suffrage, which was regarded as the motto of universal brotherhood in the France of 1848, has become a battle cry in England. There universal suffrage was the direct content of the revolution; here, revolution is the direct content of universal suffrage. An examination of the history of universal suffrage in England will show that it casts off its idealistic features at the same rate as modern society with its immense contradictions develops in this country, contradictions that are produced by industrial progress.

Alongside the official and semi-official parties, as well as alongside the Chartists, there is another clique of “wise men” emerging in England, who are discontented with the Government and the ruling classes as much as with the Chartists. What do the Chartists want? they exclaim. They want to increase and extend the omnipotence of Parliament by elevating it to democratic power. They are not breaking up parliamentarism but are raising it to a higher power. The right thing to do is to break up the representative system! A wise man from the East, David Urquhart, heads that clique. He wants to revert to England’s Common Law. He wants to squeeze Statute Law back into its bounds. He wants to localise rather than centralise. He wants to unearth “the true old legal sources of Anglo-Saxon times” from the rubbish. Then they will gush forth of themselves and will water and fertilise the surrounding country. But David is at least consistent. He also wants to reduce modern division of labour and concentration of capital to the old Anglo-Saxon level or, preferably, to that of the Orient. A Highlander by birth, an adoptive Circassian and a Turk by free choice, he is able to condemn civilisation with all its evils,

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\footnote{Marx uses the English terms “Common Law” and “Statute Law” and explains their meaning in German in brackets.—Ed.}
and even to evaluate it from time to time. But he is not trite like the men with lofty ideas who separate the modern political forms from modern society, and who prattle about local autonomy combined with concentration of capital, and about the uniqueness of the individual combined with the anti-individualising division of labour. David is a prophet who looks backwards, and is in an old-fashioned way enraptured by old England. He must therefore consider it quite all right that new England passes him by and leaves him behind, however urgent and persuasive he may be exclaiming: "David Urquhart is the only man who can save you!" As he did only a few days ago, at a meeting in Stafford.

Written on June 5, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 261, June 8, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
London, June 6. Palmerston has again given proof of his old mastery at handling diplomacy by means of Parliament and Parliament by means of diplomacy. The policy of the ministry was to be discussed on the basis of the amendments of Baring, Heathcote and Lowe. The amendments were all based on the Vienna Conference. During Whitsun week Palmerston conjured away the Vienna Conference, by referring in his dealings with Austria to the past parliamentary debate; and in his dealings with the newly re-opened Parliament he conjured away the debate, by referring to the past Conference, which, allegedly, now existed only as a myth. With the Vienna Conference are thrown overboard the amendments which presuppose it; with the amendments, the discussion of the ministry's policy ceases, and with this discussion, disappears the need for the ministry to make any statement about the tendency, aim and object of the "new" war. We are assured by David Urquhart, alias David Bey, that this aim is nothing less than to acquaint the allied troops with the summer diseases of the Crimea, now that they have sampled the winter diseases of the Crimea. And though Urquhart does not know everything, he knows his Palmerston. But he is mistaken about the power that secret design has over public history. Thus Palmerston informs the reassembled Parliament that there is no longer any subject for debate, and that the House could now do nothing better than send a war address to the Crown, i.e. give the ministry

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a Amendments to Disraeli's motion of May 24, 1855 (see this volume, pp., 227-28).—Ed.
b Parliament re-opened on June 4, 1855.—Ed.
a vote of confidence. For the time being he is thwarted by the stubbornness of the parliamentarians, who have prepared long speeches on the amendments and are resolved to dispose of their goods. By the mere act of disbanding the Conference he has broken the point off these speeches and the horror vacui, boredom, will drive Parliament into accepting his address. To save itself from the speeches it will seize on the address.

With the change in the situation, Lowe's amendment has changed its meaning. Originally it meant the break-up of the Vienna Conference. Now it means sanctioning the Vienna Conference and ministerial diplomacy, insofar as it raises Russell's formula for the reduction of Russian maritime power in the Euxinus to the ultimate aim, to the real object of the war. It is a stumbling block for the peace party insofar as it demands too much, for the war party insofar as it demands too little, and a stumbling block for the ministry insofar as it demands any object, that is any admitted object, for the war. Hence the phenomenon of pro-peace men and Tories being for the continuation of the debate on Lowe's amendment and the ministry against it; hence Palmerston's attempt to jettison it. The attempt failed. He therefore adjourned the debate until Thursday evening. A day's respite gained. In the meantime the final protocol of the Vienna Conference is printed. It is presented to the House. A new and secondary question is raised, and with his "dissolving views" Palmerston can hope to remove the real issue from the focus of the debate.

The two-day parliamentary discussion was as boring, tedious and confused as can only be expected of speeches whose point has been broken off in advance. It offered, however, a characteristic spectacle: whereas before the vote on Disraeli's motion the peace men flirted with the ministry, they now flirted with the Opposition, by which we mean the professional Opposition. Further, it revealed the entente cordiale between the Peelites and the Manchester School. The Peelites obviously flatter themselves that they will rule England after the war, at the head of the industrial bourgeoisie. Thus, after their long wanderings, the Peelites would at last have a real party behind them, and the industrialists at last have found professional statesmen. If the peace men have thus won Gladstone, Graham and Co., they have lost the "radical" Sir William Molesworth, a friend of more than twenty years' standing.

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a Ancient Greek name for the Black Sea.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English expression.—Ed.
c An account of the debate in the House of Commons on June 4 and 5 was published in The Times, Nos. 22072 and 22073, June 5 and 6, 1855.—Ed.
Molesworth must have read in Hobbes, whom he published,¹⁸⁵ that “intelligence comes through the ears”. He therefore appealed not to the intelligence but to the ears. He did what Hamlet forbids the actors to do.² He out-tyrannised the tyrant and was more Russell than Russell himself. He had also read in his Hobbes that all men are equal, because each can take the life of the other. As he is now concerned with prolonging his ministerial life he spoke in the spirit of the men who can take it from him. It was indeed a curious thing to see this adding-machine indulging in dithyrambs. Not even Babbage in his “Philosophy of Machines”ᵇ would have imagined it. Milner Gibson, the baronet from the Manchester area, was monotonous, soporific, desiccated and desiccating. He has obviously learnt from the nearby metropolis of British industry how to deliver as much as possible while keeping production costs as low as possible. He is a man whose whole appearance proclaims that he is bored. Why should he seek to amuse his fellow-men? Do as you would be done by! Moreover, he clearly counts spirit, wit and life among the faux frais de production,ᶜ and it is the first law of the economic school to which he belongs to avoid “false costs”. Bulwer hovered between the heroic mood of his “king-maker” and the contemplative one of his “Eugene Aram”.ᵈ In the former he threw down the gauntlet to Russia, in the latter he wove a myrtle wreath around Metternich’s brow.

Milner Gibson, Molesworth and Bulwer were the coryphaei of the first evening, Cobden, Graham and Russell of the second. Cobden’s speech alone deserves an analysis which space and time do not permit at present. Let us only remark that he claims Bonaparte was prepared to accept the last Austrian proposals. The late Sir Robert Peel’s dirty boy, who has recently taken to “sentiments”, “broken hearts” and “love of truth”, gave a self-apology on behalf of his neighbour, namely Sir James Graham. He had forbidden Napier to act in the Baltic Sea until the time of year when any action is ruinous for the British Navy. He had forbidden Dundas to shell Odessa. He had thus neutralised the British Navy both in

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¹ The reference is to Hamlet’s warning against overacting (Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2).—Ed.
² Ch. Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures.—Ed.
³ False costs of production.—Ed.
⁴ “King-maker” was the nickname of Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, described in Bulwer-Lytton’s novel The Last of the Barons, the action of which takes place during the Wars of the Roses; Eugene Aram is the title character of another of Lytton’s novels.—Ed.
⁵ Marx uses the English words “dirty boy” and “sentiments”—Ed.
the Baltic and in the Black Sea. He justifies himself with the size of the fleets which he had equipped. The mere existence of these fleets was proof of British power. Their action was therefore superfluous. A few days ago Napier addressed a laconic letter to a friend of Urquhart, which Urquhart read out at the Stafford meeting. This letter says literally:

"Sir! I hold Sir James Graham capable of any base act. Charles Napier."

Russell has finally excelled himself. At the beginning of his speech he declared that the big question confronting the House was the following:

"If you are determined to have peace, upon what conditions can you obtain it? If you mean to carry on the war, for what objects is that war to be carried on?"

As to the first question, his answer could be found in the Vienna protocols. As to the second, the object of the war, his answer had to be a very general one, in other words, no answer at all. If one were to accept the phrase "security for Turkey" as an answer, he would not mind. One interpretation of this "security" was given in the Vienna Note; another in the Four Points\textsuperscript{186}; finding a third was not Russell's business but the war's. It was Napoleon's principle that war must cover its own costs; it is Russell's principle that war must find its own object.

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Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Frederick Engels
FROM THE CRIMEA

The arrival of the Asia's mail at a late hour on Thursday night enabled us yesterday to publish the dispatch of Gen. Pélissier concerning the fight which took place before Sevastopol on the night of May 22, as well as an authentic account of the allied advance upon Chorgun, which was accomplished on the 25th of that month. Some 25,000 men under Canrobert crossed the Chernaya and occupied the line of that streamlet, expelling the Russian outposts from their positions on the heights immediately overhanging the right bank. The Russians fell back as a matter of course, this not being their proper field of battle, in order to concentrate all their forces on the strong line between Inkermann and the range of cliffs to the east of that place. By this advance the Allies have nearly doubled the extent of ground occupied by them—giving them room of which their increased forces stood greatly in need—and managed an opening into the valley of Baidar which may prove very useful. The first step toward a resumption of field operations has been accomplished with success, and should be followed by actions of greater importance.

As for the affair of May 22, the scene of the struggle was between the Quarantine Bay and the Central Bastion—No. 5 of the Russians. It was a very hard-contested and sanguinary conflict. The Russians, as we now learn from Pélissier's report, have occupied all the ground from the head of the Quarantine Bay to the Cemetery, and thence to the Central Bastion by detached works and rifle trenches, though the official British Admiralty plan of the siege-works shows that there are trench-works all over this important ground. But the truth now appears to be that as soon as the Flagstaff and Central Bastions were seriously menaced
and the outworks protecting them taken by the French, this piece of ground was turned by the Russians into one vast works. In a couple of nights long lines of connecting breastworks were thrown up inclosing the whole ground, and thus forming a large place d'armes or protected space where troops could safely be concentrated in order to act upon the flanks of any French attack, or even to attempt strong sorties on the flanks of the advanced French works. Pélissier knew by experience the rapidity with which the Russians proceed in structures of the sort, and the tenacity with which they defend their works when once completed. He fell upon them at once. On the night of May 22 an attack in two columns was made. The left column established itself in the Russian trenches at the head of Quarantine Bay, and effected a lodgment; the right column also got possession of the advanced trenches, but being unable to work under the heavy fire of the enemy, had to withdraw at daybreak. On the following night the attempt was renewed with stronger columns and with complete success. The entire work was carried and turned against the Russians by transplanting the gabions from one side of the trench to the opposite one. In this action the French appear to have fought with the greatest gallantry—with some sort of revival of that old furia francese which made them so celebrated in former times, although it must be confessed that the statements of Gen. Pélissier as to the odds they had to contend against have some little show of brag about them.

With regard to the third bombardment of the city, which our Halifax dispatch reported as having commenced on the 6th, followed by the storm and capture of the Mamelon and White Tower on the 7th, the Asia's mail furnishes no new information, and enables us to add nothing to our remarks of Wednesday last. We learn however that 25,000 men had been transported to the Chersonese from Omer Pasha's army at Eupatoria, with a view evidently to operations in the field, since if another bombardment and an assault were contemplated, these Turks had better have been left in their former quarters. But it also appears that the allied army was very insufficiently furnished with means of transport and supplies for a campaign in the interior; and the probability is that while waiting for them to be provided, Pélissier has occupied the troops with this active renewal of the siege operations, not with the intention of really undertaking to storm the place at present, but to keep up the morale of the men.

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a The Selenghinsk and Volhynsk redoubts.—Ed.
From the conduct of Péllissier since taking the command, it seems certain that he is determined to be guided by his own judgment only and to take no notice of whatever plans and projects the imagination of Louis Bonaparte may be inclined to hatch. Plan-making for Crimean campaigns seems now to be a fashionable occupation at Paris; even old Marshal Vaillant has sent one or two; but Péllissier at once telegraphed that if Vaillant thought his plans so good he had better come to the Crimea to carry them out himself. How this energetic but obstinate and brutal Commander will go on we shall see very shortly; at all events, if it be true, as we see it intimated, that he has ventured to forward "orders" to the British, Turkish and Sardinian Chiefs of the Staff without even taking the trouble to inform the respective Commanders of their contents, he will very soon get up a pretty squabble in the allied camp, where hitherto no single General, but the Council of War, composed of all the Commanders, has been considered supreme. Imagine old Field Marshal Lord Raglan under the command of a single French Lieutenant-General!

Meantime the Russians are not idle. The "expectant" position into which Austria has relapsed and the arrival of reserves and new levies from the interior have enabled Russia to send fresh troops to the Crimea. The 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th Infantry Corps are there already, beside several Cavalry Divisions. Now the 2d Infantry Corps, which was said to be in the Crimea six weeks ago, has actually left Volhynia for the seat of war, followed by the 7th Light Cavalry Division, attached to the Grenadier Corps. This is a pretty sure sign that the infantry and artillery of the Grenadier Corps are next on the list to march to the Crimea; and indeed they are already moving to Volhynia and Podolia to take the place of the 2d Corps. This latter body, commanded by Gen. Paniutin, who in Hungary\(^a\) commanded the Russian Division attached to Haynau's army, will bring to the Crimea 49 battalions of Infantry, beside Artillery and Light Cavalry—in all, about 50,000 or 60,000 men—for there can be no doubt that these corps, which have not yet been engaged, have been raised to the full war-complement. The troops of the 2d Corps will successively arrive on the seat of war from June 15 to July 15, at a time when decisive operations will very likely be taking place, and thus they may take a very important part in the coming Crimean campaign.

The month of June must bring some decision into this Crimean

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\(^a\) In 1849.—*Ed.*
warfare. Before June, or at the outside July, has elapsed, either the Russian field-army will have had to leave the Crimea, or the Allies will have to prepare for their own retreat.

Written about June 8, 1855


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, June 8. The arrival of three French reserve divisions in addition to the two Sardinian divisions makes it impossible for the allies to remain spellbound within the narrow confines of the Heracleatic Chersonese. So, on May 25, shortly after General Pélissier assumed command, they sent 20,000-25,000 men to the Chernaya, occupied the line of this river and expelled the Russian outposts from their positions on the heights overhanging the river’s right bank. It will be remembered that more than a month ago we pointed out a that this, the Russians' advanced line of defence, was not their true battlefield and that consequently, instead of holding their ground and accepting battle along this line, they would probably give it up at the first serious assault so as to concentrate all their forces on the strong line between Inkerman and the range of hills to the east of that place. This has now happened. By this advance the allies have nearly doubled the extent of the area occupied by them, and opened a gateway to the fertile valley of Baidar, which may become very useful in the future. Up to now, however, the advantage gained has not been swiftly and vigorously followed up. The first movement was immediately followed again by stagnation. Lack of transport facilities may have made this inevitable. Disunity between the allied commanders is cited as one cause. The shelling of Sevastopol, resumed on June 6, shelling No. 3, arouses the suspicion that it may be intended to return after an interlude to the old routine. The shelling may, however, be combined with operations in the field. At any rate, one necessary measure (cf. No. 241 of the N.O-Z.) b has at last been taken—the transportation of

a See this volume, pp. 184-85.— Ed.

b Ibid., p. 212.— Ed.
some 20,000 Turks under the personal command of Omer Pasha from Eupatoria to Chersonese. The allied army has thus increased to a full 200,000 men. With a fighting force of this size active operations can certainly be begun as soon as the organisation of supplies and transport facilities permits the army to take the field. But here there seem to be great difficulties to be overcome.

The second affair to be mentioned in the story of the main army is the battle between the Quarantine Harbour and the Central Bastion (No. 5 of the Russians). It was stubborn and bloody. As we can now see from General Pélissier's report, the Russians held all the ground from the head of the Quarantine Harbour to the churchyard, and from there to the Central Bastion by means of detached earthworks and trenches, although even the official British Admiralty map of the siege-works indulges in the fantasy of placing French fortifications over the whole of this important area. As soon as the Flagstaff and Central bastions were seriously threatened, and the outer works protecting them were taken by the French, the Russians turned this extensive stretch into one great fortification. In a few nights long lines were connected with one another, ramparts thrown up intended to enclose the whole area and form a spacious place d'armes, i.e. a fortified place where the troops could be gathered in safety in order to act against the flanks of any French attack or to undertake strong assaults on the flanks of the advanced French fortifications. To deprive the Russians of the time to carry out their plan, Pélissier decided to fall on them immediately, while their earthworks were still incomplete. On the evening of May 22 an attack was made in two columns. The left column established itself in the Russian trenches at the head of the Quarantine Harbour and managed to dig itself in; the right column also captured the advance trenches but was forced to retire again at daybreak by the heavy fire of the enemy. On the following evening the attempt was renewed with stronger columns and complete success. The entire fortification was captured and turned against the Russians by removing the gabions from one side of the trench to the opposite side. In this action the French seem to have fought again with the famous furia francese, although it has to be admitted that the manner in which Pélissier describes the difficulties to be overcome is not free from a tinge of boasting.

It is generally known that the expedition to the Sea of Azov was rewarded with total success. A flotilla consisting chiefly of the light warships of the two fleets, manned by 15,000 British, French and
Turks, seized Kerch, Yenikale and the straits leading to the Sea of Azov without encountering resistance. Advancing into this lake, the ships appeared off Berdyansk, Genichesk and Ararat, destroying or compelling the Russians to destroy large supplies of corn and munitions, a number of steamships and nearly 200 transport boats. At Kerch they succeeded in capturing Gorchakov’s letters to the commander of the place. The Russian commander-in-chief complains about the lack of provisions in Sevastopol and urges the rapid despatch of fresh supplies. Now it turns out that throughout the campaign the Sea of Azov was the main channel along which the Russians in the Crimea had been receiving their supplies and that 500 sailing-boats had been used to transport them. As the allies have up to now only found and destroyed 200 such boats, the remaining 300 must be further up near Taganrog or Azov. A squadron of steamships has therefore been sent out in search of them. The success of the allies is all the more important as it forces the Russians to send all supplies along a slow and less safe land-route via Perekop or via the interior of the Sivash Sea and to set up their main depots at Kherson or Berislav on the Dnieper, in positions far more exposed than those at the head of the Sea of Azov. The almost uncontested success of this expedition is the greatest reproach to the allies’ conduct of the war. If such results can now be achieved in four days, why was the expedition not sent out in September or October last year, at a time when similar breaches in the Russians’ line of communication might have entailed the retreat of their army and the surrender of Sevastopol?

The land forces accompanying this expedition are intended to protect the steamers if necessary, to supply the captured places with garrisons and to go into action against the Russian communications. Their main corps seems intended to act in the field as a simple flying corps, making sorties whenever there is a chance of dealing a swift blow, retiring behind its fortifications under cover of the ships’ guns, and, if the worst comes to the worst, embarking again when threatened by a greatly superior enemy force. If this is its purpose it can perform important duties, and 15,000 are not too many for this. If on the other hand it is intended to act as an independent corps with its own base of operations, undertaking a serious flanking movement against the Russians and attempting to pose a serious threat to the interior of the Crimea, then 15,000 men, weakened by detachments, are far too few for such an operation and run a considerable risk of being

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a Most western part of the Sea of Azov.—Ed.
cut off, surrounded by superior forces and annihilated. At present we only know that they have landed at Kerch and are engaged in preparing it for defence against the interior. The Russians having voluntarily evacuated Sudjouk Kale, Anapa remains the only fortress in their hands on the Circassian coast. It is a natural stronghold that is now moreover well fortified. We doubt that the allies will attack it at the moment. Should they do so they will be making a big mistake, if not positive of rapid success. They would be dispersing troops that need the utmost concentration and wasting their energies by attacking new targets before the old ones are secured.

Written about June 8, 1855

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Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
London, June 9. The great parliamentary debate has ended, or rather perished because of hypersalivation. Baring's motion was carried without opposition "amidst the general laughter of the House". The motion, insipid as it is, concludes with a war address to the Crown. Did the House declare the war "une guerre pour rire"? Or did it declare itself "une parlement pour rire"? At any rate, the real conclusion of the two-week debate did not lie in the acceptance of Baring's motion—a mere formality—but in the general laughter, the spontaneous muscular spasm contravening the regulations, the indiscreet cry of nature beneath which the "honourable House" buried motions and counter-motions, amendments and sub-amendments, ministry and opposition, speeches, counter-speeches, sermons, deductions, shrill sarcasm and pathetic entreaty, prayers for peace and war-cries, tactics and tactlessness, itself and its vote. The House saved itself from the laughable situation by laughing at itself. Thus it confessed that world-historical seriousness in this parliamentary medium first becomes contorted into conventional seriousness, and this contrived seriousness then turns into natural jesting.

Every attempt to get Palmerston to formulate ministerial policy, to make any statement about the object, tendency or purpose of the war failed completely. He flatly declared that

"it was impossible to question a minister, or indeed any friend, about the object of the war.""
It was the peace men that helped him most of all. Do you wish to know why we are waging war? There is Richard Cobden who wants peace at any price. Do you not prefer war without any price to peace at any price? Aim your blows at Richard Cobden! In this way he continually thrust Cobden or Bright or Graham or Gladstone between himself and his antagonists.

The cotton heroes did not merely serve him as padding to line his battle-dress with. More than that. He manufactured gunpowder out of their cotton. It also appeared during the debate that in Russell, just as formerly in Aberdeen, Palmerston possesses a lightning-conductor for his sacrosanct person, a lightning-conductor belonging to the Cabinet itself. It was for this purpose that he sent Russell to Vienna, for the purpose of turning him into his lightning-conductor. And Roebuck is now declaring Russell responsible for the "shortcomings" of the heroic Palmerston just as Layard and Co. formerly did with Aberdeen. The "wingbeats" of his "free soul" are now impeded by the Russellites just as they used to be by the Peelites. He has these weights hanging from him not in order to work, like Black Forest clocks, but so as to strike the hour wrongly.

All the cliques of the House of Commons have emerged the worse for wear from the conventional mock battle. The Peelites have at last admitted that they have hitherto been officers without armies. They have given up the pretension of forming a grouping of their own and have openly joined the Manchester School. As they were entrusted with the leadership of the army and navy during the first year of the war they have, by professing their belief in eternal peace, foolishly denounced themselves as the traitors within the coalition, to the happy surprise of Palmerston-Russell. They have made themselves impossible.

The Manchester School actually want peace in order to wage industrial war at home and abroad. They want to establish the mastery of the English bourgeoisie on the world market, where fighting is only to be permitted with their weapons—cotton-bales—and in England itself, where the aristocrat is to be pushed aside as superfluous in modern production, and the proletarian, as the mere instrument of this production, is to be subjugated, while they themselves, as the leaders of production, are to head the state and take over the offices of government. And now Cobden denounces a clergyman, Dr. Griffiths, for declaring at a public

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*a Marx uses the English word.— Ed.

*b From Georg Herwegh's poem "Aus den Bergen" (Gedichte eines Lebendigen).— Ed.
meeting that the House of Lords is superfluous. And Bright weeps over the fate of the royal children, who will be obliged by the ruin consequent on the war to wash their own shirts. Both denounce popular agitation. Are these the heroes of the Anti-Corn Law League, who, carried to the top on the waves of popular agitation, used to denounce the "barbaric splendour of the Crown", Lords, landed aristocracy, etc., as "false production costs"? Their whole point consisted of the struggle against the aristocracy, not excepting the peace homily. And now they are denouncing the masses to the aristocracy! *Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas* In this debate the Manchester School have renounced their *raison d'être*.

As for the Tories, they have discovered a peace party in their own bosom and proved that they have preserved their tradition as the representatives of English nationalism as little as their hatred for the "Bonapartes".

Finally, the ministerial side? Nothing characterises them better than their frantic efforts to cling to a motion which Palmerston himself had to turn down only a week before, which the proposer wished to drop, but which was accepted by Walpole in the name of the Tories, by Gladstone in the name of the peace men, and by the House in the name of "general merriment".

The *Morning Herald* has received the following communication from the Gulf of Finland:

"16 miles off Cronstadt, May 28. The *Orion* has been in to reconnoiter, and reports that the Russian fleet in Cronstadt consists of six line-of-battle ships, ready for sea; six nearly dismantled ones, thirteen apparently fitted as floating-batteries, and eight steamers of a large size, besides gun-boats, which could not be counted."

"Visited Bomarsund [...] found things exactly the same as they were left, the Russians had done nothing to repair the fortifications, we saw neither man, woman, or child ... the inhabitants fight rather shy of us, in consequence of the Russians having punished a number of them for having traded with the allied squadrons last year..." .

The reference is to the speeches delivered in the House of Commons by Cobden on June 5, 1855, and by Bright on June 7, 1855. *The Times*, Nos. 22073 and 22075, June 6 and 8.—*Ed.*

And for the sake of life to sacrifice life's only end (*Juvenalis, Satirae, VIII, 85*).—*Ed.*

*Quoted from two reports published in The Morning Herald, No. 22450, June 6, 1855—"Gulf of Finland, 16 Miles off Cronstadt" and "Visit to Bomarsund".—*Ed.*
The mails of the Baltic have put us in possession of the official documents in regard to the late events at Sevastopol. The dispatches of Gen. Pélissier and Lord Raglan we published yesterday; and we now proceed to set forth the facts as they are established by this and other testimony:

On the 6th of June, the allied batteries on the right attack again opened their fire upon the town. This time, however, it was no general bombardment; it was a cannonade concentrated upon certain points with a view to reduce them at once.\(^a\) The outworks constructed by the Russians on the 23d February and 12th March on this front of defense, the Selenghinsk, Volhynsk and Kamtschatka redoubts, had hitherto kept the besiegers and their batteries at a distance. On the Western front, the allied left attack, there were no such outworks, and the French being by this time established almost on the brink of the ditch or of the covered way (if there is one) of the defenses, the progress made on that side had by far left behind the slower advance of the right attack. As in the siege-plan of the Allies the two great divisions of the lines—the town west of the inner harbor\(^b\) and the suburb of Karabelnaya, on its eastern side—are considered as two separate

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\(^a\) Instead of the preceding text the Neue Oder-Zeitung version begins: "The telegraphic dispatch announcing that the bombardment of Sevastopol had been resumed on June 6 was inaccurate. There was only a cannonade concentrated upon certain points which were to be captured at once." — Ed.

\(^b\) The southern harbour.— Ed.
fortresses which must be attacked at the same time, the right
attack had to be pushed with greater energy and the outworks to
be forced so as to bring the Allies on this side up into line with
their advanced parallels on the left attack. In order to accomplish
this, the above redoubts and some minor intrenchments in a
quarry flanking the Mamelon (Kamtschatka\textsuperscript{a}) on its right, had to
be taken. Accordingly, after 36 hours’ cannonading, on the
evening of the 7th of June the French advanced upon the two
redoubts Selenghinsk and Volhynsk over the Careening Bay and
upon the Mamelon, while the British assaulted the quarry. After
an hour’s sharp struggle the Allies were in possession of the
works. A number of guns were taken as well as 400 prisoners,
among them 13 officers. The loss on both sides was very heavy.\textsuperscript{b}

Thus affairs on that side are nearly in the same state now as
they were before the 22d February. Of the redoubts carried by the
Allies, that of the Mamelon (called by the Russians the
Kamtschatka redoubt) was the most important. It was constructed
on the 12th of March and the following days. At that time we at
once pointed out the great importance of this work and the
considerable part it would play in the struggle.\textsuperscript{c} The event has
fully justified our views. This hastily constructed fieldwork has
arrested the progress of the besiegers on one-half of the whole
line of attack for eighty-eight days, or for a period which in
ordinary sieges is considered more than sufficient to take a
good-sized fortress twice over. We will now explain this aston-
ishing phenomenon, which has but two parallels in the
history of sieges: one in the defense of Colberg, 1807, by the
Prussians: the other in the defense of Dantzig by the French in
1813-14.\textsuperscript{191}

With the increase of armies in the field, the old and generally
small fortifications of the time of Vauban lost their significance.
They were safely passed by the hosts of the victor and scarcely
observed by his flying corps, until the reserves of his army came
up and found time to take them. But when these considerable
armies on their march fell in with large fortresses they were

\textsuperscript{a} The Kamchatka demi-lune.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The end of this paragraph beginning with the words “After an hour’s sharp
struggle” does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} See this volume, pp. 151-55. This and the following sentence do not occur in the
\textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}
invariably arrested. This was the case with Napoleon at Mantua in 1797, and at Dantzig in 1807. The reason is evident. When an army of 150,000 men advanced into a hostile country the small fry of fortresses offered no danger in the rear: all their garrisons put together were not strong enough to meet the reinforcements and reserves which were dispatched from the depots to keep up the active army to its full strength. Such small garrisons, besides, could not detach any strong bodies of troops to scour the field and to interrupt the communications of the hostile army. But when a fortress of considerable extent was met with, garrisoned by 15,000 to 25,000 men, the case was different. Such a fortress was the nucleus of defense for a whole province; it could detach in any direction, and to a considerable distance, a strong body of troops capable of acting in the field and always sure, in case of superior attack, of a safe retreat to the stronghold. To observe such a fortress was nearly as troublesome as to take it; therefore, it had to be taken at once.

Now the old fortresses of the Vauban and Cormontaigne sort concentrated all their means of defense around the main rampart and in the main ditch. All their tenailles, demi-lunes, counter-guards, tower-reduits were accumulated so as to form with all but one line of defense, which, when once broken into, was pierced altogether in a few days; and a breach once made through these defenses, the place was taken. It is evident that such a system was totally unadapted to the large fortresses which alone could check the advance of large invading armies; it would have amounted to sacrificing the garrison; the breach once effected the fort became defenseless. Another system had to be resorted to—that of advanced works. The French General Montalembert, the teacher of Carnot, was the first who boldly stood up, in spite of the prejudices of his profession, for detached forts; but the method of constructing large fortresses with detached forts so as to form a complete system of defense was elaborated to its present perfection in Germany, particularly by the Prussian General Aster. The splendid defenses of Cologne, Coblenz, Posen, Königsberg, and partly of Mayence are his work, and they mark a new era in the history of fortifications. The French at last acknowledged the necessity of coming round to this system and constructed the

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a The following two sentences do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
b The end of this sentence beginning with the words “it would have amounted to” does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
defenses of Paris with detached works planned and executed in first-rate style.\textsuperscript{a}

The system of detached forts at once necessitated a new mode of defense. The garrisons of large fortresses had to be increased to such numbers that there was no necessity of keeping up a merely passive defense, until the enemy, advancing to the glacis, came within reach of sallies. A garrison of 20,000 or 25,000 men was strong enough to attack the enemy on his own ground. The fortress and the space around it, so far as it was protected by the detached forts, took the nature of an intrenched camp, or of a base for the field operations of the garrison, which itself was converted into a small army. The hitherto passive defense became active; it took on an offensive character. So necessary was this that when the French in 1807 besieged Dantzig, the Prussian garrison, which numbered about 20,000, constructed those very detached forts which were not in existence, but which were immediately found to be required in order to apply the resources of this large garrison to a proper defense of the place. When the French defended Dantzig in 1813-14 against the Allies they carried out the same principle with still greater success.\textsuperscript{b}

A siege, which since Vauban had ever been an operation of short duration, and the end of which could almost with certainty be attained in a given number of days, unless the proceedings were interrupted from without—a siege now becomes an operation subject to as many chances as a war in the open field. The artillery on the ramparts at once became of secondary importance; field artillery almost took precedence over it even in the defense of a place. The skill of the engineer was no longer applied merely to the repairs of the damage done during the siege; it had, as in the field, to choose and to fortify positions situated in advance of the forts themselves; to meet trench by trench; to take in flank the enemy's works by counter-works; to change suddenly the front of defense, and thus to force the enemy to change his front of attack.

\textsuperscript{a} The end of this paragraph beginning with the words “The splendid defenses of Cologne” does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} gives this paragraph in abridged form: “The system of detached forts changed the mode of defence of fortresses. The garrisons of big fortresses swelled to the size of small armies; the fortress and the space around it, so far as it was controlled by the detached forts, assumed the nature of an intrenched camp or of a base for the field operations of the garrison; the hitherto passive defense became active and took on an offensive character.”—\textit{Ed.}
Infantry became the main stay in the war of sieges as in the field, and cavalry was made a very necessary ingredient of almost every garrison. There was no longer any means to fix the probable duration of a siege, and the rules of Vauban for the attack of a place, retaining most of their correctness as far as the details of the artillery attack were concerned, became utterly inapplicable to the ensemble of a siege.

The Russians at Sevastopol had no time to construct detached works. They were compelled to act upon the old method of fortifying a place. They erected a main rampart as a first defense; it was indeed the thing most required for the moment. Behind this they made a second and a third line of defense, and all the while went on strengthening the first. Then gradually feeling their superiority, even at a certain distance from the main wall, they advanced, constructed the Selenghinsk and Volhynsk redoubts, and finally the work on the Mamelon, and a long line of rifle pits, while on the western front, where the main body of the French was placed, they could merely construct a few lunettes close to the main ditch, and a series of rifle trenches not much further in advance. Thus from the moment the Mamelon was fortified by the Russians, the eastern front was comparatively safe; while on the western front, where such protecting outworks did not exist, the besiegers gradually advanced to the very brink of the main ditch.

To approach on the right attack the commanding and decisive position of Malakoff bastion the besiegers had therefore first to take the Mamelon; but the Mamelon while it defended the Malakoff was again defended by all the works in its own rear; and how they defended it, was shown in the second bombardment, when Canrobert dared not seriously assault it. Even now there can be no doubt that the loss of the French in carrying this work must have been very great.

The reopening of the fire by the Allies and the energy with which General Péllissier, heedless of the lives of his soldiers, follows up every favorable chance to gain on the defense, are accompanied by a complete stagnation of operations on the Chernaya. This mode of proceeding at once gives us an insight into the character of Péllissier confirmatory of his former reputation for tenacity, obstinacy and recklessness. There were two ways open to him; to take the field, inclose Sevastopol on the north side also,

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a The *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has here: “after the notorious flanking march”.—*Ed.*
b This sentence does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*
and then take up the siege again with redoubled energy and a quadrupled chance of a speedy success,\(^a\) or else to go on in the faulty way of the last eight months; to cling doggedly to the south side, destroy every stone of it and drive the Russians out of a place which after all, if reduced, could not be occupied by his own troops on account of the batteries on the north side.

There is not a military man of sense in either hemisphere who, on the news of Péligier's nomination to the command, and of the great reenforcements received by the Allies, did not expect that he would at once take the first course. Most particularly when Omer Pasha with 25,000 Turks came round to Balaklava, there was no doubt that the Allies were strong enough to carry on the siege, to send 15,000 men to Kerch and still to advance into the field with more men than the Russians could spare to oppose them. Why have they not done so? Are they still in want of means of transport? Have they no confidence in their ability to carry on a campaign in the Crimea? We do not know. But this is certain: unless Péligier has very cogent reasons to abstain from taking the field, he is pursuing, out of sheer obstinacy and self-will, an extremely faulty course; for with a loss equal to that he is now continually subjecting his army to, in assaults, he might obtain results in the field of far greater magnitude, and of a far more decisive effect. To take the south side without having even invested the north side, which completely commands it, is to proceed in utter defiance of all rules of warfare, and if Péligier is bent upon that, he may yet ruin the great army he commands.

We will, however, give the new commander the benefit of every doubtful circumstance. It may be that the struggles on the left attack were inevitable and provoked by the counter-approaches of the Russians. It may be that it was necessary to confine the Russians to the limits of their original lines—to convince them, by a few hard, irresistible blows, of the superiority of the besiegers—before a separation of the army into a siege-corps and a field-corps could be ventured on. But allowing even this, we now must say that the utmost limit has been reached, and that any further serious attempt upon the body of the place will be a downright blunder, unless the strength of the Russian army in the

\(^a\) The following text is added here in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*: "This was all the more to be expected after not only the reenforcements but also Omer Pasha had arrived in Balaklava with 25,000 Turks." — Ed.
field has been first tried with all the forces that can be made available for the purpose.\footnote{Instead of the last two paragraphs the Neue Oder-Zeitung has the following concluding passage: "With the same losses, to which Pélissier now continuously exposes his army with his assaults, he could obtain results of far greater magnitude, and of a far more decisive nature in the field. To try to take the south side without having even invested the north side which commands it, is an incomprehensible procedure. Pélissier may still be lacking means of transport for field operations. Or the counter-approaches of the Russians may have made it necessary to push them back to their original lines and show them the superiority of the besiegers before proceeding to field operations. However that may be, with the seizure of Malakhov no excuses are left. Should Pélissier be stubborn enough to persist in serious attempts upon the main body of the enemy instead of trying to break the strength of the Russians in the field with all the forces that can be made available, the destruction of the army he commands is not at all improbable, especially since the area in which such vast numbers of people are confined is one big graveyard whose deadly miasmas will be let loose by the first heat of the summer."—Ed.}
Frederick Engels

NAPOLEON'S WAR PLANS

The French Government has thought proper again to give to the world through the columns of the Paris Constitutionnel another intimation respecting the manner in which the war is to be carried on for the next couple of months. These exposés are now becoming not only fashionable but periodical, and although they are apt to be inconsistent with each other, they afford for the time a pretty good idea of what favorable chances are open to the French Government. Take them all in all, they form a collection of all Louis Bonaparte's possible plans of campaign against Russia. As such they deserve some attention, for they involve the destiny of the second Empire and the possibility of French national resurrection.

It seems then that there is to be no "grande guerre" with 500,000 Austrians and 100,000 French on the Vistula and Dnieper. Nor is there to be a general rising of those "oppressed nationalities" which are constantly looking toward the West. No Hungarian, Italian, Polish armies are to appear at the magic call of the man who put down the Roman Republic. All that belongs to the past. Austria has done her duty to the West. So has Prussia. So has all the world. Everybody is satisfied with everybody. This war is no grand war at all. It is not destined to renew the glory of the old struggles of the French with the Russians, though Pélissier accidentally says as much in one of his dispatches. The French troops are not sent to the Crimea to reap a harvest of glory; they are simply there to do police duty. The question pending is a

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a This refers to A. de Cesena's article on the aims and prospects of the Crimean war published in the semi-official Constitutionnel, No. 169, June 18, 1855.—*Ed.*
mere local one: the supremacy of the Black Sea—and it will be settled on the very locality concerned. To give the war any larger dimensions would be folly. "Respectfully but firmly" will the Allies knock down every attempt at resistance by the Russians in the Black Sea and on its coasts; and when they have done that—why then of course they or Russia, or both of them will make peace.

Thus another of the Bonapartist self-delusions has been put aside. The dreams of the Rhine as the boundary of France, of the acquisition of Belgium and Savoy, have vanished, and a sober modesty of no common degree has taken their place. We are not fighting to restore France to the position which is due to her in Europe. Far from it. Not even are we fighting for civilization, as we used to say a short time ago. We are too modest to pretend to anything of such magnitude. What we are fighting for is—why, nothing more than the interpretation of the Third Point of the Vienna protocol! Such is the language now held by his Imperial Majesty Napoleon III, by the grace of the army and the toleration of Europe, Emperor of the French.

And what does this all amount to? We are told the war is being carried on for a purely local object, and can be brought to a successful termination by purely local means. Take the actual supremacy of the Black Sea out of the hands of Russia, and the end will be accomplished. Once masters of the Black Sea and its shores, hold what you have got, and Russia will very soon give in. Such is the most recent of all the many plans of campaign issued from headquarters at Paris. We proceed to look at it a little more closely.

We will take matters as they stand at present. From Constantinople to the Danube on the one side, and round by the Circassian coast, Anapa, Kertch, Balaklava, to Eupatoria, the whole coast is taken out of the hands of the Russians. Kaffa and Sevastopol are the only points that hold out, the one hard pressed, the other so situated that it must be abandoned as soon as it is seriously menaced. More than that, the allied fleets sweep the inland sea of Azoff; their light vessels have been up as far as Taganrog, and every place of importance has been assailed by them. No portion of the coast can be said to remain in the hands of the Russians, except the tract from Perekop to the Danube, or about one-fifteenth part of their possessions on that coast. Now we will even suppose that Kaffa and Sevastopol have fallen, and that the Crimea is in the hands of the Allies. What then? That Russia will not make peace in that situation, she has already loudly proclaimed. She would be mad if she did. It would be giving up
the battle after your advanced guard has been thrown back, at the very moment your main body is coming up. What then can the Allies do, after having secured these advantages at an immense cost?

They can, we are told, destroy Odessa, Cherson, Nikolaieff; they can even land a strong army at Odessa, fortify themselves there so as to hold out against any number of Russians, and then act according to circumstances. They can, besides, detach troops to the Caucasus and all but destroy the Russian army which, under General Muravieff, now holds Georgia and the other trans-Caucasian countries. But suppose all these things to be accomplished: and again we ask, what then, if Russia, as she certainly will do, refuse to make peace under these circumstances? Let it not be forgotten that Russia is not placed in the same position as France or England. England can afford to conclude a shabby peace. In fact, as soon as John Bull has had enough of excitement and war-taxes, he will be but too eager to creep out of the mess and leave his dear allies to shift for themselves. England's real power and source of strength do not exactly lie in that direction. Louis Bonaparte may, too, find himself placed in a position where an unseemly peace will be preferable, for him, to a war to the knife; for it must not be forgotten that with such an adventurer, in a desperate case, the chance of prolonging his dominion for another six months outweighs every other consideration. Turkey and Sardinia are sure to be left to their own puny resources in the decisive moment. So much, at least, is certain. But Russia cannot make peace, any more than ancient Rome could, while the enemy is on her territory. Russia, for a hundred and fifty years past, has never made a peace by which she lost ground. Even Tilsit\textsuperscript{196} gave her an increase of territory, and Tilsit was concluded before a single Frenchman had put his foot on Russian soil. To make peace while a large and advancing army is on Russian soil, a peace involving a sacrifice of territory, or at least a restriction of the Czar's sovereignty in his own dominions, would be to break at once with the traditions of a century and a half. Such a step could not be thought of by a Czar new to the throne,\textsuperscript{a} new to the people, and anxiously watched by a powerful national party. Such a peace could not be concluded until all the resources offensive and (above all) defensive of Russia had been brought into play and found wanting. That day will doubtless come, and the necessity of minding her own business will be imposed upon Russia, but by

\textsuperscript{a} Alexander II.— Ed.
other enemies than Louis Bonaparte and Palmerston, and after struggles far more decisive than the "local" execution put in force on her Black Sea dominions. But let us suppose the Crimea conquered and garrisoned by 50,000 Allies—the Caucasus and everything to the South of it cleared of Russian troops, and an allied army checking the Russians on the Kuban and Terek—Odessa taken, and converted into an intrenched camp, holding say 100,000 Anglo-French troops; Nikolaieff, Cherson, Ismail, destroyed or occupied by the Allies. We will even suppose that beside these "local" exploits, something of some importance may have been accomplished in the Baltic, although with the information at our command it is hard to say what that may be. What then?

Will the Allies confine themselves to holding their positions and tiring out the Russians? Their men in the Crimea and the Caucasus will vanish faster under the effects of disease than they can be replaced. Their main army, say at Odessa, will have to be fed by the fleets, for the country for hundreds of miles around Odessa produces nothing. The Russian army, surrounded by Cossack scouts—nowhere more useful than in these steppes—will harass them whenever they show themselves out of their intrenchments, if it cannot take up a permanent position somewhere in the neighborhood of the town. It is impossible under such circumstances to force the Russians to give battle; their great advantage will always be to draw the Allies into the interior of the country. To every advance of the Allies, they will respond by a slow retreat. Yet a large army cannot be confined for any length of time in an intrenched camp without giving it something to do. The gradual progress of disorder and demoralization would force the Allies to some decided movement. Sickness, too, would make the place too hot for them. In a word, to occupy the principal points on the coast and there to await the moment when Russia finds it necessary to give in is a game that will never do at all. There are three chances to one that the Allies would be tired of it first, and that the graves of their soldiers on the shores of the Black Sea would soon be counted by hundreds of thousands.

It would be a military blunder, too. To command a coast, it is not sufficient to possess its principal points. It is the possession of the inner country which alone gives the possession of the coast. As we have seen, the very circumstances arising from an establishment on the coast of South Russia would all but force the Allies to march into the interior. And here it is that the difficulties begin. Up to the frontiers of the Governments of Podolia, Kieff, Poltava, Charkoff, the country is an almost uncultivated plain, very scantily
watered, furnishing nothing but grass, and not even that after the heats of Summer. Supposing Odessa, Nikolaieff, Cherson to be taken for a base of operations, where would be the object against which the Allies could direct their efforts? The towns are few and far between, and there are none of sufficient importance to give, if occupied, a decisive character to the operation. There is no decisive point nearer than Moscow, and that is 700 miles off! Five hundred thousand men would be required for a march on Moscow, and where are they to come from? Surely, the case is such that in this way the “local” war can never lead to any decisive result; and we defy Louis Bonaparte with all his exuberance of strategic imagination to find another.

All this, however, presupposes not only the strict neutrality but even the moral support of Austria. And where is that power at the present moment? Austria and Prussia have declared they would consider an advance of the Russian army towards the Balkan, in 1854, as a *casus belli* against Russia. Where is the guarantee that in 1856 they will not consider a French advance on Moscow or even Charkoff as a cause of war against the Western Powers? We need not forget that every army advancing from the Black Sea toward the interior of Russia as much offers its flank to Austria as a Russian army advancing into Turkey from the Danube; and at a given distance, therefore, its communication with its base of operations, that is to say its very existence, is at the mercy of Austria. To keep Austria quiet, even for a time, she will have to be bought off by the surrender of Bessarabia to her troops. Once on the Dniester, her army commands Odessa as completely as if that town were garrisoned by Austrians. And under such circumstances could an allied army venture on a wild-goose chase after the Russians into the interior of the country? Nonsense! But this nonsense, let us remember, is the logical consequence of Louis Bonaparte’s latest plan of “local warfare.”

The first plan for the campaign was the “grande guerre,” by means of the Austrian alliance. It would have placed the French army in the same numerical inferiority and virtual dependence with respect to the Austrian army as the English army is now with regard to the French. It would have given the revolutionary initiative to Russia. Louis Bonaparte could do neither. Austria refused to act; the subject dropped. The second was the “war of nationalities.” This would have roused a storm between the Germans, Italians, Hungarians on one hand, and the Slavonian insurrection on the other, which must have reacted upon France at once and overturned Louis Bonaparte’s Lower Empire in less
time than it took to set it up. The counterfeit "iron man," passing himself off as a Napoleon, shrunk back. The third and most modest of all is the "local war for local objects." It reduces itself at once to an absurdity. We are again obliged to ask: What next? After all, it is far easier to be made Emperor of the French, with every circumstance to favor the design, than to act as such, even when long study before the looking-glass has made his Majesty perfectly familiar with all the theatrical portion of the business.

Written about June 15, 1855
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Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, June 15. Sir Charles Napier has published a series of letters about the Baltic Fleet,\(^a\) the following being No. 1:

"People ask why our squadron in the Baltic, which did nothing to signify last year, is likely to do nothing this? The question is easily answered, viz., because Sir James Graham did not attend to the plans I sent him last June, and which he pretended to know nothing about; and because the Admiralty did not attend to the plans I sent them last September. Had Admiral Dundas been furnished with the appliances I pointed out, Sweaborg might have been bombarded, and probably destroyed. Instead of doing that, they spent about [...] a million of money in building iron floating batteries, which will hardly swim, and if sent to the Baltic will probably never return: and this, after it was proved, at Portsmouth, that 68-pounders would destroy them at 400 yards; and at 800 yards everybody knows they could do no harm to granite walls. Had the same money been spent in mortar vessels, something might have been expected, or had half the money been laid out in putting Lord Dundonald's plans (which he communicated to me) in execution, I have no doubt they would have been successfully employed, both in the Baltic and Black Sea. My time will come, and before long, when I shall be able to expose all Sir James Graham's conduct to me. He has been shown to have opened private letters" (in the Bandiera affair\(^b\)) "by Mr. Duncombe. He endeavoured to throw the blame of poor Captain Christie's death on Mr. Layard, and I have accused him of perverting my letters, which I am prevented from proving, by the pretence that the publication would afford information to the enemy. That pretence will soon cease, and the country shall know what means the Right Hon. Baronet used to induce Admiral Berkeley and Admiral Richards to sign instructions, which, if carried out, would have lost the Queen's fleet. The country shall know whether the First Lord of the Admiralty has the power to turn an officer's private letters into public ones, and prevent him doing the same with the First Lord's.

Sir Charles Napier."\(^b\)

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\(^a\) Published in *The Morning Advertiser.*—*Ed.*

\(^b\) *The Morning Advertiser.* No. 19964, June 15, 1855.—*Ed.*
Roebuck's Committee met again yesterday, for the 49th time, to reach a decision about the report to be submitted to the House of Commons. After a four hours' debate its members were just as incapable of reconciling their views as in earlier sessions. They adjourned again until Monday in the "hope" that they will finally be able to announce the conclusion of their proceedings.

The "Administrative Reform Association" held a large meeting yesterday in the Drury Lane Theatre; not, be it noted, a public meeting but a ticket-meeting, a meeting to which only those favoured with tickets were admitted. The gentlemen were thus completely at their ease, au sein de leur famille. They were avowedly meeting to give "public opinion" an airing. But to shield public opinion from draughts from outside half a company of constables were posted at the doors of the Drury Lane. What a fragile public opinion that only dares to be made public with the protection of constables and tickets of admission! The meeting was, above all, a demonstration in support of Layard, who is at last due to present his reform bill to the House tonight.

At a public meeting held in Newcastle-upon-Tyne the day before yesterday David Urquhart denounced "the treacherous Ministry and the feeble-minded Parliament".

About the meetings now being prepared by the Chartists in the provinces, another time.

While thus the status quo is coming in for criticism from various quarters and different points of view, Prince Albert, at a dinner in Trinity House, has seized the opportunity of stating the position of the Court with regard to the general ferment. He too has a panacea for the crisis. It is: "patriotic, [...] self-denying confidence in the Cabinet!" According to Prince Albert only the despotism of the Cabinet can enable constitutional England to stand up to Russia and wage war against the despotism of the North. The comparison he made between England and Russia was neither striking nor felicitous. For example: The Queen had no power to levy troops nor had she any troops at her command but such as offered their

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a Marx uses the English expression. The meeting was held on June 13, 1855.— Ed.
b In the bosom of the family.— Ed.
c The headquarters of the British mariners' corporation, which received its first charter from Henry VIII in 1514. Trinity House is at Tower Hill.— Ed.
d Prince Albert's address at Trinity House on June 9, 1855, and Palmerston's reply were reported in The Times, No. 22080, June 14, 1855 ("Prince Albert on Public Affairs").— Ed.
e Victoria.— Ed.
services voluntarily! Prince Albert forgets that the Queen has approximately £30 million at her disposal to *buy* troops with. Since when has *forced labour* been more productive than *wage-labour*? What would be said of a Manchester manufacturer who deplored the competition of the Muscovite manufacturers on the grounds that he only had at his disposal workers “offering their services voluntarily”? Instead of emphasising that the Emperor of Russia has had the purpose of his “holy” war clearly and firmly proclaimed to his people from the pulpit, whereas for two years England has been waging a war of which the Prime Minister has said in Parliament that “nobody can state its object”, Prince Albert deplores the fact that

“Her Majesty’s Government can take *no measure* for the prosecution of the war which it has not beforehand to explain in Parliament”!

As though Roebuck’s committee had not been set up only *after* two-thirds of the British army had been sacrificed! As though the debate on the Vienna Conferences had not been held *after* they were over! In actual fact there was not a single explanation of any war measure in Parliament apart from Russell’s blustering, unprovoked announcement of the Sevastopol expedition, whose only aim evidently was to give the Petersburg Cabinet timely warning! And if the blockade was debated it was not because the Ministry took this step but because it proclaimed it without taking it. Instead of deploring that in a war against Russia the Crown was compelled by parliamentary intrigues to submit to the dictatorship of an avowedly Russophile and notoriously peaceful Cabinet, Prince Albert complains, on the contrary, that an unfavourable vote in Parliament “forced the Queen to dismiss her confidential servants”. Instead of rightly complaining that blunders, foibles and acts of villainy which, in Russia, would render generals, ministers and diplomats liable for Siberia, in England are followed at most by a little half-hearted gossip in the press and in Parliament, Prince Albert complains, on the contrary, that

“No mistake, however trifling, can occur, no want or weakness exist, which is not at once denounced, and even sometimes exaggerated, with morbid satisfaction”.

Prince Albert inserted these morbidly irritated expectorations in a toast to his long-standing enemy Lord Palmerston. But Palmerston is not given to magnanimity. He at once used the false

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a Nicholas I.—*Ed.*  
b Palmerston.—*Ed.*
position taken by the Prince in order to beat his own breast in front of him, protesting loudly:

"I am bound to say that the English people have given us the most generous support."

He went further. He declared outright that he possessed "the confidence" of the English people. He spurned the Prince's obtrusive exhortations to the people. He paid court to the people after the Prince had paid court to him. He did not even think it worth the trouble to reply with a compliment to the Crown. Prince Albert had sought to set himself up as the protector of the Ministry, hence proclaiming the Cabinet's "independence" of Parliament and the people; Palmerston replied by pointing out the Crown's "dependence" on the Cabinet.

Written on June 14 and 15, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 277, June 18, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
London, June 16. The debate on Layard's motion was not concluded yesterday but adjourned until Monday evening. So we shall also adjourn our account of it for the time being.

One incident in the Commons sitting deserves mention. During the talks about the Vienna Conference Palmerston had intimated that the Peelites had made the stipulation of certain peace terms a condition for their entry into his Cabinet. Russell defended these same terms in Vienna. Yesterday Otway called on Palmerston to state whether he was adhering to peace terms that had originated from the Peelites, in other words from a party confessedly acting in the interests of Russia. Gladstone rose and demanded that the speaker accusing him and his friends of treason should be called to order. The call to order was made. Otway, however, repeated his description of the Peelites and his question to Palmerston. As is his custom, Palmerston refused to reply. The peace terms were naturally dependent on the events of the war. As regards the Peelites, they had in particular stipulated that a "certain" condition, which he could not name, would not be made a condition sine qua non of peace. In his reply to Palmerston, Gladstone for his part denied ever having had talks with Palmerston about the peace terms. It might be otherwise with his friend Graham. Moreover, he protested against Palmerston's system of affected official reserve on the one side, and the concealed hint, ambiguous
allusion and quasi-statement on the other. Let the ministry speak out frankly or be silent. Gladstone administered this lesson to Palmerston with sanctimonious bitterness.

The French government has issued in the *Constitutionnel* a new exposé of the conduct of the war in the coming months. These exposés have now become not only fashionable but also regular. Although in profound contradiction with themselves, they are valuable as revelations of "various" plans of campaign devised against Russia by Louis Bonaparte. They are valuable insofar as they document the disappearance of one Bonapartist illusion after the other. The first plan was that of "grand war" by means of the Austrian alliance, with 500,000 Austrians and 100,000 Frenchmen on the Vistula and the Dnieper. The plan would have assigned to the French Army the same numerically subordinate relationship to the Austrians as the English have to the French in the Crimea. It would have conceded the revolutionary initiative to Russia. Austria refused to act. The plan was dropped. The second plan was the "war of nationalities", a general rising of the "oppressed, who are constantly looking to the West". It would have provoked a storm between the Germans, Italians and Hungarians on the one side, and the Slav insurrection on the other. Recoiling on France, it would have threatened the "second" Empire with its end. The imitation "man of iron" shrank back from it. The plan was dropped. All this is now over and done with. Austria has done its duty, Prussia has done its duty, the whole world has done its duty, and Bonaparte has come to the third and most modest plan. "Local war for local aims." The French troops in the Crimea are not fighting for glory, they are merely there on police duty. The question to be settled is a purely local one: *predominance in the Black Sea*, and it must be cleared up there, on the spot. It would be foolishness to give the war wider dimensions. "Respectfully but firmly" the allies will crush any Russian attempt to resist them in the Black Sea, and then they or the Russians or both will make peace. Nothing is left of the high-sounding phrases, not even the phrase about civilisation, nothing but the fight for the 3rd point of the Vienna Protocol. *War with a purely local aim*, remarks the imperial oracle, *can only be waged with local means*. Deprive the Russians simply of their predominance in the Black Sea! In our next letter we shall show that Bonaparte has descended from

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\(^a\) A. de Cesena's article on the aims and prospects of the Crimean war published in the semi-official *Constitutionnel*, No. 169, June 18, 1855.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) See this volume, pp. 287-89.— *Ed.*
“grand war” to the “war of the nationalities”, and from the “war of nationalities” to “local war serving local purposes and waged with local means”, and this final war becomes “preposterous”.

Written on June 16, 1855
First published in the Neue Odèr-Zeitung, No. 279, June 19, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, June 18. There were several curious circumstances connected with the publication of Prince Albert's speech and Palmerston's reply. The speeches were made at Trinity Housea on Saturday, June 9. The following Monday the daily newspapers only mentioned the annual dinner of the Trinity Brotherhood in passing, without dwelling on Prince Albert's toast. Not until Wednesday, June 13, did The Daily News print the toast and the speech of thanks, followed by The Times on Thursday, June 14. It has turned out that their publication was a trick of Lord Palmerston's to restore his own popularity at the expense of his royal well-wisher. Prince Albert has now discovered at his own expense where "self-sacrificing confidence" in the noble viscount leads, the sort of confidence that he recommended so eagerly to the country. The following extract from Reynolds' Weekly will show how Prince Albert's toast was received by the majority of the weekly press. Reynolds' Weekly,b it should be noted, has a circulation of 2,496,256 copies. After detailed criticism it goes on to say:

"The royal censor maintains that no want or weakness exist, which is not at once denounced, and even sometimes exaggerated with a kind of morbid satisfaction. The patience of the English people is proverbial; [...] like Issachar, they may be compared to an ass crouched down between two burdens—usury and land monopoly; but this taunt of the Prince-Consort is the most insolent and deadly insult with which even Englishmen have borne. "Morbid satisfaction!" That is, the English people have a

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a The headquarters of the British mariners' corporation in London (for the speeches of Prince Albert and Palmerston see this volume, pp. 273-76).— Ed.
b Reynolds' Weekly Newspaper.—Ed.
'morbid satisfaction' in contemplating the horrible sufferings to which [...] treason and aristocratic imbecility have exposed our heroic soldiers—morbid satisfaction at having been made the dupes of Austria—morbid satisfaction at having squandered 40,000,000l. of treasure and lost 40,000 of the bravest human lives—morbid satisfaction at having excited the distrust of the ally whom we profess to help, and the contempt of the foe whom we wish to chastise. But the charge is not only insolent and insulting, it is also false and calumnious in the highest degree. Whatever may be the faults of the English people—and heaven knows they are many—they have no satisfaction in the miseries and disasters of their soldiers and sailors, nor in the disgrace that have been entailed on the national character [...] with the exception of royal Germans, aristocratic traitors and their abominable and disgusting parasites.... At the same time, we are prepared to admit that it is very difficult for an obese and lazy Sybarite and feather-bed soldier to conceive of the sufferings and trials of real soldiers and sailors.... There is one thing in which we agree with the royal warrior. Constitutionalism is an enormous sham—a most clumsy, bungling, incongruous, and mischievous form of government. But the Prince is silly in supposing that there is no other alternative than despotism. We beg to remind him that there is such a thing as republicanism—an alternative to which it is possible for this nation to have recourse, and in the direction of which, we think, the current of public opinion is tending, rather than to the unlimited despotism which the martial Prince covets."

Thus writes Reynolds' [Weekly Newspaper].

The new Act for the abolition of stamp duty on newspapers received the royal assent last Sunday and will come into force on June 30. Thereafter, stamp duty is only required on copies to be sent free by post. Of the London dailies, The Morning Herald is the only one to announce that it will reduce its price from 5d. to 4d. A large number of weeklies, on the other hand, such as Lloyd's, Reynolds', The People's Paper, etc., have already announced a reduction from 3d. to 2d. A new London daily, the Courier and Telegraph, in the same format as The Times, is announced, price 2d. As for new weekly papers at 2d., the following have appeared in London to date: The Pilot (Catholic magazine); the Illustrated Times and Mr. Charles Knight's Town and Country Paper. Finally Messrs. Willet and Ledger have given notice of a new weekly London penny paper. What is more significant, though, is the revolution in the provincial press caused by the abolition of stamp duty. In Glasgow alone four new daily penny papers are to appear. In Liverpool and Manchester the papers that have hitherto only appeared weekly or twice weekly are to turn into dailies at 3d., 2d., and 1d. The emancipation from London of the provincial press, the

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*a* Reynolds' Newspaper, No. 253, June 17, 1815.—*Ed.*

*b* Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper.—*Ed.*

*c* The Penny Times. Marx uses the English expression "penny paper" here and below.—*Ed.*
decentralisation of journalism was, in fact, the main aim of the Manchester School in their fierce and protracted campaign against stamp duty.

Written on June 18, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 283, June 21, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
In his book on the *Congrès de Vienne* the Abbé de Pradt justly accuses that dancing Congress, as it was called by the Prince de Ligne, of having laid the foundation of Russian supremacy in Europe and given its sanction thereto.\(^{205}\)

"Thus," he exclaims, "it happens that the European war of independence against France terminates with the subjection of Europe to Russia. It was not worth while to fatigue oneself so much for such a result."\(^{205a}\)

The war against France being at the same time a war against the Revolution, an Anti-Jacobin war, naturally led to a transfer of influence from the West to the East, from France to Russia. The Vienna Congress was the natural offspring of the Anti-Jacobin War, the Treaty of Vienna the legitimate product of the Vienna Congress, and Russian supremacy the natural child of the Treaty of Vienna. The crowd of English, French and German writers cannot therefore be allowed to throw all the blame upon Prussia, because Frederick William III, by his blind devotion to the Emperor Alexander and the categorical orders he gave his Ambassadors to side with Russia in all important questions, thwarted that infamous triumvirate, Castlereagh, Metternich and Talleyrand, in their deep-laid schemes to erect safe territorial barriers against Russian encroachments\(^{206}\) and thus ward off the unpleasant but inevitable consequences of the system they had so zealously imposed upon the Continent. Even to such an unscrupulous conclave it was not given to falsify the logic of events.

\(^{205}\) Dominique Dufour de Pradt, *Du Congrès de Vienne*, t. I, p. 262.— *Ed.*
Russia's preponderance in Europe being inseparable from the Treaty of Vienna, any war against that power not proclaiming at the outset the abolition of the Treaty, cannot but prove a mere tissue of shams, delusions and collusions. Now, the present war is undertaken with a view not to supersede but rather to consolidate the Treaty of Vienna by the introduction, in a supplementary way, of Turkey into the protocols of 1815. Then it is expected the conservative millennium will dawn and the aggregate force of the Governments be allowed to direct itself exclusively to the "tranquilization" of the European mind. From the following remarkable passages translated from the Prussian Marshal Knesebeck's pamphlet "relating to the equilibrium of Europe, composed at the meeting of the Vienna Congress," it will be seen that even at the epoch of that Congress, the principal actors were fully aware of the maintenance of Turkey being as much interwoven with "the system" as the partition of Poland.

"The Turks in Europe! What harm have the Turks done to you? They are a powerful and honest people; quiet for centuries among themselves, if you leave them undisturbed, confidence may be placed in them. Have they ever deceived you? Are they not sincere and frank in their policy? Brave and warlike indeed; but this is wholesome and good for more reasons than one. They are the best bulwark against the encroachment of the Asiatic surplus population, and just because they have a footing in Europe they ward off every encroachment. If they were driven away, they themselves would encroach. Just imagine them away. What would happen? Either Russia or Austria would get possession of those entire countries, or a separate Greek State would be founded there. Do you wish to make Russia still more powerful? to draw down on this side also the colossus on your own heads? Are you not yet content that it has advanced its stride from the Volga to the Niemen, from the Niemen to the Vistula, and will now probably extend it as far as the Wartha? And if this be not the case, do you wish to turn the power of Austria in the direction of Asia, and to make it by that means weak or indifferent to the maintenance of its central position to the encroachments from the West? Recall to yourselves the position of the past times of John Sobieski, of Eugène of Savoy, and of Montecucculi. In what way did France at first gain dominion in Germany, but because the power of Austria was of necessity constantly engaged in opposing the encroachments of Asia? Do you wish to restore this state of things, and to increase it still more by bringing it nearer Asia?

"A separate Grecian" or Byzantine "State is, therefore, to be founded! Would this ameliorate the condition of Europe? In the state of torpidity into which that people" (the Greeks) "have sunk, would not Europe, on the contrary, be obliged to be continually under arms to protect itself against the returning Turks? Would not Greece become merely a Russian colony, in consequence of the influence which Russia would possess over this State through religion, commerce and interest? Rather let the Turks alone where they are, and do not arouse the restless power

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a K. F. Knesebeck, *Denkschrift, betreffend die Gleichgewichts-Lage Europas*, beim Zusammentritte des Wiener Congresses verfasst. The excerpts quoted below (with omissions and explanatory addenda) are from pp. 11-14.—Ed.
while it reposes. 'But,' exclaims a well-meaning philanthropist, 'men are maltreated there. The most beautiful part of the world, including the ancient Athens and Sparta, is inhabited by barbarians!'

"It may be all true, my friend: men there are at present, or until lately were, strangled; but they are bastinadoed, beaten, scourged, and sold in other parts. Before you change anything, think whether you could also better at the same moment; whether the bastinado and the rod, with Greek perfidy, would be easier to bear than the silk cord and a firman" with the Turks. "Do away first with those things, and with the slave trade in Europe, and console yourself about the uncivilization of the Turk; his uncivilization has power, his faith gives courage, and we require strength and courage to be able to watch tranquilly the Muscovite pushing himself on as far as the Wartha.

"The Turks are then to be maintained, but the Poles as a nation are to sink! Yes, it cannot be otherwise.

"Whatever has strength to stand, endures; where all is rotten, it must perish. And so it is. Let any one ask himself what would be the result if the Polish nation were maintained independent in its natural character. Drunkenness, gluttony, servility, contempt for all that is better and for every other people, contemptuous derision of all order and custom, extravagance, dissoluteness, venality, cunning, treachery, immorality from the palace to the cottage; that is the element in which the Pole exists. For this he sings his songs, plays on his fiddle and guitar, kisses his mistress and drinks out of her shoe, draws his sword, strokes his moustaches, mounts his horse, marches to battle with Dumouriez and Bonaparte or anybody else on earth, delights in excessive brandy and punch, fights with friend and foe, ill-treats his wife and his serf, sells his property, goes abroad, disturbs half the world, and swears by Kościuszko and Poniatowski Poland shall not die as sure as he is a Pole.

"Here you behold what you would support when you say Poland shall be restored.

"Is such a nation worthy to exist? Is such a people fit for a Constitution? A Constitution presupposes an idea of order, [...] for it does nothing but regulate, and points out to each member of the community the place to which he belongs, for which reason it determines the ranks of which the State is to be composed, and to each rank its place, condition, order, rights and duties, as well as the course of the State machine and the principal traits of its government. What! Rule a people when no one will have order? A Polish King (Stefan Batory) once exclaimed: 'Poles—not order—you know none; not government—you respect none; to a mere chance you owe your continued existence!'

"And thus it is still. Disorder, immorality, is the Poles' element. No; let this people undergo the bastinado. Providence wills it. Heaven knows what is profitable for mankind.

"For the present, therefore, no more Poles!"

Old Marshal Knesebeck's views are then to be realized by the present war—a war undertaken for the extension and consolidation of the Vienna Treaty of 1815. During the whole period of the Restoration and the Monarchy of July there was the delusion afloat in France that Napoleonism meant the abolition of the Treaty of Vienna, which had placed Europe under the official tutelage of Russia, and France under the "surveillance publique" of Europe. Now the present imitator of his uncle, haunted by the
inexorable irony of his fatal position, is proving to the world that Napoleonism means war, not to emancipate France from, but to subject Turkey to, the Treaty of Vienna. War in the interest of the Treaty of Vienna and under the pretext of checking the power of Russia!

This is the true "Idée Napoléonienne," a as interpreted by the resurrection-man at Paris. The English being the proud allies of the second Napoleon, feel themselves, of course, authorized to deal with the sayings of the old Napoleon as his nephew does with his ideas. We are then not to be astonished at reading in a recent English author (Dunlop) b that Napoleon foretold that the next struggle with Russia would involve the great question of whether Europe should be "Constitutional or Cossack." Before the days of the Lower Empire 208 Napoleon was supposed to have said "Republican or Cossack." c However, the world lives and learns.

—And it is for failing to appreciate the glories of the Treaty of Vienna and of the European "system" based upon it, that the Tribune is charged with infidelity to the cause of human rights and of Freedom! 209

Written on June 19, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4437, July 10, 1855 as a leading article

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b This presumably refers to A. G. Dunlop's book Cossack Rule, and Russian Influence in Europe, and over Germany.—Ed.
c A reference to Napoleon's statement on St. Helena that Europe was bound to become "Republican or Cossack" (quoted by E. Las Cases in his Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène..., t. 3, p. 111).— Ed.
London, June 20. The local war proclaimed by Bonaparte in the *Constitutionnel* is a war in the Black Sea, and its purpose is the destruction of the alleged Russian supremacy in the Black Sea—a supremacy, moreover, that has never stood the test at sea, not even against the Turks. What is the state of affairs at the moment? The whole coast, from Constantinople to the Danube on one side and right round the Circassian shores to Balaklava and Eupatoria, has been snatched out of the hands of the Russians. Only Kaffa and Sevastopol are still holding out, with the former hard-pressed and the latter so situated that it will have to surrender as soon as it is seriously threatened. And more. The fleets are carrying out mopping-up operations in the inland sea of Azov, their light ships penetrate as far as Taganrog and every important place is bombarded by them. No part of the coast remains in Russian hands except the stretch from Perekop to the Danube, approximately \( \frac{1}{15} \) of their possessions on this coast. Supposing Kaffa and Sevastopol also fall, and the Crimea is under the control of the allies, then what? Russia will not conclude peace, as it has already proclaimed. It would be madness. It would be tantamount to giving up a battle after the vanguard has been repulsed, at the very moment that the main force is entering the battlefield. What remains for the allies to do? We are told they can destroy Odessa, Kherson, Nikolayev. They can go ahead and land a strong army at Odessa, fortifying it against any number of Russians and then

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\(^a\) A reference to A. de Cesena's article on the aims and prospects of the Crimean war published in the semi-official *Constitutionnel*, No. 169, June 18, 1855.—Ed.
acting according to circumstances. In addition, they can send a
detachment of troops to the Caucasus, wiping out the Russian
army in Georgia and the other trans-Caucasian possessions (under
General Muraviev) and cutting off the Russian Empire from its
south Asian possessions. And if Russia still refuses to make peace?
Russia cannot make peace as long as the enemy remains on its soil.
It has not lost through any peace it has concluded in the last 150
years. Even at Tilsit it acquired additional territory, and that
peace was made before a single Frenchman had set foot on
Russian soil. Having only recently succeeded to the throne,
Alexander II dare not even attempt something that would have
been perilous even for Nicholas. He cannot suddenly break with
the imperial tradition. Supposing the Crimea has been captured
and garrisoned with 50,000 allied troops; that the Caucasus and all
the possessions in the south have been cleared of Russians; that an
allied army is holding the Russians in check at the Kuban and the
Terek; that Odessa has been taken and turned into a fortified
camp with an army of 100,000 men; that Nikolayev, Kherson and
Ismail have been destroyed or occupied by the allies—will the
allies then limit themselves to maintaining their positions and
count on wearing out the Russians? Their troops in the Crimea
and the Caucasus will dwindle from disease faster than they can be
replaced. Their main army at Odessa would have to be supplied
by the fleets, as the land produces nothing for hundreds of miles
around Odessa. Wherever they dared emerge from the camp they
would be exposed to the harassment of the Russians, particularly
the Cossacks. To force the latter to stand and fight would be
impossible. It would always be to their advantage to entice the
allies into the interior of the country. They would respond to all
allied advances with a slow retreat. Moreover, large armies cannot
be kept idle in a fortified camp for long. Disease and the gradual
breakdown of discipline and morale would compel the allies to
take a decisive step. It is therefore not feasible to occupy the main
points of the coast and wait until the Russians find themselves
constrained to give in. It would also be a military blunder. To
control a coast it is not sufficient to hold the main points. Only
possession of the country's interior guarantees possession of the
coast. With the allied forces established on the south coast of
Russia, conditions would arise which would compel them to
advance into the interior. But this is where the difficulties begin.
All the way to the borders of the gubernias of Podolia, Kiev,
Poltava and Kharkov the terrain is mostly uncultivated steppe,
very poorly watered and yielding nothing but grass, and not even
that when the heat of the sun has dried it out. Taking Odessa, Nikolayev and Kherson as their base of operations, where is the object at which the allies are supposed to direct their efforts? There appears to be none except Moscow, 700 miles away and requiring 500,000 men to march on it. But all this presupposes not merely the strict neutrality of Austria but even her moral support. And where is it? In 1854 Prussia and Austria declared the advance of the Russians across the Balkans to be a casus belli. Why not, then, a French advance on Moscow or even Kharkov in 1856? One must never for a moment forget that any army marching from the Black Sea towards the interior of Russia exposes its flank to Austria just as much as a Russian army advancing from the Danube into Turkey, and therefore, at a given distance, renders its lines of communication and its base of operations, i.e. its very existence, dependent on Austria. Should the allied armies pursue the Russians on a wild goose chase into the interior under these circumstances? It is nonsense, sheer nonsense, but it is the inevitable consequence of Bonaparte’s latest plan of “local warfare”. On all counts an inexorable dialectic drives the “local war” beyond the appointed local boundaries, turning it into a “grand” war, but without the prerequisites, conditions and resources of a grand war. Nevertheless, Bonaparte’s latest “plan” remains important. It constitutes an admission that other powers must step on to the stage to continue the war against Russia, and that the restored Empire finds itself condemned to the impotence of waging war on Russia on a local scale when it can only be done on a European scale. All the grotesque metamorphoses undergone by the “idées napoléoniennes” under the restored Empire have been surpassed by the transformation of the Napoleonic war against Russia into a “local war”.

In the debate on administrative reform, to be resumed this evening, the amendment moved by Bulwer on behalf of the Tories gave the government the opportunity of defeating the “administratives” by a majority of 7 to 1.\(^{212}\) What characterised the whole debate was its junior civil-servant nature, which it failed to transcend for a moment. Details of favouritism and nepotism, investigations as to the “best type of examination”, resentment at merit neglected—everything was petty and pusillanimous. One seemed to be listening to a written complaint from an assistant gamekeeper to a

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\(^{a}\) An allusion to Louis Bonaparte’s book Des idées napoléoniennes, which was published in Paris in 1839.—Ed.
government board. Aberdeen, too, had a reform of the bureaucracy *in petto,* Gladstone asserted. Derby too, asserted Disraeli. Not less my Ministry, asserted Palmerston. So the city gentlemen need not swing into action to reform, inform and re-organise our Departments. Too kind!

In their earlier agitation the English bourgeoisie took the ruling caste by surprise and drew the masses behind them as a chorus, by vastly overstating their real purpose in their programme. This time the programme does not even venture to rise to the height of the real purpose. One after the other you assure us that you do not seek the fall of the aristocracy but simply want to patch up the government machine in friendship with us! Very well!* "Friendship for friendship! We are willing to reform the administration for you—within its traditional limits, of course. "Administrative reform" is not a matter of conflict between the classes as you assert. It is simply a question of the "issue", of "well-intentioned" reforms. As initial evidence of your good intentions we ask you to leave the details to us, and it is only a matter of details. We ourselves must know best how far we can go without jeopardising our class, without administrative reform inadvertently becoming a matter of conflict between the classes and forfeiting its philanthropic character. The reforming bourgeoisie are obliged to acquiesce in this ironic language of aristocratic *bonhomie* because they themselves speak a fraudulent language to the masses. The aristocracy, ministry and opposition, Whigs and Tories were never mistaken about the relationship of the Administrative Reformers to the masses. They knew that the agitation had failed before it had even had a chance to be produced in Parliament. And how could they have been mistaken? Although the Reform Association admitted selected guests only to its Drury Lane meeting, although its audience was sifted twice and thrice, their fear of a popular motion, or even simply an unorthodox speech, was so excessive that the chairman* declared at the opening of the meeting that the audience was only there to "listen to the addresses of the speakers announced in the programme", no "resolutions" would be put to the vote, therefore "no amendments could be moved", and "no addition could be made to the list of set speakers". Agitation

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* Up his sleeve.—*Ed.*

* Gladstone’s speech was made on June 15, 1855 and the speeches by Disraeli and Palmerston on June 18. The Times, Nos. 22082 and 22084, June 16 and 19, 1855.—*Ed.*

* Marx uses the English phrase.—*Ed.*

* S. Morley. For a description of the meeting see this volume, p. 274.—*Ed.*
like this is definitely not suitable to impress the tough English oligarchy and wring concessions from it.

The report of the Roebuck committee which was read out in the Commons the day before yesterday envelops its points in a broad, feeble gush of words.\textsuperscript{a} It contains timidly formulated criticism of the various departments, such as Ordnance, the Commissariat, the Medical Department, etc. It condemns Palmerston for his management of the militia, and the entire coalition ministry for the heedless frivolity with which it undertook the Sevastopol expedition. As during the examination of witnesses the committee scrupulously avoided inquiring into the fundamental reasons for the stupendous calamities, it is only natural that in the report, too, it is obliged to keep the balance between quite general criticism of the political heads and petty, detailed faulting of the administrative machinery. On the whole the committee has fulfilled its purpose of acting as a safety-valve for the pressure of public passions.

The daily papers have let out a cry of indignation at the "dastardly murders" by the Russians at Hangö.\textsuperscript{215} The fact that ships sailing under flags of truce have been misused by the British for taking soundings with a plummet and spying out Russian positions, e.g. at Sevastopol and Odessa, is, however, admitted by The Morning Chronicle.\textsuperscript{b}

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\textsuperscript{a} "State of the Army before Sebastopol", The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.—Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} This refers to a Letter to the Editor signed R.G.A. published in The Morning Chronicle, No. 27607, June 20, 1855.—Ed.
ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE TAKING OF SEVASTOPOL.—FROM THE PARIS BOURSE.—ON THE MASSACRE AT HANGÖ IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS

London, June 22. The second act of *La Sonnambula* had just finished, and the curtain of the Drury Lane Theatre was coming down when suddenly a mighty drum-roll summoned the audience back into the auditorium just as they were thronging out for refreshments. The curtain went up again, the manager stepped forward and, with great melodramatic effect, made the following announcement:

"Ladies and gentlemen! I am very happy to be able to announce a great event to you. *The allies have taken Sevastopol."

There were enthusiastic shouts of triumph, people cheered and applauded, bouquets were flying everywhere. The orchestra played and the audience sang "God save the Queen", "Rule Britannia" and "Partant pour la Syrie". A voice from the upper regions shouted "La Marseillaise!", but it died away without an echo. The manager's improvised speech was based on a telegraphic message which did not, however, report the taking of Sevastopol, but on the contrary that the French in their storming of the Malakhov, and the English in their storming of the Redan, on June 18, had been repulsed, suffering considerable losses. That play actor yesterday evening on the stage at Drury Lane copied another manager who almost a year ago, in the middle of a military spectacular, improvised the following unexpected and unforgettable words: "Messieurs, Sevastopol est pris!"

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*a Opera by the Italian composer Vincenzo Bellini.—Ed.*

*b "Leaving for Syria", a song frequently performed at official festivities during the Second Empire in France. The titles of the English songs are given in English in the original.—Ed.*

*c "Gentlemen, Sevastopol has been taken!" — Ed.*
The reason for the incomprehensible obduracy with which Pélissier continues to exhaust the forces of the allied army in one-sided assaults on the southern flank is said to be not military but financial. It is well known that Bonaparte has already drawn bills of exchange for thousands of millions on the prospect of taking Sevastopol and had them discounted by the French nation. He is on the point of drawing bills for another 800 millions or thereabouts.\textsuperscript{217} It therefore seemed essential to make an advance payment on the bills already circulating, and if crossing the Chernaya brings \textit{real results} an assault on the southern flank of Sevastopol promises to produce a \textit{dazzling illusion of success}. “The fall of Sevastopol” would look well in the prospectus for the new loan, and if a loan can be made for the war, why not a war for the loan? Confronted with that point of view, all the criticism based on military science will have to be silent. There is anyway quite a mysterious link between the war in the Crimea and the Bourse at Paris. It is well known that, just as all roads lead to Rome, so all electric wires converge in the Tuileries, where they end in a “secret closet”. It has been noticed that the most important telegrams are published in Paris hours later than in London. During those hours a certain Corsican by the name of Orsi is said to be extremely busy at the Paris Bourse. It is generally known in London that this fellow Orsi was previously the “providential” agent on the London Stock Exchange\textsuperscript{a} of the man in exile at the time.\textsuperscript{b}

If the dispatches from Admiral Dundas, which have been published by the English Cabinet, did not already prove that there was no abuse of a flag of truce on the part of the officers and crew of the boat dispatched by the Cossack, which could serve as a pretext for the Russian \textit{massacre at Hango};\textsuperscript{218} then the story told by the \textit{Invalid Reuse} would dispel any doubt on this point.\textsuperscript{c} Evidently the Russians did not suspect that a sailor, John Brown, had escaped with his life and would testify against them. The \textit{Invalid} therefore considered it superfluous to accuse the English boat of espionage, or of taking soundings, etc., and concocted its tale on the spur of the moment, following Abbé Sieyès in the conviction that “dead men tell no tales”.\textsuperscript{d} The matter was raised in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{a} Marx uses the English term.— \textit{Ed.}
  \item \textsuperscript{b} Louis Bonaparte.— \textit{Ed.}
  \item \textsuperscript{c} Marx refers to the reports on the Hangô events published in \textit{Russky Invalid}, No. 118, June 1, 1855, and \textit{The Times}, No. 22086, June 21, 1855.— \textit{Ed.}
  \item \textsuperscript{d} “La mort sans phrase”—words allegedly uttered by Sieyès when voting in the French Convention on January 17, 1793 for Louis XVI’s execution.— \textit{Ed.}
\end{itemize}
House of Lords yesterday. We cannot, however, agree with *The Times* that this assembly, otherwise "cold and unimpassioned by habit and by policy", was on this occasion trembling with the unadulterated expression of true passion.\(^a\) We find affected indignation in the choice of phrase, but in fact affectionate concern for "Russian honour" and an anxious warding off of national revenge. The Tories' spokesman for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Malmesbury, rose yesterday, set forth the facts briefly and then exclaimed:

"I have ransacked English history, and I cannot find an instance of a similar atrocious act [...]. What course does the Government mean to take under the circumstances? [...] It is a matter of the greatest importance to every officer and every army in Europe that the matter should be noticed and that condign punishment should be meted out to the perpetrators [...]."

*Clarendon*, the Whigs' Foreign Secretary, declared that he shared the "indignation" of his colleague. It is an outrage so horrible and unparalleled, so utterly at variance with the usages and the customs of civilised nations, that we are compelled to believe that the perpetrators of it cannot have acted upon the instructions or with the permission of their superiors. It was possible that the person in command of the 500 Russians had not been a commissioned officer\(^b\) (every English officer down to the rank of lieutenant has a commission, not sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, however). It is therefore quite plausible that the Russian Government disapproved of this act. He had therefore instructed the English Envoy at Copenhagen\(^c\) to request the Danish Envoy at St. Petersburg\(^d\) to state to the Russian Government that the British Cabinet waited with extreme anxiety to learn what steps the Russian Government had taken or intended to take to establish their attitude to an act which might possibly have happened in some one of the savage islands of the South Sea without exciting any degree of surprise, but which was not to be expected in civilised Europe, and which, if not severely and appropriately punished by the Russian Government, would deserve the severest of reprisals. Clarendon closed by saying that the British Government was awaiting the Russian statement before determining what course to adopt.

\(^{a}\) *The Times*, No. 22087, June 22, 1855. The debate in the House of Lords on June 21, 1855, was reported in the same issue of *The Times*.—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) Marx uses the English words "commissioned officer" and, below, "commission".—*Ed.*

\(^{c}\) A. Buchanan.—*Ed.*

\(^{d}\) O. Plessen.—*Ed.*
Lord Colchester believes that

"in any such case as this it was the duty of the officer commanding [...] immediately to communicate by a flag of truce with the highest Russian authority he could find, mentioning the circumstances, and demanding that the atrocity should be disclaimed".

The Earl of Malmesbury rises again and declares that on the whole he has no fault to find with the course taken by the Government, but shudders to have heard Clarendon use the word "reprisal". England must not sink to the level of the Russians in this matter. She must take moral revenge on the Tsar,a have every Court in Europe protest at the St. Petersburg court and thus pronounce an international judgment on Russia. Anything like "revenge" would only serve to increase public "disgust". The nominal president of the English Cabinet,b Earl Granville, avidly seize upon the Tory's words and recites like a good Christian: "No retaliation!"

Now, what does this outburst of passion in the Lords, as The Times calls it, show us? Full of moral indignation the Tory asks a question. The Whig outdoes him in indignation, but himself surreptitiously provides the Russian Government with an excuse and shows them the way to get out of the situation, by repudiating and sacrificing a subaltern. He covers his retreat by muttering something about reprisals "as a possibility". Lord Colchester seeks to chasise the Russians for having murderously attacked intermediaries bearing a flag of truce by sending another intermediary under a flag of truce. The Tory rises again and invokes a moral solution rather than reprisals. The Whig, glad to be rid of reprisals, even only as a possibility, joins in the call for "No retaliation!"c Pure farce. The House of Lords places itself between the passions of the people and Russia in order to protect Russia. The only peer who did not act the part was Brougham. "If ever the land called for blood," he said, "it is now." As far as English sensitivity to "reprisals" and "jus talionis"d is concerned, the Earl of Malmesbury has ransacked English history without finding an Irish page, or an Indian or North American. When was the English oligarchy ever squeamish except in the case of Russia!

In the report of the Roebuck committee, which was read to the House, oddly enough the final paragraph has been suppressed, a

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a Alexander II.—Ed.
b Marx refers here to the Lord President of the Council.—Ed.
c Marx uses the English phrase.—Ed.
d Right of retaliation.—Ed.
paragraph which Roebuck proposed and which was accepted by the committee after a vote. It runs as follows:

"What was planned and undertaken without sufficient information, was conducted without sufficient care or forethought. This conduct on the part of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities which befell our army in the Crimea." \(^a\)

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\(^a\) The report, headlined "State of the Army before Sebastopol", was published in *The Times*, No. 22084, June 19, 1855; the omitted paragraph is quoted here from the article "The Sebastopol Committee", *The Times*, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.— *Ed.*
**Karl Marx**

**THE MISHAP OF JUNE 18.—REINFORCEMENTS**

*London*, June 23. June 18, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, was of course not celebrated in London this year. It was to be celebrated in the Crimea with a victory, not over the French but **alongside** the French. The event seemed all the more piquant since Raglan, Wellington’s famulus, was carrying out his command more or less under the orders of a General of Napoleon III. The inscription was ready, only the event that it was to immortalise failed to happen. It will not escape people’s notice that in the history of the restored Empire there is a fatalistic predilection for resurrecting its great dates, affirming successes and disavowing misfortunes, in a second and improved edition. This glorious resurrection of Napoleonic dates, successful so far with respect to blows against the Republic, is failing with respect to blows against the enemy abroad. And the Empire without the victories of the Empire reminds one of the adaptation of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* which not only lacks the melancholy of the Prince of Denmark but also the Prince himself. Paris had arranged for a great feat of arms in the Crimea on December 2, 1854. It came to grief thanks to a surplus of rain and a shortage of ammunition. On June 18, 1855 an improved version of the battle, with a different result, was to be performed at Sevastopol. Instead, the Franco-English army suffered *its first serious defeat*.

London is in sombre mood; the stocks have fallen, and in one day Palmerston has forfeited what it took him months of the most
subtle tactical manoeuvrings to secure. The defeats occurred on June 18; the telegraphed dispatch was not published until June 22. Last Thursday the official Globe announced on Palmerston's behest that "nothing serious had happened". In the Commons' night sitting of the same date Palmerston solemnly repeated the same statement. And now it has been established that he received the telegram as early as 4 p.m. on Wednesday, June 20. The Leader asserts that this happened at the urgent request of Paris, where the misfortune in the field had been turned into good fortune at the stock exchange. However that may be, the cockneys are seriously annoyed with Palmerston. Being beaten is bad enough. But to let oneself be carried away at Drury Lane and Covent Garden by the Ministers' tricks into ludicrous oations at the capture of Sevastopol—this is too bad, Sir!

We prepared our readers sufficiently for the fact that Pélissier's stubborn persistence in attacking the southern flank heralded disaster for the allied armies. Immediately he assumed command we drew attention to the mitigating circumstance that lack of transport would place great obstacles in his way when it came to operations in the open field. Both points have now been confirmed by the English press. For instance, today's Morning Herald says:

"The army cannot take the field—as, according to all rules of strategy, it ought to do, beat the relieving army at Simpheropol [...]. That it cannot do because the 'Government grave-diggers', Neglect and Delay, have been at their murderous work again, and of 20,000 baggage cattle, which we ought to have, we have not above 4,000 or 5,000; and this while disease is once more becoming rampant in a camp which contains every possible incitement to fever, cholera, and plague. This incapacity of moving them, the same as it was at Varna and in the Valley of Death, is the cause why, day after day, our generals are compelled to waste the lives of our soldiers in desperate attacks upon almost impregnable earthworks, while the noble army that should take the field is lying on the Chernaya, without cavalry or means of transport." 

The ingenious negligence with which, from the outset of the war, the Cabinet administered the resources at its disposal has

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a The Globe and Traveller. Marx refers to the issue of June 21, 1855.—Ed.
b Palmerston made that statement on Friday, June 22. The Times, No. 22088, June 23, 1855.—Ed.
c The Leader, No. 274, June 23, 1855.—Ed.
d Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
e Marx uses the English words "this is too bad, Sir!"—Ed.
f This refers to the German version of the article "Sevastopol" (see this volume, pp. 260-66) and to other articles in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
g The Morning Herald, No. 22465, June 23, 1855.—Ed.
been shown anew by financial reports which have just been published. According to this official report the balance in hand on January 1, 1854 of the money allocated for the army was £1,835,882 and the amount expended on the army on April 1, 1854 was only £2,270,000, so that less than three-quarters of the money voted by Parliament for raising troops was used. And what was it that, according to the report of the Roebuck Committee, ruined the army? Overwork. And what is the reason of this overwork? Lack of numbers. But this lack of numbers, as the financial report shows, was the result of a Cabinet intrigue. And Prince Albert complains that the Queen has no troops at her disposal! And that the Cabinet's hands are tied! The Layard debate revealed that the self-same Cabinet, whilst complaining about lack of transport, sent troopships to Portsmouth via Newcastle-upon-Tyne to collect coal, or from the Clyde to Liverpool and from Deptford to Woolwich to be inspected by the Surveyor. The misfortunes of June 18 have made immediate reinforcements necessary. Accordingly orders were issued yesterday for immediate embarkation: the 15th Infantry Regiment, which has recently returned from Ceylon; the King's 51st Light Infantry Regiment, the 80th and 94th Infantry Regiments, all the India detachments from the various depot companies, and 1,200 men of the cavalry are to leave immediately for the theatre of war. Orders have been telegraphed to Marseilles for special steamships to be sent from there to the Governors of Malta and Gibraltar and to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands with the task of transporting all the men who are fit for service not only from the garrisons but also from the reserve of the Household Brigade and all the reserve battalions that can be spared before the arrival of the relieving regiments and militia. Sailing at once are: the 13th Light Infantry Regiment of Gibraltar, the 31st Infantry Regiment from the Ionian Islands, the 48th from Corfu, the 54th from Gibraltar, the 66th from Gibraltar, and the 92nd Scottish Highland Regiment from Gibraltar. British forces in the Crimea will thus be increased by more than 13,000 men. To this must be added four field batteries, a troop of mounted artillery and reinforcements for the siege train, all of which are ready and are

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a “State of the Army before Sebastopol”, The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.— Ed.
b Victoria. For an account of Prince Albert's speech see this volume, pp. 273-76.— Ed.
c Marx uses the English term.— Ed.
only waiting for ships. Incidentally, England is in the same position as in 1854. No reserve army. And even worse. In 1854, as the Roebuck report admits, Palmerston prevented and delayed the formation of the militia; but in 1855 he succeeded in practically dissolving the militia which was already formed. As one can see from the above list, the reinforcements absorb not only the bulk of the army, but they also swallow up the depot battalions and break up the cadres. Thus England resembles Montesquieu’s savage who fells the tree in order to get hold of the fruit. The economical country *par excellence* is spending its military capital instead of the interest. This is the result of the manoeuvrings of the Cabinet in which Prince Albert demands that one have implicit confidence! Nothing could be less accurate than the view held on the Continent that England has too small a population to be able to raise armies. In 1815, after 22 years of war, England had more than 350,000 men mobilised! But the Cabinet purposely ignores both remedies: raising the bounty for the standing army, and balloting for the militia. What else can one expect from the Prime Minister, whose debts Princess Lieven paid in 1827, and whom she appointed Foreign Secretary in 1830, a man who procured for Russia eight years of dictatorship over Turkey by means of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and eight days before the treaty expired, renewed it in the Dardanelles treaty?²²⁰

Yesterday in the Commons Roebuck gave notice that on July 3 (Tuesday week) he would table the following motion:

“That this House, deeply lamenting the sufferings of our army during the winter campaign in the Crimea, and coinciding with the resolution of their committee that the conduct of the Administration was the first and chief cause of these misfortunes, hereby visits with its severe reprehension every member of the Cabinet whose counsels led to such disastrous results.”

Roebuck’s motion therefore deliberately includes: Palmerston, Russell, Clarendon, Granville and Lansdowne, at one and the same time members of the present Cabinet and the previous one. The small, venomous, Thersites-like but crafty barrister, the perfect master of parliamentary tactics, saw himself forced into tabling this motion, as his constituents at Sheffield threatened to subject him to a vote of no confidence at a public meeting, because he had denounced Palmerston on Tuesday and expressed his confidence in the same Palmerston on Thursday. Prince Albert’s unfortunate interference in matters between the Cabinet

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²²⁰ *The Times*, No. 22088, June 23, 1855.—*Ed.*
and Parliament, and his challenging of the authority of Parliament was a further reason for this motion, which threatens to rob the Queen once more of “her confidential servants”.

We shall report on the latest activities and fortunes of the Administrative Reformers, and the machinations of the clerics next time.

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London, June 25. It is an old and historically established maxim that obsolete social forces which are still nominally in possession of all the attributes of power and continue to vegetate long after the basis of their existence has rotted away, because the heirs are quarrelling among themselves over the inheritance even before the obituary notice has been printed and the testament read, such forces, when they face their final death struggle, will once more muster all their strength, pass from the defensive to the offensive, become defiant instead of evasive and seek to draw extreme conclusions from premises which have not only been put in question but already found wanting. This is the case today with the English oligarchy and the Church, its twin sister. Countless attempts at reorganisation have been made within the Established Church, both the High and the Low Church, attempts to come to an understanding with the Dissenters\textsuperscript{222} and thus to set up a compact force to oppose the impious mass of the nation. There has been a rapid succession of religious coercive measures. The pious Earl of Shaftesbury, formerly known as Lord Ashley, mournfully announced in the House of Lords that in England alone five million had become wholly alienated not only from the Church but from Christianity.\textsuperscript{a} "Compelle intrare",\textsuperscript{b} is the reply of the Established Church. It leaves it to Lord Ashley and similar dissenting, sectarian and overwrought pietists to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for it.

\textsuperscript{a} Shaftesbury's speech on June 12, 1855. The Times, No. 22079, June 13, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} "Compel them to come in, that my house may be filled" (Luke, 14:23).—\textit{Ed.}
The first measure of religious coercion was the Beer Bill, which shut down all places of public entertainment on Sundays, except between 6 and 10 p.m. This Bill was smuggled through the House at the end of a sparsely attended sitting, after the pious men had bought the support of the big public-house owners of London by assuring them that the licensing system would continue, that is, that big capital would retain its monopoly. Then came the Sunday Trading Bill, the third reading of which has now taken place in the Commons and separate clauses of which have just been debated in the Committee of the Whole House. This new coercive measure too was sure to receive the votes of big capital, because only small shopkeepers keep open on Sunday and the proprietors of the big stores are quite willing to do away with the Sunday competition of the small fry by parliamentary means. In both cases there is a conspiracy of the Church with the monopoly of capital, but in both cases religious penal laws are to be imposed on the lower classes to set the conscience of the privileged classes at rest. Just as the Beer Bill did not hurt the aristocratic clubs so the Sunday Trading Bill does not interfere with the Sunday occupations of genteel society. The workers get their wages late on Saturday: it is for them alone that trade is carried on on Sundays. They are the only ones compelled to make their purchases, small as they are, on Sundays. The new bill is therefore directed against them alone. The French aristocracy said in the eighteenth century: For us, Voltaire; for the people, the mass and the tithes. The English aristocracy says in the nineteenth century: For us, sanctimonious phrases; for the people, Christian practice. The classical saints of Christianity mortified their body for the salvation of the souls of the masses; the modern, educated saints mortify the bodies of the masses for the salvation of their own souls.

This alliance between a dissipated, degenerating and pleasure-seeking aristocracy and the Church, an alliance based on squalid profiteering on the part of beer magnates and monopolistic wholesalers, occasioned yesterday a mass demonstration in Hyde Park, the like of which London has not seen since the death of George IV, "the first gentleman of Europe". We saw it from beginning to end and do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the English Revolution began in Hyde Park yesterday. The latest news from the Crimea acted as an effective ferment upon this "unparliamentary", "extraparliamentary", and "anti-parliamentary" demonstration.

—a Marx uses the English terms "Beer Bill" and, below, "Sunday Trading Bill".—Ed.
When someone objected that the Sunday Trading Bill was directed exclusively against the poor and not at all against the rich, Lord Robert Grosvenor, who initiated the Bill, retorted that

"the aristocracy was largely refraining from employing its servants and horses on Sundays".\(^a\)

The following wall poster, issued by the Chartists, which could be seen throughout London at the end of last week announced in huge letters:

"New Sunday Bill prohibiting newspapers, shaving, smoking, eating and drinking and all kinds of recreation and nourishment, both corporal and spiritual, which the poor people still enjoy at the present time. An open-air meeting of artisans, workers and 'the lower orders' generally of the capital will take place in Hyde Park on Sunday afternoon to see how religiously the aristocracy is observing the Sabbath and how anxious it is not to employ its servants and horses on that day, as Lord Robert Grosvenor said in his speech. The meeting is called for three o'clock on the right bank of the Serpentine (a small river in Hyde Park) on the side towards Kensington Gardens. Come and bring your wives and children in order that they may profit by the example their 'betters' set them!"

It should be borne in mind, of course, that what Longchamps\(^b\) means to the Parisians, the riding track along the Serpentine in Hyde Park means to the English *haute volée*\(^c\)—the place where in the afternoon, particularly on Sunday, they parade their magnificent carriages and their finery and exercise their horses, followed by swarms of lackeys. It will be realised from the above poster that the struggle against clericalism assumes the same character as every serious struggle in England—that of a class struggle waged by the poor against the rich, the people against the aristocracy, the "lower orders" against their "betters".

Approximately 50,000 people had gathered at the place announced on the immense lawn on the right bank of the Serpentine in Hyde Park at about 3 o'clock. Gradually the assembled multitude swelled to a total of at least 200,000 due to additions from the other bank. One could see that small groups of people were made to move from one spot to another. The police, who were present in force, were obviously endeavouring to deprive the organisers of the meeting of what Archimedes had asked for to move the earth, namely, one firm spot to stand upon. Finally a fairly large crowd made a firm stand and Bligh the Chartist constituted himself chairman on a small eminence in the midst of the throng. No sooner had he begun his harangue than

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\(^a\) From Grosvenor's speech in the House of Commons on June 13, 1855. *The Times*, No. 22080, June 14, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) A hippodrome on the outskirts of Paris.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The upper crust.—*Ed.*
Police Inspector Banks at the head of 40 truncheon-swinging constables explained to him that the Park was the private property of the Crown and that meetings could not be held there. After some negotiations in which Bligh sought to demonstrate to him that parks were public property and in which Banks rejoined he had strict orders to arrest him if he should insist on carrying out his intention. Bligh shouted amidst the bellowing of the masses surrounding him:

"Her Majesty's police declare that Hyde Park is private property of the Crown and that Her Majesty is unwilling to let her land be used by the people for their meetings. So let's move to Oxford Market."

With the ironical cry: "God save the Queen!" the throng broke up to walk to Oxford Market. But meanwhile Finlen, a member of the Chartist Executive, rushed to a tree some distance away followed by a crowd who in a twinkle formed so close and compact a circle around him that the police abandoned their attempt to get at him.

"Six days a week," he said, "we are treated like slaves and now Parliament wants to rob us of the bit of freedom we still have on the seventh. These oligarchs and capitalists allied with sanctimonious parsons wish to do penance by mortifying us instead of themselves for the unconscionable murder in the Crimea of the sons of the people."

We left this group to approach another where a speaker stretched out on the ground addressed his audience from this horizontal position. Suddenly, shouts could be heard on all sides: "Let's go to the Row, to the carriages!" The heaping of insults upon riders and occupants of carriages had already begun. The constables, who constantly received reinforcements from the city, drove the promenading pedestrians off the road. They thus helped to form a thick throng of people on either side of Rotten-Row, from Apsley House along the Serpentine as far as Kensington Gardens—a distance of more than a quarter of an hour walk. The spectators consisted of about two-thirds workers and one-third members of the middle class, all with women and children. The involuntary actors comprising elegant ladies and gentlemen, "commoners and lords", in their high coaches-and-four with liveried lackeys in front and behind, joined by a few elderly gentlemen on horseback slightly under the weather from the effects of wine—were not showing off this time but were made to run the gauntlet. A babble of jeering, taunting, discordant ejaculations, in which no language is as rich as English, enveloped

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a Victoria.— Ed.
b Marx uses the English words.— Ed.
them from both sides. As it was an improvised concert, instruments were lacking. The chorus therefore had to use its own organs and was compelled to confine itself to vocal music. And what a diabolical concert it was: a cacophony of grunting, hissing, whistling, squeaking, snarling, growling, croaking, shrieking, groaning, rattling, howling, gnashing sounds! A music that could drive men mad and move a stone. To this must be added outbursts of genuine old-English humour peculiarly mixed with long-contained seething wrath. “Go to church!”a were the only articulate sounds that could be distinguished. One lady soothingly offered a prayer book in conventional binding from her carriage. “Give it to read to your horses!”b came the thunderous reply, shouted by a thousand voices. When the horses started to take fright and began to rear, buck and finally run away, jeopardising the lives of their genteel burdens, the derisive shouting grew louder, more menacing and more ruthless. Some of the noble lords and ladies, among them Lady Granville, the wife of a minister and President of the Privy Council, were forced to alight and use their own legs. When some elderly gentlemen rode past whose apparel and especially their broad-brimmed hats betrayed their special claim to perfectitude in matters of belief, the cries of fury as if by command were drowned by irrepressible laughter. One of these gentlemen lost his patience. Like Mephistopheles he made an impolite gesture, sticking out his tongue at the enemy.c “He is a word-catcher, a parliamentary man! He fights with his own weapons!”d someone shouted on one side of the road. “He is a saint! He is psalm singing!” was the antistrophe from the opposite side. Meanwhile the metropolitan electric telegraph had informed all police stations that a riot was about to break out in Hyde Park and the police were ordered to the theatre of military operations. Soon one detachment after another marched at short intervals through the double file of people, from Apsley House to Kensington Gardens, each received with the popular ditty:

“Where are gone the geese?
Ask the police!”c

a Marx uses the English words “Go to church!” followed by a German translation in brackets.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English words “prayer book” and “Give it to read to your horses!” followed by a German translation in brackets.—Ed.
c Cf. Goethe, Faust, Der Tragödie erster Teil. Hexenküche.—Ed.
d Marx gives these and the following exclamations in English and translates them in brackets.—Ed.
e Marx quotes in English and gives the German translation in brackets.—Ed.
This was an allusion to a notorious theft of geese which a constable had perpetrated in Clerkenwell a short time ago. The spectacle lasted three hours. Only English lungs could perform such a feat. During the performance opinions such as “This is only the beginning!” “That is the first step!” “We hate them!” and the like were voiced by various groups. While rage was inscribed on the faces of the workers, such smiles of blissful self-satisfaction covered the physiognomies of the middle classes as we had never seen there before. Shortly before the end the demonstration increased in violence. Canes were menacingly raised at the carriages and the cry of “you rascals!” could be heard through the welter of discordant noises. During the three hours zealous Chartists, men and women, made their way through the throng distributing leaflets which stated in big type:

“Reorganisation of Chartism!

“A big public meeting will take place next Tuesday, June 26th, in the Literary and Scientific Institute in Friar Street, Doctors’ Commons, to elect delegates to a conference for the reorganisation of Chartism in the capital. Admission free.”

Most of the London papers carry today only a brief account of the events in Hyde Park. No leading articles have appeared as yet, except in Lord Palmerston’s Morning Post. It writes that

“a scene in the highest degree disgraceful and dangerous was enacted yesterday in Hyde Park”, an “outrage on law and decency. [...] It was distinctly illegal to interfere, by physical force, with the free action of the Legislature [...]. We must have no repetition of violence on Sunday next, as has been threatened”.

At the same time, however, it declares that the “fanatical” Lord Grosvenor is solely “responsible” for this mischief, and that he has provoked the “just indignation of the people”! As though Parliament had not passed Lord Grosvenor’s Bill in three readings! Or perhaps he too brought his influence to bear “by physical force on the free action of the Legislature”?

Written on June 25, 1855

First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 295, June 28, 1855

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a Marx uses the English words followed by a German translation in parenthesis.— Ed.

b The Morning Post, No. 25422, June 25, 1855.— Ed.
London, June 26. During yesterday's sitting in the Commons\textsuperscript{a} Mr. Otway rose and asked whether Lord Palmerston

"intended to take any measures to induce Lord Grosvenor to withdraw the Sunday Trading Bill." (General cheering\textsuperscript{b})

Lord Palmerston replied:

"If my noble friend" (Grosvenor) "hears that cheer I think he will be disposed to attend to it." (Cheers.)

As one can see the mass demonstration in Hyde Park has intimidated the Commons. They are dropping the Bill and make bonne mine à mauvais jeu.\textsuperscript{c} \textit{The Times} describes the scene on Sunday in Hyde Park as a "great act of retributive justice", and calls the Bill a product of "class legislation", "a measure of organised hypocrisy" and pokes fun at this display of "parliamentary theology".\textsuperscript{d}

On the question of the Hangō massacre\textsuperscript{225} the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Charles Wood, announces that today he has received dispatches from Admiral Dundas. According to them five seamen and the Finnish captain had been killed by the fire of the Russians, four seamen and two Finns had been wounded and

\textsuperscript{a} The speeches by Otway, Palmerston, Wood, Duncombe and Malins were published in \textit{The Times}, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Marx uses the English terms "Sunday Trading Bill" and "cheers".—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} Make the best of a bad job.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{d} \textit{The Times}, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
taken prisoner, and three officers, four seamen and two Finns had been taken prisoner without being wounded. Admiral Dundas had written a letter to the Governor of Helsingfors stating what had happened and remonstrating most strongly against the atrocious act of firing on a boat under a flag of truce. He had received an answer in which the Governor excused and to a certain extent justified the act. He declared that the officers and soldiers said they had not seen the flag of truce. They had been irritated because on some other occasions vessels had hoisted the Russian flag and it had been reported in the newspapers that English vessels had elsewhere hoisted the flag of truce to take soundings. The whole justification can be reduced to the short-sightedness of the Russian soldiers and officers. At any rate it is a sign of civilisation that Russian soldiers should read newspapers and be “irritated” by newspaper reports.

The Administrative Reformers have announced another meeting for tomorrow in the Drury Lane [Theatre]. As before: a meeting with tickets of admission and speakers by previous arrangement. Pontius Pilate asked: What is truth? Palmerston asked: What is worthiness? The Administrative Reformers have replied: worthiness is equivalent to a man’s annual earnings. Accordingly those reformers have undertaken a change in their internal organisation. Previously the members of the general committee—in reality electing themselves—had to go through the motions of an election in the form of a general vote taken within the association. Now anyone who pays £50 and above in annual subscriptions becomes a member of the general committee as a matter of course. Previously the ten-guinea and the one-guinea rule were considered sufficient for protecting the “movement” from plebeian importunity. Now the ten-guinea gentlemen are no longer considered sufficiently “respectable” and the one-guinea people are actually regarded as the mob. The posters advertising the meeting say literally:

“Admission only by ticket, which can be obtained by members. Anyone subscribing £50 and above is a member of the general committee, anyone subscribing ten guineas or one guinea is a member of the association.”

The rights of members within the association are therefore calculated according to a sliding scale of guineas. The naked,

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*a* J. M. Nordenstam.—*Ed.*

*b* In the original a pun on the word “Verdienst” which can mean either “merit”, “deserts”, “worthiness” or “earnings”, “income”.—*Ed.*
undisguised dominion of guineas is brutally proclaimed. The City reformers have let their secret out. What agitators! Moreover, circumstances were not very favourable for them lately. Drummond openly accused them in Parliament of "systematic immorality" and "corruption". And what fine examples of the purity of their class have followed each other in rapid succession, as if on command! Firstly The Lancet (medical journal) furnishes proof that the adulteration and contamination of all goods and foodstuffs is a practice by no means confined to the retail traders, but is done in the wholesale trade as a matter of principle. Then it transpires that "respectable" City firms have been circulating false dock warrants. Finally, the great fraudulent bankruptcy, directly connected with the theft of deposited securities, of the private bank of Strahan, Sir Jones Paul and Bates. In this last instance the aristocracy has learned to do homage to the "administrative" talent of the City gentlemen, for the bank "administered" mainly aristocratic guineas. Palmerston is amongst those to suffer, as is the Marquess of Clanricarde, and Admiral Napier has lost almost all his wealth. The Church has also been deprived of a good deal of worldly goods, since Messrs Strahan, Paul and Bates enjoyed a particular odour of sanctity, occasionally chaired meetings for the "conversion of heathens" at Exeter Hall, were amongst the first subscribers to the society for "the Dissemination of the Bible" and were on the committee of the "Association for the Reform of Criminals". Their faith had secured them credit. They were the favourite bank of clerical gentlemen and independent foundations. But their "administrative" talent spared nothing and no one from widows' and orphans' allowances down to the small savings of sailors. Why not let them administer the "public funds" which they are now reaching out for?

"There are symptoms at this moment among ourselves," ruefully exclaims The Daily News, the organ par excellence of the City reformers, "which indicate that no time is to be lost in averting a dangerous lapse from a high and severe tone of morality among our industrial classes."

The crisis of Messrs Strahan and Co. has of course given rise to a run by the public on the counters of the City's private banks,

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1 Marx refers to Drummond's speech in the House of Commons on June 18, 1855. The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.—Ed.
2 Marx uses the English words "dock warrants".—Ed.
3 Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
which up to then had been regarded as far more respectable than
the joint stock banks. Already the big private bankers are obliged
"publicly" to invite each other periodically to examine their
holdings of securities deposited with them, and also to request
their customers through *The Times* to inspect for themselves the
effects entrusted to them. Another circumstance which arises at a
very inopportune moment for the reforming City gentlemen is the
following: As is well known, one of their kings, *Rothschild*, is
standing as their elected representative at the threshold of the
Commons, but is not being allowed to enter that Holy of Holies
because *he* will not swear "on the true oath of a Christian" and
because Lord *John Russell*, his colleague, will not "realise" the
Jewish Bill.*227* And yesterday *Duncombe* rose to his feet hav-
ning found out that, under an Act of Parliament of 1782, any
member entering into a delivery contract with the government
*after* he has been elected loses his seat in the House of Commons,
and that Rothschild had stood security for the most recent loan of
£16,000,000. Having discovered this he gave notice that tomorrow
evening he would move that a writ be issued for a by-election in
the City of London. And there is more. Malins followed in
Duncombe’s wake and gave notice of a similar motion against
*Lindsay*, who had been directly charged by Sir Charles Wood in
the reform debate with having negotiated contracts with the
government for the supplying of ships, while he was and still is a
member of Parliament. The incident is not only important because
of the people who have been compromised, a City magnate and a
City reform magnate! It is important because it reminds the public
that it was amongst the high dignitaries of the City, those people
entering into contracts for loans and supplies with the government
both inside and outside Parliament, that Pitt, Perceval and
Liverpool, who ignored the act of 1782, found their main sup-
port. The financial aristocracy—at that time more corrupt
than under Louis Philippe—was the moving-force of the anti-
Jacobin war. Whilst they plucked the golden apples of the
Hesperides, they demonstrated to the nation in notorious City
meetings that

"it must sacrifice money and blood in order to preserve the blessed comforts of
our holy religion from the desecrating French, and to preserve itself from the
mournful desperation of atheism”.

Thus the nation is reminded, at the most inopportune time, that
the City, which is rebelling against the oligarchy, was the forcing
house in which that same oligarchy grew and put forth its most luxuriant blooms.

Written on June 26, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 297, June 29, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Contrary to public expectation the mail of the Pacific, which arrived yesterday morning, brings no detailed account of the repulse of the Allies at Sevastopol on the 18th of June. We have, it is true, some bare statements respecting the number of killed and wounded in that affair, on which we briefly comment below. But instead of the expected dispatches, we have at last Gen. Pélissier's detailed account of the capture of the Mamelon and Quarries. Even this however is not of a nature to distinctly show the drift of the military policy of the man who now virtually commands the 200,000 allied troops in the Crimea. We have to trust to negative rather than positive evidence if we desire to come to a conclusion on that subject. To guess what Pélissier intends to do, we must look not so much at what he does as at what he refrains from doing. But let us look again at the capture of the Mamelon; it has some features that repay examination.

The 6th and 7th of June were devoted to a cannonade on the whole line of the allied batteries. But while on the left attack (the Flagstaff to the Quarantine Bastion) this cannonade was a mere demonstration, on the right attack (Redan to Mount Sapun) it was in good earnest. Here the Russian outworks were particularly subjected to a heavy fire. Their fire appearing to be sufficiently silenced and their defenders sufficiently weakened, on the evening of the 7th the assault was ordered. The French had two distinct positions to carry, forming two plateaux, separated from each other by a ravine; the English one plateau, with a ravine on either

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a Instead of this paragraph the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "Detailed and official dispatches about the events of June 6, 7 and 8 arrived only a few days ago." — Ed.
side. The mode in which the two armies prepared for the assault was characteristic of their peculiar qualities and traditions. The French set apart four divisions, two for each separate attack. Thus, against the Mamelon Vert (Kamtchatka redoubt) two divisions were collected, and two more against Mount Sapun; each attack having two brigades, in distinct columns, in front for the charge, and two brigades in reserve. Thus eighteen battalions were to charge and eighteen to support—in all at least 28,000 to 30,000 men. This disposition was perfectly in accordance with the regulations and traditions of the French army, which in grand charges always attacks in columns, and sometimes in rather too unwieldy ones. The English, if formed in the same way, would have required two divisions for their part of the business; two brigades for the attack and two for the reserve. True to their own system, however, they told off for the charge about 1,000 men, or about two battalions—hardly equal to half a French brigade. They had strong reserves no doubt; but, nevertheless, where the French would have employed three men they employed only one. This is a consequence partly of the British system of attacking in line instead of in column, and partly of the great tenacity of the British soldier in defensive positions. These 1,000 British soldiers were not even let loose all at once; at first 200 charged and carried the Russian works; then 200 more were sent as a reinforcement; the remainder followed in the same way; and then 1,000 British soldiers, once established in the Russian position, held it against six successive attacks, and under the continuous front and enfilading fire of the Russian works. When the morning dawned, of their number above one-half were dead or wounded; but the place was theirs, and some of them had even now and then followed the Russians into the Redan. This was an exploit which no 1,000 Frenchmen could have achieved. But the passive endurance of the British soldier under fire knows hardly any bounds; and when, as in that night, the hand-to-hand combat takes the form of his favorite amusement, the street-row, then he is in his own element, and will fight six to one with all the reckless delight in the world.

As to the French attack, Gen. Pélissier gives us a long account of the brigades and regiments engaged, and has a complimentary

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\*a\* Instead of this sentence the German version has: "These 1,000 British soldiers were not even let loose all at once; at first 200 charged and carried the Russian works; the remainder followed in the same way, and these British soldiers, once established in the Russian position, held it against successive attacks, and under the continuous front and enfilading fire of the Russian works." — Ed.
word for each of them; but his statements as to the respective positions and lines of attack of each column are very indistinct, while his narrative of the development of the action is almost incomprehensible, and an indication of the losses is entirely wanting. By comparing this official bulletin with other accounts, we are enabled to make out that the French took the Mamelon in the first onset, followed the retiring Russians up to the Malakoff bastion, entered it here and there, were repulsed by the Russians, again lost the Mamelon, drew up in a semi-circle behind it, and by another advance finally took possession of it. On the other side of the Careening Bay ravine the Volhynsk redoubt was taken with little loss; the struggle at the Selenghinsk redoubt, which is situated to its rear, was more severe, but nothing like that at the Mamelon. Owing to the exaggerated number of troops which Pélissier brought to bear upon the points attacked, and to the unwieldy columns they must have formed, the French loss must have been very great. The fact that no official statement of it has been made, is sufficient to prove this. We should say from 1,500 to 2,000 would not be exaggerated.

As to the Russians, they were placed in peculiar circumstances. They could not garrison these outworks with great numbers of men, as this would have been to expose them to certain destruction by the enemy's artillery, even before the assault was attempted. Thus, they could only keep a minimum of defenders in these redoubts, and had to trust to the commanding fire of their artillery in the Malakoff and the Redan, as well as to the action of their reserves in the place. They had two battalions—about 800 men—in the Mamelon. But the redoubts once taken, they never got into them again so as to establish themselves properly. They discovered that a besieged army may very quickly lose a position, but cannot easily regain it. Beside this, the Mamelon redoubt was so complicated in its construction, by traverses and blindages, forming a sort of impromptu casemates, that although exceedingly well covered against artillery, its garrison was almost helpless against an assault—each compartment being scarcely capable of holding a gun and the men to serve it. As soon, therefore, as the guns were dismounted, the infantry who had to defend the work against an assault, had no space for a position from which they could act upon the assaulting columns by simultaneous fire in masses. Broken up into small detachments they succumbed to the

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a This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
b The last two sentences do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
impetuosity of the assailants, and again proved that where they cannot fight in large masses, the Russian infantry neither equals the intelligence and quickness of glance of the French, nor the desperate bull-dog valor of the English.

The engagement of the 7th was followed by a ten days' repose, during which trenches were finished and connected, batteries traced, and guns and ammunition brought up. At the same time two reconnaissances were pushed into the interior of the country. The first, to Baidar, 12 miles from Balaklava, on the road which leads down to the south coast, was merely preliminary; the second, toward Aitodor, six miles beyond Chorgun, on the Chernaya, was made in the right direction. Aitodor is situated on the high ground leading toward the valley of the Upper Belbek, by which alone, as we have stated long ago, the Russian position at Inkermann can be effectually turned. But then, to send a reconnoitring column thither, and not to follow it up by occupying the ground in force and commencing operations at once, is nothing but putting the enemy on his guard by pointing out to him from which side he is menaced. Now, it may be that the country about Aitodor was found impracticable, but we doubt it; and even in that case, the intention of a flank march to turn the enemy is too plainly indicated in this maneuver. If this flank march could be used as a mere feint, well and good; but we are convinced that it must be made the chief movement, and therefore it should not be hinted at before the Allies really mean to undertake it.

Instead, however, of following up these weak demonstrations in the field, General Pélissier attempted something very different. The 18th of June, Waterloo day, saw the English and French troops marching abreast to storm the Russian lines on the right attack. The English attacked the Redan, the French Malakoff. Waterloo was to be thus avenged; but unfortunately the affair went wrong. They were both repulsed with terrific slaughter. The official lists state their loss at about 5,000, but from the known want of veracity in the French accounts we are induced to calculate it about 50 per cent higher. As no particulars have been received, the tactical features of this battle must be left entirely

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\[a\] See this volume, pp. 201-04.—Ed.

\[b\] Instead of this sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "The intention of a flanking march to bypass the enemy was too plainly indicated in this manoeuvre to be misunderstood by the Russians." The rest of this paragraph does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
aside for the present. What we can take into consideration now is its strategical and political nature.

Pélissier is held up by the entire press of Europe as a man who will not be commanded by telegraph from Paris, but who acts unflinchingly by his own judgment. We have had reasons to doubt this peculiar sort of obstinacy, and the fact of his attempt to avenge Waterloo "nobly," that is by a common victory of the French and English, fully confirms our doubt. The idea of such a feat could only come from his Majesty, the Emperor of the French—the great believer in anniversaries, the man who cannot let the 2d of December\(^a\) pass by in any year without attempting some extraordinary trick; the man who, before the Chamber of Peers,\(^b\) said that his special vocation was to avenge Waterloo. That Pélissier had the strictest orders to celebrate the Battle of Waterloo by a splendid anniversary there can be no doubt. The way in which he did it is the only part of the business for which he is responsible.\(^c\)

The assault upon the lines of the redoubt of Karabelnaya must, as we are more than ever convinced, be considered a blunder. But until we know the man thoroughly, we will continue to give Pélissier the benefit of every circumstance which at this distance from the spot may appear to involve a doubt. Now, it may be that the sanitary state of the Heracleatic Chersonese—a subject to which we long since called attention\(^d\)—is such that a speedy termination of the operations in that small space of ground is highly desirable. The exhalations from the decomposing bodies of 25,000 men and 10,000 horses are such as to seriously affect the health of the army during Summer. Of the other abominations accumulated there we will not speak. Pélissier may think that it is

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\(^a\) I.e., the anniversary of the Bonapartist coup in France, which took place on December 2, 1851.—\(Ed.\)

\(^b\) The Senate.—\(Ed.\)

\(^c\) Instead of the preceding two paragraphs the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "Instead of following up these weak demonstrations in the field Pélissier undertook the abortive assault of June 18. He did this on the orders of the man who had declared before the Chamber of Peers that 'his special vocation was to avenge Waterloo'. Pélissier is only responsible for the way he carried out his instructions. As no detailed reports have been forthcoming so far, the tactical features of this battle cannot be judged for the present. As regards strategy, every child realises now that the nearest road to Sevastopol leads through Inkerman and the Russian army defending it." The passage that follows, up to the words "The necessity of reinforcing her force in the Crimea...", does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—\(Ed.\)

\(^d\) See this volume, pp. 109-12, 113-17, 215-17.—\(Ed.\)
possible in a short time to drive the Russians from the south side, to destroy the place completely, to leave but a few men to guard it, and then to take the field with a strong army. We make this supposition because we prefer to see at least some rational motive in the actions of an old soldier. But if this is the case he mistook the strength of the place. We said at the time, that any attempt to follow up the successes of the 7th against the town itself would be defeated\textsuperscript{a}; our opinion is confirmed by events. We said the key to Sevastopol lay north of Inkermann\textsuperscript{b}; the engagement of the 18th seems to prove it.

Thus we are ready to admit that Gen. Pélissier was led by perfectly logical considerations to prefer an assault on Karabelnaya to an advance into the field; but at the same time we must equally admit that people on the spot are very apt to take minor facts for the premises of their conclusions, and that Pélissier, by the repulse of the 18th, appears to be convicted of having given in to this weakness; for if it shows strength of character to stick obstinately to the business in hand, it equally shows weakness of intellect to follow up that business in a roundabout way, because it has once been entered upon. Pélissier would be right in attempting to take Sevastopol at all hazards; but he is evidently wrong in not seeing that the nearest road into Sevastopol leads through Inkermann and the Russian army defending that position.

Unless the allied armies take good care to profit without delay by their superiority, they will before long find themselves in a very awkward position. The necessity of reenforcing her force in the Crimea has long been recognized by Russia. The completion of the reserve battalions of the regular army, and the levy and organization of the militia in 200 battalions, \textsuperscript{c} but more especially the reduction of the Austrian army of observation to 180,000 men—the rest being either dismissed on furlough or stationed in the interior of the empire—now offer an opportunity to do this. In consequence a reserve army has been formed at Odessa, about 25,000 men of which are said to be stationed at Nikolaieff, some twelve to fifteen days' march from Sevastopol. Two divisions of grenadiers are also said to be on the march from Volhynia. By the middle of July therefore, and perhaps sooner, the Russians may again have recovered the superiority of numbers, unless decisive

\textsuperscript{a} See this volume, pp. 264-66.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} See this volume, p. 249.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{c} In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the words between the dashes do not occur.—\textit{Ed.}
defeats of the troops now opposing the Allies occur in the mean
time. We are, indeed, informed that 50,000 more Frenchmen are
marching to Toulon and Marseilles for embarkation; but they will
certainly be too late, and can hardly do more than fill up the gaps
which battle and sickness (now reappearing in the allied camp)
have made in the ranks.\(^a\)

The operations in the Sea of Azoff have destroyed one source
of supply for the Russians; but as the Dnieper is far more than the
Don the natural outlet of the Russian corn districts, there is no
doubt that great quantities of it are at Kherson—more than the
Russians in the Crimea require to feed them. Thence the
transport to Sympheropol is so not very difficult. Whoever expects
from the Azoff expedition a serious and immediate effect on the
provisioning of Sevastopol, labors under a great error.

The scales, though for some time past turned in favor of the
Allies, may yet be balanced again, or even be turned against them.
The Crimean campaign is far from being decided, if the Russians
act promptly.

Written about June 29, 1855

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4439, July 12, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1057, July 13, 1855 and the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 772, July 14, 1855 as a leading article; an abridged and altered German version was first published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 301, July 2, 1855, marked with the sign x

\(a\) The German version ends here.—Ed.
London, June 30. As Lord Grosvenor refuses to withdraw his Sunday Trading Bill voluntarily, posters have appeared in London's busiest streets today inviting people to attend another monster demonstration in Hyde Park tomorrow afternoon. When Grosvenor asked whether the sudden change in opinion of the majority was inspired by the mob in Hyde Park, the House was childish enough to reply with a vigorous No! No! b

In passing, replying to the question of a Tory peer, Panmure mentioned that the Ministers had issued a proclamation to the army in the name of the Queen, according to which certain corps and certain regiments, those at present in the theatre of war, are to receive (not only for the duration of their present service but also back-dated for several months) a significant increase in pay and an increase in their pensions. c This announcement has, for the time being, been made in the name of the Queen, d while the House of Commons was in session and without the Ministers giving the House any information. Thus the Ministers are arrogating to themselves a right which constitutionally is the exclusive prerogative of the House of Commons, that of fixing the pay of the army. However, they have to go before the House in a few weeks' or days' time to have their promised increases passed.

a Marx uses the English name.— Ed.
b Marx uses the English words "No! No!". It was on June 26, 1855 that Grosvenor asked a question in the House of Commons about the demonstration in Hyde Park on June 24 (see this volume, pp. 303-04).— Ed.
c Panmure's speech in the House of Lords on June 28, 1855, in reply to a question by Richmond. The Times, No. 22093, June 29, 1855.— Ed.
d Victoria.— Ed.
But the proclamation anticipated the vote of the House. If the House were to reject the demand it would come into conflict with the army. This is the answer to the finding of the Roebuck Committee to the effect that the Ministry was responsible for the misfortunes endured by the army. A step in the direction pointed by Prince Albert.\footnote{For an account of Prince Albert’s speech see this volume, pp. 273-76.—Ed.}

Bouverie’s Bill, which had its second reading in the House of Commons yesterday,\footnote{June 29, 1855. The Times, No. 22094, June 30, 1855.—Ed.} is significant as far as English commercial law is concerned. In England up to now anyone receiving a definite share of the profits of a business was regarded as a partner and as such was liable with the whole of his possessions for the commercial commitments of that business. Bouverie’s Bill, tabled in the name of the Ministry, aims to abolish this legal obligation. Even more important is his Bill concerning joint-stock companies. Up to now every member of a company of this kind was liable not only for the sum of his own share but also to the full extent of his possessions for all the obligations of the company. According to one of the Bills the liability of the individual shareholder is to be limited to the amount of the shares he holds but this applies only to companies whose total capital amounts to at least £20,000, the articles of association of which are signed by shareholders whose shares total at least £15,000, and where at least 20 per cent of the total capital has been paid up. The mere necessity of a law of this kind proves how much the legislature has been in the hands of high finance until now, which has succeeded, in this the first trading nation in the world, in subjecting commercial contracts to the most absurd and arbitrary legal restrictions. The new Bill claims that it is its principle “to place labour and small capitalists on an equal footing (in terms of commercial law) with big capital.” And how is this to be done? By excluding share-capital amounting to less than £20,000 from the benefits of this law and allowing it to remain subject to the old restrictions. Nothing proves more conclusively than the English legislation on joint-stock companies and commercial companies in general that big capital, not content with the superior economic weapons with which it fights the competition from the small capitalists, in England also resorts to legal privileges and exceptional laws. Until a few years ago, for example, a bank was not allowed to comprise more than six partners. It was a long time before joint-stock companies acquired the right to take legal action in the name of their boards.
of directors or have actions brought against them. In order, however, to enjoy this privilege they must be registered or incorporated, and a law dating from 1837 declares that the Crown has the right to incorporate only on the basis of a report from the Board of Trade,\(^a\) so that whether a company is incorporated or not depends on the grace and favour of the Board of Trade. Banks, benevolent and mutual aid societies, etc., are completely excluded from the effects of the new Bill.

One of the newspapers today publishes the following \textit{parliamentary statistics}: there are 327 constituencies.\(^b\) A number of these constituencies are controlled by electoral magnates. One magnate controls 9 constituencies, 4 magnates control each 8, 1 magnate controls 7, 3 magnates control 6, 8 magnates control 5, 26 magnates control 4, 29 control 3, so that 72 magnates control 297 constituencies. There remain 30 so-called “independent” constituencies. The House of Commons comprises 654 members, 594 of whom are elected by the 297 dependent constituencies. These 594 include 274 people who are directly related to peers or belong to the aristocracy.

Written on June 30, 1855

First published in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}, No. 303, July 3, 1855

Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) Marx uses the English term.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) This figure does not include the 72 constituencies in Ireland.—\textit{Ed.}
Karl Marx

AGITATION OVER THE TIGHTENING-UP
OF SUNDAY OBSERVANCE

London, July 2. Yesterday there was a repeat of the demonstration against the Sunday Bill in Hyde Park, but this time on a larger scale, under more ominous auspices and with more serious consequences. The general mood of gloomy agitation in London today is witness to that.

The posters which called on people to hold a second meeting also invited them to assemble in front of the house of the pious Lord Grosvenor on Sunday at 10 a.m., and to accompany him on his way to church. But the pious gentleman had already left London on Saturday in a private carriage—in order to travel incognito. That he is more inclined by nature to make martyrs of other people rather than become a martyr himself has already been proved by his circular letter which appeared in all the London newspapers, in which on the one hand he sticks to his bill whilst on the other hand he is at pains to show that it is meaningless, pointless and insignificant. His house was occupied all Sunday, not by psalm-singers but by constables, 200 in number. Also the house of his brother, the Marquis of Westminster, famous for his wealth.

On Saturday Sir Richard Mayne, chief of the London police, had pasted notices on the walls of London not only “forbidding” a meeting in Hyde Park but also “forbidding” people to assemble there in “large numbers” and to exhibit any signs of approval or

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a For an account of the first demonstration, held on June 24, see this volume, pp. 302-07.—Ed.

disapproval. The result of these ukases was, even according to the report in the police circular, that as early as 2.30 p.m. 150,000 people from *all* classes and of all ages, were surging to and fro, and that gradually the crowd in the park swelled to dimensions which were immensely large and astonishing even by London standards. Not only did London appear *en masse*; people again lined both sides of the road along the Serpentine, only this time the crowds were more closely packed and deeper than on the previous Sunday. The people who did not, however, appear were the upper crust. All in all perhaps 20 carriages appeared, the majority of which were small gigs and phaetons which were allowed to pass unmolested, whereas their more portly, larger belled, and taller brothers, trimmed with more braid, were greeted with the same calls as previously and with the same babel of sounds, the waves of which made the air vibrate for about a mile around. The police ukases were rebutted by the mass meeting and the exercising of thousands of pairs of lungs. The upper crust had avoided the scene of action and by its absence recognised the sovereignty of the *vox populi*.

It was 4 o'clock and the demonstration seemed to be fizzling out into a harmless Sunday diversion from lack of anything to keep it going. But that did not suit the police. Were they to retire a general laughing-stock, casting melancholy parting glances at their own notices, which people could read at the main gate of the park in huge letters? What is more, their high dignitaries were present, Sir Richard Mayne and superintendents Gibbs and Walker on horseback, and inspectors Banks, Darkin and Brennan on foot. Eight hundred constables were strategically positioned, mainly hidden in buildings and ambuscades. Stronger detachments had been positioned at intervals nearby as reinforcements. The home of the chief park attendant, the powder magazine and the premises of the rescue services, all situated at a point where the road along the Serpentine turns into a path leading to Kensington Gardens, had been converted into improvised block houses manned by large forces of police and prepared for the accommodation of prisoners and casualties. Hackney cabs were put in position outside Vine Street police station at Piccadilly ready to go to the scene of action and to escort the vanquished safely back. In short, the police had planned a far more "vigorous" campaign, as *The Times* puts it, "than any of which we have yet had notice in the Crimea".\(^a\) The police needed bloody heads

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\(^a\) *The Times*, No. 22095, July 2, 1855.—*Ed.*
and arrests so as not to go plunging directly from the sublime to the ridiculous. As soon as the two lines of people had begun to thin out more and the crowds had dispersed in various groups over the huge area of the park further away from the road, the police chiefs took up positions in the middle of the road between the two lines of people, and from their horses began issuing pompous-sounding orders right and left. Supposedly for the protection of passing carriages and riders. As, however, neither carriages nor riders appeared and there was thus nothing for them to protect, they began to pick individuals out of the crowd "under false pretences" and to have them arrested, the pretext being that they were pickpockets. When these experiments became more numerous and the pretext no longer held good, a single cry ran through the crowds, and the hidden corps of constables rushed out of their ambuscades, quickly drew their truncheons, rained blows upon people's heads until they bled, here and there pulled an individual out of the crowd (a total of 104 people were arrested in this manner), and dragged them off to the improvised block houses. The left-hand side of the road is only separated from the water of the Serpentine by a narrow strip of land. By a maneuvre a police officer and his troop managed to drive the onlookers up to the very edge of the liquid element and were threatening to give them a cold bath. In an attempt to escape the police truncheons, one individual swam across the Serpentine to the opposite bank; however, a policeman set off after him in a boat, caught him and brought him back in triumph.

How greatly had the character of the scene changed since last Sunday! Instead of the state carriages, dirty hackney cabs which drove to and fro from the police station at Vine Street to the improvised prisons in Hyde Park and from there to the police station. Instead of footmen up on the box a constable seated next to the drunken cab-driver. Instead of the elegant ladies and gentlemen inside the coaches there were prisoners with bloody heads, tousled hair, hatless, their clothes torn, guarded by shifty-looking characters recruited from among the Irish lumpen-proletariat and pressed into the London police. Instead of the swishing of fans the whizzing of the constables' leather truncheons. Last Sunday the ruling classes had shown their fashionable physiognomy, now they showed their political physiognomy.

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^a Marx uses the English word and gives the German translation in brackets.— Ed.

^b Here and below Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
Behind the kindly grinning old gentlemen, the fashionable dandies, the genteel and frail widows, the fragrant beauties in cashmere and ostrich feathers, adorned with garlands of diamonds and flowers—was the constable with his water-proof coat, greasy oilskin hat and *truncheon*. It was the reverse side of the coin. Last Sunday the crowd was confronted with the ruling class in its individual form. This time it appeared as political power, the law, the truncheon. This time to resist was to commit insurrection, and the English have to be heated up slowly and for a long time before they are prepared for insurrection. Thus the counter-demonstration was on the whole limited to cat-calling and hooting and whistling at the police vehicles, to isolated and weak attempts at freeing the prisoners, and above all to passive resistance and a phlegmatic determination to remain at the scene of action.

Characteristic was the role played in this drama by the soldiers—partly from the Guards and partly from the 66th Regiment. They were present in large numbers. Twelve of them, Guards, some decorated with medals from the Crimea, were in the middle of a group of men, women and children who were the targets for police truncheons. One old man fell to the ground after receiving a blow. "The London *stiffstaffs*" (name of abuse for the police) "are worse than the Russians were at Inkerman," cried one of the heroes from the Crimea. The police grabbed him. He was immediately released to loud shouts from the crowd of "Three cheers for the army!" The police considered it advisable to retire. In the meantime a number of grenadiers had joined the crowd, the soldiers formed a troop and, surrounded by the crowd and accompanied by the cry of "Long live the army, down with the police, down with the Sunday Bill!", they strutted up and down the park. The police were standing there not knowing quite what to do, when a sergeant from the guards appeared who loudly took them to task for their brutality, attempted to calm the soldiers and persuaded some of them to follow him to their barracks so as to avoid more serious collisions. The majority of the soldiers, however, stayed behind and, amongst the crowd, gave vent to their indignation against the police in impassioned terms. The antagonism between the police and the army in England goes back a long way. The present moment, when the army is the *pet child* of the masses, is certainly not suited to diminish that in any way.

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*a* Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.

*b* Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.

*c* Marx uses the English expression.—*Ed.*
An old man by the name of Russell is reported to have died today as a result of the injuries he received; half a dozen injured people are in St. George’s Hospital. During the demonstration various attempts were again made to hold separate meetings. At one such meeting, at Albert Gate, outside that part of the park originally occupied by the police, one anonymous speaker harangued his public in roughly the following manner:

"Men of Old England! Awake, rise from your slumbers, or be for ever fallen! Oppose the Government, the 'send-us-to-Church' Bill, every succeeding Sunday, as you have done today. [...] Don't fear to demand your just rights [...] but throw off the shackles of oligarchical oppression and misrule. If you do not [...] you will be irretrievably oppressed and ruined. Is it not a pity that the inhabitants of this great metropolis—the greatest in the civilised world—should have their liberties placed in the hands of my Lord Robert Grosvenor or such a man as Lord Ebrington? His Lordship wants to drive us to church and make us religious by act of Parliament; but it won't do [...]. What are we, and what are they! Look at the present war; is it not carried on at the expense and the sacrifice of blood of the productive classes? And what are the unproductive classes doing? They are bungling it."* 

The speaker and the meeting were of course interrupted by the police.

At Greenwich, near the observatory, Londoners held a similar meeting attended by 10,000-15,000 people. It was also cut short by the police.

Written on July 2, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 307, July 5, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

* The text of this speech was given in the report on the demonstration published in The Times, No. 22095, July 2, 1855.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE LATE REPULSE OF THE ALLIES

The mail of the Canada reached us last evening from Boston, with Gen. Pélissier's report on the repulse of the Allies on the 18th of June (which will be found in our columns today) and with other documents which complete the history of that disastrous affair. Having thus before us all necessary sources of information, we proceed to give our readers an exact and impartial analysis of the entire operation. With regard to its general character it is enough to say that of the many blundering affairs we have had to notice in this Eastern war, this is by far the most perfect piece of bungling.

The French advanced trenches were from 400 to 500, and the English from 500 to 700 yards from the Russian batteries. These distances mark the lengths of road which the respective columns of attack had to pass over without cover from the Russian fire, and unsupported by the fire of their own artillery; with sharp running, then, such as would destroy every vestige of order, they would be exposed to a fire of grape and musketry during from three to five minutes, a time quite sufficient to completely disorganize them. This single fact is characteristic of the whole plan. Unless the enemy's fire were completely silenced, and the accumulation of large masses of troops in the hostile works effectively prevented by incessant vertical shell firing, there was not the slightest chance of success.

The Russians appear to have judged well of the plans of the Allies, if they were not, as Pélissier supposes, fully acquainted with

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a Marx included this and the following two paragraphs in his report "Clashes between the Police and the People.—The Events in the Crimea" published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* (see this volume, pp. 333-36).—*Ed.*
them. They but feebly replied to the besieging fire on the 17th, withdrew their guns behind the parapets during the day, and blinded the embrasures, so that scarcely any were disabled for the next day's work. This was decidedly the best plan, as their object could not be to extinguish the enemy's fire at that time. During the night the guns were brought back into their positions, the columns and reserves told off for the defense were stationed, and thus they were in a condition to meet any assault that could be made upon their position.

The plan agreed upon between Pélissier and Raglan was to reopen their fire at daybreak on the 18th with all the vigor they could give to it for a couple of hours, and then on a sudden to launch simultaneously seven storming columns—one French against the bastion close to the Careening Bay, two French against the Malakoff bastion, three English against the Redan bastion and one English against the cluster of houses and the cemetery situated between the Redan and the head of the inner harbor. This plan was sensible enough if there was to be an assault at all; its execution would subdue the Russian fire and disperse the Russian masses concentrated for the defense before the actual attack took place. On the other hand, the allied troops would have to suffer from the Russian fire while crowding the trenches, and the defenders would very probably soon perceive the presence of columns destined to attack their position with the bayonet. But this was by far the lesser evil. The original plan therefore was the best that could be devised under the circumstances.

However, we are informed that⁠— very late in the evening Pélissier learned that the Russians intended again to attack the Mamelon in force on the 18th. This should have been considered a godsend, for the defense of the Mamelon against any force the Russians could bring against it must have been safe, or else how could the Mamelon serve as a base of operations for the assault upon the Malakoff? Thus the Russians, defeated in their assault upon the Mamelon, would have been in a sad plight to fight a second battle for the Malakoff, and it would almost appear that under these circumstances the success of the operation against the latter position must have been

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⁠— The German version of this article, published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung under the title "The Assault of the 18th [June]", begins here. It is introduced as follows: "London, July 7. Yesterday we examined the Allies' original plan for the assault on June 18." — Ed.

⁠— The version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung has here: "(now christened the Bracion redoubt)". — Ed.
certain. Pélissier appears to have thought differently. He countermanded, late at night, the cannonade, and ordered the assault for 3 o'clock in the morning, the signal to be given by three rockets. The English were informed of this change of disposition.

This proceeding ended, as it was sure to do, in the way Napoleon used to say of bungling Generals: *Ordre, contre-ordre, désordre.* Half an hour before the appointed time, the extreme right French column somehow or other got engaged with the enemy. Whether the Russians drew them out by a false sally, or whether, as Pélissier says, the Generalb mistook a French shell for the signal rockets, is not quite clear. At all events, Pélissier had to hurry his signal, and the columns, still engaged in finding their proper places in the trenches, had to start in half confusion, and in part from different starting points from those assigned to them. The middle French column, intended to turn the flank of the Malakoff, effected its purpose and got into the Russian works; but the other two columns could make no headway in the hail-storm of case-shot and musketry which assailed them. Each column consisted of a brigade of four battalions; the second brigade of each division was in second line, while the Guard formed the general reserve. Thus nearly four divisions, or 20,000 men, were at hand for the purpose. The second line was brought up to the support of the first attack, but in vain; the Guards were sent forward, and they were arrested and then thrown back as well. Two battalions only remained disposable. It was now half-past eight. The brigade of the middle column, which had penetrated into the works, was ejected; on every point the French had been repulsed with great loss and no fresh troops were at hand. The English had not succeeded either. Pélissier gave the order for the retreat, which he says was effected with "dignity."

On the English side the columns of attack were told off with that parsimoniousness characteristic of the British Army. The leading columns counted but 1,800 men each, or 1,000 men less than the French columns. Of these 1,800, but 1,000 were intended

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a In the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* this passage reads as follows: "The operation ended as it was bound to end, in the manner in which Napoleon, the real Napoleon, describes the fate of wavering and bungling generals: 'Ordre, contre-ordre, désordre'."—*Ed.*

b J. D. N. Mayran.—*Ed.*

c Instead of the preceding two sentences the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: "On the English side each of the leading columns comprised only 1,800 men, 1,000 men less than the French."—*Ed.*
for fighting—the rest for working parties. In second line, the remainder of the brigade from which the force was taken, say 1,200 to 1,400 men, were behind each column. In third line, the second brigade of each division was behind its first brigade. Finally, the Guards and Highlanders (first division) formed the general reserve. Thus, of the whole English infantry assembled on the ground, but 7,200 men were to be launched in the first onset, and of these but 4,000 were actual combatants. This weakness in the first columns was caused, first, by the traditions of the British service, and, secondly, by their habit of attacking in line; for all reports lead to the conclusion that even in this instance they attacked in line, and thus offered a gratuitously large aim to the grape of the enemy. The complication caused by the arrangement of four different lines one behind another, in narrow and irregular trenches, created great disorder and mischief from the beginning, and would have created utter confusion had the struggle become anything like serious.

The first and third columns (from right to left) were to turn the flanks of the Redan, while the second was to attack its salient angle as soon as they had succeeded. The fourth or extreme left column, as stated, had to attack the head of the inner harbor. When the signal was given, as was the case with the French, the columns were still in movement toward their respective positions. The first column, however, jumped over the parapet of the trenches and was instantly saluted with a murderous fire of case-shot. The troops, disordered by the climbing, could not form. Col. Yea, who commanded, was already shouting for a bugler to sound the retreat; no bugler was found, and on they went in great disorder. Some penetrated to the abattis surrounding the Redan, but in vain. The mass of the column fell back at once and sought the shelter of the trenches. The third column advanced a minute or two later. It missed its road, and assailed the face of the Redan near the apex, instead of the flank. It staggered forward under a tremendous hail of projectiles, but was broken and retreated in complete disorder in a very few minutes. The whole affair lasted less than fifteen minutes. Thus ended the attack upon the Redan, before any of the complicated reserves of Lord Raglan had time to come up to its support. The second column was so startled by this sudden breakdown of its flanking bodies that it did not even stir out of the trenches.

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*a This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
The fourth column, commanded by Maj. Gen. Eyre, whose report we publish, alone succeeded in establishing itself in the cemetery and the houses surrounding. Here about 1,800 men held out during the day. They could not retreat, for the ground behind them was open and under the cross fire of the Russians. Thus they fought as well as they could till 9 o'clock at night, when they effected their retreat during the darkness. Their losses amounted to more than one-third of their number.

Thus ended Péligier's grand attack upon the Karabelnaya suburb. It was hastily determined upon, more hastily changed in its main features at a late period, and carried out with extreme blundering. The Russian was right who said to an English officer during the armistice of the 19th "Your Generals must have been drunk yesterday when they ordered the assault."

A newspaper correspondent writing from the scene describes it as "an infantry Balaklava." This is perfectly just, and sums up in the briefest manner the criticisms which all intelligent military men must make upon this calamitous repulse.

Written about July 6, 1855

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4447, July 21, 1855, reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1060, July 24, 1855 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 724, July 28, 1855 as a leading article; the German version was published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, partly in Marx's report printed in No. 313 on July 9, and as a separate article in No. 317 on July 11, 1855, marked with the sign ×

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*a* The German version makes no mention of Eyre or his report.—*Ed.

*b* The last paragraph does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

CLASHES BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE PEOPLE.—
THE EVENTS IN THE CRIMEA

London, July 6. London witnessed a continuous series of clashes, lasting from Monday to yesterday evening, between the police and the "mob"; the former with their truncheons behaved provocatively, the latter reciprocated by throwing stones. We saw scenes in Marlborough Street and the nearby streets which were strongly reminiscent of Paris. Duncombe asked Parliament yesterday evening to investigate the "base and brutal" conduct of the police last Sunday. The masses intend to visit the clubs in Pall Mall the day after tomorrow. The Chartists are planning an armed procession—armed not with sabres and muskets but with tools and sticks—to move from Blackfriars Bridge to Hyde Park carrying banners with the inscription "No Mayne Law". (This is deliberately ambiguous. Maine Law, as everybody knows, is the name of the puritanical American law prohibiting alcoholic drinks. Mayne is the name of the chief of the London police.) It will have been obvious from our previous reports that the demonstrations in Hyde Park were improvised events brought about by the instinct of the masses. The unrest was afterwards increased and heightened by the provocative brutality of the police, whose chief, Sir Richard Mayne, proved worthy of the decoration he had received from Paris. It is however even now possible to discern several distinct parties which seek to accelerate, guide and utilise the mass movement for their own more far-reaching ends. These parties are:

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a July 1, 1855.—Ed.
b Street in London.—Ed.
c "No Mayne Law" and "Maine Law" are given in English in the article together with a German translation.—Ed.
d See this volume, pp. 297-307, 323-27.—Ed.
First the Government itself. During Bonaparte's stay in London, all wall posters directed against him disappeared as if by magic. Now even the most virulent posters are not removed by the police. Everything indicates a hidden purpose: the constables' enjoined brutality, the provocative language of government counsel at the Court in Marlborough Street, the unlawful employment of the arrested persons on the treadmill, the insulting manner of the official newspapers, and the Cabinet's vacillating behaviour in Parliament. Does Palmerston need a small coup d'état to maintain his Government, or does he require widespread internal disturbances to divert attention from the Crimea? If we understand correctly this reckless statesman, who hides his profound and ruthless calculations under the cloak of frivolous superficiality, we can say of him, as Voltaire says of Habakuk, that he is "capable de tout".

Secondly the advocates of Administrative Reform. They try to use the mass movement to intimidate the aristocracy on the one hand, and as a means of winning popularity for themselves on the other hand. It is for this reason that in their name and for their account, the case of those arrested last Sunday was conducted by Ballantine before the police-court in Marlborough Street. This is why they ransomed all those sentenced yesterday by depositing their fines. This is why their newspapers defend the "mob" (as the ministerial Globe calls the people) and attack the police and the Ministry.

Thirdly the Chartists, whose aims are self-evident.

Official and private reports on the unfortunate attack of June 18 have at last appeared. The publication of the official dispatches was put off for several days, and there was certainly good reason for the delay. This is undoubtedly a most perfect example of the blunders made in the Eastern affair.

The French advanced trenches were from 400 to 500, and the English from 500 to 700 yards from the Russian batteries. These distances mark the lengths of road which the respective columns of attack had to pass over without cover from the Russian fire, and unsupported by the fire of their own artillery; with sharp running, then, such as would destroy every vestige of order, would expose them defencelessly to musket fire during three to five

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[a] Marx and Engels use the English term.—Ed.
[b] Capable of anything.—Ed.
[c] This and the following two paragraphs largely correspond to the second, third and fourth paragraphs of Engels' article "The Late Repulse of the Allies" (see this volume, pp. 328-32).—Ed.
minutes, a time quite sufficient to completely disorganise them. This single fact is characteristic of the whole plan. Unless the enemy's fire were completely silenced, and the accumulation of large masses of troops in the hostile works effectively prevented by incessant vertical shell firing, there was not the slightest chance of success.

The Russians appear to have judged well of the plans of the Allies, if they were not, as Pélissier supposes, fully acquainted with them. They but feebly replied to the fire of the Allies on the 17th, withdrew their guns behind the parapets during the day, and in general made such arrangements that scarcely any other preparations were required for the next day's work. During the night the guns were brought back into their positions, the columns and reserves told off for the defence were stationed.

The plan originally agreed upon between Pélissier and Raglan was to reopen their fire at daybreak on the 18th with all the vigour they could give to it for a couple of hours, and then on a sudden to launch simultaneously seven storming columns—one French against the bastion close to the Careening Bay, two French against the Malakoff bastion, three English against the Redan bastion and one English against the cluster of houses and the cemetery situated between the Redan and the head of the inner harbour. This plan was sensible enough if there was to be an assault at all; its execution would subdue the Russian fire and disperse the Russian masses concentrated for the defence before the actual attack took place. On the other hand, the Allied troops would have to suffer from the Russian fire while crowding the trenches, and the defenders would very probably soon perceive the presence of columns destined to attack their position with the bayonet. But this was by far the lesser evil. The original plan with all its shortcomings was still the best that could be devised under the circumstances. How the plan was failed, how Pélissier's premature laurel wreath withered away and how under the protective eagles of the restored Empire, the Allied armies suffered an "infantry Balaklava"—all this we shall discuss tomorrow.

This summer seems to have severe tribulations in store for the "saints". The foremost bill broker of London, and apparently the chief of the Quakers, Gurney (one of whose daughters is married to Bunsen's son), Gurney, who is as rich as he is pious, seems to be badly compromised by the fraudulent Strand bankruptcy. He discounted bills of exchange amounting to £37,000 for Strahan and Co. though he knew that they were
bankrupt, thus enabling them to defraud the public for a few months longer. He himself managed to extricate himself without incurring any loss. The mundane press delights in making malicious remarks about the iniquities committed even by the select.

Written about July 6, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 313, July 9, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

The English version of part of the text was published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4447, July 21, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1060, July 24, 1855 and in the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 724, July 28, 1855 as a leading article

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English in full for the first time
London, July 11. As is generally known, Roebuck’s motion censuring all the members of the old Coalition Cabinet has been put down for next Tuesday. Whilst numerous meetings supporting his motion are being held at Birmingham, Sheffield, Newcastle, etc., and at the same time public petitions are being signed in support of it in every corner of London, members of Parliament are decamping to Paris, Naples and their country homes, in order to avoid the division. In an attempt to prevent this exodus, supported by Palmerston in every respect, Roebuck yesterday moved for power to call over the Commons next Tuesday. The “Call” is an old parliamentary practice which had sunk into oblivion since the time of the debate on Catholic Emancipation. At the opening of the sitting the name of every single Member of Parliament is called out. Those who are absent are subject to arrest by the parliamentary serjeant-at-arms, a public apology before the assembled House and the payment of certain fines. By a majority of 133 to 108, however, the Commons refused Roebuck the right to coerce members by means of a Call. Nothing could be more characteristic of the British Parliament and its press organs than their attitude towards Roebuck’s motion. The motion does not emanate from any member of the “official” opposition. That is its first blemish. It is directed not only against members of the present Cabinet but also against members of the dissolved Cabinet.

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a Roebuck first gave notice of his motion in the House of Commons on June 22, 1855. See this volume, pp. 297-301.—Ed.
b Here and below Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
c Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
It is not, therefore, a purely party manoeuvre. It declares that the sins of the old Ministry are not expiated by the forming of a new Ministry. It opens the way for a motion calling for impeachment. That is the other great blemish of this motion. For the official opposition is of course only willing to wage the parliamentary war "within the limits of a change of Ministers". It is far removed from waging war against ministerial responsibility. The clique of Outs is no less anxious about maintaining ministerial omnipotence than the clique of Ins. The skill in conducting parliamentary battles consists of course precisely in ensuring that during the fight it is never the office that is hit but always the person holding the office at a given time, and even he only to an extent that will permit him after being brought down as a Minister immediately to come forward as a candidate for the Ministry. The oligarchy does not perpetuate itself by retaining power permanently in the same hand, but by dropping it with one hand in order to catch it again with the other, and so on. The Tories are therefore just as dissatisfied with Roebuck's motion as the Whigs are.

As to the press, the reaction of The Times is crucial. Was there a newspaper that clamoured louder for the Roebuck Committee to be set up, as long as its purpose was, on the one hand, to bring about a change of Ministers and, on the other, to provide an outlet for the public passion? However, from the moment that Roebuck comes forward and, supported by the findings of his Committee, threatens to lay all the members of the coalition open to explicit censure by Parliament, is there a newspaper which observes a more stubborn silence than The Times? As far as The Times is concerned, Roebuck's motion does not exist; yesterday's incident in Parliament concerning the "Call" does not exist; the meetings at Birmingham, Sheffield, etc., do not exist in its columns. Roebuck himself is, of course, no Brutus. On the one hand, he has seen how miserably the Whigs have rewarded him for the services he has rendered over many years. On the other hand, he has his constituents behind him. He represents a large body of constituents whom he has to pay in popularity as he cannot pay them in cash. And finally, the role of a modern Warwick, the parliamentary King-Maker, can hardly be displeasing to this ambitious but so far scarcely successful barrister. The Tories who form the opposition cannot, of course, oppose Roebuck's motion in the same way as the Whigs can. They are therefore seeking to forestall it. This is the

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a Marx uses the English words "Outs" and "Ins" (i.e. members of the opposition on the one hand and the ruling party on the other).—Ed.
secret behind Bulwer's motion calling for a vote of no confidence in the Ministry, based on Lord John Russell's strange revelations about the Vienna conferences. Bulwer's motion remains entirely "within" the limits of a government reshuffle. It takes the fate of the Ministry out of Roebuck's hands. If it succeeds then it will be the Tories who have toppled the Whigs, and once holding the Ministry, conventional "magnanimity" would forbid them to pursue their victory and to continue supporting Roebuck. But the artfulness of the Tories at the same time enables Palmerston to employ old parliamentary tricks. The dismissal of Russell, whether voluntary or imposed, will serve to parry Bulwer's motion just as Bulwer has parried Roebuck's motion. Russell's departure would be certain to bring Palmerston's Cabinet down were it not to occur shortly before the end of the session. Now, however, it may on the contrary prolong the life of his Cabinet. If so, then no English Minister before Palmerston has managed with such skill and good fortune to use the people's clamouring in order to force himself upon the parliamentary parties on the one hand, and, on the other, to use the petty parliamentary interests, groupings and formalities that exist to force himself upon the people. He is like the old man of the sea whom Sindbad the Sailor found impossible to shake off once he had allowed him to climb onto his shoulders.

Written on July 11, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 323, July 14, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

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a The motion was tabled in the House of Commons on July 10, 1855. The Times, No. 22103, July 11, 1855.—Ed.
b See this volume, pp. 222-26.—Ed.
London, July 13. It is difficult for those not initiated into the mysteries of jurisprudence to understand why it should be that, in the most straightforward lawsuits, unexpected legal problems arise which owe their existence, not to the nature of the lawsuit, but to the rules and formalities of legal procedure. It is the handling of these legal ceremonies that makes your lawyer, just as it is the handling of ecclesiastical ceremonies that makes your Brahmin. Just as in the course of development of religion, so in the course of development of law too, form becomes content. But what legal procedure is to courts of law, the agenda and standing orders are to legislative bodies. The history of agrarian law proves that the old Roman oligarchs, the originators of chicanery in legal proceedings, were also the first to introduce procedural chicanery into legislation. In both respects they have been outdone by England. The technical difficulties involved in tabling a motion, the various metamorphoses that a bill has to go through before it can become law; the formalities which permit the opponent of a motion or a bill to prevent the former from entering the House and the latter from leaving it—all this provides an inexhaustible arsenal of parliamentary chicanery, pettifogging and tactics. But no English Minister before Palmerston has so thoroughly lent the House of Commons the appearance, tone and character of a Court of Chancery. Where diplomacy does not suffice, he has recourse to chicanery. Under his guidance every debate on an objectionable motion is turned into a preliminary debate about the day when the debate shall actually take place and the case be put.

\[a\] Marx uses the English term.—*Ed.*
So it was with Milner Gibson's motion, so it was with Layard's motion and so it is now with Bulwer's motion. So overloaded were the orders of the day at the close of the session that Bulwer was only able to bring in his motion on a day when the House went into a Committee of Supply, i.e. when the Government puts its financial requirements before the House of Commons. Friday is generally set aside for this business. However, it depends, of course, on the Government when it asks the Commons for supplies and hence when the House goes into a Committee of Supply. Palmerston promptly told Bulwer that he would not, to use the technical term, go into Supply that Friday, but proceed with the Bill on the limited liability of trading companies, and that Bulwer might "fix a day for himself". Last Tuesday, therefore, Disraeli gave notice that he would appeal to the House the following Thursday (yesterday) to set aside this piece of chicanery. Palmerston forestalled him. He rose during yesterday's sitting and declared amidst the general laughter of the House that it was certainly not his intention either to delay the debate on Bulwer's vote of no-confidence or, by placing technical difficulties in the way, to prevent the honourable House from forming an opinion. But, he went on, despite every effort, the supplementary documents relating to the Vienna Conference could not have been laid upon the table of the House of Commons before the following day, and how could the House form an opinion without having seen the documents of the case? He was, he said, prepared to set aside Monday for a discussion of Bulwer's motion. Disraeli pointed out that "the supplementary documents" bore no relation whatever to Bulwer's motion; the Bill on the limited liability of trading companies was quite important in its own way, but what the nation presently wanted to know was:

"whether the Cabinet is collectively liable for its actions or whether the principle of limited liability is also applicable here. Above all, it wanted to know the conditions under which the partners of the firm in Downing Street conducted their business."

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For the motions of Layard (tabled April 27), Gibson (May 11) and Bulwer (July 10) see this volume, pp. 167, 187, 223, 338-39.—Ed.

Marx uses the English name here and below.—Ed.

Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on July 10, 1855. The Times, No. 22103, July 11, 1855.—Ed.

The speeches by Palmerston, Disraeli, Bulwer, Russell and Shee in the House of Commons on July 12, 1855, were published in The Times, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—Ed.

10 Downing Street is the residence of the British Prime Minister. Here the reference is to the government as a whole.—Ed.
Bulwer said he would accept Monday as the day for the debate. Russell, for his part, took advantage of this incident to attempt to tone down and distort the meaning of the statement he made last Friday. But in vain; the second, amended version arrived too late, as is patently evident from today’s Times. Indeed, for several days The Times has been using every artifice to save Palmerston’s Cabinet at Russell’s expense, wherein it is steadfastly supported by the simple-minded Morning Advertiser, which regains its whole-hearted faith in Palmerston each time Parliament shows signs of losing it. Meanwhile Palmerston has gained a few days’ respite in which to do some manoeuvring. How he exploited each of those days is evident from the Irish row which occurred yesterday in the House of Commons.

For two years, as everyone knows, three bills have been drifting through Parliament, their purpose being to regulate the relations between Irish landlords and tenants. One of these bills lays down how much compensation the tenant is entitled to claim on improvements effected on the land, in the event of his landlord giving him notice to quit. Hitherto the improvements effected by Irish tenants (virtually all of whom hold a one-year lease) only served to enable the landlord to demand a higher rent on expiration of the lease. Thus the tenant, should he not wish to renew the agreement on less favourable terms, either loses the farm and, with the farm, the capital he has laid out on improvements, or he is compelled to pay the landlord interest, over and above the original rent, for improvements effected with his (the tenant’s) capital. Support for the above-mentioned bills was one of the conditions with which the coalition Cabinet bought the vote of the Irish Brigade. Hence, in 1854, they were passed by the Commons, but deferred by the Lords, with the connivance of the Ministers, until the following session (1855), when they suffered such drastic revision that all their teeth were drawn, and in this mutilated form were returned to the Commons. There, last Thursday, the main clause of the Compensation Bill was sacrificed on the altar of landed property and the Irish were astonished to discover that the scales had been tipped against them, partly by the votes of members of the Government, partly by the votes of its immediate allies. Serjeant Shee’s furious onslaught upon Palmerston portended a riot in Parliament’s

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a July 6, 1855.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
c Marx uses the English words "serjeant" and "riot".—Ed.
“Irish Quarter”, something which might, at this particular juncture, have serious consequences. Palmerston therefore, through the medium of Sadleir, ex-member of the coalition and broker to the Irish Brigade, arranged for a deputation of eighteen Irish Members of Parliament to wait upon him the day before yesterday with the request that he use his influence to have the parliamentary vote rescinded and to carry the clause through the House in another division. He, of course, declared that he was ready to do anything so as to secure the Irish votes against the motion of no-confidence. The premature exploding of this intrigue in the House of Commons gave rise to one of the rowdy scenes typical of the decline of an oligarchic Parliament. The Irish dispose of 105 votes. However, it transpired that the majority had not given a mandate to the eighteen-strong deputation. For that matter, Palmerston can no longer make quite the same use of the Irish in Ministerial crises as he was wont to do in O'Connell's day. With the disintegration of all the old parliamentary factions, the Irish Quarter too has split up and become fragmented. At all events, the incident demonstrates how Palmerston is exploiting the respite he gained to manipulate the various coteries. At the same time he is awaiting favourable news of some kind from the theatre of war, a minor event of some kind capable of parliamentary—if not military—exploitation. The submarine telegraph has taken the conduct of the war out of the hands of the generals and subjected it to the amateurish astrological whims of Bonaparte and to parliamentary and diplomatic intrigue. Hence the inexplicable and completely unprecedented character of the second Crimean campaign.

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If "time is money" in trade, time is victory in war. To let the favorable moment slip away, to miss the opportunity when your own superior strength should be brought to bear upon your opponent, is as great a fault as can be committed before an enemy. The fault is doubled if you commit it when acting on the offensive; for while merely defending a position the consequences of your neglect may be remedied, but when you are in an enemy's country, on an errand of invasion, then such inattention may involve the ruin of your army. All this is very trite, and there is not a lieutenant or cornet in the world but would treat it as a matter of course. Yet there is no rule of strategy or tactics sinned against oftener than this; and it would appear as if Gen. Pelissier, the impetuous man of action, the "Marshal Forward" of the Crimean army, were the very man doomed to exemplify in his own person this common neglect of commonplace things.

The road into Sevastopol leads round by Inkermann to the north side of the fortress, as we have said over and over again. It is not to be supposed that Pelissier and his staff do not know this as well as we do. But to go to the north side the allied army must take the field with its main strength and defeat the Russians, afterward investing the north side, and detaching a corps to keep the Russian field-army at a distance. The moment to do this was when the Sardinian corps had arrived, and the Turks, under Omer Pasha, were at Kamiesh. At that time the Allies must have been considerably stronger than the Russians. But nothing of the sort was done. The expedition to Kertch and the Sea of Azoff was

\[a\] See this volume, pp. 203, 318.—Ed.
undertaken, and assault after assault was attempted. The field operations were confined to reconnaissances and to an extension of the camping ground to the entrance of Baidar Valley. Now, at last, we learn what is the professed reason for this inactivity: the means of transport are not forthcoming, and after fifteen months campaigning the Allies are as much tied to the sea, to Kamiesh and Balaklava harbors, as ever!

This is really intolerable. The Crimea is not a desert island somewhere about the North Pole. It is a country the resources of which may certainly be exhausted as to food, but which is still able to furnish plenty of provender, draught animals, carts and beasts of burden, to anybody who has the boldness to take them. Cautious and slow movements, forward and backward within a few miles of the Chernaya, are of course not the means to get hold of these useful articles; but even if we leave the camels, ponies and arbas of the Crimea entirely out of the question, there is plenty of means of transport to be had on the Asiatic and European shores of the Black Sea, within two days' steaming from Balaklava. Why are they not impressed into the allied service? We say impressed, for impressment, commonly called requisition, is the proper way to make them available. To employ Spanish muleteers and Bulgarian laborers at a high price will never do; and in a country like Turkey even less than anywhere else. A regiment of cavalry scouring the shores of Anatolia would very soon bring hundreds of conveyances and thousands of animals together, along with the forage required. The war is prosecuted on behalf of the Turks, and to furnish means of transport is the least that can be expected of them. In every continental war the country in which armies operate is expected to do the same. To be more delicate with Turks is doubly absurd; if the Turks have not to work for their Allies, they will have to work for their Pashas, who will treat them much worse. They may not like it, but neither do they like to toil for their Pashas; and if they will not yield to discipline and order, a little application of martial law will soon break them in, as the Pashas always keep them under a similar sort of law. It is perfectly ridiculous that, with such resources within reach, the allied Generals should still complain of inability to move for want of transports.

The Russians, indeed, have given them lessons enough how they should act. The 3d, 4th, and 5th army-corps, beside several divisions of the reserves, were transported into the Crimea at a time when the Allies could not bring up food from Balaklava to the trenches. The troops were partly carried across the steppes in
wagons, and they always had plenty of food. And yet the country within a semicircle of 200 miles around Perekop is but very thinly inhabited. But the resources of the more distant provinces were put under contribution; and surely, to bring the wagons of Ekaterinoslav, Poltava and Charkoff, to assist the Russians in the Crimea, is more difficult than to get the conveyances of Anatolia and Roumelia to work there for the Allies.

Nevertheless, under the pretext of want of transports, the opportunity to conquer the Crimea as far as Sympheropol has been allowed to slip by. Now the situation is different. The Russians have formed a reserve army for the Crimea between Odessa and Cherson. What this army consists of we can judge by the simple fact that from the Western army the whole of the second army-corps and two divisions of grenadiers have been detached toward the formation of this new force. The advanced guard of this reenforcement must already have passed Cherson. These troops consist in all of five divisions or eighty-two battalions of infantry; one division or thirty-two squadrons of cavalry; and from fifty to eighty guns. To these we must add a number of reserves, and also a division at least of the reserve cavalry; and as the above eighty-eight battalions belong to the troops which have been chiefly under the eye of the Emperor, they must have their full war numbers. Allowing, therefore, for the loss on the march, the whole force assembled between Odessa and Perekop, and intended for the Crimea, may safely be estimated at something like 70,000 to 80,000 men. The heads of their columns must be past Cherson, perhaps past Perekop, by this time; and before July is out they will begin to tell upon the Allies.

Now, what have the Allies to oppose to these reenforcements? Their ranks are again thinned by cholera and fever, no less than by the slaughter of the different assaults. The British reenforcements are slow in arriving, and very few regiments indeed are being sent off. The French Government state that they do not intend to send out fresh divisions, but merely detachments from the depots to fill up the gaps made in the ranks of the various regiments at the seat of war. If these reenforcements arrive in time they will hardly suffice to bring up the allied army to the strength it had in the beginning of June; that is to say, 210,000 men at the outside, including Turks and Sardinians. The probability is it will never exceed 180,000 men at any time; to which force the Russians, by the beginning of August, will be able

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*a Alexander II.—Ed.*
to oppose at least 200,000 men in good positions, in command of
the country at their rear, and in possession of the south side of
Sevastopol as a bridgehead.

Then the chances are that the Allies will be driven back upon
the plateau behind the Chernaya, unable to move forward or
backward, and with an army now so numerous that it must change
this narrow piece of ground into one hotbed of disease. And then
Pélissier will repent his want of energy and resolution as regards
the advance into the field, and his excess of energy as regards the
storming of the place. Still, there is yet time for a move in the
field. The best moment has passed, but for all that, a bold advance
might secure even now a wider range of ground to the Allies. But
it does not look as if they were going to avail themselves of this
chance.

It must, however, be stated, in fairness to Pélissier, that public
opinion in Paris, and in Europe generally, lays the principal fault
at the door of Louis Bonaparte. That unfortunate would-be
general is said to meddle in everything. The matter is not quite
clear yet, but in a short time the nature of the interference of this
ambitious adventurer in the Crimean military operations must be
cleared up, and we shall then know where the blame of these
enormous blunders is to be placed.

Written about July 14, 1855

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1855, marked with the sign X
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

RUSSELL'S RESIGNATION.—THE EVENTS
IN THE CRIMEA

London, July 14. Our last report but one treated Lord John Russell's resignation, whether voluntary or under duress, as a fait accompli. It took place yesterday afternoon, and it is in fact a composite resignation, both voluntary and under duress. For the section of the Whigs most eager to obtain posts, headed by Bouverie, were driven by Palmerston into a minor revolt. They stated that they would be obliged to vote for Bulwer's motion unless Lord John resigned. No resistance could be offered to this. Not satisfied with their grand deed, the disloyal Whig mob collected signatures in the lobby of the House of Commons for a petition requesting Palmerston to induce the Queen to accept Russell's resignation which had already been submitted. At any rate Russell may have gained one satisfaction from these base manoeuvres, namely that of having created a party in his own image.

The resignation of a man who, as Urquhart says, is in the habit of clapping his hands behind his back to give himself moral support, would hardly have affected the continued existence of the Cabinet had not the majority of the House of Commons been eager to use any pretext allowing it to postpone the fateful dissolution. And dissolution of the House is the inevitable consequence of passing Bulwer's motion. If Palmerston were to retain his post despite the vote of no-confidence, he would have to

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a See this volume, p. 339.—Ed.
b For further details of Bulwer's motion, tabled on July 10, 1855, see this volume, pp. 337-43.—Ed.
dissolve the House, and if he were succeeded by Derby, the latter would likewise have to dissolve it. The House seems hardly inclined to sacrifice itself on the altar of patriotism.

Sir George Grey has set up a commission to investigate the police brutalities. It consists of the Recorders\(^a\) of London, Liverpool and Manchester and will meet next Tuesday.

If in commerce time is money, in warfare time is victory. The greatest blunder that can be committed in warfare is to miss the favourable moment, the moment when superior forces can be hurled against the enemy. The blunder is magnified if it is committed not during defensive operations, when the consequences of neglect can be repaired, but during offensive operations, in a war of invasion, where such carelessness can cause the loss of an army. These are truisms which, as every cadet knows, are self-evident. And yet no other rule of strategy or tactics is transgressed as frequently as this one, and General Pélissier, the impetuous man of action, the “Marshal Forward”\(^{249}\) of the Crimean army, seems to be destined by his action to illustrate the common disregard of these commonplace rules.

The road to Sevastopol leads through Inkerman to the northern side of the fortress. No one knows this better than Pélissier and his staff. But in order to conquer the northern side, the Allied armies have to take the field with their main forces, beat the Russians, encircle the north side and detach a corps to keep the Russian field army at a distance. The favourable moment to do this came when the Sardinian corps and the Turks under Omer Pasha arrived. The Allies were then considerably stronger than the Russians. But nothing of the sort was undertaken. The expedition to Kerch and the Sea of Azov was launched and one assault after another attempted. Field operations were restricted to reconnoitring and extending the camp up to the entrance to the valley of Baidar. The alleged reason for this inactivity is now at last revealed. Means of transport are said to be lacking, and after a campaign of fifteen months the Allies are just as much confined to the Sea, Kamysch and Balaklava as ever. This is indeed unsurpassable. The Crimea is not a desolate island somewhere near the South pole. It is a country whose food supplies are undoubtedly not inexhaustible, but which is capable of providing large quantities of fodder, draught-animals and carts if one has sufficient skill and daring to take them. Timorous and slow forward and backward movements within a circle of a few English miles around the

\(^a\) Marx and Engels use the English term.—Ed.
Chernaya are of course not a suitable means to get hold of them. But even if we leave the camels, ponies and arbas of the Crimea completely out of account, there still remain ample means of transport on the European and Asian shores of the Black Sea which steamers can reach within two days. Why are they not commandeered for use by the Allies? The Russians have certainly given them enough lessons demonstrating how they ought to act. The 3rd, 4th and 5th army corps and several reserve divisions were transported to the Crimea at a time when the Allies had despaired of bringing provisions from Balaklava to the trenches. Some of the troops were moved in carts across the steppe, and they seem to have suffered acutely from lack of food. And yet the country within a radius of 200 miles from Perekop is only thinly populated. But the resources of the more distant provinces were requisitioned, and it is certainly more difficult for the Russians to send carts from Yekaterinoslav, Poltava, Kharkov, etc., to the Crimea, than for the Allies in the Crimea to procure means of transport in Anatolia and Rumelia. In any case, under the pretext of lack of transport, the Allies let the chance to conquer the Crimea up to Simferopol slip. Now the position has changed. The Russians have formed a reserve army for the Crimea located between Odessa and Cherson. The strength of this army can only be estimated by us on the basis of the detachments made from the western army; these consist of the entire 2nd army corps and two infantry divisions. Together this amounts to five infantry divisions (82 battalions), one cavalry division (82 squadrons) and 80 cannon. Infantry and cavalry reserves have to be added to this. Taking into account the losses it suffered during the march, the army destined for the Crimea and assembled between Odessa and Perekop can therefore be assessed at approximately 70,000 to 80,000 men. The vanguard of their columns must by now have already passed through Perekop, and their weight will be felt by the Allies before the end of July.

What can the Allies set against these reinforcements? Their ranks are being thinned again by cholera and fever just as much as by the various attempted assaults. British reinforcements are rather slow in arriving—very few regiments have in fact sailed. The 13,000 men reported by us\(^a\) to have left some time ago have proved to be a government bluff. The French government for its part declares that it does not intend to send fresh divisions but merely detachments from the depots to make good the losses.

\(^a\) See this volume, p. 299.—*Ed.*
incurred at the theatre of war. These reinforcements, provided they arrive in time, will hardly be sufficient to bring the Allied army up to the strength it had in June, i.e. 200,000 men, including Turks and Sardinians. It will probably amount to no more than 180,000 men, who at the beginning of August will be opposed by at least 200,000 Russians in good positions, in command of the country in their rear and holding the south side of Sevastopol as a bridgehead. If under these circumstances the allied army were again squeezed into the narrow plateau behind the Chernaya, these human masses would by their momentum turn the restricted space into a graveyard.

There is still time to take the offensive. True the most favourable moment has been missed, but nevertheless a bold advance by the allied army would even now ensure an extension of their living space. But there is no indication that they intend to use this opportunity.

Finally, in justification of Pélissier one might mention that public opinion here and in Paris has sought and found the cause of the wretched state of the second Crimean campaign in the intervention of Louis Bonaparte, the general from afar.

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First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 327, July 17, 1855
Marked with the sign ×


Printed according to the Neue Oder-Zeitung
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London, July 17. Whether voluntary or under duress, Russell's dismissal has served to parry Bulwer's motion\(^a\) just as Bulwer parried Roebuck's motion. This view, which we expressed in our report of July 11,\(^a\) was confirmed beyond any shadow of doubt by yesterday's sitting in the Commons.\(^b\) It is an old Whig axiom that "parties are like snails—the tails move the heads". The present Whig Cabinet, however, seems to be polypoid; it appears to thrive on amputation. It survives the loss of its limbs, its head, anything except its tail. Although Russell was not the head of the Cabinet, he was the brains of the party which forms the Cabinet and which is represented by it. Bouverie, the Vice-President of the Board of Trade,\(^c\) represents the tail of the Whig polyp. He discovered that the Whig body would have to be decapitated to keep the Whig rump alive, and he made this discovery known to Palmerston in the name of and on behalf of the Whig tail. Russell yesterday assured that tail of his "contempt". Disraeli tormented Bouverie with a "physiology of friendship" and a biological description of the various types in which the species being known as "friend" is distinguishable. Finally, Bouverie's attempt to justify the action by saying that he and the tail had discarded Russell in order to save him, completes the genre picture of this party of office-hunters.

The natural head of the Whig party being amputated in this way, its usurped head, Lord Palmerston, has become all the more

\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 337-39.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^b\) A report of the House of Commons debate of July 16, 1855 was published in\textit{The Times}, No. 22108, July 17, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^c\) Marx uses the English term.—\textit{Ed.}
firmly attached to the rump. After the fall of Aberdeen and Newcastle he used Gladstone, Graham and Herbert to take possession of the inheritance of the Coalition Cabinet. After the departure of Gladstone, Graham and Herbert he used Lord John Russell to help him form a purely Whig Cabinet. Finally he used the Whig tail to whisk Russell away and thus to become sole ruler in the Cabinet. All those metamorphoses were just so many steps on the way to the formation of a purely Palmerston Cabinet. Russell's statements show that he repeatedly tendered Palmerston his resignation, but was persuaded each time by him to withdraw it. In exactly the same way Palmerston persuaded Aberdeen's Cabinet to resist Roebuck's Committee of Inquiry to the utmost. On both occasions with the same degree of success and to the same end.

He linked Bulwer's motion so closely to Russell that it fell through of its own accord as soon as the corpus delicti, Russell, vanished from the Cabinet. Bulwer was therefore obliged to declare that he was withdrawing his motion. However, he could not resist the temptation of actually delivering the speech which was to have supported his motion. He forgot that the motion on which his speech was based no longer existed. Palmerston exploited this unfortunate situation. He immediately assumed the pose of a gladiator after the battle had been called off. He was rude, blustering and boastful, but in this way he incurred chastisement at the hands of Disraeli, which, as the expression on his face revealed, caused even this accomplished play-actor to lose his usual cynical composure. However, the most important part of Disraeli's reply was the following statement:

"I have reason to believe that the views which Lord Russell brought from Vienna were favourably received, not merely by a majority, but by the whole of his colleagues, and that nothing but circumstances which they did not anticipate [...] prevented the plan of the noble Lord being cordially and unanimously accepted. I do not make that statement without due authority. I make it with the same conviction that I spoke six weeks ago of the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of the Government, the truth of which subsequent events have already justified. I make it with the conviction that, even before this Session of Parliament terminates, evidence confirming that statement will be in the possession of the House."

The "circumstances" to which Disraeli refers were, as he explains in the course of his speech, "the difficulties presented by the French". Disraeli indicates that Clarendon's correspondence, which was intended for use in Parliament, contradicts the secret instructions issued by the Ministry. He concluded his speech with the following words:
"A belief exists in the land that there is guilt in the management of our affairs. A foreign document appears" (Buol's circular), "the people are agitated, they think, they talk, their representatives in this House ask questions. What happens? The foremost of our statesmen dare not meet the controversy which such questions bring forward. He mysteriously disappears. [...] But who dares meet with it? The First Minister of the Crown, who has addressed this House tonight in accents and in language utterly unworthy of his position, and utterly unworthy of the occasion, which have convinced me that if the honour and interests of the country be any longer intrusted to his care, the first will be degraded, and the latter, [...] will be betrayed."

Roebuck surpassed Disraeli in the intensity of his language. "I want to know who are the traitors who are now in the Cabinet?" First Aberdeen and Newcastle. Then Graham and Gladstone and Herbert. Then Russell. Who is next?

In the meantime the position of the man who secretly ruled over the coalition, as he now officially rules the Ministry, is quite secure. If another vote of no-confidence were to take place before the end of the session, which is not likely, he will dissolve Parliament. At all events he has six months before him in which to conduct Britain's foreign policy without restriction, not even disturbed by the noise and mock battles of the Commons.

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London, July 18. The turbulent, uproarious and noisy night sitting of the Commons of July 16 was inevitably followed by a reaction of languor, fatigue, and enervation. The Ministry, well versed in the secrets of parliamentary pathology, was counting on this general mood of dejection as a means of preventing any division on Roebuck’s motion,\(^a\) and not only the division but the debate itself. Not a single member of the Ministry spoke before midnight, shortly before the close of the sitting, although for a moment there was a lull in the proceedings in the House which invited statements from Ministers, and despite repeated demands from all sides of the House. The Cabinet persisted in stoic silence and left it to the representatives of the Marquess of Exeter, the representative of Lord Ward, and similar peers’ representatives in the Commons to bury the honourable House in that tedious mire which Dante, in his “Inferno”, makes the eternal residence of the indolent.\(^b\) Two amendments to Roebuck’s motion had been tabled, one from General Peel and the other from Colonel Adair, both proposed by military men and both lapsing into flanking marches.\(^c\) Peel’s amendment demands that the House vote on the “previous question”,\(^{251}\) i.e. neither for nor against the main motion, declining to answer Roebuck’s question. Colonel Adair demands approval of the “policy which decided upon the expedition to Sevastopol” and that “this policy be persevered in”. Roebuck’s censure in respect of the bad execution of the Crimean expedition

\(^a\) For Marx’s discussion of Roebuck’s motion see this volume, pp. 337-38.—Ed.
\(^b\) Dante, *Divina commedia*. Part I, “Inferno”, Canto 111.—Ed.
\(^c\) The debate was reported in *The Times*, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—Ed.
is thus countered by him with praise for its good origin.

The Cabinet refrained from making any statement as to which of the amendments it intended to adopt as the Ministerial amendment. It seemed to want to feel the pulse of the House, in order to seek refuge either in General Peel’s question without an answer or in Colonel Adair’s answer without a question. At last the House seemed to have sunk into that semi-sleep that Palmerston was waiting for. Then he sent forward the most insignificant member of the Cabinet, Sir Charles Wood, to declare that the Ministry was backing Peel’s amendment. Supported by cries of “Divide! Divide!” from the benches of his allies, Palmerston rose and “hoped the House would come to a decision tonight”. He thought he had managed to burke Roebuck and even to rob him of the honour of a “great debate”, a parliamentary tournament. But Disraeli was not the only one to oppose the division. Bright, with his characteristic massive earnestness, rose to his feet:

“The Government had evidently wished to shirk this question, and had abstained until midnight from declaring what course they intended to take. The question was the most important one ever to come before the House. The debate, he thought, might last a whole week to the advantage of the country.”

Thus obliged to accept the adjournment of the debate Palmerston had to abandon his original plan of campaign. He suffered a defeat.

Roebuck’s speech possessed the great merit of brevity. With simplicity and clarity he summed up the reasons for his verdict, not as a barrister but as a judge, a manner befiting him as chairman of the Committee of Inquiry. He evidently had to contend with the same obstacles which are preventing the allied fleet from entering the harbour of Sevastopol—namely the sunken ships, the Aberdeens, Herberths, Gladstones, Grahams, etc. It was only by manoeuvring his way past them that he could reach Palmerston and the other surviving members of the Coalition Cabinet. They were barring the way to the present Cabinet. Roebuck tried to dispose of them by means of compliments. Newcastle and Herbert had to be praised for the conscientious way they had discharged their official duties, and Graham too. The other sins which they had committed from lack of insight had been punished with their exclusion from Downing Street. All that

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a Marx uses the English verb “to burke” in the corresponding German grammatical form (geburkt).—Ed.

b 10 Downing Street is the British Prime Minister’s residence. Here the reference is to the government as a whole.—Ed.
remains is to deal with the wrongdoers who have not yet been punished. This, he said, was the real purpose of his motion. He attacked Palmerston especially not only as an accomplice, but in particular as the person in charge of the militia. In order to keep his motion within the traditional limits set by Parliament Roebuck evidently took the point out of it. The arguments produced by the ministerial seconds were so feeble that the soporific form in which they were developed actually had a soothing effect. The evidence given by the witnesses is incomplete, called some. You are threatening to ostracise us, cried others. The whole affair happened so long ago, said Lord Cecil. Why not condemn Sir Robert Peel belatedly for what he did? Every member of the Cabinet is in a general manner responsible for the acts of the Cabinet, but no one in particular. That was the view of the “liberal” Phillimore. You are endangering the French alliance and setting yourselves up as a jury over the Emperor of the French. That was the view expressed by Lowe (of The Times) followed by Sir James Graham. Graham, the man of clear conscience, states that he himself is dissatisfied with General Peel’s pure negative. He insists that the House should decide “Guilty” or “Not guilty”. He will not be satisfied with a verdict of “not proven” such as the Scottish courts use to dismiss doubtful criminal cases. Do you really want to reintroduce the antiquated and unparliamentary procedure of impeachment? The press, public opinion is to blame for everything. It forced the Ministers to undertake the expedition, at an inopportune time and with inadequate means. If you condemn the Ministry then you ought to condemn the House of Commons, which gave its backing! And finally Sir Charles Wood’s attempt at a justification. If Roebuck exonerates even Newcastle and Herbert and Graham, how can he accuse us? We were nothing, and we are responsible for nothing. Thus Wood with his “feeling which penetrates nothing”.

Written on July 18, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 335, July 21, 1855
Marked with the sign X

a Napoleon III.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English term and gives the German translation in brackets.—Ed.
c Marx gives the English term in brackets.—Ed.
d An expression used by the Duke of Alba in Schiller’s Don Carlos (Act II, Scene 5).—Ed.
At our last advices there was a lull in the warlike operations in the Crimea. No more assaults had taken place; the guns were all but silent; and but for the rifle-firing carried on constantly between the two lines of intrenchments, for the sapping and mining by which the Allies were pushing on toward the Malakoff hill, and for an occasional sortie by the Russians, we might suppose that hostilities had been suspended. But this can be nothing but the calm that precedes the storm; and ere this, that storm must have burst. There is every probability that a struggle more savage than Inkermann, the Mamelon Vert, or the assault of June 18, has already been consummated at Sevastopol.

In fact the month of August must to a certain degree decide the result of the campaign. By this time the great part, if not all of the Russian reenforcements must have arrived, while the ranks of the Allies cannot but be thinned by sickness. If they hold their ground on the plateau of the Chersonesus it will be as much as they can do. That they will not take the south side of Sevastopol this year is a notion abandoned now even by the British press. They are reduced to the hope of knocking the place to pieces bit by bit, and if they manage to proceed at the speed they have hitherto exhibited, the siege will equal in duration that of Troy. There is no reason to expect that they will do their work with increased rapidity, for we are now all but officially informed that the vicious system hitherto followed is to be obstinately continued. The Crimean correspondent of the Constitutionnel of Paris, a man of high rank in the French army, and believed to be Gen. Regnault
de St. Jean d'Angély, Commander of the Guards, has announced the fact, that the public may spare themselves the trouble of making speculations as to a field campaign and eventual investment of the north side of Sevastopol. Under present circumstances, he says, this could not be done without raising the siege and abandoning to the Russians the entire plateau; and therefore it has been decided to knock away as hard as possible at the position already attacked, until it is completely destroyed.\(^a\) Now, the announcements of this letter may be relied on, as there is every reason to believe that the French Emperor\(^b\) not only approves, but even revises every letter from this source before it is printed, and as Regnault is one of his special pets.

What is to be the consequence of all this we can easily discover. The Russian army at and about Sevastopol now consists of the third and fourth corps, two divisions of the fifth and one of the sixth corps, beside marines, sailors, local troops, Cossacks and cavalry—presenting a force under arms of 180 battalions, or 90,000 infantry, with 30,000 artillery and cavalry, beside about 40,000 sick and wounded. Even the French Moniteur estimates their effective strength under arms at 110,000 men.\(^c\) Now the whole of the second corps (50 battalions, 32 squadrons, 96 guns) and two divisions of grenadiers, with one division of cavalry (24 battalions, 32 squadrons, 72 guns), are on the march or already at Sevastopol, representing an additional force of 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and Cossacks, and 5,000 artillery. The Russians thus will shortly have concentrated a force of at least 175,000 men or considerably more than the Allies can have left after their recent losses by combats and disease. That with these the Russians should be able at least to hold their own, particularly as they can constantly relieve the garrison by fresh troops after the old ones are exhausted by fatigue, is certainly the least that is to be expected from them.

The Allies, on the other hand, have no chance of receiving similar reenforcements. They now number 21 divisions of infantry (12 French, 4 English, 3 Turkish, 2 Piedmontese), or about 190 battalions; 3 divisions of cavalry (1 French, 1 English, 1 Turkish), or about 60 squadrons; and a corresponding number of guns. But as their battalions, and especially their squadrons, are very much thinned by the losses of the campaign, the whole force will not

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\(^a\) "Devant Sébastopol, 26 juin", Le Constitutionnel, No. 192, July 11, 1855.—Ed.

\(^b\) Napoleon III.—Ed.

\(^c\) Le Moniteur universel, No. 198, July 17, 1855.—Ed.
exceed 110,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 20,000 to 25,000 artillery, train, and non-combatants fit for duty. Now if the forces of the two contending parties were so nicely balanced before the arrival of the Russian reenforcements, the scale must evidently turn against the Allies as soon as they arrive. All the allied reenforcements arrived and now being sent out are merely detachments from the depots to keep up the battalions and squadrons engaged; and they are not very strong if we are to believe the statements of the Press. However, three divisions are said to be on the march to Marseilles and Toulon, where steamers are concentrating; while, in England, the regiments intended for the Crimea are ordered to be ready for immediate embarkation. They will perhaps amount to another division of infantry and one of cavalry. Thus about 33,000 infantry, with perhaps 2,500 cavalry and artillery may be gradually arriving in the Crimea during August and September; but all this depends very much upon the celerity with which they are got off. At all events, the Allies will find themselves once more in a numerical inferiority, and may again be locked up on the plateau where they spent the last dreary Winter. Whether the Russians can now succeed in driving them off that stronghold we will not undertake to say. But to hold their own is evidently the only thing the Allies can expect, until they receive reenforcements on a gigantic scale. Thus the war promises to be reduced to a series of resultless and bloody encounters, in which each party will send forth fresh bodies of troops, day after day, to meet the enemy in hand-to-hand struggles, whether on the ramparts of the town, on the parapets of the trenches, or on the escarpd heights around Inkermann and Balaklava. No position of hostile armies can be imagined in which the shedding of more blood can lead to results less important than we must expect from such fights.

There is, however, one chance of something decisive occurring. If the Russians, beside the troops they have sent, can afford to send another 50,000 men, so as to insure to their army an incontestable superiority, serious defeats may be incurred by the Allies, so as to force them to reembark. To judge of this possibility we must look at the force the Russians have under arms on the whole extent of their frontier. The Crimean army, including the reenforcements mentioned above, we set down at about 175,000 men. In the Caucasus, where, beside the local troops and Cossacks,

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*Marx and Engels give other figures—30,000 to 35,000—in their article “From Parliament.—From the Theatre of War” (see this volume, pp. 363-66).—*Ed.
the 16th and 17th divisions are engaged, they may have about 60,000 men. In Bessarabia they are said to have 60,000 men under Lüders—mostly combined battalions and reserves, as we should say, since only one division of the infantry of the fifth corps is there, and nothing has ever been stated about troops of the first or second corps having marched in that direction. In Poland and Volhynia there would remain two divisions of guards, one of grenadiers, three of the first army-corps, and various reserves—amounting to about 160,000 men. The greater portion of the reserves and part of the guards are concentrated on the Baltic in the following manner: 50,000 men under Sievers in the German Baltic Provinces, 30,000 in Finland under Berg, and 50,000 men in and about St. Petersburg, as an army of reserve under Rüdiger; in all about 585,000 men. The remainder of the Russian forces, about 65,000 men, are in the interior; and thus the total armed force would make up 650,000 men. Considering the enormous levies made by Russia, this number does not appear at all exaggerated.

Now, it is clear that at this advanced season of the year no serious danger of a landing on the Baltic coast is to be apprehended, and a general shifting toward the south of the various detachments placed there might be effected so as to liberate say 30,000 men, to be replaced by the militia or other troops from the interior. These 30,000 men marching toward Poland, would liberate in that country an equal number, and by the time the Austrians have reduced their army on the frontier to the harmless number of 70,000 or 80,000 men, which must soon be the case, another 30,000 to 40,000 men from the Polish army might be spared. Thus the troops might be found for such a reinforcement as would preclude all possibility of the Allies ever mastering the Crimea singlehanded, and they might be brought to the scene of war by the middle of October. But the question arises whether it will be possible for the Government to feed such a large number of troops during the Winter, especially since the Sea of Azoff has been cleared of Russian vessels. As to this we have not sufficient data to venture an opinion; but if that can be done, and the measure be adopted, the Allies might as well batter away at the rocks that surround Balaklava harbor as at the ramparts of Sevastopol defended directly and indirectly by a force of 250,000 men.

Russia has hitherto been held in check by 300,000 Austrians on the flank of her line of communication with the Crimea. Let her once get rid of that trammel, and the Allies will soon see what a
power they have to deal with. They have allowed the time to slip away when, aided indirectly by Austria, they might have taken Sevastopol. Now, that Russia begins to be safe on that side, and has only the Allies to deal with, it is too late.

Written about July 20, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4459, August 4, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1064, August 7, 1855 and the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 726, August 11, 1855 as a leading article; an abridged German version was included in the report by Marx and Engels published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 337, July 23, 1855, marked with the sign ×

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, July 20. The debate on Roebuck’s motion\(^a\) did not turn out in the way the Ministry was fond of thinking. Even yesterday morning it was prophesying in its semi-official organs that Roebuck’s motion would be defeated by five votes to one. Last night it considered itself fortunate in obtaining 289 votes to 182 for the previous question,\(^b\) i.e. the refusal of the House to decide on the motion at all. The same House that forced Aberdeen to resign because he refused to set up a Committee of Inquiry, saved Palmerston by refusing to come to a conclusion on the verdict of its own Committee. The adjournment of Parliament adjourns the fate of Palmerston’s Cabinet until the new session. That is when its lease of life will end. We shall return later to the sitting itself.

At present there is a lull in the war operations in the Crimea. No more attempted assaults, the cannon are almost silenced; and if it were not for the constant exchange of rifle fire between the two lines of trenches, if the allies were not advancing their position up the Malakhov hill by mining and sapping, and if the Russians did not make the occasional sorties, one might think that all hostilities had been suspended.

That is the calm before the storm. In two or three weeks a battle will begin, man against man, much fiercer than at Inkerman, the Green Mamelon or the assault of June 18.\(^257\) The month of August ought to be decisive up to a certain point: the Russian forces which are now on their way will have arrived, and the allied

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\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 337-38, 356-57.—Ed.

\(^b\) The authors use the English words “previous question”.—Ed.
forces will have been reduced by sickness. The life-and-death battle will then begin, and the allies will have enough to do maintaining their ground on the plateau.

Even the English press has now given up the idea of the south side of Sevastopol being taken this year. They are now reduced to the hope of subduing Sevastopol bit by bit; and if they manage to proceed with the same speed as they have up to now the siege will last as long as that of Troy. There is absolutely no reason to believe that they will speed up their task, for we have been as good as told officially that the deficient system adopted so far will be stubbornly continued. The Crimea correspondent of the Constitutionnel, a man of high rank in the French army (it is said to be General Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angély, commander of the guards), has announced to the public that it can spare itself the effort of indulging in speculation about a campaign in the open and the possible blockade of the northside of Sevastopol. He maintains that under the present circumstances this could not happen without first abandoning the siege and surrendering the whole of the plateau to the Russians. It has therefore been decided to hammer away as fiercely as possible at the position which has already been attacked until it has been completely destroyed. The announcements contained in this letter can be regarded as semi-official, as there is every reason to believe that Bonaparte not only approves of them but that he also checks every report from this source before it goes to print. Regnault is one of his special favourites—the Minister of War who, at the time of the Legislative Assembly, gave his signature to the dismissal of Changarnier.

The consequences of all this are not hard to predict. The Russian army in and around Sevastopol consisted of the 3rd and 4th Corps, two divisions of the 5th and one of the 6th Corps, apart from marines, sailors, local troops, Cossacks and cavalry, all in all an army of 180 battalions or 90,000 infantry with 30,000 men of the artillery, cavalry, etc., plus about 40,000 sick and wounded. Even the French Moniteur estimates their effective force under arms to be 110,000 men. Now, the whole of the 2nd Corps (50 battalions, 32 squadrons and 96 cannon) and two divisions of infantry with a division of cavalry (24 battalions, 32 squadrons, 72 cannon) are marching towards or are already near Sevastopol. They represent an additional force of 55,000 infant-

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a “Devant Sébastopol, 26 juin”, Le Constitutionnel, No. 192, July 11, 1855.—Ed.

b Le Moniteur universel, No. 198, July 17, 1855.—Ed.
ry, 10,000 cavalry and Cossacks and 5,000 artillery. Thus the Russians will soon have concentrated an army of at least 175,000 men, considerably more than the allies can have after their most recent losses in the sorties and from sickness. It is all the more to be expected that the Russians will be capable of at least holding the territory they have held so far, since they are able constantly to relieve with fresh forces the garrison troops exhausted by their efforts.

The allies on the other hand have no chance of receiving similar reinforcements. They now number 21 divisions of infantry (12 French, 4 English, 3 Turkish, 2 Piedmontese), or approximately 190 battalions, 3 divisions of cavalry (1 French, 1 English, 1 Turkish), or approximately 60 squadrons and a corresponding number of cannon but, since their battalions and particularly their squadrons have been substantially thinned by the losses in the campaign, their total strength will not exceed 110,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry and 30,000-35,000 artillery, vehicle train and those unfit for active service. If the forces of the two opposing parties were thus almost equally balanced before the arrival of the Russian reinforcements, the scale must clearly tip to the disadvantage of the allies as soon as those reinforcements arrive. What has been sent so far have merely been detachments from the depots, who were to make up the losses suffered by the battalions and squadrons engaged in combat, and they cannot be many in number, if the press reports are reliable. In the meantime it is reported that 3 divisions are marching to Marseilles and Toulon where steamships are being concentrated, whilst in England regiments intended for the Crimea have received orders to be ready for immediate embarkation. They will comprise approximately one division of infantry and one division of cavalry. Thus approximately 33,000 infantry with perhaps 2,500 cavalry and artillery might arrive little by little in the Crimea in August and September. This, however, depends entirely on how quickly they embark. At all events the allies will again find themselves numerically inferior and can be wedged in on the plateau once more, where they were brought to ruin during last year's sad winter.

Whether the Russians will succeed this time in driving them from that fortified hiding-place we dare not say. But it is clear that all the allies can expect to do is to maintain their own ground, unless they were to receive reinforcements on a gigantic scale. Thus the war could be reduced to a series of encounters and hand-to-hand fights, as fruitless as they are bloody, with each side
sending forward fresh troops daily to meet the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, whether it be on the ramparts of the city, on the parapets of the trenches, or on the escarpments round Inkerman and Balaklava. Of all the possibilities it is most likely that matters will take that course. No situation involving two enemy armies could be devised where greater spilling of blood will lead to results of less significance than can be expected from engagements of this kind. And this has been brought about by the mediocrity of the commanders-in-chief on both sides, by impotent dilettantism at Paris and deliberate treachery in London.

Written on July 20, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 337, July 23, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

The English version of part of the text was published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4459, August 4, 1855, and reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1064, August 7, 1855 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 726, August 11, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English in full for the first time
London, July 23. If the guarantee of the Turkish loan\textsuperscript{259} should run into the same opposition this evening as it did last Friday, then Palmerston will immediately \textit{dissolve} the House of Commons. To the adroit all circumstances are favourable. Dissolving the Commons as a result of Bulwer's motion, or dissolving it on account of Roebuck's motion\textsuperscript{a}—both methods are equally risky. The diplomatic activity at the Vienna conferences,\textsuperscript{260} the administration organising the winter campaign—neither position is suitable for appealing to the electorate from Parliament. But the "guarantee of the Turkish loan"! Scenery, situation and motive are transformed as if by a stroke of magic. It is no longer Parliament that condemns the Cabinet on the grounds of treachery or incompetence. It is the Cabinet which accuses Parliament of hindering the conduct of the war, of jeopardising the French alliance and of abandoning Turkey. The Cabinet no longer appeals to the country to absolve it from Parliament's condemnation. It appeals to the country to condemn Parliament. In fact the loan is so formulated that Turkey receives no money directly, but, under the most humiliating conditions for a nation, she is put under guardianship and has to allow the sum allegedly loaned to her to be administered and dispensed by English commissioners. The English administration has stood the test so brilliantly during the Eastern war that it must indeed be tempted to extend its blessings to foreign realms. The Western Powers have taken possession of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Constantinople, and not just the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but the Ministry

\textsuperscript{a} For a description of the Bulwer-Lytton and Roebuck motions and their discussion in the House of Commons see this volume, pp. 337-43, 353-57.—\textit{Ed.}
of Home Affairs too. Since Omer Pasha was transplanted from Bulgaria to the Crimea, Turkey has ceased to exercise authority over her own army. The Western Powers are now trying to seize the Turkish finances. For the first time the Ottoman Empire is contracting public debts without receiving a loan. It finds itself in the position of an estate owner who does not only raise an advance on a mortgage but also binds himself to relinquish to his creditor the administration of the sum advanced. The one remaining step is to relinquish the estate itself. Palmerston has demoralised Greece and paralysed Spain by means of a similar system of loans. But appearances are on his side. The participation of the peace party in the opposition to the loan adds strength to these appearances. Thanks to a nimble somersault he again stands as the representative of war against the whole opposition as the representatives of peace. We know which war he intends to conduct. Chaining Finland more securely to Russia in the Baltic by means of useless and unproductive acts of murder and arson. Perpetuating in the Crimea a series of butcheries in which defeat alone, not victory, can produce a decision. Following his old habit he casts foreign alliances into the parliamentary scales. Bonaparte has already had the loan sanctioned by his so-called "legislative corps". The English Parliament must condescend to becoming the echo of the "legislative corps"—the echo of an echo, or the alliance will be jeopardised. Using the French alliance as a shield to ward off all blows from himself, Palmerston at the same time has the satisfaction of seeing it receive a pummelling. As a proof that he can send "the right man to fill the right place" Palmerston has promoted Sir W[illiam] Molesworth to Colonial Secretary, and Sir B[enjamin] Hall to Commissioner of Forests and Land Revenues in place of Molesworth. Molesworth belongs to Wakefield's school of colonisation. Its principle is to make land in the colonies artificially dear and labour artificially cheap in order to engender the "necessary combination of productive forces". The experimental use of this theory in Canada drove immigrants away from that country to the United States and Australia.

In London there are three committees of inquiry in session at the moment, one appointed by the Cabinet, the other two by

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*a From Layard's speech in the House of Commons on June 15, 1855. The Times, No. 22082, June 16, 1855.—Ed.

*b Marx calls it Minister der Waldungen und Domänen. The actual title was up to 1857 Commissioner of Woods, Forests and Land Revenues and in that year was changed to Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings.—Ed.
Parliament. The first, composed of the Recorders of London, Manchester, and Liverpool, investigating the *events in Hyde Park*, finds itself flooded daily with evidence not only that the constables used unprecedented brutality, but also that this brutality was intentional and used on orders. If it were uncompromising the inquiry would have to begin with Sir George Grey and the Cabinet as the principal offenders. The second committee, under Berkeley’s chairmanship, dealing with the effects of the Act on the “sale of spirits on Sundays”, shows the sanctimonious superficiality of sabbatarian experiments for the improvement of society. Instead of decreasing, the number of excesses from drunkenness has increased. The only difference is their partial displacement from Sundays to Mondays. The third committee, chaired by Scholefield, is concerned with the adulteration of food and drink and of all commodities contributing to the maintenance of life. Adulteration seems to be the rule, purity the exception. For the most part the substances added to impart colour, odour and taste to worthless materials are poisonous, and all of them are detrimental to health. Trade appears here as a vast laboratory of fraud, the list of commodities as a diabolical catalogue of phantoms, free competition as the freedom to poison and be poisoned.

The *Report of the Inspectors of Factories* for the half-year ending April 30 has been laid before both Houses of Parliament—an invaluable contribution to the characterisation of the Manchester men of peace and the class disputing the aristocracy’s monopoly of government. In the report the “accidents arising from machinery” are classified under the headings:

1. “Causing death”, 2. “Loss of right hand or arm. Loss of part of right hand. Loss of left hand or arm. Loss of part of left hand. [...] Fracture of hand or foot. Injuries to head and face” and 3. “Lacerations, contusions and other injuries not enumerated above.”

We read of a young woman “who lost her right hand”, of a child who “had the nasal bones crushed in and the sight of both eyes destroyed by this machine”, of a man whose “left leg was cut off, [...] right arm broken in three or four places”, whose head

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*Marx uses the English word.—* 
*See this volume, pp. 323-27.—* 
*Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year Ending 30th April 1855.—* 
*Here and in the rest of this passage the Report has “Amputation of” where Marx writes “Loss of”.—* 
*Marx paraphrased the extract.—*
was cut and "mutilated in a shocking manner"; of a youth who had his "left arm torn out at the shoulder joint", among other injuries, and of another man who had "both arms torn out of the shoulder joints, his abdomen lacerated, the intestines protruded, both legs broken, head contused", etc., etc. The industrial bulletin of the factory inspectors is more terrible and more appalling than any of the war bulletins from the Crimea. Women and children provide a regular and sizeable contingent in the list of the wounded and killed. Deaths and injuries are no more praiseworthy than the colours marked on the body of a Negro by the plantation owner's whip. They are almost exclusively caused by the absence of the legally prescribed protective guards around the machines. It will be recalled that the manufacturers of Manchester—this metropolis of the party of peace at any price—assailed the Cabinet with deputations and protests against the Act ordering certain safety precautions in the use of machinery. Since they were unable to change the law at present, they attempted by intrigues to get rid of the Factory Inspector L[eonard] Horner, and to manoeuvre a more pliant guardian of the law into his place. So far without success. They claimed that the introduction of the safety equipment would eat up their profit. Horner has now proved that there are few factories in his district which could not be made safe for £10. The total number of accidents arising from machinery during the six months covered by the report is 1,788, among these 18 fatal accidents. The sum total of money fines imposed on the manufacturers, of compensation for injuries paid by them, etc., is £298 for the same period. To make up this sum fines for "permitting work during illegal hours", for "employing children under 8 years of age", etc., are included in it, so that the fines imposed for the 18 deaths and the 1,770 mutilations fall far short of £298. £298! This is less than the cost of a third-class racehorse! 263

The Roebuck committee and the British oligarchy! Scholefield's committee and the British commercial class! The report of the Factory Inspectors and the British factory owners—these three headings provide a graphic idea of the physiology of the classes now ruling in Great Britain.

Written on July 23, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 343, July 26, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Karl Marx

LORD JOHN RUSSELL
Written July 25-August 12, 1855

First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
Nos. 347, 359, 363, 365, 369 and 377,
July 28, August 4, 7, 8, 10 and 15, 1855

Marked with the sign ×

An abridged English version was published in the New-York Daily Tribune,
No. 4479, August 28, 1855

Printed according to the Neue Oder-Zeitung

Published in English in full for the first time
London, July 25. Lord John Russell was fond of quoting an old Whig axiom that “parties were like snails, for with them it is the tail that moves the head”. He hardly could have surmised that to save itself the tail will strike off the head. If not the head of the “last Whig cabinets”, he was indisputably the head of the Whig Party. Burke said once that

“the number of estates, country-houses, castles, forest lands and the like which the Russells had wrested away from the English people was quite incredible”.\(^a\)

The great repute in which Lord John Russell has been held and the prominent role which he has dared to play for over a quarter of a century would be even more incredible if the “number of estates” which his family has usurped did not furnish the clue to the puzzle.

Lord John seems to have spent his whole life simply chasing after posts and holding on so stubbornly to the posts he captured that he forfeited all claim to power. So it was in 1836-1841 when he was given the post of leader of the House of Commons. So in 1846-1852 when he could call himself Prime Minister. The semblance of power that enveloped him as the leader of an opposition assaulting the exchequer always disappeared the day he came to power. As soon as he changed from an Out to an In\(^b\) he

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\(^a\) “A Letter from the Right Honourable Edmund Burke to a Noble Lord, on the Attacks Made upon him and his Pension, in the House of Lords, by the Duke of Bedford...”, p. 37. Marx gives the English words “quite incredible” in brackets after the corresponding German words.—Ed.

\(^b\) Marx uses the English words “Out” (member of the opposition) and “In” (member of the Government).—Ed.
was done. With no other English statesman did power so abruptly change into powerlessness. But, on the other hand, no other knew so well as he how to transform powerlessness into power.

The sham power Lord John Russell periodically wielded was not only sustained by the influence exerted by the family of the Duke of Bedford, whose younger son he was, but also by the absence of all the qualities which generally fit a person to rule over others. His Lilliputian views on everything spread to others like a contagion and contributed more to confuse the judgment of his hearers than the most ingenious misrepresentation could have done. His real talent consists in his capacity to reduce everything that he touches to his own dwarfish dimensions, to diminish the external world to an infinitesimal size and to transform it into a vulgar microcosm of his own invention. His instinct to belittle the magnificent is excelled only by the skill with which he can make the petty appear great.

Lord John Russell’s entire life has been lived on false pretences: the false pretences of parliamentary reform, the false pretences of religious freedom, the false pretences of Free Trade. So sincere was his belief in the sufficiency of false pretences that he considered it quite feasible to become, not only a British statesman on the basis of false pretences, but also a poet, thinker and historian. Only this can account for the existence of such balderdash as his tragedy Don Carlos, or, Persecution, or his Essay on the History of the English Government and Constitution, from the Reign of Henry VII to the Present Time, or his Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht. To his egoistic narrow-mindedness every object is nothing but a tabula rasa on which he is at liberty to write his own name. His opinions have never depended upon the actual facts; on the contrary, he regards facts as dependent on the way he arranges them in his rhetorical efforts. As a speaker he has not produced a single idea worth mentioning, not one profound maxim, no penetrating observation, no impressive description, no beautiful thought, no poignant allusion, no humorous portrait, no true emotion. Russell’s “most docile mediocrity”, as Roebuck admits in his history of the reform ministry, surprised his audience even when performing the greatest deed of his public life: when he tabled his so-called Reform Bill in the House of Commons. He has a peculiar

manner of combining his dry, drawling and monotonous delivery resembling that of an auctioneer with schoolboy illustrations from history and a certain solemn gibberish on “the beauty of the constitution”, the “universal liberties of this country”, “civilisation” and “progress”. He gets really heated only when personally provoked or goaded by his opponents into abandoning his pose of affected arrogance and self-satisfaction and displaying all the symptoms of extreme helplessness. In England it is generally agreed that his numerous failures are due to a certain natural rashness. This rashness, too, is really merely a false pretence. It is brought about by the subterfuges and expedients intended only for the given moment necessarily coming into conflict with the adverse circumstances of the next moment. Russell does not act instinctively but calculatingly; but his calculations are petty like the man himself—they are always merely make-shifts intended for the next hour. Hence his constant wavering and dodging, his rapid advances and disgraceful retreats, his insolent words prudently retracted, pledges proudly made and wretchedly redeemed, and, if nothing else was of any avail, there were sobs and tears to move the world to pity. His whole life can be viewed, therefore, either as a systematic sham* or as an uninterrupted blunder.

It may seem astonishing that a public figure should have survived such a host of stillborn measures, crushed projects and abortive schemes. But just as a polyp thrives on amputation, so Lord John Russell on abortion. Most of his plans were advanced solely for the purpose of placating his discontented allies, the so-called Radicals, while an understanding with his adversaries, the Conservatives, ensured the “burking” of these plans. Who can say that since the days of the reformed Parliament he ever staked the fate of his Cabinet on a single one of his “comprehensive and liberal measures”, or of his “great reforms presented by instalments”. On the contrary. The proposal of measures to satisfy the Liberals and their withdrawal to satisfy the Conservatives contributed more than anything else to maintain and prolong his Ministry. There were times when Peel deliberately kept him at the helm in order not to be compelled to do things which he knew Russell would only prattle about. In such periods of secret understanding with the official opponent Russell exhibited impudence vis-à-vis his official allies. He became bold—on false pretences.

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* Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
We shall cast a retrospective glance on his performance from 1830 until the present day. This commonplace genius has deserved it.

**London, August 1.**

"If I was a painter," said Cobbett, "there would I place the old oak (the British Constitution), corroded at the root, his top dead, his trunk hollow, loosened at his base, rocking with every blast, and there would I place Lord John Russell, in the person of a tom-tit, endeavoring to put all right by picking at a nest of animalculae seated in the half-rotten bark of one of the meanest branches. There are some who even think that he is eating the buds while he pretends to clear the tree of injurious insects."

So minute were Lord John Russell's reform efforts during his antediluvian career from 1813 to 1830; but minute as they were, they were not even sincere, and he never hesitated to repudiate them as soon as he perceived merely the scent of a ministerial post.

Since 1807 the Whigs had pined in vain for a share in the proceeds of taxation, when in 1827 the formation of Canning's cabinet, with whom they pretended to agree on the subject of commerce and of foreign policy, seemed to afford them the long-sought-for opportunity. Russell, at that time, had given notice of one of his tom-tit Parliamentary reform motions. But upon Canning's stern declaration that he should oppose Parliamentary reform to the end of his life, up rose Lord John and withdrew his motion. He said

"Parliamentary reform was a question on which there was a great diversity of opinion among those who advocated it, and to which the leaders of the Whigs were always unwilling to be pledged as to a party question. It was now for the last time that he brought forward this question."

He concluded his speech with the insolent statement that "the people no longer wished for Parliamentary reform". He, who had always made a show of his noisy opposition to Castlereagh's six infamous gagging acts of 1819, now refrained from voting on

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a Russell's speech in the House of Commons on May 3, 1827. Quotations from and references to Parliamentary speeches are as a rule based on Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.—Ed.
Mr. Hume's motion\(^a\) for the repeal of one of those acts which made a man liable to transportation for life for uttering in print anything which had even a tendency to bring either house of Parliament into contempt.

Thus, at the conclusion of the first period of his Parliamentary life, we find Lord John Russell disavowing his support of Reform, to which he paid lip service for more than ten years, and fully concurring with the opinion of that Whig prototype, Horace Walpole, who remarked to Conway that\(^b\)

"popular Bills are never really proposed but as an engine of party, and not as a pledge for the realisation of any such extravagant ideas".

It was, then, by no means Russell's fault that instead of bringing forward the motion for reform for the last time in 1827, he had to table it again four years later, on March 1, 1831, in the shape of the famous Reform Bill. He was not even the author of this Bill, which he still exhibits as his great claim to the admiration of the world in general, and England in particular.\(^c\) In its principal features—the breaking up of the greater part of the nomination boroughs, the addition of county members, the enfranchisement of copyholders, lease-holders,\(^d\) and twenty four of the chief commercial and industrial towns of England—it was copied from the Bill which Lord Grey (the chief of the Reform Ministry in 1830) had moved in the House of Commons in 1797, when heading the Opposition, and which he had wisely forgotten about when he was a member of the Cabinet in 1806. It was the identical Bill, slightly modified. The ejection of Wellington from the Cabinet, because he had declared against Parliamentary Reform; the July Revolution in France; the threatening great political unions formed by the middle and working classes at Birmingham, Manchester, London, and elsewhere; the rural war in the agricultural counties\(^e\); the "bonfires" in the most fertile regions of England\(^e\)—all these circumstances compelled the Whigs to propose some measure of Reform. They gave way grudgingly,

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\(^a\) Tabled in the House of Commons on May 31, 1827.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) The *New-York Daily Tribune* has: "we find him fully concurring with the opinion of that Whig prototype, Horace Walpole, that".—*Ed.*

\(^c\) Instead of the words "and England in particular" the *New-York Daily Tribune* has "and the gratitude of the English nation in particular".—*Ed.*

\(^d\) Marx uses the English words "boroughs", "copyholders", "lease-holders" and, below, "freeholders".—*Ed.*

\(^e\) The *New-York Daily Tribune* further has: "(Out of the fires came the Reform," says a celebrated writer)".—*Ed.*
slowly, and after vainly reiterated efforts to keep their places by a compromise with the Tories.\(^a\) They were prevented by the formidable attitude of the people, and also by the uncompromising intransigence of the Tories. Hardly, however, had the Reform Bill become law, and begun to work, when, to quote Mr. Bright's words (spoken on June 5, 1849), the people "began to feel that they had been cheated".\(^b\)

Never, perhaps, had a mighty, and, to all appearances, successful popular movement been turned into such a mock result. Not only were the working classes altogether excluded from any political influence, but the middle classes themselves soon discovered that Lord Althorp, the soul of the Reform cabinet, had not used a rhetorical figure when telling his Tory adversaries that "the Reform Bill was the most aristocratic act ever offered to the nation".

The new country representation was far larger than the increase in votes granted to the towns. The franchise given to the tenants-at-will rendered\(^c\) the counties, still more efficiently than before, the tools of the aristocracy. The substitution of the £10 householders for the payers of scot and lot, actually disfranchised a great number of former town voters. The granting or withdrawal of the franchise was, on the whole, calculated not to increase middle-class influence, but to exclude Tory patronage and promote Whig patronage. By a series of the most extraordinary tricks, frauds, and juggles, the inequality of the electoral districts was maintained, the monstrous disproportion between the number of representatives, on the one hand, and the size of the population and the importance of the constituencies, on the other, restored. If some fifty-six rotten boroughs, each with a handful of inhabitants, were extinguished, whole counties and populous towns were transformed into rotten boroughs. John Russell himself confesses, in a letter to his electors in Stroud, on the principles of the Reform Act (1839), that "the £10 franchise was lettered by regulation, and the annual registration was made a source of vexation and expense".

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\(^a\) The New-York Daily Tribune has: "It was their only means of rushing into office. They gave way grudgingly, slowly, and after vainly reiterated efforts at one time to shuffle out of the only liberal clauses of their own measure, and again to abandon it altogether, and to keep their places by a compromise with the Tories." — Ed.

\(^b\) John Bright's speech in the House of Commons.— Ed.

\(^c\) The New-York Daily Tribune has: "tenants-at-will occupying at an annual value of £50, rendered".— Ed.
Intimidation and patronage, where they could not be perpetuated, were replaced by bribery, which, from the passage of the Reform Bill, became the main prop of the British Constitution. Such was the Reform Bill of which Russell was the mouthpiece, but not the author. The only clauses since proved to be due to his invention are that which compels all freeholders,\(^{272}\) except parsons, to have had a year of possession, and the other clause preserving the privileges of Tavistock, the family "rotten borough" of the Russells.

Russell was but a subordinate member of the Reform Ministry, without a vote in the Cabinet, \textit{viz.}: Paymaster of the Forces, from 1830 to November 1834. He was, perhaps, the most insignificant man among his colleagues, but he was nevertheless the youngest son of the influential Duke of Bedford. Hence it was decided to grant him the privilege of introducing the Reform Bill in the House of Commons. One obstacle stood in the way of this family arrangement. During the Reform movement, before 1830, Russell had always figured as "Henry Brougham's little man".\(^{a}\) Russell could not be entrusted with bringing in the Reform Bill as long as Brougham sat beside him in the Lower House. The obstacle was removed by throwing the conceited plebeian on the woolsack in the House of Lords.\(^{273}\) Because very soon the more prominent members of the original Reform cabinet either became members of the House of Lords (e.g. Althorp in 1834), died, or went over to the Tories, not only the entire inheritance of the Reform Ministry devolved upon Russell but soon he was regarded as the father of the child whose godfather he had been. He thrived on the false pretence of being the author of a Reform Bill which was itself a falsification and a piece of juggling. Apart from this he distinguished himself in the years 1830 to 1834 only by the irritable acrimony with which he opposed all inquiry into the pension-list.\(^{b}\)

\(^{a}\) Marx uses the English words "little man" and gives the German translation in brackets.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{b}\) Instead of the passage beginning with the words "One obstacle stood in the way of this family arrangement" and ending with the words "inquiry into the pension-list" the \textit{New-York Daily Tribune} has: "Beside the Reform-Bill discussion, Lord John distinguished himself by the acrimony and virulence with which he opposed all inquiry into the pension-list. Some years later, when all the prominent members of the original Reform cabinet, having been removed to the Lords, died out, or separated from the Whigs, Lord John not only entered upon their inheritance, but soon passed in the eyes of the country as the natural father of the bill of which he had been but the godfather by courtesy."—\textit{Ed.}
London, August 3. Let us return to our character sketch of Russell. He is worth dealing with at greater length, first because he is the classical representative of modern Whiggery, and second because his story, at least from one aspect, comprises the history of the reformed Parliament up to the present day.

In introducing the Reform Bill Russell made the following statement with regard to the ballot and short parliaments (the Whigs, of course, had prolonged the annual parliaments of England to three years in 1694 and to seven years in 1717):

“There can be no doubt that the ballot has much to recommend it; the arguments which I have heard advanced in its favour are as ingenious as any that I ever heard on any subject. But the House must beware of arriving at a hasty decision.... The question of short parliaments, is one of the utmost importance, which I shall leave to be brought before the House by some other member at a future time, in order not to embarrass the great subject with details.”

On June 6, 1833 he claimed to have

“refrained from bringing forward those two measures in order to avoid a collision with the Lords, although opinions (!) deeply seated in his heart. He was convinced of their being most essential to the happiness, prosperity and welfare of this country.”

(At the same time we have here an example of his species of rhetoric.)

On account of this “deeply seated conviction” he proved to be a constant and relentless enemy of the ballot and short parliaments throughout his entire ministerial career. At the time these statements were made they served as a twofold expedient. They mollified the distrustful democrats of the House of Commons, and they intimidated the intractable aristocrats of the House of Lords. Yet as soon as Russell had secured the support of the new court of Queen Victoria (see Brougham’s reply to Russell’s letter to the electors of Stroud, 1839) d, thus imagining himself to

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a Marx uses the English word here and below.—Ed.
b “The preceding two paragraphs do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune. The quotation from Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on March 1, 1831, which follows immediately is shorter and is introduced with the words: “On bringing in the Reform Bill, he said:”.—Ed.
c The sentence in brackets does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
be an immortal office-holder, out he comes with his statement of November 1837, justifying "the extreme length to which the Reform Bill had gone" by the fact that it ruled out the possibility of ever proceeding any further.

"The object of the Reform Bill," he stated, "was to increase the preponderance of the landed interest, and it was intended as a permanent settlement of a great constitutional question."

In short, he made the finality statement that earned him the title of "Finality John". But this finality, this standing still, was no more seriously meant than the talk of proceeding further. It is true, he opposed Hume's parliamentary reform motion in 1848. With the combined might of the Whigs, Tories and Peelites he again defeated Hume over a similar motion in 1849 by a majority of 268 to 82. Emboldened by his conservative reserves he spoke out provocatively:

"In framing and proposing the Reform Bill, what we wished was to adapt the representation of this House to the other powers of the State, and keep it in harmony with the Constitution. Mr. Bright and those who agree with him are so exceedingly narrow-minded, they have intellect and understanding bound up in such a narrow round that it is quite impossible to get them to understand the great principles on which our ancestors founded the Constitution of the country, and which we, their successors, humbly admire and endeavour to follow. The House of Commons, in the 17 years that have elapsed since the Reform Bill, has satisfied all reasonable expectations. The existing system, although somewhat anomalous, works well: the better for its anomalies."

However, as in 1851 Russell was defeated over Locke King's motion for extending the county franchise to £10 occupiers—and as he was even compelled to resign for a few days—his "broad" mind suddenly grasped the necessity for a new reform bill. He gave the House his pledge that he would introduce it. He did not say what his "measure" was but he drew a bill of exchange on it, payable during the next session of Parliament.

The Westminster Review, the organ of the so-called Radicals allied to Russell, wrote at the time,

"the pretence of the present ministry to office had become a byword of scorn and reproach; and at length, when its exclusion and party annihilation seemed imminent, forth comes Lord John with the promise of a new Reform Bill for 1852. Keep me in

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a Russell's speeches in the House of Commons on November 20 and 21, 1837. Marx gives the nickname in English, and also "finality" in the next sentence.—Ed.

b Instead of this sentence the New-York Daily Tribune has: "But this finality was as false a pretence as his reform itself."—Ed.

c Russell's speech in the House of Commons on June 5, 1849. The last sentence but one is omitted in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
office, he says, till that time, and I will satisfy your longings for a large and liberal measure of reform.\(^a\)

In 1852 he indeed proposed a Reform Bill, this time of his very own invention, but of such astonishingly Lilliputian proportions that neither the Conservatives considered it worth attacking, nor the Liberals worth defending. Still, the aborted reform afforded the little man the pretext, when he was eventually forced out of the Ministry, for hurling a Scythian arrow as he fled at the victorious Lord Derby, who succeeded him. He made his exit with the pompous threat that he "would insist on the extension of the suffrage".\(^b\) The extension of the suffrage had now become a "matter of the heart" for him.\(^c\) Scarcely had he been thrown out of the Cabinet when this child of expediency, now called by his own supporters Foul-Weather Jack,\(^d\) invited to his private residence at Chesham Place the various factions whose marriage brought into being the sickly monster of the coalition. He did not forget to send for the "exceedingly narrow-minded" Brights and Cobdens, begging their forgiveness at this solemn meeting for his own broad-mindedness and giving them a new promissory note for a "larger" amount of reform. As a member of the coalition Cabinet in 1854 he amused the Commons with yet another reform project, which he knew was destined to become another Iphigenia to be sacrificed by himself, another Agamemnon, for the sake of another Trojan War. He performed the sacrifice in the melodramatic style of Metastasio, his eyes filled with tears, which however dried up as soon as the "unpaid" seat which he occupied in the Cabinet was exchanged for the Presidency of the Cabinet at a salary of £2,000 as a result of a miserable intrigue against Mr. Strutt, a member of his own party.\(^e\)

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\(^a\) In the *New-York Daily Tribune* one more sentence of this passage is quoted: "The Reformers of the House of Commons yielded to that reasoning."—Ed.

\(^b\) From Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 23, 1852.—Ed.

\(^c\) This sentence does not occur in the *New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.*

\(^d\) Marx uses the English nickname and gives a German translation in brackets.—*Ed.*

\(^e\) The next paragraph is omitted in the *New-York Daily Tribune* and the end of this paragraph reads as follows: "Hardly out of office, this child of expediency, now emphatically called by his own followers Foul-Weather Jack, summoned to his private residence at Chesham-place the different sections of the Liberal party to make solemn asseverations of his own large-mindedness, and to hand to them another promissory bill of a larger amount of reform. When a member of the Coalition cabinet, he amused the House with a Reform bill which he knew would prove another Iphigenia, to be sacrificed by himself, another Agamemnon, for the benefit of another Trojan war. He performed the sacrifice indeed in true melodramatic style, his eyes filled with tears, but these soon passed away."—Ed.
The second reform plan was supposed to shore up his falling Cabinet, the third to bring down the Tory Cabinet. The second was a subterfuge, the third a piece of chicanery. He arranged the second so that no one would accept it; he presented the third at a moment when no one could accept it. With both he demonstrated that if fate had made him a Minister, nature had made him a tinker, just like Christopher Sly. Even of the first Reform Bill, the only one put into effect, he grasped only the oligarchical knack and not the historical tack.

[IV]

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 365, August 8, 1855]

London, August 4. On the outbreak of the Anti-Jacobin War the influence of the Whigs in England entered a period of decline, and continued to sink lower and lower. On account of this they turned their eyes on Ireland, resolving to use it to tip the balance, and inscribed on their party banners Irish Emancipation. When they came into office for an instant in 1806 they did, in fact, bring a minor Irish Emancipation Bill before the House of Commons, carrying it through its second reading, only to withdraw it voluntarily in order to flatter the bigot idiocy of George III. In 1812 they attempted to foist themselves on the Prince Regent (later George IV) as the only possible instruments of reconciliation with Ireland, albeit in vain. Before and during the reform agitation they fawned on O'Connell, and the “hopes of Ireland” served as powerful engines of war on their behalf. Yet the first act of the Reform Ministry at the first sitting of the first reformed Parliament was a declaration of war against Ireland with the “brutal and bloody” measure of the “Coercion Bill”, subjecting Ireland to martial law. The Whigs fulfilled their old pledges “with

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a Character in Shakespeare's The Taming of the Shrew.—Ed.
b The date is omitted in the New-York Daily Tribune and the article begins with the following sentence: “Another of the false pretenses on which he sought a niche in the temple of fame was his efforts on behalf of Ireland.” — Ed.
c This sentence does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
d In the New-York Daily Tribune this sentence reads: “...a declaration of civil war against Ireland, a ‘brutal and bloody measure’, the Irish Coercion ‘Red-Coat Tribunal bill’, according to which men were to be tried in Ireland by military officers, instead of by Judges and Juries”. (The phrase “brutal and bloody measure” was used by Daniel O'Connell in the House of Commons on February 5, 1833.) — Ed.
fire, imprisonment, transportation and even death”. O'Connell was persecuted and convicted of sedition. The Whigs, however, had only introduced and carried the Coercion Bill against Ireland by expressly committing themselves to present another bill, a bill concerning the Church of England in Ireland. Furthermore, they had also promised that this bill should contain a clause placing certain surplus funds from the revenues of the Established Church in Ireland at the disposal of Parliament. Parliament, in its turn, was to employ them in the interests of Ireland. The importance of this clause lay in the recognition of the principle that Parliament possessed the power to expropriate the Established Church—a principle of which Lord John Russell ought to have been convinced all the more firmly as the entire immense fortune of his family consists of former Church estates. The Whigs promised to stand or fall by the Church Bill. But as soon as the Coercion Bill had been passed they withdrew the above clause, the only one of any value in the Church Bill, on the pretext of avoiding a collision with the House of Lords. They voted against and defeated their own motion. This occurred in 1834. Towards the end of that year, however, an electric shock seemed to have revived the Irish sympathies of the Whigs. The fact of the matter is that they had to relinquish the Cabinet in the autumn of 1834 to Sir Robert Peel. They had been hurled back into the Opposition benches. And straightaway we find our John Russell eagerly engaged in his work of reconciliation with Ireland. He was the main agent in negotiating the Lichfield House compact, which was concluded in January 1835. The Whigs hereby left patronage (the allocation of offices, etc.) in Ireland to O'Connell, while O'Connell secured them the Irish vote both inside and outside Parliament. But a pretext was needed to drive the Tories out of Downing Street. With characteristic “impudence”, Russell chose the Church revenues of Ireland as his battlefield, and as his battlecry the very same clause—notorious under the name of the Appropriation Clause—which he and his colleagues in the Reform Ministry had themselves withdrawn and abandoned shortly before. Peel was indeed beaten with the slogan of the “Appropriation Clause”. The Melbourne Cabinet was formed and Lord John Russell installed himself as Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons. Now he

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a The last two sentences do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
b 10 Downing Street is the official residence of the British Prime Minister.—Ed.
c The New-York Daily Tribune has: “... and Lord Russell became leader in the House of Commons.”—Ed.
began to sing his own praises: on the one hand for his intellectual constancy, because although now in office he continued to adhere to his *opinions* about the Appropriation Clause; on the other hand for his moral moderation in refraining to *act* on these opinions. He never translated them from words into action. When he was Prime Minister, in 1846, his moral moderation triumphed so emphatically over his intellectual constancy that he even repudiated his "opinion". He knew of no measures more fatal, he exclaimed, than those threatening the Established Church in its fundamental root, its revenues.\(^a\)

In February 1833 John Russell, in the name of the Reform Ministry, denounced the Irish *Repeal agitation*.\(^b\)

"Its real object," he exclaimed to the Commons, "is to overturn at once the United Parliament, and to establish, in place of King, Lords and Commons of the United Kingdom, some parliament of which Mr O'Connell was to be the leader and the chief."\(^b\)

In February 1834 the Repeal agitation was again denounced in the Speech from the Throne, and the Reform Ministry proposed an address

"to record in the most solemn manner the fixed determination of Parliament to maintain unimpaired and undisturbed the legislative union of the three realms".\(^c\)

But hardly had John Russell been cast up on the Opposition sandbanks when he declared:

"with respect to the *repeal of the union*, the subject was open to amendment or question, just as any other act of the Legislature".

that is no more and no less than any beer Bill.\(^d\)

In March 1846 John Russell brought down Peel's administration by means of a coalition with the Tories, who were burning with desire to punish their leader for his disloyalty over the Corn Laws. Peel's Irish "*Arms Bill*"\(^278\) served as a pretext, and Russell, full of moral outrage, lodged an unconditional protest against it. He becomes Prime Minister. His first act is to move the very same "Arms

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\(^{a}\) The *New-York Daily Tribune* has: "he could not conceive a more fatal measure than the disestablishment of the Church, and he declined to take any further notice of the project of 1835".—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 6, 1833.—*Ed.*

\(^{c}\) "Address in Answer to the King's Speech", House of Commons, February 4, 1834.—*Ed.*

\(^{d}\) The words "i.e. no more and no less than any beer Bill" do not occur in the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*
Bill”. However, he made a fool of himself to no avail. O'Connell had just been calling monster meetings against Peel's Bill, he had organised petitions with 50,000 signatures; he was in Dublin, whence he was manipulating all the springs of agitation. King Dan (the popular nickname of Daniel O'Connell) would have lost all if he had appeared to be Russell's accomplice at this juncture. He therefore served notice on the little man in threatening terms to withdraw his Arms Bill at once. Russell withdrew it. O'Connell, despite his secret dealings with the Whigs, then heaped humiliation on top of defeat, an art he has brought to perfection. So as to leave no doubt at whose behest the retreat had been sounded, he announced the withdrawal of the Arms Bill to the repealers in Conciliation Hall in Dublin on August 17, the same day John Russell announced it to the Commons. In 1844 Russell charged Sir Robert Peel with "having filled Ireland with troops, and with not governing but militarily occupying that country". In 1848 Russell occupied Ireland militarily, imposed the felony acts, proclaimed the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Acts and boasted of the "energetic measures" of Clarendon. This energy, too, was a false pretence. In Ireland there were on the one hand the O'Connellites and the priests, in secret agreement with the Whigs; on the other, Smith O'Brien and his supporters. The latter were simply dupes who took the repeal game seriously and thus came to a comical end. The "energetic measures" taken by the Russell government and the brutalities they committed were thus not called for by circumstances. Their object was not the maintenance of English supremacy in Ireland, but rather the prolongation of the Whig regime in England.

[V]

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 369, August 10, 1855]

London, August 6. The Corn Laws were introduced in England in 1815, the Tories and the Whigs having agreed to raise their

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a The following text up to the words “In 1844 Russell charged Sir Robert Peel...” does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English nickname and gives a German translation in brackets.—Ed.
c Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 13, 1844.—Ed.
d The rest of the paragraph does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
e Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
rent of land by means of a tax on the nation. This object was attained not only because the Corn Laws—laws against the import of corn from abroad—artificially raised the price of grain in some years. Taking the period 1815-1846 as a whole, what was perhaps even more important was the illusion of the tenant-farmers that the Corn Laws were able to maintain the price of corn at an a priori determined level in all circumstances. This illusion had an effect on leases. We find that in order to revive this illusion time and again, Parliament was constantly occupied with new, improved versions of the Corn Laws of 1815. If corn prices proved unruly, and fell despite the dictates of the Corn Laws, parliamentary committees were appointed to investigate the reasons for “agricultural distress”.\(^a\) In so far as it was the object of these parliamentary investigations, “agricultural distress” was in reality limited to the disproportion between the prices paid by the tenant to the landowner for his land and the prices at which he sold the products of his land to the public—the disproportion between rent of land and grain prices. The problem therefore could be solved by simply reducing rent, the landed aristocracy’s source of income. Instead of this, the latter naturally preferred to “reduce” corn prices by legislative means; one Corn Law was succeeded by another, slightly modified; failure was blamed on insignificant details which could be corrected by a new Act of Parliament. Though the price of corn was thus kept above the natural level under certain conditions, rent was kept above its natural level under all conditions. As this was a matter of the “holiest interests” of the landed aristocracy, of their cash income, both their factions, Tories and Whigs, were equally ready to revere the Corn Laws as a lodestar elevated above their party struggles. The Whigs even withstood the temptation of entertaining liberal “views” on this matter—especially as at that time there seemed little prospect of covering any losses on land tenure by winning back their hereditary tenure of government posts. In order to secure the vote of the finance aristocracy both factions voted for the Bank Act of 1819, whereby the interest on national debts contracted in depreciated money should be paid at full value. Having borrowed, say, £50, the nation had to repay £100. In this way the assent of the finance aristocracy to the Corn Laws was obtained. A fraudulent increase of the national interest rates in return for a fraudulent increase of rent—this was the gist of the agreement between finance

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\(^a\) Here and below Marx uses the English expression. In the first case he gives a German translation in brackets.—Ed.
aristocracy and landed aristocracy. It is not then surprising that Lord John Russell branded any Corn Law reform as mischievous, absurd, impracticable and unnecessary in the parliamentary elections of 1835 and 1837. From the start of his ministerial career he rejected every such proposal, at first politely, then passionately. In his defence of high corn duties he was a long way ahead of Sir Robert Peel. The prospect of famine in 1838 and 1839 did not succeed in shaking either him, or the other members of the Melbourne Cabinet. What the distress of the nation could not do, the distress of the Cabinet could. A deficit in the exchequer of £7,500,000 and Palmerston's foreign policy, which threatened to cause a war with France, led the House of Commons to pass a vote of no confidence in the Melbourne Cabinet proposed by Peel. This occurred on June 4, 1841. The Whigs, always as eager to chase posts as unable to fill them and reluctant to give them up, attempted in vain to sidestep fate by dissolving Parliament. Then there awoke in John Russell's profound soul the idea of conjuring away the Anti-Corn-Law agitation just as he had helped to conjure away the reform movement. So he suddenly advocated a "moderate fixed duty" instead of the sliding tariff—friend that he is of "moderate" political chastity and "moderate" reforms. He had the audacity to parade through the streets of London in a procession of government candidates accompanied by banner-bearers with two loaves impaled on their poles in blatant contrast to each other, one being a two-penny loaf with the inscription "Peel loaf", the other a shilling loaf inscribed "Russell loaf". The nation, however, refused to be misled this time. It knew from experience that the Whigs promised bread and paid out stones. Despite Russell's ridiculous carnival capers the general election left the Whigs with a minority of 76. They were at last forced to decamp. Russell avenged himself for the disservice which the moderate fixed duty of 1841 had done him by calmly letting Peel's "sliding scale" crystallise into law in 1842. He now despised the "moderate fixed duty"; he turned his back on it; he dropped it without expending a single word on it. 

a Instead of the preceding text of instalment [V] the New-York Daily Tribune has: "Let us now look at his Free-trade pretenses. The Corn Laws had been enacted in 1815, by the concurrence of Tories and Whigs."—Ed.
b Instead of the preceding two sentences the New-York Daily Tribune has: "During the prospect of dearth (1838-1839) he and Melbourne did not contemplate any alteration in the existing duties."—Ed.
c Russell's speech in the House of Commons on June 7, 1841.—Ed.
d The last two sentences do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
During the years 1841-45 the Anti-Corn-Law League grew to colossal dimensions. The old alliance between landed aristocracy and finance aristocracy could no longer safeguard the Corn Laws, for the industrial bourgeoisie had increasingly supplanted the finance aristocracy as the chief element of the middle class. For the industrial bourgeoisie, however, the abolition of the Corn Laws was a matter of survival. Repeal of the Corn Laws meant for the industrial bourgeoisie reduced production costs, expansion of foreign trade, increase in profits, a reduction of the main source of revenue, and hence of the power, of the landed aristocracy, and the enhancement of their own political power. In the autumn of 1845 they found fearsome allies in the potato blight in Ireland, the high corn prices in England and the failure of the harvest in most of Europe. Intimidated by the menacing economic outlook, Sir Robert Peel therefore held a series of Cabinet meetings at the end of October and the first weeks of November 1845 at which he proposed the suspension of the Corn Laws and even hinted at the necessity of a definitive repeal. There was a delay in the decisions of the Cabinet owing to the stubborn resistance of his colleague Stanley (now Lord Derby).

At that time, during the Parliamentary recess, John Russell was on holiday in Edinburgh, where he got wind of the proceedings in Peel’s Cabinet. He decided to exploit the delay caused by Stanley and forestall Peel in this popular position, giving himself the appearance of having forced Peel’s hand and thus robbing any prospective moves by him of their moral weight. Accordingly, on November 22, 1845 he addressed a letter from Edinburgh to his City voters full of angry and malicious references to Peel, on the pretext that the ministers were delaying too long coming to a decision about the emergency in Ireland. The periodical famines in Ireland in 1831, ’35, ’37 and ’39 had never been able to shake the faith of Russell and his colleagues in the Corn Laws. But now he was all fire. Even such an appalling disaster as the famine of two nations conjured up before the eyes of the little man nothing but visions of mousetraps for his rival “in office”. In his letter he

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a In the *New-York Daily Tribune* the preceding part of this paragraph is condensed as follows: “During the years 1841-45, the Anti-Corn-Law League became formidable. In the autumn of 1845, it found new and terrible allies in the famine in Ireland, the corn-dearth in England, and the failure of the harvest all over Europe.”—Ed.

b Instead of the words “the appearance of having forced Peel’s hand” the *New-York Daily Tribune* has: “the appearance of having forced Free trade upon Peel”.—Ed.
Karl Marx

tried to conceal the real motive for his sudden conversion to Free Trade with the following wretched confession:

"I confess that on the general subject my views have, in the course of twenty years, undergone a great alteration. I used to be of opinion that corn was an exception to the general rules of political economy; but observation and experience have convinced me that we ought to abstain from all interference with the supply of food." 

In the same letter he reproached Peel for not yet having interfered with the supply of food to Ireland. Peel caught the little man in his own trap. He resigned, leaving a note with the Queen pledging Russell his support should he undertake to carry out the abolition of the Corn Laws. The Queen summoned Russell and asked him to form a new Cabinet. He came, saw—and declared that he was unable to do so, even with the support of his rival. That was not what he had intended. For him it was merely a false pretence, and they were threatening to take him at his word! Peel stepped in again and repealed the Corn Laws. As a result of his act the Tory party collapsed and disintegrated. Russell allied himself with it in order to defeat Peel. So much for his claim to the title of "Free Trade Minister" of which he was still boasting in Parliament only a few days ago.

[VI]

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 377, August 15, 1855]

London, August 12. Let us return once again to Lord John Russell so as to conclude his character sketch. At the outset of his career he acquired a sort of reputation on the plea of his tolerance and at the end of his career on the plea of his bigotry, on the first occasion by his motion for the repeal of the "Test and Corporation Acts", on the second occasion by his "Ecclesiastical Titles Bill". The Test and Corporation Acts prevented dissenters from holding

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\textsuperscript{a}} "Lord John Russell to the Electors of the City of London. Edinburgh, Nov. 22", The Times, No. 19092, November 27, 1845.—Ed.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\textsuperscript{b}} The rest of this paragraph does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\textsuperscript{c}} Victoria.—Ed.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\textsuperscript{d}} This sentence does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{\textsuperscript{e}} Here and below Marx uses the English word "repeal" and gives the names of the acts in English or in a Germanised English form. He gives the German translation of the name of the second act in brackets.—Ed.}\]
civil service posts. They had long been a dead letter when Russell moved his famous repeal motion in 1827. He defended it on the ground that he was convinced that "the repeal will enhance the security of the Church of England". A contemporary writer informs us: "No one was more astonished that the motion was carried than the mover himself." The solution to the riddle is obvious if one notes that the Tory Ministry itself moved the Catholic Emancipation Bill the following year (1829), and hence must have been only too glad to get rid of the "Test and Corporation Acts" in the meantime. Apart from this the dissenters have never received anything from Lord John except promises whenever he was in opposition. While in office he even opposed the abolition of church rates.

His anti-Popery cry is, however, even more characteristic of the shallowness of the man and the pettiness of his motives. We have seen that in 1848 and 1849 he defeated the reform motions of his own allies by an alliance of the Whigs with the Peelites and Tories. Being so dependent on the conservative opposition his Ministry had grown very weak and shaky by 1850 when the Papal Bull establishing a Roman Catholic hierarchy in England and the appointment of Cardinal Wiseman Archbishop of Westminster provoked some surface agitation amongst the most hypocritical and fatuous sections of the English people. Russell, at any rate, was not caught unawares by the Pope's measures. His father-in-law, Lord Minto, was in Rome when the Roman Gazette announced the appointment of Wiseman in 1848. In fact, we know from Cardinal Wiseman's Letter to the English People that the Pope had informed Lord Minto of the Bull establishing the hierarchy in England as early as 1848. Russell himself took some preparatory steps by having the titles of the Catholic clergy in Ireland and the colonies officially recognised by Clarendon and Grey. But now, in view of the weakness of his Cabinet, perturbed by the historical recollection that the anti-Popery cry threw the Whigs out of the government in 1807, fearing that Stanley might imitate Perceval and forestall him, Russell, during the Parliamen-

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a Russell's speech in the House of Commons on June 7, 1827. The Neue Oder-Zeitung gives 1828 as the date of Russell's motion—probably a misprint.— *Ed.

b Marx gives the English term "church rates" in brackets after the German equivalent.— *Ed.

c Russell's attacks on Pius IX.— *Ed.

d *Gazzetta di Roma.*— *Ed.

e "Cardinal Wiseman's Manifesto", *The Times*, No. 20651, November 20, 1855.— *Ed.*
tary recess, as he had tried to forestall Sir Robert Peel over the repeal of the Corn Laws—pursued by all these forebodings and phantoms, the little man turned a complete somersault into an unrestrained Protestant frenzy. On November 4, 1850, he published the notorious “Letter to the Bishop of Durham”, in which he assured the Bishop:

“I agree with you in considering the late aggression of the Pope upon our Protestantism as insolent and insidious, and I therefore feel as indignant as you can do upon this subject.”

He speaks of “the laborious endeavours which are now making to confine the intellect and enslave the soul”. He calls the Catholic ceremonies “mummeries of superstition, upon which the great mass of the nation looks with contempt”, and he finally promises the Bishop to see to it that new laws are passed against the Papal usurpation should the old ones be inadequate. The same Lord John had declared in 1845, though then admittedly out of office:

“I believe that we may repeal those disallowing clauses which prevent a Roman Catholic Bishop from assuming a title held by a Bishop of the Established Church. Nothing can be more absurd and puerile than to keep such distinctions.”

In 1851 he presented his Ecclesiastical Titles Bill in order to maintain these “absurd and puerile” distinctions. But having been defeated during the year by a combination of the Irish Brigade with the Peelites, Manchester Men, etc.—on the occasion of Locke King’s motion for the extension of the suffrage—his Protestant zeal evaporated and he promised an alteration of the Bill, which in fact came into the world stillborn.

As his anti-Popery zeal was a false pretence, so was his Jewish Emancipation zeal. All the world knows that his Jewish Disabilities Bill is an annual farce—bait to catch the votes which the Austrian Baron Rothschild commands in the City. A false pretence, too, were his anti-slavery declarations.

“Your [...] opposition,” Lord Brougham writes to him, “to all the motions in favour of the Negroes, and your resistance even to the attempts for stopping the newly established slave trade, widened the breach between you and the country [...]. The fancy that you, the opposers of all the motions against the slave trade in 1838, the

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a The New-York Daily Tribune has: “just the day before the anniversary of Guy Fawkes” — Ed.
b Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on July 9, 1845.— Ed.
c This paragraph continues thus in the New-York Daily Tribune: “Some months later, being ejected from office, he fawned again on what he had called the Pope’s minions.” — Ed.
d Marx gives the name of the bill in English.— Ed.
enemies of every interference with the colonial Assemblies, which are composed of slave traders, should all of a sudden have become so enamoured of the Negro cause as almost to risk your tenure of place upon a bill for its furtherance in 1839, would argue a strange aptitude for being gulled [...]." 

False pretences, too, were his legal reforms. When Parliament passed a vote of no confidence on the Whig Cabinet in 1841, and with the imminent dissolution of the Commons boding little success, Russell attempted to rush a Chancery Bill through the House, in order to

"remedy one of the most urgent evils of our legal system, the delays in the Courts of Equity, by the creation of two new judges of equity" (judges whose guiding principle is not the letter of the law but equity, or fairness). 

Russell called this Bill of his "a large instalment of legal reform". His real intention was to smuggle two Whig sympathisers into the newly created posts, before the formation of a Tory Cabinet which was to be expected. Seeing through his game, Sir Edward Sugden (now Lord St. Leonards) moved an amendment that the Bill should not take effect until October 10 (that is after the opening of the newly elected Parliament). Although not the slightest alteration had been made to the content of the Bill, regarded by Russell as so "urgent", he immediately withdrew it after the passing of the amendment. It had become a "farce" and had lost its point. 

Colonial reforms, educational schemes, the "liberties of the subject", public press and public meetings, enthusiasm for war and yearning for peace—all of them were but false pretences for Lord John Russell. The whole man is one false pretence, his whole life a lie, all his activity a continuous chain of petty intrigues for the achievement of shabby ends—the devouring of public money and the usurpation of the mere semblance of power. No one has ever illustrated more strikingly the truth of the biblical words that no man can add one cubit unto his stature. Placed by birth, connections, and social accidents on a colossal pedestal, he always remained the same homunculus—a dwarf dancing on the tip of a pyramid. History has, perhaps, never exhibited any other man—so great in pettiness.

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a "Lord Brougham's Reply to Lord John Russell's Letter to the Electors of Stroud...", The Times, No. 17041, May 14, 1839.—Ed.
b Marx uses the English terms "Chancery Bill", "Courts of Equity", "judges of equity".—Ed.
c The words in brackets do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
d The last sentence does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
e Matthew, 6:27.—Ed.
It is a great mistake to judge of the movement in England by the reports in the London press. Take, for instance, the late Birmingham Conference. The majority of the London newspapers did not even notice it, while the remainder contained only the meager intelligence of its having taken place. Yet what was this Conference? It was a public Congress composed of delegates from Birmingham, London, Huddersfield, Newcastle, Halifax, Sheffield, Leeds, Derby, Bradford, Nottingham and other places, convened to take the task of discussing the most important subject of the day—the foreign policy of England—out of the hands of an incapable and collapsing Parliament.

The movement, undoubtedly, had been instigated by the meetings addressed by Mr. Urquhart throughout the factory districts, and the distinguishing feature of the Conference just held at Birmingham was the harmonious working together of men from the middle and the laboring classes. The Conference divided itself into various Committees charged to report on the most prominent questions of British foreign policy. I have been favored with a detailed account of the proceedings and the documents connected therewith, of which I proceed to place the most characteristic before the readers of the Tribune. The first is a correspondence between the Secretary of the Conference and Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Minister of Lord Derby, concerning the treaty on the Danish succession of May 8, 1852. Lord Malmesbury writes:

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a Instead of the preceding text the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “London, July 27. In contrast to the Administrative Reform Association, a State Reform Association has been set up in London. It has included Ernest Jones and several other Chartist
“Sir: I have had the honor of receiving your invitation to attend the Birmingham Conference on the 17th, 18th and 19th July. It will not be in my power to do so. As you request me to furnish you with any useful information on the subject of the proposed subjects of inquiry, I do not hesitate to observe that your resolution passed on July 6, respecting the Danish treaty of 8th May, 1852, is founded on a totally erroneous view of the cases and facts. It is not true that the succession to Denmark, the Sound and Schleswig-Holstein, is secured to Russia by that treaty. Russia has obtained no right, present or prospective, that she did not possess before the treaty. There are now four male heirs to the crown of Denmark alive. The treaty prescribes that if their extinction should become universal, the high contracting parties—namely, Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, France and Sweden—shall engage to take into consideration any further proposition made to them by the King of Denmark for securing the succession on the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Should this remote contingency occur, the contracting powers would therefore meet again to settle the Danish succession, and I leave you to judge whether the Five Powers who signed the treaty of 8th May with Russia are likely in such a case to determine that, as head of the house of Holstein-Gottorp, she should annex to her dominions the whole of the present Danish monarchy.

“I have the honor etc.  

Malmesbury.”

The following is the answer of the Secretary to Lord Malmesbury’s letter:

“My Lord: I am instructed by the Birmingham Conference to thank your lordship for your very important communication on the subject of the Danish Treaty. We gather from it that in the case of the expected failure of the four heirs leaders in its Committee. At a public meeting which it held the day before yesterday it declared its principal aim to be a reform of Parliament on the basis of universal suffrage.

“The Birmingham Conference closed its deliberations on July 23. It was attended by delegates from Huddersfield, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, London, Halifax, Sheffield, Leeds, Derby, Bradford, Nottingham and Birmingham, who convened in Birmingham to form a judgment on the foreign policy of the ruling class and its representatives in Cabinet and Parliament. As the Birmingham Daily Press notes, the Chartists had refrained from involvement in any organised movement for years, but not in this. They took part in it heart and soul because they felt that it pursued no interest hostile or alien to them, indeed no class interest at all.

“Urquhart’s presence in the factory districts undoubtedly gave the impulse to this remarkable conference, whose sitting he attended to the very end. As lack of time prevented us from making use of the invitation to attend the conference, we are now presenting in extracts some interesting documents from the printed report of the Conference, which has been sent to us. The venal London press suppresses or distorts the facts. The following correspondence took place between the Earl of Malmesbury and the Secretary of the Committee appointed by the Conference:”.—Ed.

a Frederick VII.—Ed.

b This and the following document are quoted from Birmingham Conference. Report of Committee on the Danish Treaty.—Ed.
to the United Monarchy of Denmark, England and Russia are pledged to interfere between the King of Denmark on the one hand, and the several States of Denmark, Schleswig and Holstein on the other. We are at a loss to know by what right such an interference can be justified, and we cannot but think the fact of war with Russia ought to be taken advantage of in order to enable us to abstain from so immoral and illegal action. You give us to understand that you think the character of the six Powers is a security against the admission of Russia to the whole succession in right, first, of Holstein-Gottorp, and secondly, of the principle of the integrity of the monarchy. We are most anxious to learn from your lordship who will come in for the whole if Russia does not, and, if England did not mean Russia to come in for the whole, why did she not make Russia’s renunciation of Holstein-Gottorp a condition of the treaty? As your lordship signed the treaty in question, it is to be presumed either that these questions are unanswerable, or that your lordship will be the person of all others, best able to give to them a satisfactory answer. I am, therefore, instructed to request that your lordship will be so kind as to answer these questions, and thus relieve us from a source of great uneasiness. I have the honor to be, etc.,

"Langford."

The correspondence stops here—Lord Malmesbury not having felt inclined to go on. His Lordship’s inability to answer those questions is, however, not without an excuse—the noble lord having found all points concerning the Danish Succession so well settled by Lord Palmerston’s Protocol of July 4, 1850, that the Treaty required indeed his mere signature.

The second document is the report of the committee appointed by the Conference, on the famous Four Points. I quote as follows:

“In endeavoring to ascertain the character of the Four Points as the basis of peace, your Committee have considered the development given to them by the Conference at Vienna, the amount of support or opposition that each proposal for such development has received from the respective Powers, the time and the manner in which the Points were first laid down by the Cabinets of England and France, the source from which they originally sprang, and their relevance to the avowed object of the War—viz., the Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. We find their source in the following proposition, laid down in the

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a The final text of this Protocol was signed on August 2, 1850.—Ed.

b Birmingham Conference. Report of Committee on the Proposed Bases of Pacification known as “The Four Points”. The quotations that follow are taken from that publication.—Ed.

c Instead of the last two paragraphs the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “The correspondence naturally stops here although his Lordship could have pointed out that his participation in this business was purely formal. Palmerston and Baron Brunnow had already signed the Protocol that laid down the clauses and principles of the future treaty.

"The Conference had formed various committees to inquire into and report on different matters. Most important of all is indisputably the Memoir of the Committee on the Four Points, from which we quote the most important passages:”.—Ed.
dispatch of Count Nesselrode, of June 29, 1854, and headed, 'Consolidation of the Rights of the Christians in Turkey': 'Setting out from the idea that the civil rights to be obtained for all the Christian subjects of the Porte are inseparable from religious rights, as is stipulated by the Protocol—and would in fact become valueless to our co-religionists if, in acquiring new rights, they should lose their old ones—we have already declared, that, if this were the case, the demands made by the Emperor of Russia on the Porte would be fulfilled, the cause of the dispute done away with, and his Majesty would be ready to give his concurrence to a European guaranty for this privilege.'

"This proposal, which is a proposal for the perpetual interference, not of one, but of five Powers, in the internal affairs of Turkey, was accepted on the part of England and France, in the shape of what is now known as the Fourth Point, couched in the following terms by Drouyn de Lhuys, in his dispatch of 22d of July, 1854, which was the reply to Count Nesselrode: 'That no Power shall claim the right to exercise any official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rights they may belong, but that France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, shall lend their mutual cooperation in order to obtain from the initiative of the Ottoman Government the consecration and observance of the religious privileges of the various Christian communities, and turn the generous intentions manifested by the Sultan to the account of their various co-religionists, so that there shall not result therefrom any infringement of the dignity and independence of his crown.'

"The effect of the Fourth Point is to destroy the independence of the Ottoman Empire, which it is the avowed object of the war to defend, but its illegality consists in the fact that this proposed surrender has been made by England and France without the consent of Turkey, and persisted in by them in spite of Turkey's refusal to discuss the point at the Conference of Vienna. To use the words of Sidney Herbert, 'the matter is complicated by the fact that we are agreed with our enemy but not with our ally.'

"Had we been beaten in war by Russia and compelled to sue for peace we could not legally have made such a proposal on the part of another Power. In order to remove this illegality it would be necessary first for England and France to go over openly to Russia and to declare war against Turkey. As the Fourth Point is the surrender of the independence of Turkey, so the First Point is the surrender of her integrity; and, as in the Fourth Point, that surrender is made without the consent of the party concerned; such consent to the development of the First Point having been expressly reserved by the Turkish Plenipotentiary.

"We find that the separation of Wallachia, Moldavia and Servia from Turkey is concealed under the statement that they are still to be subject to the Porte.[...] The phrase, 'no exclusive protection shall in future be exercised over those provinces,' is developed in five succeeding articles, which put the Five Powers in the same condition with the Porte as Joint Suzerain, and receives its finishing stroke from the proposal made by France and England at the sixth meeting of the Conference, that Wallachia and Moldavia should be united in a single State, under a hereditary Prince chosen from one of the reigning families of Europe. But the infamy of this surrender, alike of the avowed purposes of England, and of the rights of our ally—Turkey—is enhanced by the fact that it was made at a time when the armies of Russia were compelled to evacuate the Turkish territory, without the smallest assistance from the forces of England and France. As the surrender of the integrity

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\textsuperscript{a} Nicholas I.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Abdul Mejid.—\textit{Ed.}
and independence of the Ottoman Empire was thus made before the expedition to Sevastopol, it follows that this expedition must have been intended for the purpose of enforcing that surrender—enforcing it upon Turkey by exhausting her resources, enforcing it upon England by representing it as a triumph over Russia. We find this last view of the matter supported by Mr. Gladstone when he pointed out that Russia refused the Four Points before the expedition to Sevastopol, and accepted them afterward.[...]

"We cannot for a moment suppose that the English Cabinet was not aware that by substituting Austrian for Turkish soldiers in Wallachia and Moldavia they were setting free the Russian army to support Sevastopol, nor is the supposition that this was a concession to Austria, made for the purpose of obtaining her adherence to the Turkish cause, a tenable proposition in the face of the two facts that the nominal objects of our interference [...] were already on the one hand secured by the Turkish victories over the Russians, and on the other hand surrendered by the terms of peace already offered to Russia in the fourth and first points.a

"The second point was the free navigation of the Danube. The interruption of the navigation of the Danube dates from the cession by Turkey to Russia, at the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, of the delta of the Danube—a cession which was contrary to the Treaty of London of July 6, 1827, which bound Russia to acquire no Turkish territory.202 The acquiescence of England in this violation of public law was defended by her desire for peace—a pretense which is at all instances inconsistent with the existing state of war. The cession of the Danubian delta to Turkey was an indispensable demand in any real war of England against Russia. [...] It has, on the contrary, been made a means of injury to Austria. At the fourth meeting of the Vienna Conference, held March 21, 1855, Baron Prokesch, the Austrian Plenipotentiary, having proposed that Russia should admit the neutrality of the Danubian delta, the Russian Plenipotentiary b said 'that they would not consent to an arrangement which had the appearance of an indirect expropriation'. Lord J. Russell did not support the very moderate proposal of Austria, and the question was settled on the 23d of March in favor of the continued possession by Russia of the Danubian delta. [...]c

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a The passage beginning with the words "We find this last view" and ending with the words "in the fourth and first points" does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung. The rest of the German version of this article was published in the next issue of the Neue Oder-Zeitung on July 31, 1855. It was introduced by the following words: "With reference to the second point the Birmingham document goes on to say:".—Ed.

b A. M. Gorchakov.—Ed.

c In the Neue Oder-Zeitung there follows a passage from the same document which was omitted in the New-York Daily Tribune: "After fully conceding this point to Russia, Lord John writes on the 12th April to Lord Clarendon:—'Count Buol told us he had not pressed the neutrality of the islands at the mouth of the Danube, as he was sure if he had done so, the Russian Minister would have broken up the conference... On the 16th April, Lord John Russell telegraphed to Lord Clarendon that 'Austria will not support any demand for cession of territory;' and having first neglected to support Austria in the half measure of neutrality of the Delta, having then ascertained that she will not support the whole measure, namely, the cession of the Delta to Turkey, which had been put out of court by Lord John Russell's submission to Russia on the 23rd March, he then proposes to Lord Clarendon to demand 'The cession to Turkey of the islands at the mouth of the Danube surrendered by the treaty of Adrianople.'".—Ed.
"The Third Point is as follows: That the treaty of 1841\textsuperscript{293} shall be revised by the high contracting powers in the interest of the European equilibrium, and in the sense of a limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea.

"To give sincerity and reality to the Third Point, it is necessary to divide it into two, and then correct the false terms of the Second Point. These two Points should be: First, the limitation of the power of Russia; second, the restoration of the rights of Turkey in the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. Russia has not a natural preponderance in the Black Sea: she is not able to descend from Sevastopol and take possession of Constantinople and of Turkey; had she possessed this power she would have used it.[...] She must, therefore, have been withheld in the past, and can only continue to be withheld for the future by the impracticability of the undertaking. As a preparation for such an undertaking, she has robbed Turkey by treaty, not of her fair share of power in the Black Sea, but of the exclusive control of the Straits which command her capital in the Bosphorus, and which secure it at the Dardanelles. [...]\textsuperscript{2} For the restoration of the Sultan’s exclusive control of the Straits, no stipulation was necessary; it reverts to him on the abrogation by the fact of war of the treaties by which it has been temporarily placed in abeyance. This simple view of the case has, however, not even been suggested at the Conference of Vienna. If we read the dispatch of 14th June, 1853, of Lord Clarendon to the Austrian Government, we shall find the reason in the words: the just claims of Russia. If the claims of Russia were just, and if England intended to support them, England should have declared war against Turkey. [...]\textsuperscript{b}

"With regard to the limitation of the power of Russia, your Committee would direct attention to the following memorable words of the Austrian plenipotentiary, Count Buol, in his letter of 20th May, 1855: ‘In our opinion the joint efforts of the Allies should be directed to limiting the political power of Russia to such a point as to render the abuse of its material resources if not impossible, at least in the highest degree difficult. The diminution, nay, even the total destruction of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, would not of itself suffice to deprive Russia of the advantage which she derives from her geographical position with regard to Turkey.’

"Of all the delusions attempted by the English Government upon Parliament, the only one which has failed has been the proposal for limiting the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea.[...] Had the war been intended as announced—to protect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire—the terms of peace offered to Russia would have been: 1. Cession to Turkey of the Danubian Delta, which \textit{de jure} it still has; 2. indemnification by Russia of the expenses of the war. [...]\textsuperscript{b}

The Committee wind up their report as follows:

"Your committee find it impossible to reconcile these facts with the innocence of the British Cabinet.\textsuperscript{c} It would be a want of discernment to suppose that all the members of the Cabinet have been thoroughly cognizant of the nature of their conduct. One cannot however overlook the preeminence of the four Foreign Ministers, Lord Clarendon, Lord Aberdeen, Lord John Russell, and above all Lord Palmerston, whose aid in securing the recognition of the Treaty of Adrianople, the

\textsuperscript{a} The passage beginning with the words “Russia has not a natural preponderance” and ending with the words “secure it at the Dardanelles” does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The last two sentences do not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} This sentence does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}
payment to Russia, even in time of war, of the Russo-Dutch loan, the Treaty of Unkiair-Skelessi and of the Dardanelles, and the Treaty of Balta-Liman, and whose perfidy toward Poland, Hungary, Sicily and Italy, no less than his treachery toward France, Persia, Spain, and Denmark, point him out as the implacable enemy—not only of Turkey, but of every nation of Europe, the willing tool of Russia, and the master in the English Cabinet of those whom he has reduced to the condition of accomplices, and compelled previously to assist in the crimes which at first they wanted the intellect to detect, the honesty to resist, the courage to punish. In such punishment dealt out by the highest tribunal in the land, and with all the solemnities with which the ancient law and custom surrounded those impeached of high treason, your committee place their only hope of rescuing the people from the conspirators who have betrayed them to a foreign power."

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Frederick Engels

THE ARMIES OF EUROPE